







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
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HISTORY
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Printed by J. ADLARD, Duke-street, Smithfield.

HISTORY
OF
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Printed by J. Almon, Duke-street, Strand.

HISTORY
OF
GREAT BRITAIN,

FROM THE
REVOLUTION, 1688,
TO THE CONCLUSION OF
THE TREATY OF AMIENS, 1802.

—
BY WILLIAM BELSHAM.
—

IN TWELVE VOLUMES.

Ac mihi quidem videntur huc omnia esse referenda ab iis qui præsunt aliis :
ut ii qui eorum in imperio erunt, sint quam beatissimi. CICERO.

Beneficio quam metu obligare homines malit ; exterarumque gentes fide ac
societate junctas habere, quam tristi subjectas servitio. LIVY, lib. 26.

VOL. III.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR RICHARD PHILLIPS,
NO. 6, BRIDGE-STREET, BLACK-FRIARS.

1805.

HISTORY
OF
GREAT BRITAIN,

REVOLUTION, 1688,

TO THE CONCLUSION OF
THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, 1713.



IN TWELVE VOLUMES.

At the end of the first volume, there is a list of the names of the authors of the works which have been printed in the reign of King William the Third, and of the names of the printers of the same. This list is printed in the margin of the first volume, and is continued in the margin of the second volume. It is printed in the margin of the third volume, and is continued in the margin of the fourth volume. It is printed in the margin of the fifth volume, and is continued in the margin of the sixth volume. It is printed in the margin of the seventh volume, and is continued in the margin of the eighth volume. It is printed in the margin of the ninth volume, and is continued in the margin of the tenth volume. It is printed in the margin of the eleventh volume, and is continued in the margin of the twelfth volume.

Vol. III.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR RICHARD PHIPPS,
NO. 4, BRIDGE-STREET, BLACK-TRIALS.

1713.

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HISTORY OF GREAT BRITAIN.

GEORGE I.

BOOK VII.

State of Parties at the King's Accession. Total Change of Administration. Impolitic Violence of the Whigs. Impeachment of Bolingbroke, Oxford, Ormond, and Strafford. Death of the Earl of Halifax. Riots and Tumults throughout the Kingdom. Rebellion in Scotland—and in England. Character of the Pretender. Rebellion suppressed. Trials for High Treason. Septennial Act passed. Death of Louis XIV.—his character. Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain, France, and Holland. Cession of Bremen and Verden to Hanover. Dangerous Projects of Sweden. Parliament convened. Correspondence of Goertz and Gyllenburg. Cabals of the Earl of Sunderland. Secession of Walpole, &c. Sinking Fund established. Domestic Disturbances. Riot Act passed. Acquittal of Oxford. Act of Grace. Disputes with Russia. Death of Charles XII.—his Character. Debates in Parliament. Mr. Shippen committed to the Tower. Plot to assassinate the King. State of Affairs on the continent. Romantic Schemes of Cardinal Alberoni. Quadruple Alliance. Naval Victory off Messina, Sermon of Bishop Hoadley. Ineffectual Attempt to repeal the Test Laws. Peerage Bill. Abortive Project of Invasion. Sicily reduced. Vigo taken. Political Negotiations.

Peace with Sweden. Session of Parliament. Peerage Bill revived. Irish Declaratory Act. South-Sea Bill. Coalition of Parties. Memorial of Count Bestuchef. Affairs of Mecklenburg.

BOOK
VII.

1714.

GEORGE LOUIS, elector of Hanover, and head of the house of BRUNSWIC-LUNENBURG, derived his descent from the blood-royal of England, by his mother Sophia, daughter of Frederic, elector palatine and king of Bohemia; who married Elizabeth of England, only daughter of James I. It is evident, therefore, that the title of this prince was founded solely on the choice of the parliament, *i. e.* of the people or nation; and that the usual order of succession was entirely superseded. For, *admitting* the male line of the house of Stuart to have been extinguished in the person of James II., the right of blood rested in the house of Savoy, descended from Henrietta duchess of Orleans, daughter of Charles I. And the princess Sophia herself being the youngest daughter of the unfortunate palatine, more than fifty descendants of that prince prior in the order of succession were passed over in the act of William, which settled the crown of England on the house of Hanover. So that the rights of the people were not only asserted, but exercised in their full extent; and the family upon the throne is indisputably an *elected family*, though the general law or rule of succession remains unaltered.

An express instantly dispatched on the demise of the queen (August 1st) reached the earl of Clarendon, ambassador at Hanover, late in the evening of the 5th. Repairing immediately to the palace of Herenhausen, the earl entered the chamber of the elector two hours after midnight, and on his bended knee saluted him king of Great Britain. This joyful and interesting intelligence was received by the new monarch with decorous and dignified serenity. The marquis de Chateaufort, ambassador of France at the court of Herenhausen, in his audience of the king made use of this expression in speaking of the late treaties: "There are yet a few difficulties remaining; but your majesty shall be the arbiter of the peace." To which the king replied, "I will be the guarantee of it." Preparing for his departure from Hanover, the king intimated to the magistracy of the city his desire to confer upon his good subjects some distinguished mark of his royal affection and favor; and in conformity to their requisition a certain excise on provisions was abolished, and all insolvent debtors discharged. The monarch was, at the period of his accession, in the 55th year of his age, being born the day before the restoration of king Charles II. The uniform prudence with which this prince had conducted himself throughout the conflicts of the late reign, the general respectability of his cha-

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1714.

State of
Parties at
the king's
accession.

racter, and the auspicious circumstances which attended his elevation, seemed to augur calm and prosperous days. The embers of civil discord and animosity were extinguished however only in appearance; and the violent measures which the king was unhappily persuaded to adopt soon rekindled not only the torch of sedition but the flames of war. The kingdom might at this time be considered as divided with great nearness of equality into the two adverse factions of whigs and tories; the latter of which, from the egregious indiscretion of the whigs in the fatal business of Sacheverel, had recently acquired a great addition of strength and vigor. But it must not be imagined that all who were included in the appellation of tories, who detested the principles, civil and religious, maintained by the whigs, as destructive of the ancient constitution and orthodox faith, and who hated still more the persons of the whigs than their principles, as their perpetual and implacable rivals for power, distinction, and popularity, were therefore attached as a party to the exiled family. Doubtless a great majority of them would have been seriously alarmed at any attempt to restore the son of the late king James to the throne, at least while he remained a papist; and his notorious bigotry precluded almost every hope or expectation of his conversion to protestantism. Previous

to the æra of the revolution, the speculative line of discrimination between the two grand factions of the state, now gradually fading into obscurity, was clearly and strongly marked. The WHIGS maintained civil government to be an institution of human origin and appointment, consonant indeed to the divine will, as essential to the order and happiness of the moral and rational creation. The powers vested in the civil magistrate they regarded therefore as a delegation or trust from the people : and it was a necessary consequence of this doctrine, that the individuals entrusted with these powers were ultimately responsible to the people for the exercise of them, and liable to be degraded and punished for the abuse of them. They asserted that there were unalienable rights inherent in human nature, for the preservation of which, government was originally instituted ; amongst the chiefest and most important of which they accounted the right which every man possesses of worshipping God, not according to a degree of the state, but to the dictates of his own conscience. In other words, they maintained the principle of TOLERATION, not as a matter of favor, but of justice. And this principle was considered by them as violated, not only by laws professedly penal, but by any exclusion from the common rights and privileges of citizenship, founded not on any

BOOK VII.
1714. species of civil delinquency, but the mere unavoidable diversity of religious opinions. The TORIES, on the other hand, rejected these doctrines with vehement indignation and abhorrence, as subversive of the welfare, and even of the existence, of civil society. They asserted that government was expressly ordained of God, from whom alone princes derive their authority, and to whom alone they were responsible for their actions; that to resist the will of the sovereign, was in effect to resist the will of God; and that although, when the commands of the sovereign were directly opposed to the commands of God, an active obedience could not be lawfully yielded; yet even in these extreme cases it was the duty of the subject quietly to submit to all the consequences of his non-compliance: and that passive obedience and non-resistance were at all times and in all cases right and obligatory, where active obedience became either criminal or impracticable. They were far from denying that it was the duty of the prince to consult and provide for the welfare and happiness of the people, as the great end of his government; but for any neglect or contempt of this duty, there was, as they asserted, no lawful remedy but humble petition and remonstrance. That the people had rights, they admitted; but these rights were not to be defended by force. In the number of these rights,

however, they did not include the right of private judgment in religion. They conceived it to be the duty of individuals to acquiesce in that *formula* of doctrines, and to conform to that mode of worship, which the wisdom of the state had provided; that to oppose private to public opinion was in all cases presumptuous and unwarrantable; and in matters of religion more especially dangerous, and doubly culpable, as a contemptuous defiance of the united authority of church and state*. Subsequent to the revolution,

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* That this delineation of the principles by which the two great parties in the state were distinguished is accurate and just, may be demonstrated by an appeal to that perfect standard of toryism and high-churchism, the ever-memorable decree of the university of Oxford, passed in full convocation, July 21, 1683, and presented to the king (Charles II.) July 24. "The VICE CHANCELLOR, doctors, proctors, and masters, regent and not regent, met in convocation, decree, judge, and declare, to the honour of the holy and undivided Trinity, the preservation of the catholic truth in the church, and that the king's majesty may be secured from the machinations of treacherous heretics and schismatics, all and every of the following propositions (*cum multis aliis*) to be false, seditious, and impious, and destructive of all government in church and state.

* * * * *

"All civil government is derived originally from the people.

* * * * *

"That there is a mutual compact, tacit or express, between a prince and his subjects, and that if he perform not his duty they are discharged from theirs.

* * * * *

BOOK
VII.

1714.

however, in which great transaction the tories had taken a very laudable and decided part, they appear to have been much embarrassed to maintain the credit and consistency of their system. At the trial of Sacheverel, the duke of Leeds, so famous under his former title of earl of Danby, and who had himself given a noble specimen of his patriotism by signing the invitation to the prince of Orange, scrupled not to declare the revolution to be an event, however urgent the political necessity of it, utterly irre-

“ That if lawful governors become tyrants, or govern otherwise than by the laws of God and man they ought to do, they forfeit the right they had unto their government.

* * * * *

“ The sovereignty of England is in the three estates—viz. king, lords, and commons; the king having but a co-ordinate or sub-ordinate power.

* * * * *

“ Self-preservation is the fundamental law of nature, and supersedes all others whensoever they stand in competition with it.

* * * * *

“ There is no obligation upon Christians to passive obedience when the prince commands any thing contrary to the laws.

* * * * *

“ It is not lawful for superiors to impose any thing in the worship of God that is not antecedently necessary.

* * * * *

“ Wicked kings and tyrants ought to be put to death; and if the judges and inferior magistrates will not do their office, the power of the sword devolves to the people.”

concilable with any just principles of government; that those who examined it least therefore were its best friends; and that a veil ought to be thrown over that transaction, instead of quoting it as a precedent fit and proper for imitation. Many of this party satisfied themselves with the notion of an abdication on the part of the monarch, and asserted with Sacheverel himself, in defiance of facts, that the nation did not resist. The generality of the tories, however, including almost the whole body of the clergy, highly offended with the unexpected advancement of the prince of Orange to the throne, adopted the famous distinction of a king *de facto*, and a king *de jure*: and by yielding a passive obedience to the monarch in possession, they flattered themselves that they consulted their interest without abandoning their principle. After the death of the duke of Gloucester, the MARCELLUS of England, the national detestation of popery, which equally pervaded all parties, induced the tories to acquiesce in the parliamentary settlement of the crown on the house of Hanover, as the least of two great evils, without appearing very solicitous, after the lapse of so many years, to reconcile their practice with a theory the original uncontaminated dignity of which it was no longer possible for them to maintain. The whigs, on the contrary, had

BOOK VII. ever distinguished themselves by the ardor of
1714. their zeal for the Hanover succession. Nor
would the strength of their attachment to that
house have been shaken or impaired by any
recantations or protestations, however frequent
or solemn, on the part of the Pretender. Under
the banners of this party the dissenters of all
denominations ranged themselves with eager-
ness; and in a political view they might be con-
sidered as directly opposed to the Jacobites, who
regarded the sectaries with peculiar malignity,
and who, under the general denomination of
tories, sought for occasions of subverting the
present establishment, with anxiety as incessant
as the dissenters to fortify and secure it. Under
these circumstances, it is no wonder that the
king should entertain a strong predilection for
the whigs; and being educated in the principles
of Lutheranism, which bear a nearer analogy to
presbyterianism than to episcopacy, he regarded
the dissenters with favour, as men whose politi-
cal and religious opinions rendered them his
firmest and most unalterable friends; and it is
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being once alluded to in his presence, as a proof
of their implacable animosity to kings, he replied
with a pleasant indifference, "that he had no-
thing to fear, for that the king-killers were all
on his side." Convinced that no danger was to

be apprehended, on the death of the queen, BOOK
VII.
1714.
either from foreign or domestic enemies, he appeared in no haste to leave Herenhausen ; and it was not till the middle of September that he arrived in England, which exhibited every-where the appearance of satisfaction and tranquillity. The king of France, of whom alone any jealousy could be entertained, ordered, on the first intelligence of the demise of the queen, M. d'Ibberville, his envoy extraordinary at the court of London, to declare, in the most explicit language, his resolution to adhere to the terms of the late treaty, and his sincere desire to maintain the most perfect amity and good understanding with the new sovereign. The Pretender, who had repaired from Lorraine to Paris at this juncture, was refused an audience of his Most Christian Majesty, and received notice from M. Torcy to return without delay to his former residence at Bar-le-duc. Count Königseg, the Imperial ambassador, in addition to the usual congratulations, offered, in the name of the emperor his master, any number of troops that might be wanting at this crisis to support the authority of government.

In conformity to a wise and salutary act passed in the late reign for securing the protestant succession, the existing parliament was continued for six months, notwithstanding the demise of the

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BOOK VII.
1714. sovereign. And being assembled August 5, the lords of the regency, consisting of the seven great officers of state, and certain other persons previously nominated under the hand and seal of the elector, came to the house of peers; and the lord chancellor Harcourt made a speech in their name, exhorting to unanimity, and a firm adherence to his majesty's interest, as the only means of continuing the present happy tranquillity. Mr. secretary Bromley, moving the address of condolence and congratulation in the house of commons, insisted much on the loss sustained by the nation in the death of the late queen. But Mr. Onslow observed, that the stress of the address ought to be placed rather on the congratulation than the condolence; and the house, approving the suggestion, declared to his majesty, "that the duty they owed to his majesty and to their country obliged them to moderate their grief; that the princely virtues of his majesty gave them a certain prospect of future happiness in the security of the national religion, laws, and liberties; assuring his majesty that they would support his undoubted right to the imperial crown of this realm, against the Pretender, and all other persons whatsoever." The civil-list bill passed with perfect unanimity, clauses being added for the payment of the disputed arrears due to the troops of Hanover; and the sum of

100,000*l.* was voted by the house to any person BOOK
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1714. that should apprehend the Pretender, if he should land, or attempt to land, in any part of the kingdom. These are strong proofs of the eagerness of the tories at this crisis to share with their antagonists, the whigs, in the favourable regards of the new monarch. In the answer transmitted by the king, he declared, “that it would be the constant object of his endeavours to secure to them the full enjoyment of their religion, laws, and liberties, and to make them an happy and flourishing people.” The sum of 1,400,000*l.* being granted in the last session by way of lottery, both blanks and prizes bearing a certain interest, such was the state of public credit, that not more than one-twentieth part of the sum had been subscribed. The parliament now therefore voted an addition of one *per cent.* to the interest of the capital: and the lords of the regency and privy council went in a body to the bank, and subscribed individually large sums to the loan; which had so happy an effect, that in a few days the whole subscription was completely filled.

Previous to the departure of the king from Hanover, notwithstanding the present fair and flattering appearances, he had transmitted orders to the regency to remove lord Bolingbroke from his post of secretary of state, and to seal up the Change of
Adminis-
tration.

BOOK VII. doors of his office. This was ominous of the
1714. change of ministry, which took place immediately on his assumption of the regal power. And it was no less absolute and decisive than that which preceded it, A.D. 1710. The earl of Halifax was made first commissioner of the treasury, the king refusing to create a lord high treasurer; not choosing, as he said, that there should be any greater man in the kingdom than himself. Lord Townshend and general Stanhope were nominated secretaries of state, and to them was chiefly committed the direction of foreign affairs. The earl of Nottingham, the only tory admitted into the new administration, was declared president of the council, the former council being previously dissolved. Lord Cowper was re-instated in the high office of chancellor; the command of the army was restored to the duke of Marlborough; the privy-seal given to the earl of Wharton; and lord Sunderland appointed to the government of Ireland; the duke of Shrewsbury alone, of all the members of the late administration, being received with marks of favor, and he retained his office of lord chamberlain.

Hitherto no more was done than might have been with certainty expected; no more than the attachments and even the interests of the new government might reasonably perhaps be thought

to require. But it quickly appeared that measures of great severity, amounting to almost a general proscription of the tory party, were determined upon by the whigs, who were now in full and exclusive possession of the government; and whose power seemed established on a basis so firm, as might, if the spirit of equity and moderation had influenced their councils, have inclined them to a milder and more temperate system of policy. In the sermon preached at the coronation of the king, October 20, the bishop of Oxford inveighed strongly against the treaty of Utrecht, which this prelate most absurdly affirmed had raised the hopes of the Pretender to the highest pitch; asserting also that the peaceable accession of the king was owing merely to the *unexpected death* of the late queen, which had entirely disconcerted the schemes of his partisans, although it was notorious that this event for many months had been the subject of anxious and incessant apprehension*.

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Impolitic
Violence of
the Whigs.

* In a very few places only was the general joy interrupted by any appearance of disaffection. Sacheverel, the reigning idol of the tory faction, on the Sunday preceding the coronation of the king, preached at Sutton Coldfield near Birmingham. The effect of his inflammatory harangue was quickly visible. The loyalists meeting at a public tavern to celebrate the coronation-day, the rabble assembled in a tumultuous manner, broke the windows of the tavern, and compelled the company to disperse. The popular cry was,

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The parliament which assembled in March 1715, was composed almost entirely of whigs, who were well disposed to second the most vindictive measures which could be suggested by the administration: "for the ministers," says lord Bolingbroke, "whose true interest it must always be to calm the minds of men, were upon this occasion the tribunes of the people. The royal proclamation convoking this assembly contained in it the following indiscreet expressions; "It having pleased Almighty God, by most remarkable steps of his providence, to bring us safe to the crown of this kingdom, notwithstanding the designs of evil men, we do not doubt that our loving subjects will, in the ensuing elections, have particular regard to such as shewed a firmness to the protestant succession *When it was in danger.*" This was styled by sir William Wynd-

"The church and Sacheverel for ever—Down with the whigs!" If any one cried "God bless king George!" his life was in danger. Very late events have demonstrated that the lapse of eighty years has served only to increase the bigotry and brutality of a genuine high-church mob. The name of the king is indeed at present combined, in their "bawling and senseless moods," with that of the church. Certainly not because they are become converts to the principles of government, ecclesiastical or civil, avowed by the ancestors of the monarch, but because they presumptuously imagine that the monarch has himself become the patron of those principles which once formed the bond of attachment to the house of Stuart. (A.D. 1792).

ham, a member, conspicuous for his parliamentary talents no less than his zealous attachment to the tory interest, “an unprecedented and unwarrantable exertion of the prerogative, and of dangerous consequence to the very being of parliaments ;” for which, having refused to apologise, he was, by order of the house, reprimanded by the speaker, who intimated that it was owing to the extraordinary lenity of the house that he was not committed to the Tower. Sir William Wyndham, in reply, declared, “that he was neither conscious of offering any indignity to his majesty, nor of violating the privileges of that house ; and that he had therefore no thanks to give those gentlemen, who, under pretence of lenity, had brought this censure upon him.” This incident sufficiently indicated the temper of the house ; the attention of which was, however, quickly engaged by far greater objects, in consequence of official information from general Stanhope and Mr. Walpole (a man of distinguished ability, and who had in the late reign suffered severely for his attachment to the whig interest, under the recollection of which he yet smarted) that the papers found in the office of the late secretary lord Bolingbroke would afford ample ground for impeaching various of the members of the former administration, which they affirmed to be the most wicked and corrupt

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that had ever sat at the helm of affairs in this country. This nobleman, who had hitherto preserved the appearance of great serenity, attending and even taking a part, as usual, in the debates of the house of lords, now withdrew with great precipitation to the continent. In the beginning of April, general Stanhope laid before the house of commons all the papers relating to the negotiations of the late ministry with France, which were immediately referred to a select committee of twenty-one persons, whose candor and impartiality may be estimated by the tenor of their declarations during the course of this investigation. Mr. Boscawen spoke of “the insolence of a set of men, who, having committed the blackest crimes, had yet the assurance to dare the justice of the nation.” Mr. Walpole said, “that he had not words to express the villany of the last *frenchified ministry* ;” and Mr. secretary Stanhope expressed his wonder, “that men who were guilty of such enormous crimes had still the audaciousness to appear in public.” In June, Mr. Walpole, as chairman, made the report, in which the secret preliminaries signed with M. Mesnager, the suspension of arms, the seizure of Ghent and Bruges by the duke of Ormond, lord Bolingbroke’s journey to Paris, and separate conferences with the French ministry ; in a word, all the measures which preceded or facilitated the conclusion of the peace of

Utrecht, were stated as highly criminal. And Mr. Walpole, boldly asserting that to vindicate these measures was in a manner to share the guilt of them, terminated the report by impeaching Henry lord viscount Bolingbroke of HIGH TREASON: and lord Coningsby, immediately standing up, exclaimed, "The worthy chairman has impeached the hand, but I impeach the head—I impeach Robert earl of Oxford and earl Mortimer of high treason." On the 21st of June general Stanhope impeached the duke of Ormond of high treason; and the day following, Mr. Aislavie impeached the earl of Strafford of high crimes and misdemeanours. And such was the temper of the house, that these impeachments were for the most part carried without difficulty, and almost without a division. The governing party, however, thought it not advisable to institute any proceeding against the bishop of London, the co-adjutor of lord Strafford, and vested with equal powers as plenipotentiary at the congress of Utrecht. On the contrary, taught by recent experience the danger of attacking the CHURCH, it was said "that this good and pious prelate was joined in the commission only to palliate the iniquity of it under the sacredness of his character." The bishop himself, shrinking from the blast of political persecution, declared, "that he was kept wholly in

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ment of
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broke,

Oxford,

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the dark in all the negotiations relative to this transaction ;” and Mr. Hungerford pleasantly remarked, that he saw it was determined that the bishop, though in fact equally concerned with lord Strafford, should be allowed “ benefit of the clergy*.”

On a review of these proceedings, it is surely very hard to discover upon what constitutional grounds any of these impeachments could be voted, and much less how the charges contained in them could amount to the crime of high treason. The measures adopted by the late tory ministry were, it must be allowed, disgraceful to the reputation, incompatible with the engagements, and in some points injurious to the interests, of the kingdom. But as nothing was done without the sanction and concurrence of parliament, on what pretence of justice ministers could be punished for carrying into effect measures of state policy which had received either the previous or subsequent approbation of the legislature, it seems

* On a subsequent occasion, nevertheless, and when the storm had blown over, this prelate affirmed in debate, “ that the Utrecht treaty was just and honorable, and that he himself drew up the instructions of the embassy.” On which lord Coningsby reminded the bishop of his former plea of ignorance, and asked “ how his lordship could pretend to have been kept entirely in the dark as to this business?” to which no answer was made.

difficult or rather impossible to devise. To mislead or delude the parliament into a mistaken approbation of any specific measures of government, by defective or erroneous information, is indeed an high offence: but to execute measures approved by the legislature, in consequence of full and sufficient information, cannot be criminal in individuals holding offices of responsibility, because it is their duty to conform to the public will; and to the legislature itself it would be solecism and absurdity to impute criminality. Of the impeachment of the duke of Ormond in particular, a nobleman of unblemished integrity, of honor without a stain, equally distinguished by courtesy and courage, no less the ornament of his country than its defence, the injustice appears gross and manifest. Of all the charges adduced against the late ministry, the suspension of arms, which was productive of consequences so disastrous and fatal, was one of the most, or rather was incomparably the most serious, and of the greatest magnitude. But it cannot be pretended that the duke of Ormond could, or ought, to exercise any discretion in this case: his orders were peremptory and positive. And for any military commander to assume, under such circumstances, a dispensing power, and to presume to act in open contradiction to the authority from which he derives his commission, would indeed call for

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and justify a parliamentary impeachment. The duke, seeing the spirit of faction and revenge so strongly predominate in the proceedings against him, followed lord Bolingbroke to the continent; and both these noblemen, irritated by persecution, and destitute of resource, entered into the service of the court at St. Germaine's, now removed to Commerci in Lorraine, which received by this means a dangerous addition of talents and strength. On his arrival in France lord Bolingbroke apologised in a letter to his friend lord Lansdowne for his sudden and abrupt departure: "You will," said he, "excuse me when you know that I had certain and repeated information, from some who are in the secret of affairs, that a resolution was taken by those who have power to execute it, to pursue me to the scaffold. Had there been the least reason to hope for a fair and open trial, after having been already prejudged unheard by two houses of parliament, I should not have declined the strictest examination. I challenge the most inveterate of my enemies to produce one instance of a criminal correspondence, or the least corruption of any part of the administration in which I was concerned." Though lord Bolingbroke suffered himself to be engaged by earnest solicitation in the service of the Pretender; and even accepted the seals as secretary of state to that shadow of a king, while,

as he expresses it, “the smart of a bill of attainder tingled in every vein;” on perceiving the hopeless condition of his affairs, and the weakness and distraction of his counsels, he willingly received in about six months his dismissal from this unenviable pre-eminence. It is a curious circumstance, that, on leaving the Pretender’s service, this nobleman had articles of impeachment formally exhibited against him, branched out into the several heads of treachery, incapacity, and negligence: to which he made an elaborate reply, expressing at the close of it his obligation to the Pretender “for cutting by this means that Gordian knot asunder by which he had conceived himself for ever bound to his interests, and which would have effectually precluded every idea of making his peace at home,”—an event which from this time became the object of his incessant intrigues and solicitations. “One must,” says the duke of Berwick in his Memoirs, “be entirely deprived of common sense not to see that the *king* committed an enormous fault in dismissing the only Englishman capable of conducting his affairs. I owe him the justice to declare, that he omitted nothing that was in his power to do. He moved heaven and earth to obtain succours, but the court of France did nothing but amuse him.”

The duke of Ormond, who was much more in earnest in his attachment to the exiled family, and

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who disdained to court a reconciliation with that country by which he considered himself as treated with the highest injustice and ingratitude, retained, during the remainder of his life, his station in the Pretender's court, around the cheerless and contracted circle of which he alone reflected some scattered rays of lustre. Previous to his departure from London, he visited, for the last time, the earl of Oxford, who dissuaded him from flying with as much earnestness as he entreated Oxford to make his escape. He at length parted from the earl with these words: "Farewell, Oxford without a head!" To which Oxford replied, "Farewell, duke without a duchy!"—That the king had originally no intention of proceeding to these fatal extremities might, in defect of other proofs, be collected from the mode of Ormond's dismissal: for, on the day succeeding his landing at Greenwich, a message was delivered to the duke by lord Townshend, "that his majesty had no farther occasion for his services as captain-general, but would be glad to see him at court." This nobleman was also nominated of the privy council. The impeachment of Ormond was distinguished from the rest by the closeness of the division, being carried, in a house of 425 members, by a majority of forty-seven voices only.

The earl of Oxford, conscious of the steadiness of his attachment to the house of Hanover, of the

king's real obligation to him, and the knowledge of that obligation, determined to abide the fury of this political tempest; and the impeachment preferred by the commons being followed by a motion in the house of peers for his commitment, he rose to speak in his defence, observing, "that the whole charge might be reduced to the negotiation and conclusion of the peace. That the nation wanted a peace (he said) no one would deny; and he averred, that the conditions upon which it was made were as good as the obstinate and perverse reluctance of the allies to concur in the queen's measures would admit;—that it had been approved by two successive parliaments; that he had acted by the express commands of his sovereign, without offending against any known law; and, being justified in his conscience, was unconcerned for the life of an insignificant old man." The earl was attended to the Tower by a prodigious concourse of people, shouting "High church Ormond and Oxford for ever*!"

* At lord Oxford's magnificent mansion of Wimpole is, or at least *was* to be seen, a portrait of that hobleman in his robes of office, as speaker of the house of commons, holding in his hands the famous bill, afterwards passed into an act, known by the appellation of the Act of Settlement; of which he was in that capacity an active and zealous promoter. The celebrated Prior, being shown this portrait, wrote upon the blank part of the scroll—"This bill paid in full, June 1715,"—that being the date of the warrant for the earl's commitment to the Tower.

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And the riots and tumults which ensued in various parts of the kingdom, fully justified and verified the expression of the earl of Anglesea in the debate of this day, “that it was to be feared such violent measures would make the sceptre shake in the king’s hands;” for which the house, in its wisdom, insisted upon his making an apology.

When the articles of impeachment were exhibited against the earl of Strafford, that nobleman complained of the arbitrary and illegal seizure of his papers; and desired a competent time to prepare for his defence—requiring for this purpose duplicates both of such as had been laid before the committee of secrecy and of those remaining in the hands of government. This request, to the disgrace of the ruling party, was vehemently opposed until the earl of Ilay represented, “that in all civilized nations, all courts of judicature, *the Inquisition excepted*, allowed the persons arraigned all that was necessary to their justification; and that the house of peers of Great Britain would not, he was persuaded, in a case of this nature, do any thing contrary to that honor and equity for which they were so justly renowned throughout Europe.” The house, thus suddenly and powerfully awakened to a sense of its own dignity, resolved that the earl should be allowed copies of such papers as he might have occasion to use in his defence. Bills of attainder,

in default of personal appearance, passed against the duke of Ormond and lord viscount Bolingbroke. Their names and armorial bearings were erased from the rolls of the peerage by order of the house; and the duke's achievement as knight of the garter taken down from St. George's chape at Windsor.

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From the address of the speaker to the king at the close of the session, which was protracted to the end of the summer, it does not appear that the anger of the house had suffered any abatement.—“Your commons,” said the speaker, (sir Spencer Compton) “could not see, without the utmost indignation, the glories of her late majesty's reign tarnished by a treacherous cessation of arms; the faith of treaties violated; that ancient probity, for which the English nation had been justly renowned throughout all ages, exposed to scorn and contempt. Such was the condition of the kingdom when it pleased the divine Providence to call your majesty to the throne of your ancestors, under whose auspicious reign your commons behold with pleasure the glory of the Plantagenets, your majesty's royal ancestors, revive, and have an unbounded prospect of the continuance of this happiness to the latest posterity.”

The earl of Halifax had from the first coldly and reluctantly acquiesced in the system of that administration of which he was by the nation

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looked up to as the head; and he was upon this account regarded by the zealots of whiggism as deficient in vigor and spirit, if not secretly attached to the tories*.” This nobleman, justly esteemed for the general liberality of his principles and conduct, was greatly disgusted at the unexpected ascendancy acquired by lord Townshend, whose talents and services were incontrovertibly much inferior to his own; and the disapprobation which he openly expressed of these violent proceedings, though perfectly consonant to his general character of wisdom and moderation, was liable to the suspicion of its being in some degree personal. An universal expectation of his resignation prevailed, when he was suddenly seized with the stroke of death, expiring after a few days illness in the vigor of his age, May 19th, 1715. Though the abilities of the earl of Halifax as a statesman and financier were unquestionably great, he is perhaps still more known to posterity as a most munificent patron of literature; maintaining in this respect an illustrious rivalry with the earl of Oxford, the head of the opposite state faction; and in the space of more than eighty intervening years these noblemen have had in this view—it is not enough to say no equals, but no successors. When on the great

* Tindal.

and memorable change of administration, A.D. 1710, the earl of Halifax interceded with the earl of Oxford in favour of the English Menander Congreve, who, through the patronage of Halifax, enjoyed a lucrative place under the government, Oxford with great dignity and elegance replied:

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“ Non obtusa adeo gestamus pectora Pœni,
Nec tam aversus equos Tyriâ sol jungit ab urbe.”

It is pleasing to be able thus occasionally to strew the thorny paths of history with the flowers of Parnassus. Happy would it be for mankind, if the destroyers of countries, possessed by the demon of ambition, could be persuaded to direct some part of their attention to these guiltless gratifications, and learn, at length, to weave the garland of repose* ! The earl of Halifax was suc-

* A very invidious caricature portrait of the earl of Halifax is to be found in the Satires of POPE, under the appellation of Bufo.

“ Proud as Apollo on his forked hill,
Sat full blown Bufo, puffed by every quill;
Fed with soft dedication all day long,
Horace and he went hand and hand in song:
His library, where busts of poets dead,
And a true Pindar stood without a head,
Receiv'd of wits an undistinguished race,
Who first his judgment asked and then a place.
Dryden alone—what wonder ! came not nigh;
Dryden alone escap'd this judging eye;
But still the great have kindness in reserve;
They help'd to bury whom they help'd to starve.”

Pope

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Rebellion  
in Scot-  
land,

ceeded as first commissioner of the treasury by Mr. Walpole.

A very great part of the nation being much inflamed with the late extraordinary proceedings, the partisans of the Pretender were incited to exert themselves with redoubled vigor and activity; and it was determined at one and the same time to take up arms in both kingdoms against the government. In the month of September, 1715, the earl of Mar set up the standard of rebellion, and proclaimed the Pretender, under the style and title of King James III. at Castletown in

Pope has elsewhere taken pains to impress the idea, that this nobleman was a mere sciolist in literature; and having matters of much more importance than poetry to engage his attention, it may easily be supposed that his criticisms were often hasty and superficial. The poetical remains of lord Halifax are valuable, chiefly as affording a proof of his early and devoted attachment to the Muses. They contain, however, some beautiful passages—one of which, well deserving to be rescued from oblivion, occurs in his epistle to the earl of Dorset on the victory gained by king William on the banks of the Boyne, in which that monarch received a slight contusion from a musquet ball which grazed on his shoulder.

“ O, if in France this hero had been born,  
What glittering tinsel would his acts adorn!  
Their plays, their songs, would dwell upon his wound,  
And operas repeat no other sound;  
Boyne would for ages be the painter's theme,  
The Gobelin's labour, and the poet's dream:  
The wounded arm would furnish all their rooms,  
And BLEED for ever SCARLET in their looms.”



Scotland, and soon collected an army of 10,000 men. The vigilance of the government in a great measure rendered abortive the designs concerted by the adherents of the house of Stuart on the south of the Tweed. The habeas-corpus act being suspended, several noblemen were committed to the Tower, amongst whom were lord Lansdowne and the earl of Jersey, who had engaged to join the duke of Ormond on his intended landing in the west. By previous consent of the lower house of parliament, sir William Wyndham, Mr. Harvey, and various other members of that house, were seized, and committed to close custody; the bail of the duke of Somerset, father-in-law to sir William Wyndham, being peremptorily refused, and the duke himself, for some indiscreet expressions of resentment, removed from his place of master of the horse.

Notwithstanding, however, these spirited and resolute measures of prevention, the earl of Derwentwater and Mr. Foster appeared at the head of a considerable armed force in Northumberland, hoping to surprise the town of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, where they expected to find ample supplies of arms and stores, and to be joined by very many of the lower order of inhabitants: but the well-affected, both of the church and dissenters, formed themselves into a town-guard of 700 men, and another corps of 700 keelmen, mostly dissenters, were also embodied for

and Eng-  
land.



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the defence of the place ; so that this design, the success of which would have rendered them very formidable, proved wholly abortive\*. Thus disappointed, they suddenly altered their route, and advanced northward to Kelso, where they were joined by a body of highlanders ; and again entering England by the western border, proclaimed the Pretender at Warkworth, Penrith, Lancaster, and other places, in their progress to the southward. On their arrival at Preston, November 12, they were attacked by the king's forces under the generals Willes and Carpenter, who, investing the town on all sides, compelled them to surrender at discretion. And the very same day a bloody battle was fought, between the earl of Mar and the duke of Argyle, at Sheriff-moor, near Dumblaine in Scotland. The duke, apprised of the intention of the earl of Mar to cross the Forth, in order to join the insurgents in the Lowlands, hastened to secure the passes of that river, which he himself crossed at Stirling, and immediately took possession, with a force not exceeding 4000 men, of the heights of Dumblaine. The earl of Mar now advanced to the attack ; the clans of Clanronald and Glengary marching in the van. Clanronald, who led in person the right wing, was killed at the first onset, which occasioned a sudden pause ; but Glengary, who

\* Tindal.



succeeded to the command, stepping forward, BOOK  
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1715. waved his bonnet, and cried three or four times aloud, "REVENGE!" On this the men rushed down upon the royalists, sword in hand, with such determined and irresistible impetuosity, that the left wing of the king's army was in a short time entirely broken; and general Whetham, who commanded it, carried the news of his own defeat with incredible expedition to Stirling—declaring the ruin of the whole army to be inevitable. In the mean time, the duke of Argyle, who commanded the right wing in person, charged the enemy with the most heroic ardor, and drove them before him, about two miles, as far as the Loch of Allen, though they repeatedly attempted to rally. On his return from this pursuit, he was unexpectedly confronted by the victorious rebels on their return from the pursuit of Whetham; and each army found itself possessed of the station occupied in the early part of the engagement, by the adversary. In this posture they remained till evening, when the rebels returned to Ardoch, and the duke to Dumblaine; and next day, marching back to the field of battle, he carried off the wounded, and several pieces of cannon left by the enemy. Though the engagement was thus indecisive, all the honor as well as advantage of the fight rested with the duke of Argyle, who,



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 1715. with a force so inferior, had entirely disconcerted the schemes of his antagonist by the most intrepid personal exertions. Various successes were obtained also by the royalists in the northern parts of Scotland, where the loss of Inverness was very severely felt by the rebels; and Argyle being now joined by large reinforcements, it was with difficulty Mar kept the field till the arrival of the Pretender in person, who landed at Peterhead December 26th, and immediately issued various proclamations: one of which was for summoning a convention of the estates; a second ordering all fencible men to repair to his standard; and a third fixing a day for his coronation. He cherished, however, no sanguine hope of success: "For me," said he in a speech addressed to his friends convened in council, "it will be no new thing if I am unfortunate: my whole life, even from my cradle, has shown a constant series of misfortunes; and I am prepared, if so it please God, to suffer the threats of my enemies and yours." In a very short time the folly and rashness of the enterprise became so apparent, that, on receiving intelligence of the approach of the duke of Argyle, he resolved to embark on board a French ship lying in the harbour of Montrose, February 4, 1716, accompanied by the earls of Mar and Melfort, which, stretching over to Norway, in order to



avoid pursuit, and coasting along the shores of Germany and Holland, arrived in five days at Gravelines. The rebel army, retiring northward, quietly dispersed without making any farther effort, or receiving the slightest molestation.

The extreme misconduct and want of capacity apparent in the whole of this enterprise was decisive of the personal disposition and character of the claimant of the British crown; and the impolitic violence which had hitherto predominated in the counsels of the new monarch was happily compensated by the wretched imbecility of his rival. "Should the Pretender ever be restored, it was easy," lord Bolingbroke tells us, "to see that the court of St. James's would be constituted in the same manner as that of St. Germaine's." On being presented with the draught of a declaration to be dispersed in England, he took exception against several passages, and particularly those by which a direct promise of securing the churches of England and Scotland was made. "He was *told*," he said, "that he could not, in conscience, make such a promise;" and, on being farther urged to compliance, asked with warmth, "why the tories were so desirous to have him, if they expected those things from him which his religion did not allow?" And after consulting his confidants and casuists, the papers were at length printed, with amendments



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1715. which exhibited the extreme of jesuitical prevari-  
cation, insomuch that lord Bolingbroke abso-

Character  
of the Pre-  
tender.

lutely refused to countersign them. Intoxicated with superstition and enthusiastic zeal, all efforts were quickly perceived to be lost on a man whose obstinacy and prejudice were fortified by the native narrowness of his understanding. “His religion,” says the nobleman just mentioned, “is not founded on the love of virtue, and the detestation of vice, on a sense of that obedience which is due to the will of the Supreme Being, or of those obligations which creatures formed to live in a mutual dependence on one another lie under. The spring of his whole conduct is *fear*; he has all the superstition of a capuchin, but I found in him no tincture of the religion of a prince; and I conversed with very few among the Roman-catholics themselves, who did not think him too much a papist.”

The earl of Mar, on his arrival at Paris, published a narrative of his expedition into Scotland, containing many curious particulars. He declares “that, a month before the chevalier landed, the resolution was taken of abandoning Perth, in consequence of the total failure of their expectations. Instead of the wild incursion into England, he had imagined that Mr. Forster would have co-operated with him in the south of Scotland; and had actually detached 1500 men across



the Forth to join him. The vigilance of the government had prevented any insurrection in the west, where the duke of Ormond, after actually landing incognito, was immediately compelled to retreat. They were wholly disappointed in their expected supplies of men and ammunition from France. The duke of Berwick positively refused to repair to Scotland to take the chief command; and it is plainly intimated that the conduct of lord Bolingbroke, at this time entrusted by the chevalier with the principal management of his affairs, was in the highest degree insidious." Certain it is, that the chevalier had too little sense or sagacity to avail himself of the talents, or derive advantage from the counsels, of lord Bolingbroke; and that lord Bolingbroke had too much pride, and too little either of zeal or of hope, to take any pains to accommodate his conduct to existing circumstances. The court of St. Germaine's could never be brought to adopt his plans; and the behaviour of Bolingbroke, equally negligent and insolent, rendered him only an incumbrance upon theirs. In the endless diversities of the human understanding, there are minds which seem not only incapable of reflecting but of receiving light; and of this opaque and impenetrable class, fortunately for the British nation,

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BOOK must be ranked that of the Pretender at this  
 VII. critical period to the British throne.

1715. Although the rebellion in both kingdoms was  
 Rebellion suppressed. thus happily and speedily suppressed, the clemency of the king did not appear so conspicuous as might have been wished and reasonably expected. The lords Derwentwater, Nithisdale, and Nairne, with divers other noblemen, being tried in Westminster-hall, received sentence of death, earl Cowper presiding as lord high steward. Earnest intercession was made for the condemned lords; and the countesses of Derwentwater and Nithisdale, and lady Nairne, threw themselves at the king's feet, and with affecting and urgent supplications implored his mercy; but no mitigation of the sentence could be obtained. In consequence of divers petitions presented to the house of Peers, a motion was made, and carried by a majority of five voices, "that the house should address the throne to reprieve such of the condemned lords as should deserve his majesty's mercy." But to this address the king haughtily and unadvisedly answered, "that on this and all other occasions he would do what he thought most consistent with the dignity of the crown and the safety of his people." And the earl of Nottingham, who had powerfully supported the motion, so far incurred the displeasure

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 High Treason.



of the court, that he was within a few days removed from his office of president of the council, to which the duke of Devonshire succeeded; and his brother the earl of Aylesford from the chancellorship of the duchy of Lancaster. In the last declaration of the earl of Derwentwater, a young nobleman whose virtues and accomplishments made him the object of general regard and compassion, he apologised for suffering himself to be persuaded, though with difficulty, to the disingenuous expedient of pleading *guilty* upon his trial, in the flattering hope of obtaining a pardon, knowing that his intentions were ever strictly honorable and disinterested—though, had the prince who governed granted him life, he professed that he should have thought himself under an obligation never more to have taken up arms against him. Very many of the lower classes of the people also fell a sacrifice to the fatal delusion of those mistaken principles which led them to engage in this revolt\*, which might, in all human probabi-

\* One Paul, a clergyman, and vicar of Orton-upon-the-Hill, in the county of Leicester, was tried and convicted, A.D. 1715, of high-treason, he having joined the rebels at Preston in Lancashire, and suffered, with the most undaunted resolution, the utmost rigor of the law. On the Sunday previous to his departure he preached a sermon at his own parish church, from Ezek. xxi. 26, 27. "Thus saith the Lord God: Remove the diadem, and take off the crown. Exalt him that is low, and abase him that is high. I will



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lity, have been easily prevented by the adoption of a more equitable and generous policy. “ Certain it is,” says lord Bolingbroke, “ if milder measures have been pursued, that the tories would never have universally embraced Jacobitism ; the violence of the whigs forced them into the arms of the Pretender, and dyed the royal ermines in blood.” The king was notwithstanding of a disposition by no means harsh or implacable : on the contrary, it was with overturn, overturn, overturn, and it shall be no more, until he come whose right it is, and I will give it unto him.”—*Vide* Rev. Mr. MACAULAY’S *History of the Parish of Claybroke*.

Many of the best friends of government at this period, with the best opportunities of judging, lamented the violence of its proceedings, and the unhappy consequences of its errors. “ Was it not a mistake,” said Mr. Smith, late chancellor of the exchequer in the reign of king William and queen Anne, speaking in the house of commons, in reply to an oratorical representation of the unerring wisdom of government (April 1717), “ not to preserve the peace at home after the king was come to the throne with the universal applause and joyful acclamation of all his subjects ? Was it not a mistake. upon the breaking out of the rebellion, not to issue a proclamation to offer pardon to such as should return home peaceable, as had ever been practised before upon such occasions ? Was it not a mistake, after the suppression of the rebellion and the trial and execution of the principal authors of it, to keep up animosities, and drive people to despair, by not passing an act of indemnity and grace, by keeping so many persons under hard and tedious confinement, and by granting pardons to some without leaving them any means to subsist ?”



extreme hesitation and reluctance that he con-  
curred in the measures which he was assured  
were necessary to his safety. And we are told,  
that when lord Somers, who in a state of great  
corporeal infirmity still retained his wonted  
powers of mind, was informed by lord Towns-  
hend, with much exultation, that the king had  
at length consented to all that was required of  
him, this aged and venerable patriot asked him  
with great emotion, and shedding many tears,  
whether they meant to revive the proscriptions  
of Marius and Sylla\*. Such indeed was the

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\* "All the traditional accounts of this nobleman," says Mr. Walpole (late lord Orford), who has delineated his character with great felicity, "the historians of the last age, and its best authors, represent him as the most incorrupt lawyer and the honestest statesman; as a master-orator, a genius of the finest taste, and as a patriot of the noblest and most extensive views; as a man who dispensed blessings by his life, and planned them for posterity. Mr. Addison, who has drawn a labored, but diffuse and feeble character, of him in the *Freeholder*, tells us that he gained great esteem with queen Anne, who had conceived many unreasonable prejudices against him. Mr. Addison might as well have said that the queen had at first disbelieved, and was afterwards converted to Sir Isaac Newton's system of comets. Her majesty was full as good a judge of astronomy as of lord Somers's merits. The momentous times in which he lived gave lord Somers opportunities of displaying the extent of his capacity, and the patriotism of his heart. The excellent balance of our constitution never appeared in a clearer light than with relation to this lord, who, though impeached by a misguided house of commons, with all the intemperate folly that at



BOOK VII. prevailing aversion of the tories to take refuge in Jacobitism, that lord Guernsey, one of the most  
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times disgraced the free states of Greece, yet had full liberty to vindicate his innocence, and manifest an integrity which could never have shone so bright unless it had been juridically aspersed. In this country happily the factious and the envious have not a power of condemning by a shell which many of them cannot sign." To these observations it may be permitted to add, that when we reflect on the firm and undaunted stand made by the house of lords on this and other interesting occasions against the democratic fury of the commons, we shall not be forward to applaud the wisdom of those by whom that house was once voted, or of those who are now ready to pronounce it, useless. That there should exist one sovereign will only in a state, is certain; but the legislative body in which this will resides may, by a just and wise organization, contain within itself a principle of vigorous collision and control. But we have lately heard much from certain presumptuous speculatists on the science of government, of the ridiculous folly and absurdity of permitting under a free constitution, any portion of hereditary authority—or, to adopt their own phraseology, "hereditary nonsense," to exist, however limited or modified:—though it is remarkable, that, previous to these recent discoveries in politics, wisdom was ever accounted the grand characteristic feature of aristocracy, as power of monarchy, and public spirit of democracy. And of the justice of this political axiom, not to appeal to ancient times, the celebrated republics of Venice and Berne remained for centuries striking and obvious examples. Nor are the reasons—the permanent causes of this permanent effect—difficult to develop: but at present, in politics, as at no very distant period in philosophy, a pretended *common sense*, made up of audacity of assertion, and insolence of abuse, is to supersede all inductions of reason, knowledge, and experience. The harshness



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popular leaders of the party, on the motion for addressing the king at the first breaking out of the rebellion, said, "that it was well known he had on several occasions differed from the majority of that house ; but being now convinced that our liberty, religion, and all that is dear to Englishmen, were aimed at, he would (laying his hand on his sword) rather die with his sword in his hand, than survive the Pretender's coming in, though he were to enjoy the greatest honours and preferments under him."

The ministry, perceiving and probably resenting the general discontent and disaffection of the people to a government which willingly concealed, even from itself, the desire of vengeance by which it was actuated, under the veil of loyalty and patriotism, now found or imagined the necessity of adopting a measure for the preservation of the public safety, which has been ever considered as the highest and most unconstitutional exertion of parliamentary authority attempted since the æra of the revolution ; and, if we except the act of Henry VIII, declaring the proclamations of the crown equal in validity to acts of parliament, and the perpetuity act of Charles I, it may not

of this censure must however be qualified with the acknowledgment, that in the writings now alluded to are to be found many important and interesting truths, expressed in language peculiarly striking and energetic.



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Act.

be too much to affirm, since the first existence of parliaments. This was no other than the introduction of the famous *septennial bill*, in the session of 1716, by which the parliament not only assumed a power of prolonging the duration of future parliaments, but even its own; and being elected by the nation for three years, they elected themselves for four years more. As the discretion vested in parliament has however no precise limits, no one has ventured formally or judicially to impeach the validity of this act; and it has been truly urged in its favor, that it was in fact agreeable to the sentiments of a great and respectable part of the nation, who had long seen and deplored the evils attending the frequent recurrence of parliamentary elections under the present miserably corrupt, though long-established, modes of election; and who were convinced of the danger which must eventually have arisen from the dissolution of the present parliament at a juncture so critical. The bill, which originated in the house of peers, was opposed with great ability by divers noblemen, and in particular by the earl of Nottingham, who, disgusted and provoked by the intemperate conduct of the administration, had now quitted his connexions with the whigs. This nobleman observed, “that frequent parliaments were of the essence of the English constitution, and were sanctioned by the



practice of ages ; that the members of the lower house were delegated by the body of the nation for a certain term of years, at the expiration of which they were no longer the representatives of the people ; that by thus lengthening, at their own pleasure, the duration of their own authority, they deprived the people of the only remedy which the wisdom of our ancestors had provided against the ignorance and corruption of those who might be tempted to betray the trust reposed in them ; that as to the pretence of adding energy or stability to the foreign transactions or projected alliances of government, what prince or state could rationally entrust us with the care of their interests, when we appeared so ready to abandon our own ? that the preamble of the bill itself might suffice to deter them from entering into engagements with our government, when they understood by it that the Popish and Jacobite faction was so powerful as to threaten destruction to the present establishment ; and that the government acknowledged its weakness to be such, as to make so extraordinary a provision necessary for its safety, when it appeared that the nation was not to be trusted, and that the affections of the king's subjects were restricted within the limits of the house of commons. He affirmed that a long parliament would encourage every species of corruption in every class of the



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1716. community ; that the value of a seat would bear a determinate proportion to the legal duration of parliaments, and the purchase would rise accordingly ; that a long parliament would both enhance the temptations, and multiply the opportunities, of a vicious ministry, to undermine the integrity and independency of parliaments far beyond what could occur if they were short and frequent ; that the reasons urged for prolonging the duration of this parliament to seven years would probably be as strong, and by perseverance in the same impolitic conduct, might be made much stronger before the end of that term, for continuing and even perpetuating their legislative power." On the other hand, lord Carteret, who, though young as a statesman, was one of the ablest speakers in support of the bill, acknowledged that frequent parliaments are a great security of the people's rights and liberties ; but he observed that this bill was not against frequent meetings of parliament, but only against frequent elections ; that they ought maturely to weigh and consider what was suggested in the preamble of the bill ; that there is a restless popish faction, designing and endeavouring to renew the rebellion within this kingdom ; that of all rebellions, this last was the most monstrous and unnatural,—for all others were carried on under pretences of liberty, whereas the last was



a rebellion for slavery. That as to our allies abroad, though he could not affirm that they expected this bill, yet it was reasonable to suppose that they would rejoice to see it pass into a law, having found, by sad experience, that great changes may be made in the best concerted measures by different parliaments, inflamed by different ministers; that, in short, this bill would fix the king and the present happy establishment on a lasting foundation, and therefore he was for committing it." The question of commitment being at length put, it was carried in the affirmative, after an acrimonious and violent debate, by 96 voices against 61. But thirty lords entered their protest, at the head of whom were the dukes of Somerset and Shrewsbury.

When this bill was transmitted to the commons, it had to encounter an opposition still more vehement and formidable. No sooner was it announced to the house, by two of the judges sent from the peers, that their lordships had passed a bill for enlarging the time of the continuance of parliaments, to which they desired their concurrence, than lord Guernsey moved to reject the bill without reading it. The house, however, determined by a great majority to receive it; and the bill being a first and second time read, Mr. Shippen rose to oppose the commitment of it. He commenced his observations



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with remarking, “ that he too well knew the hazard attached to every unguarded expression in that house, to venture to say, that by any measures already taken (alluding to the late great augmentation of the land forces) we have paved the way to a despotic and military government. Such reflexions, indeed, might perhaps be pardoned from persons without doors, who are not able to enter into the depth and wisdom of our counsels, and who presume to censure what they cannot comprehend. But the present bill is yet unpassed, and we have as yet a right to investigate its merits with freedom. It has been urged, that the disaffection of the people is so great, and the enemies of the government both at home and abroad so powerful that a new election, at this period, may be destructive of its peace, and even of its safety. If this argument be applied to the ministry, it is enough to reply, that it is no concern of ours, whether they have rendered themselves odious to the people or not—they may be destroyed, and the government subsist and flourish. But if it be applied to his majesty, no argument could be offered so injurious to his honor. How is it that in the infancy of his reign, he hath deprived himself of the love and affection of a people who so lately received him with every expression of joy? But, admitting the fact, is this the way to extinguish



the discontents already existing, or will it not rather increase and create fresh discontents? Agreeably to the law as it now stands, a dissolution will not be necessary for a year and a half; and can national discontents be imagined to exist so long under so wise, so excellent, and so indulgent an administration as we now enjoy? Another reason for passing this bill is, that it may encourage our ancient allies to enter into new treaties, which, under the actual constitution of things, they may hesitate or refuse to do. In order therefore to obtain the favor and friendship of those nations in whose support we have on so many occasions lavished our treasure and our blood, we must, it seems, alter the present frame of our constitution! What emotions of indignation must not the insolence of this demand excite—especially if it happen to be urged by a state which owes its very being to England, and which continues to subsist as a sovereign power by our aid and protection! Sir, his majesty, as king of Great Britain, is the arbiter of Europe, and may dictate to other nations, who will for their own sakes court his friendship, and who have always found their account in the alliance of the crown which he now wears. The expense attending frequent elections has been also mentioned. But this is an argument which merits no attention. Every gentleman is a



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judge of his own circumstances, and knows how far they are competent to the necessary expenses of an election; for I will not suppose that the advocates of this bill can mean to extend this argument to *corrupt expenses*, when the incorrupt, unbiassed, and constitutional mode in which the election of the present parliament was conducted is so *notorious*. The manner in which this bill has been introduced into the house is itself a sufficient reason for its rejection. It is sent from the LORDS; and as it relates merely to ourselves, I apprehend it to be inconsistent with our honor to receive it. Our predecessors have shown a determination to resist all attempts to innovate on their privileges; and shall this glorious house of commons be content humbly to model themselves at the pleasure of the lords? Shall we tamely and meanly acquiesce in an attack that strikes at the very foundation of our authority? But however unlimited our complaisance, I humbly conceive we have it not in our power to consent to this bill; for I cannot discover by what rule of reason or law we, who are only representatives, can enlarge, to our own advantage, the authority delegated to us—or that by virtue of such delegated authority we can destroy the fundamental rights of our constitution. This house has no legislative authority but what it derives from the people. The mem-



bers of this assembly were chosen under the triennial act. Our trust is therefore a triennial trust; and if we extend it beyond the strict legal duration, we cease from that instant to be the trustees of the people, and are our own electors. From that instant, we act by an unwarrantable assumption of power, and take upon us to create a new constitution. For though it is a received maxim in civil science, that the supreme legislature cannot be bound; yet an exception is necessarily implied, that it is restrained from subverting the foundation on which it stands. The triennial act, which restored the freedom and frequency of parliaments, was a concession made to the people by king William in the midst of his difficulties; and the policy of those ministers who may advise his majesty to give his royal assent to the repealing of it, is of a nature too refined for my understanding. And as his majesty has been pleased to propose that prince as a model to himself, and is emulous to imbibe his spirit and to equal his glory, it is a matter of astonishment to those who are not in the secret of affairs, to see the salutary measures adopted on the most mature deliberation, with a view to the public good, in the reign of the former monarch, so eagerly and rashly rescinded in the very commencement of that of the latter. There must certainly be some latent cause for the precipitation with



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1716. which this bill has been urged ; there must be some secret measure in contemplation, which the ministers of the crown suspect will not stand the test of a new parliament. It must be something, I repeat, hereafter to be done by them ; for I will do them the justice to believe, that, for all the manifold mischiefs that have been done, they feel entirely at their ease—perfectly callous to the emotions of sensibility or remorse. A standing parliament, which it is the object of this bill to establish, has been said to resemble a standing pool, the waters of which grow, for want of a fresh and free current, offensive and fetid. But the present parliament may more justly be compared to a torrent, which, in its furious and foaming course, desolates the land, bearing down all the land marks and ancient mounds which have been raised to confine it within its regular and accustomed banks.”

After a variety of able speeches from the most distinguished members on both sides of the house, sir Robert Raymond, afterwards lord Raymond, and chief justice of England, concluded the debate with a comprehensive reply to the arguments in favor of the bill, and a masterly recapitulation of the objections urged against it, of which the multifarious particulars that demand a place in general history will suffer only a concise and cursory mention. “ The arguments for the



bill were, according to the enumeration of this  
able speaker, 1. The expenses attending fre-  
quent elections : 2. The divisions and animosities  
excited by them : 3. The advantages to be de-  
rived by our enemies from these domestic feuds :  
4. The encouragement which this bill holds out  
to our allies to form with us more strict and per-  
manent connexions. As to the expenses of  
election, they were, he acknowledged, of late  
years, most alarmingly increased, and were be-  
come very grievous and burdensome. They  
have increased, however, not from the contests  
of neighbouring gentlemen with each other, but  
from the intrusion of strangers, who, having no  
natural interest to support them, and coming no  
one could tell from whence, have recourse to the  
scandalous arts of bribery and corruption, which  
have imposed a necessity upon gentlemen to  
enlarge their expenses, in order to preserve  
their ancient and established interests in their  
respective counties ; and the impunity which the  
practice of bribery and corruption had too often  
met with in that house, he was compelled to add,  
had greatly enhanced the evil. But would any  
one assert that septennial parliaments were com-  
petent to remedy this evil ? Would they not  
rather increase it ? For those that will give  
money to obtain a seat in parliament for three  
years, will give proportionably more for seven.

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BOOK No—not septennial, but annual parliaments are  
VII. the true constitutional remedy for this grievance :  
1716. this was our ancient constitution, and every departure from it has been attended with inconvenience and injury. With respect to the animosities and divisions attending frequent elections, they are chiefly of a private nature, and little affect the public: such as they are, however, this bill is more calculated to inflame than to extinguish them. But our most alarming and pernicious animosities proceed certainly from a very different source—from the resentment and ambition of some, from the folly and prejudice of others. That our enemies will take advantage of our divisions whenever it is in their power, cannot be doubted; but since the triennial act passed, ten successive parliaments have sat, two long and bloody wars have been waged, our factions ran high, and our enemies were vigilant; yet no such inconveniences were felt as are now apprehended or alleged: nor were any attempts made by them, as far as I have heard, to our prejudice during the temporary ferments of those elections. The last argument is deduced from the encouragement this will give to your allies to enter into treaties with you. Sorry should I be to suppose we had any allies who refused to treat with us because we refused to relinquish our constitution: were such a requisition to be made to



them on our part, would it not be rejected on theirs with contempt and indignation? But the measure now proposed is calculated not to strengthen the hands of the executive power, but to lessen its influence with foreign nations. Is it not to proclaim to the world that the king *dare* not call a new parliament? that he *dare* not trust the people in a new choice? And is not this a supposition dishonorable alike to the monarch and to the parliament now existing? It presumes that another house of commons would act differently from the present; which implies that this house does not truly represent the people. Frequent parliaments are coeval with the constitution. In the reign of Edward III. it was enacted, that parliaments should be holden every year once, and oftener if need be. This must be understood of new parliaments; for prorogations and long adjournments were not then known. Every long interruption of parliaments has been attended with mischief and inconvenience to the public: and in the declaration of rights at the revolution it is asserted, as the undoubted right of the subject, that parliaments should be held frequently; and the preamble of the bill, which we are now called upon to repeal, declares, 'that by the ancient laws and statutes of the realm frequent parliaments ought to be held, and that frequent **NEW** parliaments tend very much to the

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BOOK happy union and the good agreement of the king  
VII. and his people.' Before this repeal takes place,  
1716. I hope it will be shown in what consists the error  
of those assertions. Would the king establish his  
throne in the hearts of his people, this is the most  
sure and effectual way : for such frequent appeals  
to the people generate confidence, and confidence  
is a great advance towards agreement and affec-  
tion. Will not the people say with reason, if  
this bill should pass, that, when the original  
term of delegation is elapsed, you are no longer  
their representatives ? In my opinion, with great  
submission I speak it, king, lords, and commons  
can no more continue a parliament beyond its  
natural duration, than they can make a parlia-  
ment. The wisest governments, it is well known,  
have ever been the most cautious in continuing  
those persons in authority to whom they have  
entrusted the supreme power. A standing par-  
liament and a standing army are convertible,  
and fit instruments to support each other's  
powers. For these reasons, and because no state  
necessity can be alleged or pretended for the  
passing of such an act, at a time when the pre-  
sent parliament may be convened for two suc-  
ceeding sessions, I shall give my vote against  
the commitment of the bill." On a division, the  
question of commitment was carried in the affir-  
mative by a majority of 284 against 162 voices.



While this memorable bill was pending in the house, various petitions were presented against it: one, in particular, from the borough of Horsham, stating, "that they looked upon this bill as an overturning of the constitution, and an infringement of their liberties," gave such offence, that the house refused to receive it; and the general question, *that this bill do now pass*, was carried in the affirmative by a triumphant majority of 264 votes against 121; and soon after it received the royal assent; the king expressing in his speech at the conclusion of the session, June 26 (1716), the satisfaction he felt at the prospect of a *settled government*, supported by a parliament which had shown such zeal for the prosperity of their country, and the protestant interest of Europe. And his majesty now deeming himself in a state of perfect security, and being, by an act passed in the course of the last session, relieved from the disagreeable embarrassment of a clause in the act of settlement restraining him from leaving the kingdom without the consent of parliament, determined to re-visit his dominions in Germany—the state of affairs on the continent demanding his most serious attention.

Louis XIV, king of France, had terminated his long career in the course of the preceding summer, September 1, 1715. For more than

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Death of  
Louis XIV



BOOK half a century this monarch had reigned the  
 VII. dread and envy of Europe; and at no period  
 1716. since the foundation of the monarchy had France  
 displayed such power or splendor. During the  
 continuance of the feudal system, the authority  
 of the monarch and the collective force of the  
 monarchy were restrained and diminished by the  
 independent authority vested in the nobles. When  
 the regal authority was at length fully restored,  
 and established, by the insidious and profound  
 policy of Louis XI, the power of France was for  
 a series of years eclipsed by the superior great-  
 ness of the house of Austria. But at the acces-  
 sion of Louis XIV. the pride of that haughty  
 family had been signally humbled by the genius  
 of Richelieu and the arms of Gustavus. Thus,  
 by the dangerous policy of the last century,  
 France was left without a rival, and Louis XIV.  
 soon shewed himself of a disposition to improve  
 and extend that superiority to its utmost limits.  
 Vain, unfeeling, unprincipled, haughty, ambi-  
 tious, the ruling passion of his life was the thirst  
 of GLORY\*. For this he scrupled not to sacrifice

His Cha-  
 racter.

\* In a letter written by Louis to the count d'Estrades, ambassador at the court of London, January 1662, he declares "that the king of England and his minister Clarendon do not as yet sufficiently know him—that he aims at GLORY, preferably to any other consideration—that all motives of interest are as nothing to him in comparison of a point of honor—and that he shall always be ready to hazard



the repose of nations, and to deluge Europe in blood. A prospect of the internal state and condition of France under his government discovers an amazing contrast of magnificence and wretchedness. In religion a malignant and merciless bigot, he forced from their native homes, by the violence of his persecution, myriads of the most industrious and virtuous of his subjects, the loss of whom France yet feels and laments. From the impression made, nevertheless, by the first rapid glances of history, his character appears in

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all, rather than tarnish that GLORY at which he aims as the principal object of all his actions."—Surrounded from his infancy with an host of sycophants, no wonder that this monarch became at length intoxicated with flattery. From the lips of Massillon only did he hear what bore the resemblance of truth. When I attend other celebrated preachers," said the king, "I go away pleased with them: from Masillon I depart displeased with myself." A short extract from a sermon of this famous orator, preached on a solemn occasion before the king, will sufficiently account for this difference of effect: "SIRE, if the poison of ambition reach and infect the heart of the prince—if the sovereign, forgetting that he is the protector of public tranquillity; prefer his own glory to the love and safety of his people—if he employ for his own interest only a power solely given him for the happiness of those he governs—in a word, if he be a king for the misery of mankind alone, and, like the monarch of Babylon, wish to raise the impious statue, the idol of his greatness, on the tears and ruins of states and nations—GREAT GOD! what a scourge for the earth! what a gift dost thou present to mortals in thy wrath, in appointing such a master over them!"



BOOK a variety of dazzling and imposing points of view.  
VII. He was possessed of strong natural powers of  
1716. mind, and of great personal accomplishments.  
He was generous, affable, condescending, a  
munificent patron and rewarder of merit. Under  
his reign great characters were formed, great  
public works both of ornament and utility con-  
structed. Science and the arts flourished under  
his auspices, and a new Augustan age appeared.  
He sustained the adverse fortune of his later  
years with firmness and magnanimity. His  
heart, softened by distress, seemed at length to  
feel for the distresses of his people; and he ac-  
knowledged, when too late to rectify his error,  
that he had formed mistaken opinions respecting  
that *glory* which he had been so anxiously solici-  
tous to acquire. His death took place at a criti-  
cal moment; and the projects formed in favor  
of the house of Stuart, which were by its ablest  
adherents, before that event, deemed "wild and  
uncertain," became, in consequence of it, mad  
and desperate.

He was succeeded by Louis XV, an infant  
only five years of age, and the government of the  
kingdom was now vested in the hands of the duke  
of Orléans, regent of France. This prince, who,  
in case of the death of the infant monarch, had  
just pretensions, founded on the arrangements of  
the treaty of Utrecht, to the throne of France,



dreaded with reason, notwithstanding the act of renunciation, the competition of the king of Spain. And the situation of the king of England, who had also the designs of a restless rival to oppose, being analogous to that of the regent, they concluded with an emulation of eagerness—all political difficulties being previously obviated by the ability and address of the earl of Stair, now ambassador at Paris—a treaty of friendship and alliance for their mutual assistance and support, to which the States General, after some hesitation and delay, acceded. This treaty was signed at the Hague, January 1717, by lord Cadogan, l'abbé Dubois, and pensionary Heinsius. But in England, where distrust and hatred of France were universally prevalent, it excited much murmur and surprise; nor would the nation easily be persuaded to believe that the protestant succession in England could derive any additional security from the officious or insidious guarantee of France. This treaty with France was preceded by two others—the first a defensive alliance between the emperor, Great Britain, and Holland, signed November 1715, by which all differences relating to the Dutch barrier were accommodated, and the protestant succession in the house of Brunswic guaranteed by the emperor. The second a defensive alliance between England and the emperor, signed May

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Treaty of  
Alliance  
between  
Great  
Britain,  
France,  
and Hol-  
land.  
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BOOK 1716, by which the quota of troops to be furnished on each side, in case of necessity, was fixed, and the protestant succession anew guaranteed by the emperor. This treaty was never formally communicated to parliament, and appears to have been chiefly designed as a political manœuvre to quicken and facilitate the negotiations then depending with France.—The affair, however, which principally engaged the king's solicitude at this period, and which forms, indeed, the grand key to almost all the numerous and intricate negotiations, conventions, and alliances of the present reign, was the recent cession of the duchies of Bremen and Verden by Denmark, who had conquered them from the Swedes; and for which Denmark was to receive a certain equivalent in money from Hanover. Exclusive, however, of this pretended equivalent, the king of England, as elector of Hanover, undertook to guaranty to Denmark the duchy of Sleswic, conquered by that power from the duke of Holstein, the ally of Sweden, and son of Hedwig Sophia eldest sister of Charles the Twelfth;—his Danish majesty thus wisely parting with one half of his conquests, in order to establish a permanent property in the other. The ratifications of the treaty by which these duchies were ceded to Hanover were exchanged July 1715, and the duchies actually delivered into the pos-

Cession of  
Bremen  
and Ver-  
den to  
Hanover.



session of his Britannic majesty October 15th next ensuing; on which day, agreeably to an express proviso of the treaty, war was declared by king GEORGE, in his electoral capacity, against Sweden. This whole transaction the king of Sweden regarded as a most flagrant injury and insult: and little regarding, in the vehemence of his anger, the distinction arising from the twofold character sustained by his adversary, as king of England and elector of Hanover, and well knowing that, in the mere capacity of elector, he would not have ventured to gratify his ambition so much at the risque of his safety, he directed all the efforts of his vengeance against the English nation, who appeared to him to countenance this usurpation, and whom he therefore considered as his determined and mortal enemies.

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In the summer of the same year, 1715, sir John Norris sailed with a strong squadron to the Baltic, for the protection of the national commerce, which had suffered extremely from the hostile resentment of the Swedes. The purposes of this armament were, however, as it subsequently appeared, much more of a political than a commercial nature; for by a memorial presented in the month of October to the court of London, the Swedish ambassador complained "that the English squadron had actually joined



BOOK the Danish fleet in the attack upon the island of  
 VII. Rugen, *in consequence of the late cession of Bre-*  
 1717. *men and Verden*, contrary to the treaties subsist-  
 ing between the two nations." And it is re-  
 markable, that the king of Sweden was himself at  
 this very time besieged in the city of Stralsund;  
 to the reduction of which that of the isle of Ru-  
 gen was considered as preparatory. Rugen  
 was accordingly taken; and the Swedish mo-  
 narch made his escape with the utmost difficulty,  
 and extreme personal hazard, in the night pre-  
 ceding the surrender of Stralsund. A disposition  
 much less inflammable than that of Charles XII.  
 might be easily supposed roused into resentment  
 by this injurious treatment. In the succeeding sum-  
 mer also (1716) sir John Norris had again appeared  
 in the Baltic, openly acting in conjunction with  
 the Danes. At this period, therefore, with a view  
 to gratify in the most effectual manner his hatred  
 and revenge against the king of England, the  
 king of Sweden was deeply engaged in negotia-  
 tions and intrigues with the English malcon-  
 tents; and a project was formed for the invasion  
 of the kingdom, by that heroic and romantic  
 monarch, at the head of a large body of forces,  
 which would doubtless have been joined by great  
 numbers of the disaffected, who waited only a  
 favorable moment for revolt. The king of Eng-  
 land, who had received information from various

Dangerous  
 Projects of  
 Sweden.



quarters of this dangerous conspiracy, on his <sup>BOOK</sup> return from the continent, January 1717, caused <sup>VII.</sup> the Swedish ambassador, count Gyllenburg, to be <sup>1717.</sup> arrested. At the same time baron Goertz, the Swedish resident in Holland, was also, by an excess of complaisance for which it would not be easy to find a precedent, arrested at the requisition of the king by order of the States: and in the papers of these two noblemen, which by a bold and irregular exertion of power were seized and searched, was found ample proof of their secret machinations. The foreign ministers were not a little alarmed at this extraordinary procedure; and the marquis de Monteleone, the Spanish ambassador, in particular, expressed his astonishment and regret that no other mode of preserving the peace of the kingdom could be devised, than by arresting the persons of ambassadors, and seizing their papers—the sacred repositories of their masters' secrets. The secretary of state, Mr. Methuen, stated the urgent necessity which had impelled the king his master to adopt a measure so contrary to his inclinations: and baron Goertz openly avowed the whole project of the invasion, of which he acknowledged himself the author, and which he said “was amply justified by the conduct of the king of Great Britain, who had joined the confederacy against the king of Sweden without



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having received the least provocation—who had assisted the king of Denmark in subduing the duchies of Bremen and Verden, and then purchased them of the usurper—and who had, in the course of this very summer, sent a strong squadron of ships to the Baltic, where it joined the Danes and Russians against the Swedes.” The states of Holland not venturing to detain the baron long in confinement, he prosecuted his designs with increase of zeal and earnestness.

The parliament was convened on the 20th of February 1717, when the king declared to the two houses the alliance recently concluded with France and the United Provinces, and stated the actual danger of an invasion from Sweden; and in a short time copies of the letters which had passed between the ministers Gyllenburg and Goertz were laid before them. Of the dangerous nature of this correspondence a few passages may be selected as proofs. October 1716 Gyllenburg writes, “There is no medium. Either BREMEN or the HANOVERIAN must be sacrificed. The latter is not so difficult, considering the general discontent. Ten thousand men would be sufficient. The malcontents require but a body of regular forces, to which they may join themselves. That body being transported in the month of March, when the easterly winds reign, and when it will not in the least be dreamt of,



will cause a general revolt."——November 1716, BOOK  
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 "I should believe, that if the preliminary concerning Bremen was settled, we might come to an agreement in relation to what they ought to help us to take from the CZAR by way of reprisal for our losses in Germany. On the other hand, if we do not submit to them, your excellency may be assured, that as well to justify their past actions, as to force us to a compliance, they will prevail upon the *mercenary parliament* which they have at present to take vigorous resolutions, and even to declare war against us. This is what we must expect. The English ministers do not mince the matter; and they have already made it appear that they will stick at nothing. They are all furious persons. Sunderland, who is in a manner at the head of affairs, has got all the interest he has with the king of England by having consented to what has been done against us; and, being beside our enemy, is at present at Hanover to take his instructions from the Germans: and your excellency may depend upon it he will execute them with all the boldness (*effronterie*) imaginable. Your excellency therefore will find we ought to make use of this opportunity to enter into measures against people who certainly will not do any thing by halves. We must either ruin them, or be undone ourselves—that is, if it be in their power to bring it



BOOK VII. to pass. My friends are now in town. An express which came to them yesterday from the 1717. Pretender will put them in better condition for forming a plan. To-day they are going about it." On the other hand baron Goertz writes to count Gyllenburg, December 11, 1716: "As I run no risque with you, sir, I will freely tell you, that, even before my departure from Sweden, we were already, on our side, disposed to this expedition. It is easy to believe that those dispositions are since increased, in proportion as the animosity of the court where you are, hath continued increasing. There is therefore now no other question, but of the means to satisfy our just desire of revenge. For several months past we have had some preliminary negotiation upon these matters with the court of Avignon. Which way can the king of Sweden better secure to himself the recovery and possession of the said duchy (viz. Bremen) than by reducing king George to be nothing more than an elector of the empire? Again, January 1717: "Assure your friends, that the expedition to England does at present take up all our thoughts and attention.—Tell me whence proceeds the good disposition wherein Walpole seems to be?"—A royal message was delivered in the month of April to the house of commons, by general Stanhope, informing the house of the danger which



still impended over the nation from the designs of Sweden, and demanding an extraordinary supply, to enable him to make good such engagements as it might be necessary for him to contract with other powers, in order effectually to avert it. A supply of 250,000*l.* was accordingly voted, but by a perilous majority of *four voices* only, and not without vehement debate and opposition, chiefly in consequence of an alarming division in the administration, and the eventual secession of various of its members distinguished equally by eminence of station and ability—amongst whom lord Townshend, some time secretary of state, and lately appointed lord lieutenant of Ireland, and Mr. Walpole, first commissioner of the treasury, appeared most conspicuous. The leaders of the secession, by the faint and languid support which those who took any part in the debate gave to this motion, and the obstinate silence of the rest, sufficiently showed their disapproval of the conduct of the court, which, for the sake of an useless acquisition of territory in Germany, scrupled not to involve Great Britain in an expensive, dangerous, and destructive war: and it was now clearly perceived, though unfortunately at a period too late, that the separation of the kingdom from the electorate ought to have constituted the basis of the settlement of the crown upon the house of Hanover. The mes-

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sage was declared, by Mr. Shippen, to be unparliamentary and unprecedented : penned, he supposed, by some foreigner totally unacquainted with their accustomed forms of procedure, and their invariable usage of granting money only on estimate, and for certain specified services. And he asked, what glorious advantages were to be obtained for England, which made it necessary to incur this expense, and to encounter this danger? Mr. Hungerford ridiculed the idea of courting, and much more of purchasing, foreign alliances ; and said, that a nation so lately the terror of France and Spain was surely able to defend itself, in any cause which called for national exertion, from the attack of so inconsiderable an enemy as Sweden. General Stanhope, in the warmth of debate, asserting, “ that none could refuse compliance with this message, but such as were not *the king's friends*,” much offence was taken at this expression by many members far removed from the suspicion of disaffection ; and Mr. Lawson, member for Cumberland, observed, “ that he was surprised to hear such unguarded expressions fall from so respectable a person ; and that if every member of the house who used freedom of speech must be accounted an enemy to the king, whenever he happened to disapprove of the measures of his ministers, he knew no service they could render



to their country in that house ; and it were better at once to retire to their country-seats, and leave the king and his ministers to act entirely at their discretion.”

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On the commitment of the bill, Mr. Pulteney, who had now resigned his office of secretary at war, protested that he could not persuade himself that any Englishman had dared to advise his majesty to send such a message ; but he hoped that the house would not be swayed by German counsels ; and that such resolutions would be adopted as would make a German ministry tremble.

It was again urged, that no occasion did or could exist for entering into foreign alliances with a view of defending Great Britain from this danger : that we had an army and a fleet far superior to any force that Sweden could in her present state bring into action against us : that we were in actual alliance with France, from whose former connexion with Sweden apprehensions might otherwise have been entertained. But if the court persisted in asserting the necessity of new and foreign engagements against Sweden, it was doubtless requisite to state, since no one could pretend to conjecture, what those engagements were. And the speaker, who took part in the debate, declared that no additional burdens on the public appeared at this time ne-



BOOK VII.  
1717. cessary. It was his opinion therefore, that if the sum now demanded were expended for her safety abroad, such proportion of the national troops as equalled the amount of the expenditure ought to be disbanded at home.

Lord Finch, eldest son of the earl of Nottingham, reprobated in strong terms this novel system of politics. "It appeared," as he also said, "from the memorial recently presented by the Russian minister, and by the answer which had been returned to the same, that such measures were pursued as were likely to engage us in a quarrel with the czar."—To which general Stanhope replied, "that the coldness between the king and the czar arose from the refusal of his majesty to guaranty the late conquests of Russia : and as for the instances which his majesty has caused to be made with the czar, and the measures he may have concerted to get the Russian troops out of the duchy of Mecklenburg his majesty has acted in all this as elector and prince of the empire : and he was persuaded all the gentlemen there would agree with him, that the king's dignity, as king of Great Britain, was never understood to tie up his hands with respect to his interests in Germany, and as prince of the empire." In conclusion, though the subsidy was granted, the dissatisfaction of the house was sufficiently apparent ; and the fact itself remained indisputable, that the



Germanic politics of the king had embroiled the kingdom of Great Britain in a dangerous contest, not only with Sweden but Russia. Before the rising of parliament, however, the king was enabled to inform the two houses, which he deemed it proper to do in person by a speech from the throne, that a powerful fleet under sir George Byng had safely arrived in the Baltic, and that the danger of an immediate invasion was now removed.

The debate on the supply was the prelude to a great and almost total change in the ministry, which had been for some time past agitated by great internal animosities. And though a real and very important difference of opinion existed in the cabinet on the subject of continental politics, these heats and contentions may be traced to another and much less honourable source—the insatiable ambition of the earl of Sunderland, whose cabals and intrigues had, subsequent to the death of the earl of Halifax, divided the court into two opposite and hostile parties. The destination of Sunderland to the government of Ireland, at the accession of the present king, had appeared to that nobleman only as a splendid banishment. He eagerly wished to engross, or at least to share, the supreme direction of affairs in England. He saw that this was only to be effected by the most unbounded compliances with the king's foreign predilections. During the absence of the mo-



BOOK VII.  
1717. narch in Germany, the preceding autumn, accompanied by general Stanhope, lord Sunderland repaired to the continent under pretext of travelling for the benefit of his health ; and, on his arrival at Hanover, he soon insinuated himself into the confidence of Bothmar, Bernstorff, and Robethon, the king's German ministers ; and through their means into that of the king. The first discernible effect of this influence was the dismissal of lord Townshend from his office of secretary of state, who was at the same time nominated successor to lord Sunderland in the government of Ireland. Mr. Methuen, to preserve appearances, retained present possession of the seals ; but count Gyllenborg, in his dispatches at this period, declared lord Sunderland to be the secret mover of the counsels of the king of England. General Stanhope, who, on his departure from England, enjoyed the perfect confidence of his colleagues Townshend and Walpole, and who was personally much esteemed by the king, was with wonderful facility brought to favor the views ; and before he left Hanover, seemed entirely under the influence of the artful and aspiring Sunderland. After a vain effort to compromise these disputes, and even a faint semblance of reconciliation, Townshend and Walpole finding themselves excluded from the secret counsels of the king, and becoming every day more in-



significant, determined to risque the consequences of an open rupture. On the very evening of the day on which the discontented party had distinguished themselves by their public and parliamentary opposition to the measures of the court, lord Townshend was dismissed from his government of Ireland ; and, on the next morning, Mr. Walpole, Mr. Methuen, and Mr. Pulteney, delivered in their resignations. Also, in a short time, the earl of Orford relinquished his seat at the head of the admiralty, and the duke of Devonshire at the board of council—lord Cowper, with difficulty, consenting to retain possession of the great seal.

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Great endeavours were made to detach Walpole from his party—the king himself condescending to urge his continuance in office with extreme earnestness ; but his resolution was not to be shaken. And now, to the astonishment of the world, the gallant Stanhope, wholly divesting himself of his military character, assumed the gown of chancellor of the exchequer ; and a general of horse was, for the first time, placed at the head of the board of treasury. The earl of Sunderland was constituted secretary of state in his room ; his colleague, being the celebrated Addison, whose wit, urbanity, and polished talents, seemed ill calculated to recommend him to a post of such eminence, amid the violent conflicts of



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1717. angry and discordant factions. The earl of Berkeley succeeded the earl of Orford, and the duke of Bolton lord Townshend—the office of lord chamberlain, vacated by the last promotion, being conferred upon the duke of Newcastle. The duke of Kingston had, some months previous to these political changes, been constituted lord privy seal in the room of the earl of Wharton, deceased; and the duke of Roxburgh appointed secretary of state for Scotland.

A vehement mutual resentment and aversion from this time succeeded to the friendship which had formerly subsisted between Stanhope and Walpole. In a debate which took place soon after the change of administration, general Stanhope took occasion to observe, “that, conscious of his incapacity for the affairs of the treasury, he had accepted of this employment so remote from his studies and inclination in obedience to the king’s commands; that, however, he would endeavour to make up by honesty, application, and disinterestedness, what he wanted in ability and experience; that he would content himself with the salary and lawful perquisites of his office; and, though he had quitted a better place, he would not quarter himself upon any body to make it up; that he had no brothers, nor other relations, to provide for: and that, upon his first entering into the treasury, he had made a stand-



ing order against the late practice of granting re-  
versions of places."

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Mr. Walpole, being touched with these inuendoes, replied with great asperity; and so bitter an altercation ensued, that the house was obliged to interpose its authority in order to prevent any disastrous consequences. And Mr. Hungerford remarked, that it became the members of that house, after the oriental fashion, to avert their countenances while these two great men, the fathers of the state, were thus exposing each other's nakedness.

In the course of the present session, and a very short time previous to his resignation, Mr. Walpole had exhibited a signal proof of his financial ability in the introduction of the memorable bill for the reduction of the public debt; which, amongst other wise and salutary regulations, enacted, that all the public funds redeemable by law, and bearing higher interest than five per cent, be redeemed according to the respective provisos of clauses of redemption; and that the irredeemable annuities, with consent of the proprietors, be converted into an interest, or perpetual annuity, not exceeding five per cent. per annum, redeemable by parliament. And by this bill the joint surplusses arising as well from the proposed reduction of interest from six to five per cent, as from the excesses of the several taxes appro-



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priated to the payment of the interest, were solemnly declared to be solely and unalienably applicable, under the denomination of a sinking fund, to the discharge of the principal of the public debt contracted previous to the 25th of December 1716. Had this plan been as steadily prosecuted as it was wisely concerted, the nation would have been soon relieved from her pecuniary difficulties: for as, in consequence of the progressive redemption of the debt, the surplusses must increase with accelerated rapidity, it operated, so long as it was allowed to operate, with a marvellous and almost magic energy. Of this plan of redemption it may with striking propriety be said,

“*Mobilitate viget, viresque acquirit eundo.*” VIRG.

—————Every moment brings  
New vigor to its flight new pinions to its wings.

The riots and tumults, which were the too natural consequence of the measures adopted by the present ministry, broke out afresh from time to time in various parts of the kingdom with alarming symptoms of disaffection and violence. Oaken boughs worn on the 29th of May, and white roses on the 10th of June, the birth-day of the Pretender, were the ostentatious badges of the party. But the spirit of disloyalty and sedition seemed to display itself at this period with more conspicuous malignity at the city of Oxford than



perhaps any other place ; insomuch that it was deemed necessary by the government to station there a considerable military force, between whom and the youth of the university frequent occasions of quarrel arose ; some of which were of magnitude to come under judicial cognizance : and that ancient and venerable seat of the Muses seemed, by a deplorable fatality, to be converted into the temple of civil discord.

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It is remarkable that the prince of Wales, who had been constituted guardian of the realm during the absence of the king, had conducted himself with such prudence, and had acquired such popularity as to excite the serious umbrage of the monarch, by whom he was never again entrusted with the reins of government ; but a new and memorable proof, not lost upon men of discernment, was afforded, of the efficacy of a mild and liberal policy.

On the return of the king from the continent, numerous addresses of congratulation were presented ; amongst which, one from the university of Cambridge, particularly noticing the suppression of the late rebellion, was most graciously received. At a meeting of the vice-chancellor and heads of houses in Oxford, a motion being made for the same purpose, it was rejected with marked indignation. Dr. Smalridge, bishop of Bristol and dean of Christ-church, had the



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1717. preceding year been removed from his post of lord almoner, for refusing, with Atterbury bishop of Rochester, to sign the protestation of the episcopal bench against the claims of the Pretender. This prelate now gratified his resentment by declaring, that the rebellion had long been suppressed, and that there would be no end of addresses should one be presented every time his majesty returned from Hanover; that any marks of royal favor they had received were more than counter-balanced by the troops now quartered upon them; and that the history of this country afforded no precedent for addressing a king on his return from his GERMAN DOMINIONS." As a decisive proof of their alienation from the court, or rather from the government, sir Constantine Phipps, who, on a strong presumption of disaffection, had been removed from his office as one of the lords justices of Ireland, had an honorary degree conferred upon him, with marks of peculiar distinction; and the earl of Arran, on the attainder of his brother the duke of Ormond, was chosen to succeed him as chancellor of the university.\*

\* The famous Dr. South, now in extreme old age, being on this occasion called upon to declare his vote, answered with his characteristic vivacity, "Heart and hand for the earl of Arran!" So marked at this period was that opposition of politics by which the two universities were long distin-



The cry of 'the CHURCH and SACHEVEREL' seemed still to retain its full efficacy and influence over the multitude; and the dwelling-houses and meeting-houses of the sectaries were the favorite objects of the popular vengeance. In consequence of these outrages, the house of commons presented an address to the king, in which they state, "that great numbers of his majesty's deluded subjects had assembled in a tumultuous and rebellious manner, had committed great disorders, and done great injuries to others of their guished, and all traces of which are not yet entirely obliterated, that we cannot wonder the court should embrace with eagerness every opportunity to display its resentment against the one, and its approbation of the other. A royal present of books having been sent to Cambridge soon after the commencement of the tumults at Oxford; the celebrated Dr. Trapp took occasion from this circumstance to pen the following well-known epigram:—

Our royal master saw with heedful eyes  
The wants of his two universities:  
Troops he to Oxford sent, as knowing why,  
That learned body wanted loyalty;  
But books to Cambridge gave, as well discerning  
How, that right loyal body wanted learning.

This epigram received a very happy and decisive retort from the late sir William Browne,—as it is said, *impromptu*.

The king to Oxford sent a troop of horse,  
For tories know no argument but force:  
With equal care, to Cambridge books he sent,  
For whigs allow no force but argument.



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fellow-subjects and fellow protestants ; and they declare it to be their indispensable duty to express their utmost abhorrence of all such traitorous proceedings, and their highest resentment against the authors and promoters of them ; and besecch his majesty, that the laws now in force may be put in speedy and vigorous execution against them. And they further desire that, in justice to those who for their zeal and firm adherence to his majesty's government have been sufferers in the said tumultuous and traitorous disorders, his majesty would be graciously pleased to direct an exact account to be taken of the losses and damages sustained by such sufferers, in order that full compensation may be made ; and assuring his majesty, that all expenses so incurred shall be made good out of the first aids granted by parliament." To which the king replied, " that he would give immediate directions for putting in execution the several matters so justly recommended to him." This was followed by a very loyal and proper address from the dissenters themselves, acknowledging the seasonable protection granted them by government, and expressing a grateful sense of his majesty's gracious answer to the address of his faithful commons in favor of those whose sufferings they so justly impute to the zeal displayed by them for his majesty's person and government. " We desire,"



say they, "nothing more than to enjoy our civil rights, with a full liberty to profess our own religious sentiments, which we take to be a privilege due to all men. Nor know we any reason why we have now suffered from the outrages of disaffected persons, but because we were known to be a body of men fixed in our duty to your majesty." To this address his majesty replied in the most gracious terms, expressing his deep concern at the unchristian and barbarous treatment which they had met with, and assuring them of his royal protection, and a full compensation for all their sufferings." At this period the riot-act passed for the prevention of similar disorders, declaring it to be felony for more than twelve persons to remain assembled more than one hour after its being publicly read by the magistrate; and by the salutary operation of this law the internal tranquillity of the kingdom was in a great degree restored and established.

The earl of Oxford, who had now remained two years in the Tower, was encouraged by the defection of his most powerful adversary, Mr. Walpole, to petition the house of lords that his imprisonment might not be indefinite; and the house appointed an early day for his trial in Westminster-hall; for which the most solemn and magnificent preparations were made; earl Cowper presiding, as on former occasions, in the capacity

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BOOK of lord high steward. The articles of the im-  
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peachment being read, and sir Joseph Jekyl  
1717. standing up as one of the committee of managers, in the name of the commons of England, to make good the first charge, lord Harcourt rose and observed, “that the articles of the impeachment being numerous, and two of them only extending to the charge of high treason, it was superfluous to enter into the investigation of the rest till these had been decided upon; for, supposing him guilty of all, the utmost their lordships could inflict, or the earl could suffer, would amount to no more than the forfeiture of life and estate.” The commons affected to resent what they styled an encroachment upon their privileges, and peremptorily refused to proceed in the order prescribed by the lords. The lords on their part haughtily refused *a free conference* on the subject, as demanded by the commons: and on their non-appearance at the subsequent adjournment of the court, the earl was acquitted; not, as was generally believed, without the secret approbation and concurrence of the crown. The commons, however, presented an address to the king, desiring that he might be excepted out of the intended act of grace; by which they expressed at once their sense of the earl’s demerit, and their contempt of their lordships’ sentence of acquittal. The act of grace accordingly passed



with this and some other exceptions ; and Oxford, BOOK  
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1717. to preserve some appearance of consistency, was forbidden to present himself at court ; but no attempt was at any time made to revive the proceedings against him.

By virtue of this act, the lords Carnwath, Widrington, and Nairne, with many other persons of distinction concerned in the late rebellion, were discharged. Lord Nithisdale had previously effected his escape ; the earl of Derwentwater and lord viscount Kenmure only suffering the utmost rigor of the law: The prison doors throughout England and Scotland, grating on their brazen hinges, were now at length thrown open, and the wretched captives immured in the castles of Lancaster, Chester, Carlisle, Edinburgh, and Stirling, were set at liberty. But great numbers had previously, by the *indulgence* of government, been sent as slaves to the plantations, or had silently expired in the recesses of their dark and dreary dungeons. The session of parliament was terminated July 15, 1717, by a speech from the throne, in which the king made unnecessary and somewhat ostentatious boasts of his royal clemency.

Early in the spring of this year, the minister of Russia had presented a memorial to the court of London, setting forth the solicitude of the czar to conclude a treaty of amity with his majesty, and



BOOK VII. to guaranty the Hanover succession; saying,  
1717. “that it was not the fault of his czarish majesty that the said negociation was not brought to an happy conclusion; although his czarish majesty has lately observed, that several contrary steps have been taken by your majesty’s ministers in many foreign courts, particularly at the court of Vienna, and those of Denmark and Prussia, as well as at the diet of Ratisbon, though his czarish majesty had given no cause for such measures; notwithstanding that he had sufficient reasons to be upon his guard, and to provide for his own security, considering the general report, and the particular advices he had had from many places, that your majesty is negotiating a separate peace with Sweden, in which you promise your assistance against his czarish majesty, upon the condition of the cession of Bremen and Verden, as it plainly appears by the letter lately published by the Swedish minister.”

An answer was delivered to this memorial, dated April 2, 1717, which says,—“As to the complaints contained in that memorial of the steps which his majesty may have taken at several courts in Germany with regard to the Russian troops in the empire, granting it to be true that the British ministers had acted with vigor at the said courts in order to procure the evacuation of the said troops, his czarish ma-



jesty ought not to be in the least surprised at it, BOOK  
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1717. considering the strict union which has so long subsisted between Great Britain, the emperor, and the empire; which union has been confirmed and strengthened the last year by a new treaty of alliance and guarantee between the emperor and the king."

The czar, as it appears, had cherished the hope that the duke of Mecklenburg Schwerin, who was married to the princess Catharine Iwanowna, daughter of the late emperor Iwan, would, in consequence of the distracted state of his affairs, have been induced to resign his dominions to him, in exchange for an equivalent to be provided for the duke, out of his czarish majesty's new conquests. But this design was as obnoxious to the courts of Copenhagen and Berlin as to that of Hanover. Also the city of Wismar, the last Germanic possession belonging to Sweden, being in the summer of 1716 besieged by the Prussians, Hanoverians, and Danes, the czar sent a large body of forces into Germany under pretext of co-operating with them: but the city had surrendered previous to their arrival, and the allies would not suffer the troops of Russia to enter within the walls of Wismar. This treatment suddenly roused the resentment of the czar, who plainly perceived that his favorite and invidious project of a



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settlement in Germany, as a prince of the empire, would be obstinately opposed by all the powers of the Baltic. He now therefore formed a resolution of withdrawing himself from the alliance in which he was engaged. And though he had consented to take the command of the combined fleets, in order to effect a descent upon the Swedish province of Schonen, he at once changed the whole course of his policy. Far from putting this plan into execution, he appeared determined to make Denmark feel the effects of his vengeance. In the month of September 1716, secretary Stanhope, then with the king at Hanover, wrote to lord Townshend, “that the czar had declared he would quarter his troops upon the Danish territories; and he adds, that M. Bernstorff thinks it necessary to crush the czar immediately; to secure his ships, and even to seize his person, to be kept till his troops shall have evacuated Denmark and Germany.”\* These violent Germanic counsels were checked and restrained indeed by the prudence, or perhaps the fears, of the English ministers: but the breach between the courts of London and Petersburg became every day more public; and the animosity of the czar being raised to the highest pitch, he now with eagerness acceded to the preliminaries

\* Coxe's State Papers.



of a convention, through the dexterous intervention of baron Goertz, with his inveterate rival the king of Sweden, with whom he had been near twenty years at war, and assented to the project of elevating the Pretender to the throne of Great Britain.

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With greater powers than those delegated to baron Goertz for the accomplishment of this project no subject can be invested. The terms of this extraordinary commission, dated Lund in Schonen, October 23, 1716, are as follow: "We CHARLES king of Sweden, Goths and Vandals, &c. have judged it necessary to constitute the said baron Goertz our minister plenipotentiary, and to grant him, by virtue of these presents, full powers to treat and conclude in our name, with all and singular persons of what condition soever, all matters which may relate to our service and be for our interest; promising on our royal word, that we will approve and ratify, and put entirely in execution, whatever the said baron Goertz shall so transact and conclude. In sure testimony whereof we have caused our seal to be affixed to these presents, and signed the same with our own hand."—When the king of England passed through Holland, on his return from Hanover, January 1717, the czar Peter was at the Hague; but the two monarchs were mutually indisposed to a personal interview. A



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conference between his czarish majesty and baron Goertz took place soon after at Loo, in which the foundation was probably laid of the good understanding which was in a short time established between Sweden and Russia. Of the singular character of this famous minister a portrait has been drawn, which it would be presumption to attempt to heighten or retouch. "Never was any man at the same time so supple and so audacious; so full of resources in disgrace; so vast in his designs; so active in his measures. Affrighted at no end, hesitating at no means, he was prodigal of gifts and of promises, of oaths, of truth, and of falsehood. He was a man capable of overturning the political system of Europe, and he had conceived the idea of effecting it. That monarch, who at the age of twenty had issued his commands to count Piper, now submitted to receive lessons from baron Goertz. He had remarked," as the same historian (M. Voltaire) affirms, "that, amongst all the enemies of the king of Sweden, George elector of Hanover and king of England was the person against whom he harboured the bitterest resentment, because he was the only one whom he had never injured or offended—because George had entered into this quarrel professing to aim at conciliation, though his only object was to keep possession of Bremen and Verden,



to which he had no other right than that which he derived from a pretended purchase of the king of Denmark, to whom they did not belong.”

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But the good fortune of the king of England, which throughout the whole course of his life was ever remarkable, delivered him from all apprehensions, by the death of the king of Sweden, who was shortly afterwards killed in the trenches be-


Death of  
Charles  
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fore the fortress of Frederickshall in Norway, November 30, 1718, O. S.\*; an event which produced great political convulsions in Sweden, in the first shock of which baron Goertz lost his head on the scaffold. This monarch was one of the most remarkable characters which the present or indeed any age has produced. Attacked in early youth, without pretence or provocation, by an ambitious and unprincipled confederacy of kings, he defended himself with heroic valor and glorious success. But intoxicated by a long and uninterrupted course of prosperity, inflamed with an eager desire of revenge, and indulging wild and extravagant ideas of conquest, he refused with disdain all terms of accommodation, and at length expe-

His Character.

\* His fall was destined to a barren strand,  
A petty fortress, and a dubious hand :  
He left that name at which the world grew pale,  
To point a moral or adorn a tale.



BOOK VII.  1718. rienced a fatal reverse of fortune, the calamitous consequences of which Sweden still most sensibly feels. Nevertheless the memory of this romantic monarch is held in high veneration by the Swedes, who yet celebrate the anniversary of his birth with an enthusiasm due only to that of the great restorer of Swedish liberty and independency, the illustrious GUSTAVUS VASA, a name profaned and insulted by this commemoration; for a tyranny more oppressive than that of Charles XII was never exercised, nor a submission more abject ever exacted by any monarch from any people.

1717. The parliament of Great Britain was again convened in the month of November 1717. The king in his speech assured the two houses that his endeavours to preserve the public tranquillity had not been unsuccessful; and that he had reason to believe they would in the end produce their full effect. A considerable reduction of the army was in consequence proposed on the part of the ministers, who contented themselves with moving for 18,000 men only for the service of the ensuing year. Even this force was deemed by the opposition very unnecessary, and an effort was in vain made to limit the number to 12,000.

High Debates in Parliament. Mr. Walpole, in particular, declaimed with much energy on the danger of a standing army in a



free country ; and he affirmed, that though a considerable proportion of the privates had been disbanded, the officers had been retained, and the soldiers wanting to complete the several companies and regiments might be raised by beat of drum in twice twenty-four hours ; so that a force double to what was intended by parliament was virtually vested in the crown : and Mr. Shippen, in the course of a very able speech, declared the expense attending the army to be the smallest objection to it. The chief argument against it was, that the civil and military power would not long subsist together. Far from being necessary to our protection, he apprehended so great a force to be inconsistent with our safety. In certain circumstances an army might be necessary, but in such circumstances it was only to be chosen as the lesser evil ; for that, abstractedly considered, it was an evil, every lover of liberty must acknowledge. “ I know” (said this inflexible patriot) “ that these assertions interfere with some paragraphs of his majesty’s speech. But we are to consider that speech as the composition of the ministers and advisers of the crown, and we are therefore at liberty to controvert every proposition in it, *particularly those which seem calculated rather for the MERIDIAN OF GERMANY than of GREAT BRITAIN.* But it is the infelicity of his majesty’s reign, that

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*he is unacquainted with our language and* CONSTITUTION; and it is therefore the more incumbent upon his British ministers to inform him, that our government does not stand upon the same foundation with that which is established in his German dominions. If we recur to the history of Europe, we shall find that the nations once free have lost their liberties by allowing, on some plausible pretence of exigence, their princes to maintain an armed force during peace. They perceived, too late, that they had erected a power superior to themselves, and they now wear the chains which they forged for their own necks. The consent of parliament is indeed alleged in favor of the army entrusted to the crown in this country. But the consent of parliament cannot alter the nature of things, or prevent the same causes from producing the same effects. No art can disguise from an army, however denominated, the knowledge of its own strength; and the experience of the last century has taught us, that a parliament army may give as deep a wound to the constitution as an army of the crown. So long as the army, therefore, is continued, so long is the constitution suspended; so long is it at the mercy of those who command it."

During this speech, Mr. Lechmere had taken down in writing those marked expressions appa-



rently pointed not so much against the ministers as the king; and when Mr. Shippen had sat down, Mr. Lechmere immediately rose, and stated to the house, that these words were a scandalous invective against his majesty's person and government—such as merited the highest resentment of that house; and he therefore moved, that the member who had spoken them be committed to the Tower. This motion was immediately seconded by Mr. Spencer Cowper, supported by sir Joseph Jekyl and various others; on which Mr. Walpole desired that the member might be permitted to explain these rash words spoken in the heat of debate. But Mr. Shippen declared that he desired no such indulgence, and that the words needed neither explanation nor apology. The house in a flame immediately resolved that the chairman leave the chair; and the speaker resuming his place, Mr. Farrer, member for Bedford, reported from the committee the words spoken by Mr. Shippen; upon which Mr. Shippen withdrew. And the question being put, “that the words spoken by William Shippen, esq., a member of this house, are highly dishonorable to, and unjustly reflecting on, his majesty's person and government,” it was carried in the affirmative by 175 voices against 81—and the speaker was ordered to issue



BOOK his warrant for the immediate commitment of  
VII. Mr. Shippen to the Tower.

1718. In the course of the session a remarkable debate took place on the introduction of the annual bill for the prevention of mutiny and desertion ; when Mr. Walpole again appeared as the champion of the rights and liberties of a great and high-spirited nation determined to live or to die free. Martial law was declared by him, and many other patriots in the house, to be a law unknown to our constitution, destructive of our liberties, and not endured by our ancestors ; and it was moved that the offences committed by the soldiery be cognisable and punishable by the civil magistrate. On the clause, whether courts-martial should punish mutiny and desertion with death, it was carried in the affirmative by 247 voices against 229. Upon this occasion Mr. Walpole used the memorable expression, “ He that is for blood shall have blood.” In the house of lords, where the debate was renewed with equal vehemence, the bill finally passed by a majority of 88 against 61 voices. These were great and noble, though unsuccessful exertions : but the spirit of the nation was not yet subdued to that tameness and indifference, or rather that lethargic stupor, which is the too certain forerunner of national



thralldom. An incident demanding historic notice happened in the month of March this year, 1718, in the trial and execution of James Shepherd, a youth under nineteen years of age, for a most singular and atrocious design upon the life of the king. He had imbibed from his childhood the highest principles of monarchical right; and regarding the present sovereign as an unjust invader of the crown, he formed a cool and deliberate resolution to assassinate him. On the 24th of January he left a letter at the house of Mr. John Leake, a non-juring clergyman, in which he declared his belief, from the discontents visible throughout the kingdom, that, if the prince now reigning could be removed, the KING might be settled on the throne without loss of blood. In order to effect this, he professes his readiness, should it be thought advisable to trust one so young, to convey letters of invitation to *his majesty*, then in Italy; and on his arrival in England I will, said he, smite the usurper in his palace. He acknowledged, nevertheless, the temerity of his attempt, and the probability of his suffering a cruel death; which, that he might the better support, he desires, from the period of his return to England to that of making the attempt, to receive every day the holy sacrament from one who, that he may be exempt from any participation in the danger,



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1718. shall be entirely ignorant of the design. Leake, in the highest degree alarmed at the contents of this epistle, gave immediate information to the magistrates; and, on Shepherd's again repairing to the house, he was apprehended. Upon being examined at the office of lord Sunderland, he avowed himself, without hesitation, the writer of the letter, glorying in his design, which he affirmed had been for three years past in his contemplation. On his trial he disdained to make any defence, but acknowledged the truth of the depositions, and declared, with great magnanimity, that he died a willing martyr to his principles. At the place of execution he was attended by one Orme, a non juring priest, who gave him public absolution; for which daring insult on the government, he was taken into custody, but soon afterwards discharged, nothing further being proved against him. Shepherd died with undaunted and heroic firmness, leaving to mankind an instructive and memorable example in how dreadful a degree the most admirable qualities of the human mind may be perverted and depraved by a fatal conjunction with speculative errors.

Such was the dispatch of public business at this period, that the session of parliament closed March 21, 1718; a few days previous to which, the king, by royal message, informed the house of



commons, "that he had reason to judge, from the information he had lately received from abroad, that an additional naval force would be necessary;" and an address was moved and presented, assuring his majesty "that the house would make good such exceedings as his majesty in his royal wisdom should deem necessary for the purpose of giving effect to his unwearied endeavours to preserve the *peace of Europe*." No division on this motion took place, Mr. Walpole alone observing, "that this *pacific address* had violently the air of a declaration of *WAR*."

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This conjecture proved, unhappily, prophetic; a new and interesting scene now began to open, and the designs of the court of Herenhausen gradually unfolded themselves. Though Bremen and Verden had been several years in the actual possession of the king of England, the investiture of those duchies by the emperor was still wanting to complete the validity of the purchase. This, therefore, had been for some time past the grand object of the attention and solicitude of the English court. And as the emperor, notwithstanding the recent renewal of treaties, affected delay, and indicated much reluctance to comply with the eager applications of the English monarch, means were to be devised to obviate his objections, or at least to convince his imperial majesty how much it concerned the interests of



BOOK the court of Vienna not to insist too strongly or  
VII. pertinaciously upon them. By the treaty of  
1718. Utrecht, the kingdoms of Naples and Sardinia  
were ceded to the house of Austria, together  
with Milan and the Low Countries; and the  
island of Sicily, with the title of king, to the  
duke of Savoy. This was a subject of bitter  
chagrin to the emperor, who was anxiously  
desirous to annex to his other Italian dominions  
that opulent and extensive island, from time  
immemorial connected with the neighbouring  
kingdom of Naples, from which it had been so  
recently disjoined by an act of political violence.

The intrigues of the court of Vienna to this  
purpose were well known to the Hanoverian  
cabinet; and, so long since as November 1716,  
secretary Stanhope, speaking of the situation of  
Victor Amadeus of Savoy, in a dispatch to lord  
Townshend from Hanover, used these words:  
“He will think himself very happy if the king  
can secure his peace with the emperor at the  
expense of Sicily; so that we may boldly offer  
Sicily to the emperor, and may, I hope, secure  
his assistance for these NORTHERN AFFAIRS.”  
On the other hand, Spain was no less dissatisfied  
with the situation in which she was left by the  
treaty of Utrecht than the emperor. Her pride  
was deeply wounded by the forcible dismember-  
ment of her monarchy, though the experience of



a century had shewn how little accession of strength she really derived from the possession of those detached and remote provinces, or rather how great an increase of weakness. Cardinal Alberoni, prime minister of Philip V, a man of a lofty and aspiring genius, which delighted to form bold and dangerous projects, at this time entertained the chimerical hope of re-uniting to the monarchy of Spain the kingdoms and provinces of which she had been divested. And the emperor, being actually engaged in a war with Turkey, the cardinal embraced the opportunity to equip a formidable armament, which sailed from Barcelona July 1717, and, landing at Cagliari, the capital of Sardinia, soon made an entire conquest of the island; pretending, as a reason for this invasion, the previous violation of the most positive engagements on the part of the emperor; or, to adopt the haughty language of the court of Madrid, of the *archduke*.

It must be remarked that no definitive treaty had taken place between Spain and the emperor since the war of the succession, nor had the respective titles of these rival potentates been as yet reciprocally and formally acknowledged. "Greatness of soul," says the marquis de Grimaldi, in his circular letter addressed to the ministers of the several foreign courts, "made his majesty bear the dismemberment of his domi-

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1718. nions, which the plenipotentiaries would sacrifice to the tranquillity of Europe. After which he persuaded himself that these stipulated sacrifices would at least have secured to him the rest of this nation, as glorious as afflicted. But no sooner had he complied with the surrender of Sicily in favor of the repose of Spain, upon the condition of the evacuation of Catalonia and the island of Majorca, than he found that the orders received for that purpose were concealed ; and when at last it came to the knowledge of his allies, it was pretended that the treaty should be executed, by virtue whereof his majesty demanded the evacuation of the places. Nothing was more easy for that purpose than for the garrisons of the *archduke* to have surrendered to the king's troops the gates of the places they possessed, in the same manner as was reciprocally practised among the potentates of Europe. But quite on the contrary ; the generals of the *archduke* violating the public faith of treaties, and the reciprocal engagements, abandoned the places to the Catalans, making them at the same time believe that they would soon return, and thereby fomented their disquiet and rebellious spirit so far as to induce them to think of a furious and obstinate resistance." The war carried on against the Ottoman Porte by the emperor was occasioned by the ambition of the sultan Achmet III. to



recover possession of the Morea, ceded to the Venetians by the treaty of Carlowitz. The court of Vienna, actuated at this period by the lofty genius of prince Eugene, first remonstrated against so flagrant a violation of that treaty of which she was one of the chief contracting parties and guarantees; and then openly commenced hostilities in defence of the rights of her ally. The vast but undisciplined armies of the Turks were found unable to cope with the superior skill and extraordinary talents of the imperial general, who, in the course of this new war, fully sustained the glory he had formerly acquired in the fields of Zenta. Crossing the Danube in the sight of the enemy, he gained a complete victory (A. D. 1716) at Peterwaradin;—the grand visir, Ali Coumourgi, and almost all the pachas and agas who commanded under him, with the flower of the Turkish army, perishing in the battle, which was immediately followed by the siege and capture of Temeswar, and the reduction of a great part of Walachia. Early in the following campaign prince Eugene invested Belgrade; and an immense army of 150,000 men being assembled by the new grand visir, Astchi Ali, for its relief, encamped on the heights surrounding that city in the form of an amphitheatre, through the openings of which flow the rivers Save and Danube: so that the besiegers were themselves in a

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manner besieged. The imperial general did not await the attack; but, marching out of his entrenchments, charged the enemy with such impetuosity that they were again totally defeated, with the loss of their camp, artillery, and baggage—the field being covered with a countless multitude of the slain. Belgrade surrendered the very next day; and the Sublime Porte, being thrown into the utmost consternation by these repeated disasters, immediately set on foot a negotiation, which, under the mediation of the maritime powers, terminated in a pacification signed at Passarowitz, September 1, 1718. Conformably to the terms of this treaty, the conquests acquired by the heroic valour and high fortune of prince Eugene remained with the emperor; while, on the other hand, the Turks were suffered to retain the Morea, the successful invasion of which constituted the original pretext for the court of Vienna to interfere as a party in the war.

The duplicity, or rather the perfidy of Spain, during these transactions, was so gross as to excite the indignation of all Christendom. The catholic king had given strong and repeated assurances to the pope, that he would not undertake any thing against the emperor whilst his army should be employed in so religious a cause, and would even aid the Venetians with a squadron of men of war. The ships so sent did not



however arrive in the Levant till the season for action had elapsed. And the circular letter or manifesto of M. de Grimaldi openly avowed, BOOK  
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1718. “that his catholic majesty looked upon the war with the Turks to have opened to him a gate of revenge in recovering those territories which had been usurped from him by the *archduke*.” On which a sort of counter-declaration was published by the cardinal Paulucci, secretary to the pope, to clear his holiness from the imputation of any collusion in this affair; and expressive of vehement resentment at the violation of faith in his catholic majesty, for whose neutrality during the Turkish war the pontiff had pledged himself in the most solemn manner.

The emperor loudly complaining of this hostile, and, as he termed it, sacrilegious attack, while his armies were combating the common enemy of the Christian faith, and the king of Spain professing a willingness to submit the justice of his quarrel to equitable arbitration, the king of England, and the regent of France, in concert with the states general, undertook the accommodation of these differences. And conferences being opened with the court of Vienna, the famous **QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE** was at length concluded, July 1718, at London, between these formidable powers, by which it was determined that Sardinia, now actually in the possession of



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1718. Spain, should be transferred to the house of Savoy, and Sicily, incomparably a more valuable possession, ceded in exchange to the emperor.

In vindication of this arbitrary and violent measure the following very extraordinary reason is assigned in the preamble of the treaty : “ The powers by which the treaty of Utrecht was set on foot believe that article, viz. ‘ the cession of Sicily to the house of Savoy,’ which is not essential to the treaty, may justly be altered, even without the consent of the parties concerned, as it tends to the perfection of the treaty.” The pretensions of Spain were altogether disregarded ; only it was stipulated that the succession to the duchies of Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia, claimed by the queen of Spain as heiress of the houses of Medici and Farnese, should devolve upon her eldest son, in case of a failure of male issue : and three months only were allowed to the parties interested in these cessions to declare their acceptance or rejection.

But though the regent of France, from his eager desire to secure the friendship of England, and from personal animosity to the king of Spain, entered entirely into the views of the English monarch upon this occasion, he retained at the bottom all the Bourbon prejudices against the house of Austria. The principle obstacle to the alliance concluded A. D. 1716-17 between Great



Britain and France, was the unwillingness of the regent to assent to the expulsion of the Swedes, the ancient enemies of the imperial house from Germany. And he at no period discovered any further indifference respecting the political interests of the country which he governed, than a regard to his own interest and the great objects of his personal ambition, the ruling passion of his mind, rendered absolutely requisite\*.

Spain, as may be imagined, was little dis-

\* After several years had intervened from the date of the alliance concluded at the Hague in January 1717, the ambassador, lord Stair, in a dispatch to his own court, says: "I have all along endeavoured to persuade the regent, that, in the present state of the kingdom of Sweden, it can be of no great use to France that that crown should preserve a foot in the empire; and that the true and solid balance against the emperor, and for preserving the liberty of Germany, must be by making a close conjunction among the princes of the North of Germany. This thought, in general pleases the regent very well; but he does by no means like the particular part of it, to deprive the crown of Sweden of their dominions in Germany."—*HARDWICKE Papers*.

When affairs after this took a different turn, when jealousies and dissensions arose between the emperor and the king of England, and hopes were entertained that England might be effectually detached from the Austrian interest, the regent-court of Versailles entered with eagerness into the projects of Hanoverian aggrandisement, even at the expense of Sweden—sensible that this sacrifice was trivial in comparison of the advantage gained by France in depriving Austria of the friendship and political support of Great Britain.



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1718. posed to acquiesce in this settlement. In the month of April preceding, we find cardinal Alberoni, in a letter to lord Melcombe, envoy at Madrid, thus expressing himself: “ Il n’y a une seule gazette qui me dise que votre ministère n’est plus Anglois mais Allemand; et qu’il est vendus lâchement à la cour de Vienne, et que par les brigues *inconnus dans votre pays* on tache de faire donner dans le panneau la nation aussi.” The propositions of general Stanhope, the English secretary of state, who was himself invested with the character of ambassador extraordinary to the court of Madrid on this occasion, were refused with disdain. A still more formidable armament than that which had last year effected the conquest of Sardinia was now fitted out by the indefatigable exertions of the cardinal, destined for the invasion of Sicily; his Sicilian majesty having concerted his own measures with the court of Vienna, and wisely resolving to submit to terms which he would in vain attempt to resist.

The Spaniards having landed their forces, consisting of 30,000 men, flattered themselves with the speedy reduction of this rich and beautiful island. But the king of England relying with a too well-founded assurance on the obsequious acquiescence of his parliament, though England had no imaginable motive to interfere in these distant scenes of contention, caused a formidable



fleet to sail for the Mediterranean, under the command of sir George Byng, with peremptory orders to attack the Spanish fleet if engaged in any hostile enterprise against Naples or Sicily. The British admiral, on his arrival off Cadiz, transmitted by his secretary a copy of his instructions to the cardinal, who perused them with great emotion; and throwing the paper passionately on the ground, in the spirit of rashness and folly, returned for answer, "that the chevalier Byng might execute the orders he had received from the king his master.\*" The admiral, pro-

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\* The instructions of the admiral were as follow:—  
"You are to make instances with both parties to cease from using any further acts of hostility; but in case the Spaniards do still insist, with their ships of war and forces, to attack the kingdom of Naples, or other the territories of the emperor in Italy, or to land in any part of Italy, which can only be with a design to invade the emperor's dominions, against whom only they have declared war by invading Sardinia; or if they should endeavour to make themselves masters of the kingdom of Sicily, which must be with a design to invade the kingdom of Naples, in such case you are with all your power to hinder and obstruct the same. If it should so happen that, at your arrival with our fleet under your command in the Mediterranean, the Spaniards should already have landed any troops in Italy in order to invade the emperor's territories, you shall endeavour amicably to dissuade them from persevering in such an attempt; and offer them your assistance to help them to withdraw their troops, and put an end to all further acts of hostility. But in case these your friendly endeavours should prove ineffectual, you shall, by keeping company with, or intercepting their



**BOOK** ceeding therefore on his voyage, cast anchor with  
**VII.** his whole fleet in the bay of Naples, where the  
**1718.** magnificence of the spectacle drew immense  
multitudes of people to the surrounding shores,  
which resounded with loud acclamations.

On receiving intelligence from count Daun, the viceroy, that Messina, the capital of Sicily, was reduced to the last extremity, he again weighed anchor, and on the 9th of August, 1718, came in sight of the Faro of Messina; and dispatched his own captain with a message to the marquis de Lede, commander of the Spanish forces, proposing a cessation of arms in Sicily for two months, that the powers of Europe might have opportunity to concert measures for restoring a lasting peace; declaring at the same time, that, should this proposal be rejected, he should, in pursuance of his instructions, use all his force to prevent further attempts to disturb the dominions the king his master had engaged to defend. The Spanish general answered, "that he had no power to treat of an armistice, but should obey his orders, which were to reduce Sicily to the dominion of his master the king of Spain." On the 11th of August the Spanish fleet, consisting of twenty-seven sail of the line, was

ships or convoys, or, if it be necessary, by openly opposing them, defend the emperor's territories from any further attempt."



descried off the coast of Calabria, lying to in the order of battle : and though, on the approach of the British squadron, they bore away, apparently with the view of maintaining a running fight, the superior manœuvres of the English commander soon brought on a close action, which, before sun-set, terminated in the almost total destruction of the Spanish fleet—Don Castanita, the commander in chief, and three other admirals, being captured. Captain Walton being detached by sir George Byng with five ships of the line in pursuit of a division of the Spaniards much superior in force, acquainted the English admiral with the event of his undertaking in the following memorable letter : “ Sir, we have destroyed all the Spanish ships and vessels which were upon the coast, the number as per margin.” Upon inspecting the margin of this laconic epistle, no less than thirteen ships of war of different descriptions were found comprised in it. It is said that rear-admiral Cammock, a native of Ireland, who commanded one of the divisions of the Spanish fleet, proposed to the commander in chief to remain in the road of Paradise, where the coast is bold, and the anchorage good, with their broadsides to the sea in order of battle, a position in which the British fleet might have been greatly annoyed from the batteries erected on shore, and the various and rapid currents would have pre-

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1718. vented a close and regular approach. But the evil genius of Spain predominated, and this proposal was rejected.

In reward of this great victory sir George Byng was raised to the dignity of the peerage, by the style and title of Viscount Torrington, and received other distinguished marks of the royal favour. But the court of Madrid exclaimed in the most bitter and passionate language against the conduct of England, as contrary to the law of nations, and a flagrant violation of the most solemn engagements; and orders were issued at all the ports of Spain and the Indies for making reprisals upon the English—a blow most severely felt by the mercantile part of the community; which, since the grant of the Assiento, had carried on a most lucrative commerce with the Spanish colonies in America. In consequence of this hostile procedure, war was formally declared by England against Spain, which was soon followed by a like declaration on the part of the regent of France. To this decisive measure the duke of Orleans was incited, not merely by a desire to maintain inviolate his engagements with England, but by a recent provocation on the part of Spain of the most serious nature.

Whatever efforts the court of Madrid, under the direction of so ardent and enterprising a genius as Alberoni, was capable of making, it



could scarcely be imagined possible that she could ultimately succeed in her designs against so formidable a confederacy. The cardinal therefore did not hesitate to employ all the arts of political intrigue, in order to compensate his deficiency of force. France abounded with malcontents, and the regent had many enemies, who either wished his removal, or were interested in the execution of the late king's will—assigning the regency to his legitimated son, by the celebrated madame de Montespan, the duc de Maine. These malcontents were favourably heard at the court of Madrid; and the prince de Cellamare, the Spanish ambassador at Paris, was ordered to treat with them. A plot was soon formed, and a great number of persons of rank and distinction were involved in the conspiracy. The project was, to seize the regent, when engaged in one of those parties of pleasure which were frequent with him in the vicinity of Paris. The king's person was at the same time to be secured, and orders were to be issued to the governors of the different provinces and towns to assemble the parliaments for settling the government, whilst the states of the kingdom should meet and make a final determination of matters. The mines were charged, and ready to spring, when the regent received from the king of England an intimation that some attempt was con-

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1718. triving against his person and government. This notice, though general only, was of great use in exciting the vigilance of the regent and his ministers, who from that time kept a very strict watch over all suspected persons, particularly the duke and duchess of Maine, and the prince de Cellamare. At length the whole affair was discovered by the following accident. The ambassador of Spain, for the greater safety, had entrusted his dispatches, containing intelligence of the most secret and important nature, to the abbé de Portocarrero, and a son of the marquis de Monteleone. These emissaries set out from Paris in a chaise, and had not proceeded two leagues before the carriage broke down. On this occasion the abbé shewed much more concern for his portmanteau than for himself, and he had the indiscretion to protest that he would not have lost it for an hundred thousand pistoles. The driver of the *voiture*, astonished at this declaration, gave notice, on his return to Paris, to the police of what he had seen and heard. The Spaniards being pursued, were overtaken and seized at Poitiers. The whole conspiracy being thus detected, the prince de Cellamare was arrested, and his papers secured. Soon after he was conducted under a guard to the frontier. The marquis de Pompadour, and several other persons of note, were committed to different



prisons. The duc de Maine was sent to Dour-  
lens, the duchess to Dijon, and the cardinal de  
Polignac was ordered to his abbey of Auchin,  
where he remained under confinement.

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The declaration of war on the part of the regent was accompanied by a manifesto, stating the causes of the rupture, and concluding with the following paragraph. "We now see with horror what it was which made the minister of Spain inaccessible to all projects of peace. He would thereby have seen all the odious plots which he formed against us prove abortive. He would have lost all hopes of laying this kingdom desolate, of raising up France against France, of having the management of rebels among all the orders of the state, of kindling a civil war in the bosom of our provinces, and, in fine, of becoming to us the scourge of Heaven, by putting in execution those seditious projects, and springing that mine which was to serve as a prelude to the conflagration. What a recompense is this to France for the treasures and blood of which she has been so profuse for the sake of Spain."

The parliament of Great Britain again meeting in the month of November (1718), the king in his speech declared, "that the court of Spain had rejected all his amicable proposals, and had broke through their most solemn engagements for the security of the British commerce. To vindicate



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therefore the faith of his former treaties, as well as to maintain those he had lately made, and to protect and defend the trade of his subjects, which had been violently and unjustly oppressed, it became necessary for his naval forces to check their progress. That, notwithstanding the success of his arms, that court had lately given orders at all the ports of Spain and the West Indies, to fit out privateers against the English. He said he was persuaded a British parliament would enable him to resent such treatment; and he assured them his good brother the regent of France was ready to concur with him in the most vigorous measures."

It is necessary to remark, that, during the late recess of parliament, several alterations had taken place in the principal offices of government. The highest ambition of the earl of Sunderland was at length gratified, by his promotion to the head of the treasury, in the room of general Stanhope, who joyfully resumed his former post of secretary of state—being now, moreover, created a peer of the realm, under the title of earl Stanhope. Mr. Addison, who was found essentially deficient in the requisite qualifications for his situation, resigned at the same time, under colour of ill health and the fatigues of office, to Mr. Craggs. And Mr. Aislavie was appointed to the chancellorship of the exchequer—the affairs of govern-



ment in the house of commons being now chiefly conducted by these able though subordinate ministers. Lastly, the great seal of England, recently relinquished by lord Cowper, was transferred to lord chief justice Parker, created earl of Macclesfield. An address of thanks and congratulation, in reply to the speech delivered from the throne, being proposed, it was forcibly urged, that such address might be attended with the most serious consequences, as stamping with the approbation of parliament measures which, upon examination, might appear equally contrary to the law of nations and the interests of Great Britain. And it was moved in the house of peers, by lord Strafford, that the instructions of admiral Byng might be laid before the house. Earl Stanhope replied, "that there was no occasion to submit the admiral's instructions to public discussion, as the treaties, of which the late sea-fight was a necessary consequence, had already received the approbation of parliament. He accused the court of Spain of a violation of the treaty of Utrecht, and of public faith, in attacking the emperor while he was engaged in a war against the common enemies of Christendom. He added likewise, that it was high time to check the growth of the naval power of Spain, in order effectually to protect the British commerce, which had been violently oppressed by the Spaniards." His lordship said,



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“that in this whole affair his majesty had acted by the advice of his privy council, of which he was one; that he thought it an honor to have been one of the advisers of the late measures, and was ready to answer for them with his head.” In the lower house Mr. Walpole declaimed with much vehemence and energy against the measures in question; and affirmed, that to sanction them by the proposed address, would answer no other purpose than to screen from punishment the ministers of the crown who had dared to plunge the nation into a war with Spain, of which they now wished to relieve themselves from the responsibility. He declared, that, instead of the *entire satisfaction* which they were called upon to express, he would substitute an entire dissatisfaction—the conduct of the ministry being contrary to the laws of nations, and a breach of solemn treaties.

The address, however, was at length carried in both houses, though not without considerable difficulty—the numbers in the upper house being 83 votes against 50, and in the lower 210 against 155 voices. On a subsequent message from the king, December 17, 1718, that he had found it necessary actually to declare war against Spain, the debate was renewed with fresh vigor. Mr. Shippen with unbroken spirit observed, “that there existed no necessity for involving this na-



tion in a war on account of any mercantile grievances, as there was every reason to believe they might be amicably redressed ; and added, that the war seemed to be *calculated for another MERIDIAN.*” The expression, though amounting to a sort of defiance, passed unnoticed ; and Mr. Methuen, who had formerly been ambassador at Lisbon, accounted and apologised for the dilatoriness of the court of Spain, in respect to the mercantile grievances complained of, from the multiplicity and diversity of regulations which prevailed in the several provinces and ports of that kingdom. An expression occurring in one of the numerous papers upon this occasion submitted to the inspection of parliament, was animadverted upon as very extraordinary—it being therein intimated in plain terms, that the king of England, from motives of disinterested generosity, was willing to purchase peace for Europe at the expense and by the sacrifice of some possession appertaining to the British crown. This was said to be a very uncommon stretch of condescension. The king of Spain was to be tempted by an offer from England—which offer was suspected to be the cession of Gibraltar or Minorca—to accede to the terms of the quadruple alliance, by which nothing was gained by England ; and the great object of which was plainly the security of the king’s German acquisitions, and the aggrandise-



BOOK VII.  
1718. ment of Hanover. The expression referred to had been used by Mr. secretary Craggs in his reply to a memorial of M. de Monteleone, presented subsequent to the naval engagement off Messina. "I beg of your excellency," says the English minister, "to reflect, that the king has demanded no new advantage; that he does not seek to aggrandise himself by any new acquisition; but is rather inclined to sacrifice something of his own to procure that general quiet and tranquillity which he only desires to enjoy in common with the rest of his neighbours. And I have his majesty's orders to declare to your excellency, that he wishes, not only for peace, but even for the strictest friendship, with his catholic majesty; that he earnestly demands them both, and that on his part he offers them to him."

The supplies necessary for the national defence in this exigency were however voted with zeal and unanimity. But it was remarked that the declaration of war was not attended with those acclamations which had distinguished the commencement of the two former wars against France. The best and firmest friends of the government hesitated to approve those measures of violence which, by Mr. Walpole and the members of the secession in general, were deemed not merely injurious to the nation, but



eventually hazardous to the safety of those mi-  
nisters who should venture publicly to justify  
or support them; for it did not at this time  
clearly appear how far the complaisance of  
parliament would in time extend; nor was it  
previously very credible that the interests of three  
powerful kingdoms should be made entirely sub-  
servient, by men chosen to guard and protect  
them, to the aspiring views of a German elec-  
torate. But experience and observation taught  
these timid and scrupulous statesmen very diffe-  
rent and much juster notions of things.

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The attention of the public had recently been  
excited in a most uncommon degree by a sermon  
preached before the king at the Chapel Royal,  
by Dr. Benjamin Hoadley, lord bishop of Ban-  
gor, "On the nature of the kingdom of CHRIST."  
As the foundation of this memorable discourse,  
the bishop selected the famous declaration of  
Christ to Pilate, the Roman procurator—"MY  
KINGDOM IS NOT OF THIS WORLD." And the  
direct and undisguised object of it was, to prove  
"that the kingdom of Christ, and the sanc-  
tions by which it is supported, were of a na-  
ture wholly intellectual and spiritual—that the  
CHURCH, taking the term in its utmost latitude  
of signification, did not, and could not, possess  
the slightest degree of AUTHORITY under any  
commission, or pretended commission, derived



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1718. from him : that the church of England, and all other national churches, were merely civil or human institutions, established for the purposes of diffusing and perpetuating the knowledge and belief of Christianity; which contained a system of truths, not in their nature differing from other truths, excepting by their superior weight and importance; and which were to be inculcated in a manner analogous to other truths, demanding only, from their more interesting import, proportionably higher degrees of care, attention, and assiduity, in the promulgation of them." It is scarcely to be imagined, in these times, with what degree of furious and malignant rancor these plain, simple, and rational principles were attacked by the zealots and champions of the church. On the meeting of the convocation, a committee was appointed to examine this famous publication; and a representation was quickly drawn up, in which a most heavy censure was passed upon it, as tending to subvert all government and discipline in the church of Christ, to reduce his kingdom to a state of anarchy and confusion, to impugn and impeach the royal supremacy in matters ecclesiastical, and the authority of the legislature to enforce obedience in matters of religion by civil sanctions. A sudden stop, however, was put to these disgraceful proceedings, by a royal prorogation; and from



this period the convocation has never been convened but as a mere matter of form, and for the purpose of being again prorogued. The controversy which thus commenced was carried on for several years with great ability and animation on the part of the bishop, aided by various excellent pens, though opposed by men whose learning and talents gave an artificial lustre to bigotry and absurdity. No controversy however, upon the whole, ever more fully and completely answered the purpose intended by it. The obscurity in which this subject had been long involved was dissipated. The public mind was enlightened and convinced. CHURCH AUTHORITY, the chimæra vomiting flames, was destroyed; and the name of HOADLEY will be transmitted from generation to generation, with increase of honor, of esteem, and grateful veneration. It would be injustice also to deny to the king himself his share of praise, for countenancing and supporting opinions so opposite to those which have usually constituted a part of the policy of princes, and which reflect equal credit upon his understanding and integrity.

As a far more important proof, however, of the liberal and benignant disposition of this monarch, earl Stanhope, his favorite and confidential minister, presented to the house of lords, December 1718, a bill for the repeal of the occa-

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Ineffectual  
Attempt to  
repeal the  
Test and  
Corpora-  
tion Acts.

sional conformity and schism acts, passed under the late administration ; and likewise such clauses of the test and corporation acts as operated to the exclusion of protestant dissenters from civil offices. The latter part of the bill had an unexpected and formidable obstacle to encounter, in the opposition of the lord Cowper, who joined the tory lords in sounding the alarm of *DANGER to the CHURCH*, should the dissenters be admitted to the common rights and privileges of citizens in the state. Dr. Wake, archbishop of Canterbury, a prelate eminent for learning and general respectability of character, but who, since his elevation to the primacy, seemed to have lost sight in a great measure of those principles to which he owed his advancement, employed upon this occasion some arguments against the dissenters which were considered by his former friends as not a little extraordinary. He affirmed, “ that the acts this bill proposed to repeal were the main bulwarks of the English church ; and though he had *all imaginable tenderness for well-meaning and conscientious dissenters*, he was compelled to say, that many of that persuasion had made a wrong use of the *favor and indulgence* shewn them at the revolution ; it was therefore deemed necessary for the legislature to interpose, in order to put a stop to the scandalous practice of occasional conformity. As to the act against schism—the



protest of the lords against which, reprobating, in the most indignant terms, that detestable statute, he had himself signed—his grace added, that the repeal of it was SUPERFLUOUS, as no advantage had been taken of the act to the prejudice of the dissenters.”

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In opposition to these *novel sentiments* of his grace, the bishop of Bangor demonstrated “that the acts styled by the archbishop the bulwarks of the church, under whatever false colours they might be disguised, were acts of real persecution : that, if the *mere pretext* of self-preservation, or self-defence, was once admitted as a sufficient ground for passing laws of this nature, all the heathen persecutions against Christians, and all the popish persecutions against protestants, would be justified : that the church of England as by law established stood not, and he trusted would never stand, in need of such miserable supports : that toleration was not a *favor* or *indulgence*, but a natural right ; and that the safety of the church was secured by no means so effectually, as by a regard to the just and equitable claims of their fellow-christians and fellow-citizens.” He added, “that the ardent and intemperate zeal which many displayed for the interests of the church was, he feared, principally incited by a regard to their own interests, and by a secret and fond attachment to the power, the honors, and the



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emoluments which appertain to it. The desire of power and riches, was, he owned, natural to all; but reason and religion ought to restrain men from indulging in it, to the injury or prejudice of others; or in any manner inconsistent with the general rights and liberties of mankind."

These sentiments of the bishop of Bangor were strongly enforced by Dr. Kennet bishop of Peterborough, who declared his opinion, that the repeal of the acts in question would not be detrimental to the church, but would redound to her advantage and security. He affirmed that the evidence of history proved the church to be most safe and flourishing when the clergy did not affect more power than appertains to their share, and were tender of the rights and liberties of their fellow-subjects: but that arbitrary measures and persecutions first brought, as the experience of the last century sufficiently evinced, scandal and contempt upon the clergy, and, at last, ruin both upon church and state. "The church," said this prelate, "is, I admit, a term of sacred and venerable import, and therefore it is that in the mouths of bigots, or of malicious and designing men, it has produced such fatal effects. 'The temple of the Lord—the temple of the Lord are we,' was of old the boast of the seditious and abandoned among the Jews, and was used as a colour and incentive to every evil purpose." The



bishop said, "that the dissenters, though the most zealous promoters of the revolution, had hitherto been no gainers by it; for it was well known that they enjoyed the full benefits of toleration under king James." And he stated, as a gross political absurdity, that they were incapacitated by the test from serving that government of which they were allowed to be the firmest friends;—and alluding to what had passed in the course of the debate, he declared, that he hoped it would not be thought sufficient, in opposition to the plainest dictates of justice and equity, which called aloud for the repeal of these acts, to say, "that the example of SWEDEN was otherwise."

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In this memorable debate, no one distinguished himself more than lord Lansdowne, who had imbibed in all their virulence the ancient principles of toryism; who had been a steady and inveterate enemy to the Hanoverian succession; and who was happy to embrace this occasion of pronouncing an invective against the dissenters, replete with malignant and sarcastic wit, and breathing a spirit which, unrestrained by external causes, would doubtless have displayed itself in all the terrors of the most sanguinary persecution. This nobleman declared, "that he always understood the act of toleration to be meant as an indulgence for tender consciences, not a licence for hardened ones—and that the



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1718. act to prevent occasional conformity was designed only to correct a particular crime of particular men, in which none were included but those followers of Judas who came to the Lord's supper for no other end but to sell and betray him. It is to me" (said his lordship) "a matter of astonishment, to hear the merit of dissenters so highly extolled and magnified within these walls. Who is there among us but can tell of some ancestor either sequestered or murdered by them? Who voted the lords useless? The dissenters.—Who abolished episcopacy? The dissenters.—Who destroyed freedom of parliament? The dissenters.—Who introduced government by standing armies? The dissenters.—Who washed their hands in the blood of their martyred sovereign? The dissenters.—Have they repented? No—they glory in their wickedness at this day. That they have remained not only quiet, but have appeared zealous in the support of the present establishment, is no wonder: for who but themselves, or their favorers, have been thought worthy of countenance? If universal discontent pervades at this time all ranks of people throughout the nation, the reason is plain, flagrant, and notorious: it arises from the insolence and the presumption of the dissenters, from their open insults of the clergy, from their public vindication of the murder of king Charles I, and their vile



reflexions upon the memory of queen Anne, ever dear to the people of England; besides other indecent and arrogant provocations, too many to enumerate, too grievous to endure. And if all this is done, not only with impunity, but with authority and reward, is there not more than sufficient reason for jealousy—a jealousy which this new attempt to break down all the fences and boundaries of the church at once will certainly have no tendency to extinguish? If, indeed,” (concluded his lordship) “there are individuals amongst them who pretend to peculiar merit, let them stand forth, and clearly and explicitly state their claims—for God forbid but that all of them should have their deserts!”

If at this distance of time, and on a cool and impartial review of facts, we are compelled severely to censure the conduct of the whigs, now exercising the entire powers of government, as exhibiting plain indications of the rage and hatred characteristic of a political faction, it is not difficult to conjecture, from this and similar specimens of tory eloquence, to what far more dangerous extremes of violence the opposite faction, if triumphant, were prepared to resort. The speculative principles of the whigs also being in their own nature just, beneficent, and generous, the spirit of their administration, after the first emotions of rancor and revenge were gratified, became in-



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 VII. the tories gained a permanent ascendancy, the  
 1718. certain foundation would have been laid of an  
 internal and everlasting system of oppression,  
 distraction, and calamity.

After a long debate, the house agreed to leave out the clauses respecting the corporation and test acts; in which state it was transmitted to and passed by the commons; and in the royal speech, at the close of the session, his majesty expressed the highest satisfaction at this signal instance of legislative wisdom and moderation\*. No sub-

\* Sir Robert Walpole, at this time in opposition, with a view to embarrass the measures of the court, spoke and voted against this repeal: and he is said frequently to have expressed, in the latter years of his life, his regret at having joined in the clamors of the high-church party on this occasion.—Lord Chesterfield, then a very young man, and in the service of the prince of Wales, who at this period countenanced the opposition, voted on the same side with more sincerity: “I thought it” (says he) “impossible for the honestest man in the world to be saved out of the pale of the church, not considering that matters of opinion do not depend upon the will—that it is as natural and allowable that another man should differ in opinion from me, as that I should differ from him; and that if we are both sincere, we are both blameless, and should consequently have mutual indulgence for each other.”—It may be transiently remarked, in answer to the virulent accusations of lord Lansdowne, that it is the height of folly, as well as injustice, to charge the acts of Cromwell’s usurpation upon the dissenters or presbyterians of the last century; when it is notorious



sequent attempt during this reign was made in parliament for the repeal of the test; for the king declared to lord Barrington, who was at this

that they opposed them to the utmost of their power, and that 200 members of the house of commons of that denomination were secluded by military violence from the house before the ordinance passed for the trial of the king. Had the condemnation of that merciless and perfidious tyrant—for such, notwithstanding his boasted private and personal virtues, he undoubtedly was—resulted from the unbiassed will of the nation, future ages might have applauded the act; though, as perpetrated by a desperate and lawless faction, in opposition to the public will, it is indeed the subject of just abhorrence. Let the guilt of the individuals concerned in this transaction, however, be what it may, why are we, who have only an historical knowledge of the fact, and who live in another age of the world, called upon to express our penitence and contrition for it? Certainly the service of the 30th of January is a political farce, upon which the wisdom of government ought long ago to have dropped the curtain. There is, indeed, a charge omitted by lord Lansdowne, but which might be properly urged against the dissenters, as containing not fictitious, but real culpability. It is, that, possessing the authority and confidence of the nation in the convention parliament of 1660, they had the unpardonable weakness to restore king Charles II. to the crown, without any previous limitations or conditions. Let the idolizers of kings, who have hearts to feel, if not understandings to be convinced, view the interesting and affecting portrait now in the possession of lord Elliot, of his illustrious ancestor sir John Elliot, who, with many other distinguished patriots, was, for his noble exertions in the cause of liberty, committed to the Tower, after the dissolution of the last of the early parliaments of Charles I. He is drawn pale, languishing, and



BOOK time accounted the head of the dissenters, “ that  
VII. he was assured by his ministers there were no  
1718. hopes of carrying this point; and he was per-  
suaded the dissenters were too much his friends  
to insist upon a thing which might be infinitely  
prejudicial to him without doing them any essen-  
tial good.” And in this declaration they uni-  
versally and cheerfully acquiesced. Such was the  
wise and liberal policy of this reign with respect  
to the dissenters, and such the grateful returns  
made by them to the court.

Previous to the recess of parliament a bill was  
unexpectedly brought in, under the sanction of  
the government, for limiting the peerage, by re-  
straining the crown from enlarging the present  
number of peers by more than six new creations  
—the king by message declaring, “ that he had  
so much at heart the security and constitution of  
parliaments in all future ages, as to be willing  
that his prerogative should not stand in the way  
of so great and necessary a work.” This was  
generally considered as a measure not so much  
of policy as resentment on the part of the crown,

emaciated;—but, disdaining to make the abject submission  
required of him by the tyrant, he expired under the excessive  
rigors of his confinement, leaving this portrait as a legacy  
and memento to his posterity and to mankind; who, in the  
contemplation of such enormities, have reason to rejoice

“ When Vengeance in the lurid air

“ Lifts her red arm expos’d and bare.”



eagerly and intemperately desirous to excite the chagrin and diminish the political importance of the prince of Wales; who had highly offended the court by the support he had for some time past given to the opposition. The court influence, weakened by the late secession, and in this instance opposed by the general sense of the nation, which saw its tendency to elevate the aristocracy, and by the *esprit du corps* of the house of commons, was at this juncture deemed not sufficiently powerful to carry this favorite project into effect: and the bill was withdrawn by lord Stanhope, in order to its revival with greater force the ensuing session. On the 18th of April 1719, the parliament was prorogued; and early in May, the king, accompanied by lord Stanhope and many other persons of distinction, set out on his second journey to the continent.

The parliament of Ireland assembling July 1, 1719, the duke of Bolton, lord lieutenant of that kingdom, in his speech, strongly urged the necessity of guarding the designs of the disaffected; and declared, "that it would be very pleasing to his majesty, if any method could be found, not inconsistent with the security of the church, to render the protestant dissenters more useful and capable of serving his majesty, and supporting the protestant interest than they now are,—they having upon all occasions given sufficient proofs



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of their being well affected to his majesty's person and government, and to the succession of the crown in his royal house. And this his excellency declared he was expressly ordered to lay before the legislature, as a thing greatly importing his majesty's service, and the national security." In consequence of this interposition an act passed to relieve the dissenters from certain penalties inflicted by the existing laws; but the repeal of the sacramental test, to which the king plainly extended his views, could not be obtained by any effort of regal influence from the equity or complaisance of the present parliament.

Wholly actuated by the blind and furious spirit of revenge, cardinal Alberoni had by this time formed a rash and romantic project for the restoration of the Pretender, who had recently quitted his residence, at Urbino in Italy; and repairing to Madrid, was received there with all the honors due to a king of Great Britain. And a new armament was equipped at Cadiz, on board of which 6000 regular troops, with arms for a much larger number, were embarked, under the command of the duke of Ormond. Scarcely, however, had they reached Cape Finisterre, but they were dispersed and shattered by a violent tempest, which totally disabled them from prosecuting their voyage. Two frigates only, with the earls Maréchal and Seaforth, and the marquis of Tullibar-



dine, with 300 Spanish soldiers on board, arrived, April 1719, on the northern coast of Scotland, where they were joined by some clans of highlanders. But on the approach of the king's forces, the highlanders, after a vain though vigorous attempt to defend the pass of Glenshiel, dispersed, and the Spaniards surrendered themselves prisoners of war.

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Meantime the efforts of the English arms abroad were attended with brilliant success. In consequence chiefly of the able and unintermitted exertions of sir George Byng, and the powerful assistance which the imperialists derived from the English fleet, the Spaniards were reduced to the humiliating necessity of evacuating the islands of Sicily and Sardinia. For though the marquis de Lede, notwithstanding the decisive victory obtained by sir George Byng, had compelled the city of Messina to surrender, the Spanish army was effectually precluded by the vigilance of the British admiral from receiving any reinforcements or supplies by sea. And, on the other hand, a numerous body of imperialists, commanded by the count de Merci, was landed on the island under convoy of the British fleet; by the vigorous co-operation of which the city of Messina was recovered. On the approach of spring, A. D. 1719, Palermo was invested; the count de Merci marching across the mountains, while the British fleet coasted along the shore.



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The marquis de Lede, who had retreated under the cannon of Palermo, now prepared to give battle to the imperialists, although in his circumstances a defeat must have proved fatal; when a felucca arrived with dispatches from the court of Madrid, empowering the marquis to sign a convention, by which Spain agreed to relinquish her pretensions to Sicily: and the shattered remains of her troops were immediately embarked at Tauromini for Barcelona. Such was the just confidence placed by the king of England in the zeal and ability of the gallant officer invested with the high and arduous commission thus prosperously terminated, that, in reply to an application for instructions, his majesty declared he would send him none, for that he well knew how to act without any. And the uniform success attending all his enterprises, vulgarly ascribed to fortune, a more just and accurate discernment, tracing the concatenation of events, perceived to be the natural consequence of the wisdom and vigor with which his measures were invariably planned and executed.

During these transactions in Sicily, lord Cobham, with a considerable force, made a descent on Spain, and took Vigo. Two line of battle ships, divers vessels on the stocks, and a great quantity of naval stores, were totally demolished by a detachment of French soldiers and English sailors acting in conjunction at Port Antonio on the coast of Biscay. Preparations also were mak-



ing for an expedition against Spanish America; and an army of French, which had penetrated into Spain under the duke of Berwick, reduced the towns of Fontarabia and St. Sebastian. So that the court of Madrid found itself attacked on all sides, its schemes completely disconcerted, and no resource left but to accede, however reluctantly, to the terms of the quadruple alliance. The disgrace of Alberoni immediately followed; his catholic majesty, by a letter under his own hand, ordering him to quit the kingdom in three weeks.

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The king of England was no less successful in his political negotiations than in his warlike exertions. The death of the king of Sweden had removed the grand obstacle to the restoration of peace in the north. The pretensions of the house of Holstein being wholly set aside, that monarch was succeeded by his younger sister Ulrica Eleonora, married to Frederic prince of Hesse Cassel, in whose favor she, with the consent of the Swedish diet, in a short time relinquished the sovereignty, of which the states of Sweden had, after the death of Charles XII, greatly abridged the prerogatives. The Swedish nation was now reduced to extremity. Drained of men and money, they were unable to continue the war; and almost the whole army, led by the late monarch into Norway, had miserably perished. Previous



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1719. to the decease of that extraordinary personage, a congress had been held between the Swedish and Russian plenipotentiaries in the isle of Aland, where an agreement was on the point of taking place, extremely prejudicial to the interests of George I, both as elector and king. On the catastrophe which happened at the close of the last year, the king of England dispatched lord Carteret, a nobleman of great address and ability, to break up the congress of Aland; lest Sweden, strengthened by a union with Russia, should persist in refusing the cession of Bremen and Verden\*. In this nefarious mission the Englishman succeeded but too well. Supported by the presence of an English fleet in the Baltic, he deluded Sweden with promises to assist in wresting from Russia Livonia and the other conquered provinces. The czar, incensed at the conduct of the Swedish government, sent a vast armament to the gulf of Bothnia; and landing 40,000 men in different parts of the kingdom, carried havoc and destruction into that unfortunate and devoted country, destroying eight towns and a vast number of hamlets or villages. With so potent an enemy to contend against, Sweden had no alternative but to throw herself into the arms of Britain. In July 1719, a provisional treaty was

\* Coxe's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 161.



concluded, and in November formally ratified, BOOK  
VII.  
1719.  
agreeably to the terms of which Bremen and Verden were ceded to Hanover, at the expense of a million of rix-dollars—a far more considerable sum than the revenues of that electorate were generally deemed competent to discharge. This peace was negotiated and signed by a Hanoverian minister, one Adolph-Frederic van Bassewitz, who had the presumption to engage in the name of his Britannic majesty, both as king and elector, immediately to renew the ancient alliances and friendships, &c. &c.; “*as also the guarantees upon the foundation of the treaty of peace concluded amongst the allies of the North, or which may be concluded or applied to the profit of the ducal house of Holstein Gottorp;*” or in plain terms, he undertakes to guaranty Sleswic to Denmark, Bremen and Verden to Hanover, and the eventual equivalent for Sleswic to the duke of Holstein. Immediately previous to the signing of this pacification, the guarantee of Sleswic to Denmark by Great Britain had been formally granted in direct contravention of the treaty of Travendahl, and no less to the sacrifice of the national honor than the hazard of the national safety. The kings of Poland, Prussia, and Denmark, under the mediation of Great Britain, agreed at the same time to a suspension of arms, which was speedily followed by definitive treaties



BOOK of peace. His Polish majesty contented himself  
VII. with a simple recognition of his right to the  
1719. crown. The king of Prussia acquired Stetin, and  
the Eastern Pomerania, on the payment of two  
millions of rix-dollars. And Denmark was al-  
lowed to retain possession of Sleswic on the resti-  
tution of the Western Pomerania and the city of  
Wismar, with its surrounding district, which are at  
this day all that remains of the splendid conquests  
of Gustavus Adolphus, acquired at so immense an  
expense of blood and treasure. The czar alone,  
full of indignation, menaced a serious continuance  
of the war, harassed Sweden with repeated de-  
scents, and absolutely refused to hear of the me-  
diation of Great Britain in any form.

After an absence of six months the king re-  
turned to London ; and on the 23d of November,  
1719, the parliament was opened by a popular  
speech, in which his majesty congratulated the  
two houses on the present happy posture of af-  
fairs. “ It had pleased God to strengthen the  
arms of Great Britain, and to prosper the several  
negotiations. One protestant kingdom, Sweden,  
had been already relieved by our seasonable in-  
terposition, and a foundation laid for such an  
union amongst the great protestant powers as  
would very much tend to the security of our holy  
religion ; and he affirmed, that the hand of God  
had been visibly with them in all their undertak-




ings." Thus are the real or supposed interests of religion wrested, and the sacred name of God profaned by artifice and ambition, and made to serve as a screen and cover for the most corrupt and selfish purposes. If we are called upon to believe in immediate interpositions of divine Providence, they must surely be intended to accomplish higher and nobler ends than the acquisition of Sleswic to Denmark, or Bremen to Hanover. Little disposition however to animadvert with severity on the system of court policy at present appeared. The near prospect of peace soothed and softened the minds of all, and dutiful and loyal addresses were returned. Two days only after the commencement of the session, the bill for limiting the peerage was again introduced. In allusion to this bill, the king in his speech from the throne had used these remarkable expressions: "As I can truly affirm that no prince was ever more zealous to increase his own authority than I am to perpetuate the liberty of my people, I hope you will think of all proper methods to establish and transmit to your posterity the freedom of our happy constitution, and particularly to secure that part which is most liable to abuse. I value myself," said he, "upon being the first who hath given you an opportunity of doing it; and I must recommend it to you to complete those measures which remained imperfect the last session." Certainly

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VII.

1719.



BOOK VII.  1719. it would be harsh and uncandid to ascribe this apparent generosity of sentiment to the exclusive influence of invidious motives; but the eagerness with which this bill, so derogatory to the prerogative, was patronised by the ministers of the crown, could not but excite the jealousy of men versed in the science of human nature. Lord Cowper observed, “that, besides the reasons which induced him last session to oppose the bill, another now existed equal in weight to all the rest—the earnestness with which it was recommended. Precipitation was always dangerous, and in many cases suspicious; and he could not help being of opinion, that, if there were no secret meaning in this bill, it would not be pressed upon the house in this extraordinary manner.” This insinuation the earl of Sunderland endeavoured to obviate by vehement asseverations of the honor and purity of his own motives, and those of his colleagues in office; and the object of the bill being in unison with the feelings, and favorable to the power and grandeur of the peerage, passed the house by a great majority of voices. But on its transmission to the commons it met with a very cold, changing by degrees into a very hostile, reception. Mr. Walpole particularly distinguished himself by the animation of his opposition to this bill. By an allusion *happily imagined*, he compared the two houses of parliament to the temples



of Fame and Virtue; and observed, "that among the Romans the former was placed behind the latter, to denote that fame was no otherwise attainable than by virtue. But, if the present bill passed into a law, one of the most powerful incentives to virtue would be taken away. He affirmed that this bill would not only operate as a discouragement to merit, but would endanger the constitution; that the peers were already possessed of sufficient privileges; but that the proposed limitation of their number would prodigiously enhance their authority, and in time reduce the commons to their ancient state of feudal dependency; that he was astonished their lordships could presume to send such a bill to that house, or that they could flatter themselves it would ever receive their concurrence, or expect that they would voluntarily exclude themselves and their posterity from the honors of the peerage. And he thought it a very injurious and ungrateful return in one who had himself been advanced to a participation of those honors for his public services, to endeavour, on his admission to the house of peers, to bar the door against future claimants. Besides this, he declared, on advert- ing to the clause which assigned to twenty-five Scottish peers hereditary seats in lieu of the sixteen elective ones, that the bill was a manifest violation of the act of union, and would endanger



BOOK the entire dissolution of it, by the high offence it  
VII. would give to the great body of the Scottish  
1719. peerage, in thus excluding them and their posterity from all future possibility of taking their seats as British peers." In the result, after a long and violent debate, and notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the court, the bill was *rejected* by a majority of 269 against 177 voices.

During this session the celebrated declaratory bill, for the better securing the dependency of Ireland upon the imperial crown of Great Britain, was introduced and passed; in which the supremacy of the appellant jurisdiction of the English house of peers, and the right of the English parliament to make laws to bind the kingdom of Ireland in all cases whatsoever, were asserted in a high tone, in consequence of the refractory spirit which had lately displayed itself in various instances in that kingdom. This act took its rise from an appeal to the house of peers in England, by Maurice Annesley, against a decree of the house of peers in Ireland, which was reversed by the English peers, and Annesley ordered to be put in possession of the estate of which he had been deprived. Pursuant to this order, the barons of the exchequer in Ireland issued an injunction to the sheriff of the county of Kildare to put the sentence in execution, and set a severe fine upon him for his pertinacious



non-compliance. On which the Irish house of peers discharged the fine, and passed a resolve that lord chief baron Gilbert, and the other barons of the exchequer, had acted in manifest derogation to the king's prerogative in his high court of parliament in Ireland, as also of the rights and privileges of that kingdom, and of the parliament thereof; and the barons were committed to the custody of the black rod. A representation also was transmitted to the king, setting forth their right to the final adjudication of causes in that kingdom. On this the house of peers in England resolved, that the Irish barons of exchequer had acted with courage, according to law, in support of his majesty's prerogative, and with fidelity to the crown of Great Britain; and an address was presented to the king, that he would be pleased to bestow on them some mark of his royal favor. Finally, the above-mentioned declaratory bill was framed, and passed with the single protest of the duke of Leeds; though in the house of commons it met with a vigorous opposition from Mr. Plumer, Mr. Hungerford, and lord Molesworth. It was, notwithstanding, submitted to with sufficient tameness by the Irish parliament. Nor was it conceivable at this period, by any effort of political sagacity, that Ireland would be in a situation, before the termination of the century, to



BOOK extort from England an entire and absolute  
VII. renunciation of these haughty and unjust pre-  
1720. tensions.

Introduc-  
tion of the  
South-Sea  
Bill.

This session of parliament was rendered for ever memorable by the introduction of the famous South-Sea bill by Mr. Aislabie, chancellor of the exchequer, which, after long and able discussion, received the royal assent, April 7 (1720). By this act, which proposed eventually to reduce all the different public securities into one grand aggregate fund, the South-Sea company was invested with certain commercial privileges, and authorised to take in by purchase or subscription both the redeemable and irredeemable debts of the nation, to the amount of about thirty-three millions, at such rates and prices as should be agreed upon between the company and the respective proprietors ;—a clause proposed in the house of commons, for ascertaining what share of the capital stock of the company should be vested in those proprietors of government stock who might voluntarily subscribe, being most unwisely rejected. In return, the company consented that the interest upon their original capital of nine millions four hundred thousand pounds, as well as the interest upon the public debts, to be redeemed in the mode prescribed by the present act, should, after Midsummer Day 1727, be reduced to 4 per cent. redeemable



by parliament. And, exclusive of this reduction, the company agreed to pay into the exchequer four years and a half purchase of all the long and short annuities that should be subscribed, and one year's purchase of such long annuities as should not be subscribed—amounting on the execution of the act to no less than seven millions; for raising which sum they were empowered to open books of subscription, to grant annuities redeemable by the company, and to convert the money so raised into additional stock. It is evident, from the wild and extravagant terms of this contract, that it was never meant to be seriously fulfilled. In vain did the sagacity of Walpole discern, and his eloquence display, the mighty mischiefs contained in this casket of Pandora; in vain did he urge the acceptance of the equitable and rational proposals of the Bank; the house was fascinated by the dazzling and magnificent appearance of the South-Sea project, and the bill passed with general applause, and by a vast majority of votes, fifty-five members only dividing against it. Early in June 1720 the session came to its termination, and the king declared his intention again to visit his dominions in Germany.

At this period the earl of Stair, who had for nearly six years past served his country with distinguished ability as ambassador at the court of

Dismission  
of the Earl  
of Stair.



BOOK VII.  
1720. Versailles, was unexpectedly recalled. He had been for some time not upon very cordial terms with the present ministers, with whom, as appears, he had recently and zealously interceded in vain for the pardon of the earl of Mar; who had been amused and deluded with false hopes of obtaining it. "Lord Mar," says the ambassador to Mr. Craggs, secretary of state, "is *outré* at the usage he has met with. He says our ministry may be great and able men, but that they are not skilful in making proselytes, or keeping friends when they have them. I am pretty much of his mind. He was certainly determined to leave the Pretender's interest. He is now full of resentment, and in most violent agitation\*." The contrast between the policy of the English court in this reign, and that of Henry IV. of France after his triumphs over the faction of the League, must be acknowledged very striking. But every king is not formed by nature for a hero. The immediate cause of the recal of lord Stair was a political difference of a somewhat serious complexion, which arose between him and the lords Sunderland and Stanhope, respecting the famous Law, raised by the regent to the comptroller-generalship of the finances, and whose credit at the French court, from the knowledge of his mis-

\* Hardwicke State Papers.



chievous designs, the ambassador had laboured to subvert. In a letter to Mr. secretary Craggs, dated February 14, 1720, he vindicates his public character and conduct with great spirit, and in a manner highly characteristic of his well-known firmness and elevation of mind. "If," says he, "lord Stanhope has not gained Mr. Law, I am afraid we shall not find our account in his lordship's supporting him when he was ready to fall—in making him first minister, and recalling me from this court, where my long stay should have enabled me to be better able to judge of their designs, and of their ways of working, than a stranger of greater capacity could possibly be. After the usage I meet with, I do not wonder to see that our ministers have so few friends. As to my revocation, if it was possible I should have a mind to stay in this country, you have made it impracticable. You have taken all effectual ways to destroy any personal credit I had with the regent—you have made it plain to him that I have no credit with the king. You are under a necessity therefore of sending another minister to this court. As to the manner of my revocation, I do not care to make the grimace of desiring it for false reasons—I expect nothing, and I fear nothing. As to my behaviour when I come home, I shall ever be a faithful servant to the king, and act as a man in whom the love of his



BOOK country is superior to all other considerations\*.”

VII.

—But such were not the men fit for the purposes  
1720. of the earl of Sunderland.

Coalition of  
Parties.

Previous to the recess of parliament, a reconciliation, external and nominal indeed only, had taken place between the king and the prince of Wales, chiefly through the intervention of Mr. Walpole. This was followed by a sort of coalition of parties; but the same rooted animosity subsisted under a thin *gossamer* veil of friendship. In consequence nevertheless of this union of interests, lord Townshend was, before the king's departure, declared president of the council, Mr. Walpole condescended to accept the post of paymaster of the forces, and Mr. Methuen that of comptroller of the household. The government of the kingdom was vested, as in the preceding year, in a council of regency, consisting of the same persons, to whom were now added lord Townshend and the duke of Devonshire. The negotiations with Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia, were far advanced when the king left Germany; and lord Carteret, ambassador at Stockholm, labored with such assiduity and success, that in the month of January 1720 he had signed a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive with the Swedes, containing twenty-one

Treaty  
with Swe-  
den.

\* Hardwicke State Papers.



articles; conformably to the tenor of which his Britannic majesty stipulated not only to furnish the powerful succours therein specified, but to engage his friends and allies to contribute by subsidies and auxiliary troops, “*ad coërcendum Czarum Russiæ*”—the express words of the treaty. And the king of Great Britain, “as a strong mark of his friendship, promised that the war in which he is now engaged with Spain shall not prevent his sending, the next spring, a squadron sufficient to stop the progress of the czar.” Both in this and the former treaty the losses sustained by the English commerce, in consequence of the depredations of the Swedes, which formed the only plausible pretext for involving Great Britain in this northern quarrel, were passed over entirely unnoticed. On this occasion a very indignant memorial was presented to the court of London by M. Bestuchef, minister of Russia, in which he asserted, “that his majesty the king of England, as elector of Hanover, had entered into engagements never to treat with Sweden without the participation of the czar, to use all possible means to procure him the cession of the conquered provinces, and not to oppose in any manner the other pretensions he might form—obligations confirmed likewise as king of Great Britain. He even reproached the king of England with ingratitude, affirming that

Memorial  
of the Rus-  
sian Am-  
bassador.



BOOK the duchies of Bremen and Verden were pro-  
VII.  
cured from Denmark by the powerful solicitation  
1720. of the czar. He declared that the czar had offered a treaty of defensive alliance with England, and the guarantee of the protestant succession; but that his proposals for a reconciliation remained without an answer, and a strong squadron sent to the Baltic had actually joined the Swedes"—“Your majesty,” said the memorialist, “who knows so well what is due to sovereigns, may judge whether a mediation offered with circumstances so little equitable can be impartial; or whether, instead of desiring to obtain peace, it is not rather seeking pretences for a rupture.” As the policy now adopted, from whatever motive, of counteracting the ambitious projects of Russia, and rescuing Sweden from the destruction which threatened her, was upon the whole rational and just, the successive treaties with that power were approved and applauded by the generosity of the English nation. But, to men capable of observation, it was plain that, in the eager solicitude of the king of England to retain and secure his Germanic acquisitions, he was willing to join Sweden against Russia, or Russia against Sweden, Austria against Spain, or Spain against Austria; to enter into one set of connexions and engagements as elector, and another as king, as circumstances varied; in order to secure



the accomplishment of his wishes. Yet must it BOOK VII.  
 be acknowledged, that, by the mildness and 1720.  
 equity of his government, he had created to him-  
 self a new title, more valid than that which could  
 be conferred by any treaty, in the grateful and  
 spontaneous affections of the people.

The English fleet, under sir John Norris, en- English Fleet forms a Junction with Sweden.  
 tered the Baltic in the month of April (1720),  
 and immediately formed a junction with that of  
 Sweden. The Russians, knowing that the Eng-  
 lish admiral had instructions similar to those under  
 which sir George Byng had lately acted, retired  
 into their ports, where it was not judged expe-  
 dient to attack them. After all the indefatigable  
 exertions and expensive sacrifices of the king of  
 England to procure from the court of Stockholm  
 the absolute cession of Bremen and Verden, and  
 which was at length so happily and unexpectedly  
 accomplished, the investiture of those duchies, of  
 which he had been so long and so eager an expec-  
 tant, notwithstanding the mighty services ren-  
 dered to the house of Austria, was not yet at-  
 tainable from the gratitude or condescension  
 of the court of Vienna. On the contrary, the  
 emperor seemed to think those services amply  
 compensated by the *protectorial commission* with  
 which that monarch had been recently invested  
 by his imperial majesty for the administration of  
 the duchy of Mecklenburg—the duke of Meck-



BOOK VII.  
 1720. lenburg being suspended from his government, by a sentence of the Aulic council, for tyranny and mal-administration. And it is even related, upon good authority, that this commission was actually and formally exchanged at the court of Vienna, for the INSTRUCTIONS of sir George

Designs of  
 Hanover  
 upon the  
 Duchy of  
 Mecklen-  
 burg.

Byng.\* The affairs of Mecklenburg had long occupied a large share of the attention of the king of England, who was strongly suspected of a design to add that contiguous duchy to his other acquisitions in Germany. And the duke of Mecklenburg, in his several memorials to the diet at Ratisbon, openly charges the house of Lunenburg with aspiring to the absolute sovereignty of Lower Saxony; and affirms that the troubles in his dominions have been continually fomented and inflamed by the court of Herenhausen, expressly with that view. But though the emperor was at little pains to conceal his dislike and jealousy of these designs, the necessity of his affairs compelled him to make this concession, which was apparently considered only as a prelude to a more firm and permanent possession.

\* Lord Chesterfield—*Vide* Case of the Hanover Forces.



## DISSERTATION II.

ON

*THE CAUSES*

OF THE

## MINISTERIAL SECESSION

A. D. 1717.

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THERE is nothing more difficult to develop, and at the same time less interesting, in the whole compass of historical discussion, than the secret views, motives, jealousies, cabals, intrigues, and quarrels of ministers. The only question which can appear to posterity of moment, is that which respects the political merit or demerit of the measures actually adopted. The great celebrity to which Mr. Walpole subsequently attained, gives, however, a sort of artificial importance to the present inquiry; and we are solicitous to know how far so great a man, and so great a statesman, was influenced by public, and how far by private, motives, in joining the secession from the administration at this period; and in what degree the motives, public or private, in which the secession originated, were laudable or justifiable. The state-papers recently published by the Rev. William Coxe, and appended to his *Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole*, throw much light upon this investigation: and though the public motives ascribed in the *HISTORY* to Townshend,



Walpole, and their associates, appear to have existed, and perhaps to have predominated in their minds, it is no less evident that they were likewise actuated by those personal motives which in the former editions of this work were slightly and distantly touched upon.

On the death of the queen, the tory faction were not merely excluded from power, but became in their turn the objects of party revenge and political persecution. Hatred to the tories appears, indeed, to have been almost the sole principle and bond of union amongst the whigs, who entertained against each other a degree of animosity little inferior to that which they displayed against the common adversary. During the latter years of the late reign, the earl of Sunderland, a man of distinguished ability and high connexions, was considered as the great political leader of the whigs; and he had flattered himself with the idea of being placed at the head of the new ministry. His most formidable rival was, apparently, the earl of Halifax, who had, in the reign of king William, presided with the highest reputation at the board of treasury; and in the subsequent distribution of places this nobleman was reinstated in his former situation. But it was quickly ascertained that he possessed no political influence; and his resentment and disgust were so openly avowed as to occasion a prevailing expectation of his resignation. The true rival was lord Townshend, connected with Walpole by marriage with his sister, and who had found means to ingratiate himself into the confidence of baron Bothmar, the Hanoverian resident, by whose advice the king was chiefly actuated in forming the new ministerial arrangements, in which the post of principal secretary of state was assigned to Townshend, and that of lord lieutenant of Ireland to the earl of Sunderland. This exalted station appeared to Sunderland only as a splendid banishment; and viewing the ascendancy of Townshend with astonishment



and indignation, he eagerly wished to engross, or at least to share, the supreme direction of affairs in England. On the death of the marquis of Wharton, he was recalled from Ireland, and constituted lord privy seal. But this was only the footstep of his ambition. He knew that on the advancement of Townshend jealousies had immediately arisen between the English secretary and the Hanoverian ministers, Bothmar, Bernstorff, and Robethon, who were anxious to retain their former influence over the mind of the king. These men were powerfully supported by the famous Melesina baroness of Schulenburg, afterwards created duchess of Munster and Kendal, by the last of which titles she was commonly known—the favorite mistress of the king, and by many persons believed to be secretly married to him—a woman of great art and intrigue, and, as there is abundant proof, of equal rapacity and avarice; but highly decorous in her manners, cautious and prudent in her external deportment, and who even affected, and perhaps felt—for all these qualities may easily co-exist—a zealous attachment to religion; being perfectly exact in her devotions, and constantly attending the Lutheran chapels on the Sunday, at one of which she received the holy communion with *regular and exemplary piety*. Such were the persons to whom Sunderland scrupled not to pay his court, striving by every artifice to insinuate himself into the favor of the duchess, of whom Walpole declared, “that she was so venal a creature, that she would at any time sell the king’s honor for a shilling to the highest bidder.”

In the summer of 1716 the king, with his German mistresses and ministers, repaired to the continent, accompanied by Mr. secretary Stanhope, who was as yet on terms of perfect friendship and confidence with Townshend and Walpole. This was the opportunity for which Sunderland wished and waited. Having previously obtained permission



of the king to go to Aix-la-Chapelle "to drink the waters for his health," he arrived in a short time at Hanover. The king's visit to the continent was undertaken extremely against the inclination, and even the remonstrances, of Townshend and Walpole, who represented so long an absence to be highly detrimental to the public interest; and they were doubtless sensible it might eventually prove at least equally injurious to their own. So early as July 30, 1716, Mr. Walpole wrote to secretary Stanhope "that there was reason to believe the designs of lord Sunderland, Cadogan, &c. were carried further, and were better supported than they had imagined; that all the *foreigners* were engaged on their side of the question; and that the duchess of Munster entered into the dispute with more than ordinary zeal and resentment against them." He adds, "Nevertheless his (*i. e.* Sunderland's) professions for an entire reconciliation and perfect union are as strong as *words* can express; and you may be *sure* are reciprocal." August 30, he writes to secretary Stanhope, "Lord Sunderland has left us, and *will soon be with you*. We parted with all the professions and assurances of mutual friendship and union that was possible. He seemed, indeed, sensible of the ill consequences of the measures he had been engaged in."

But very soon after his arrival at Hanover the effects of his insidious artifices became fully apparent, and in a mode for which Townshend and Walpole were by no means prepared. Stanhope, a frank and gallant soldier, had, without any claim or pretension on his part, been recommended by lord Townshend to the office he occupied, chiefly from his inexperience and supposed incapacity for the management of foreign affairs. And when the design of making him secretary of state was first communicated to him, he understood it to be proposed *en raillerie*, and replied in the spirit of pleasantry, by putting his hand to his sword: nor was it



without much reluctance that he was at length prevailed upon to consent to the appointment. A perfect cordiality appears to have subsisted between Townshend, Walpole, and Stanhope, till the event of the king's departure for Hanover; and he was regarded as the grand barrier against all intrigues that might be attempted to the prejudice of the ministers during the residence of the king in Germany. But being continually near the person of the king, and far distant from his colleagues, he soon found his own independent consequence. By the nobleness of his manners, and the general liberality of his sentiments, he gained much upon the favor of the sovereign, while his solicitude to secure and extend the influence he had now acquired, his spirit of military enterprise, and deficiency of political sagacity, made him facile and open to every scheme of the Hanoverian cabinet. At this moment arrived Sunderland, who with far superior knowledge and talents combined a fixed determination to supplant the existing ministry, by seconding and supporting without reserve all the continental plans and projects of the monarch. By his consummate address he soon acquired a decided ascendancy over the generous and unsuspecting nature of Stanhope, and rose by rapid gradations into high estimation with the king; so that, in a very few weeks after he had fixed his residence at Hanover, count Gyllenburg, the Swedish ambassador, scrupled not to pronounce him "the secret mover of the councils of the king of England," which, at this period, were equally calculated to enrage the courts of Stockholm and Petersburg, however inimical to each other; the first, by the violent and unjust retention of Bremen and Verden; and the last, "by making all the offers imaginable"—to use the words of count Gyllenburg to baron Goertz, Dec. 29, 1716—"to acquire Bremen of the king of Sweden at the expense of the czar, who is to be the sacrifice of that acquisition." And the Swedish ambassador



elsewhere says, "that if the preliminary concerning Bremen was settled, the English ministers would be very well pleased to retrieve the false step they had made, by talking loudly of the defensive treaty between us, and by persuading the nation to give us the succours therein stipulated: they might, in that case, agree in relation to what should be taken from the czar by way of reprisal for the Swedish losses in Germany."

In consequence of the machinations of Sunderland, and the consequent alienation of Stanhope from his former friends, an order was unexpectedly dispatched, November 1716, for the removal of lord Townshend from his office. This was accompanied by a softening letter from secretary Stanhope, announcing his lordship's advancement to the viceroyalty of Ireland, and lamenting that the impracticability of his lordship's temper did not *permit* the king longer to continue him in his former post. Lord Townshend in anger refusing to accept his new appointment, and Mr. Walpole, Mr. Methuen, the lords Orford, Cowper, &c. declaring their resolution to retire with him, the alarm of the court was excited, and on the return of the king, January 1717, the most specious apologies were made by Stanhope and Sunderland for their past conduct; and the king himself condescended to acknowledge to Townshend in person that he had been imposed upon by false reports. Moved by these flattering instances of regard, and justly apprehensive of the consequences of a quarrel amongst the whigs, Townshend relinquished his intention of retiring from public life, accepted the government of Ireland, and a general reconciliation seemed to take place. But the good understanding between the different members of administration did not long continue. The king's professions of favor to Townshend and Walpole appeared wholly fallacious—the confidence of the king being evidently confined to the lords Sunderland and Stanhope. New divisions took place: the support given by



Townshend and Walpole to the measures of government was cold and formal. Sunderland had, by unremitted exertions, greatly increased his parliamentary interest. It was thought that a whig administration might be formed without the aid of lord Townshend and his adherents. Sunderland and Stanhope, therefore, no longer wished to postpone his dismissal, which took place immediately on the debate relative to the motion of supply, as related in the narrative. But a strong effort was made to gain over Walpole to the party of the court; his parliamentary talents and knowledge of finance being now very conspicuous. The king repeatedly refused to accept his resignation, and urged in the strongest terms his continuance in office. At the close of the conference both the king and the minister were observed to be extremely agitated; but though the prospect was highly tempting to his ambition, the fidelity of Walpole to his engagements remained unshaken.

The conqueror of Almanara now, to the astonishment of his former military associates, put on the gown of chancellor of the exchequer. Sunderland, the life and soul of the new administration, was constituted secretary of state for foreign affairs; Mr. Addison succeeded Mr. Methuen as the other secretary; the earl of Berkeley was placed at the head of the admiralty, in the room of the earl of Orford; the duke of Bolton was appointed lord lieutenant of Ireland; and the duke of Kingston privy seal—the last office vacated by the earl of Sunderland, who was now regarded as first minister.

The treaty with Denmark, by which Bremen and Verden were ceded to Hanover, and the king of Great Britain agreed in consequence to declare war against Sweden, was concluded July 1715, when Townshend and Walpole were in the plenitude of their power, not merely with their acquiescence, but with the warm approbation at least of lord Townshend; the two brothers voluntarily incurring the reproach and responsi-



bility of the innumerable mischiefs which ensued from that fatal measure; which, indeed, was by Townshend vindicated to the latest hour of his official existence. M. Slingelandt, afterwards pensionary of Holland, in a confidential letter to that nobleman, dated March 10th, 1717, excellently says: "As much as the crown of Great Britain is superior to the electoral cap, so much is the king interested to sacrifice Bremen and Verden for a peace, rather than continue any longer in a war." But Townshend, in answer, professes his opinion, "that, without any partiality to the pretensions of the king, but simply with a view to the interests of Great Britain and Holland, Sweden must not be suffered to retain any longer those gates of the empire, which, *since the peace of Westphalia*, she has never made use of but for the purpose of introducing confusion and disorder, or of turning Germany from the pursuit of its true interests against France. And" (he adds) "I lay it down as a principle, that, for the advantage and tranquillity of Europe, the king of Sweden ought to be deprived of those provinces which have supplied him with the means of doing so much mischief." But, admitting these observations to be as true as they are historically false, how were the gates of Bremen and Verden more dangerous than those of Wismar and Stralsund? That Walpole, who at this time really acted, and at all times affected to act, a subordinate part in foreign affairs, ever declared himself explicitly in favor of this invidious and dangerous usurpation, does not appear. But Horace Walpole, in his well-known pamphlet, styled "The Interest of Great Britain steadily pursued," has expatiated on the subject, and zealously defended the policy of this most unjust purchase. "It is the interest of this country," he affirms, "that those two provinces, which command the navigation of the Elbe and the Weser, the only inlets from the British seas into Germany, and which, in case of any disturbance in the North, are most capable of



protecting or interrupting the British trade to Hamburg, should rather be annexed to the king's electoral dominions, than remain in the hands of the king of Denmark, who has frequently formed pretensions on that city; or of Sweden, who has molested our commerce in the Baltic." That it was of any political moment for Great Britain to contend to what continental power Bremen and Verden should belong, is an extravagance which would never have been heard or thought of, had not the elector of Hanover unfortunately worn the crown of Britain. But that an opposition of political principle entered into this memorable contest between the whig ministers of George I, and that Townshend and Walpole were not willing to go the same unwarrantable lengths to gratify the king's Germanic predilections, which the political profligacy of Sunderland and the grateful attachment of Stanhope prompted them to adopt, is sufficiently evident, not to speak of anterior evidence, from the general tenor of the correspondence recently published: and it now remains to explain the chief causes of the difference subsisting between them respecting the system of continental politics.

Certain it is, that lord Townshend originally encouraged the idea which the king entertained of cultivating a strict union with France, in opposition to the opinion of Sunderland, and even of Stanhope. But a defensive alliance having been concluded with the court of Vienna (May 1716), that minister had now entirely changed his system, conceiving the French alliance in present circumstances to be unnecessary and unadvisable. In the remonstrance framed by the cabinet ministers previous to the king's visit to the continent, we find the following remarkable expressions:—"Neither can any doubt be made but that the regent of France, who has hitherto left no engine unemployed to defeat our alliance with the emperor, and whose principal aim seems to be to gain time for putting in execution the designs he has formed against his majesty, will eagerly lay hold on such an oppor-



tunity to distract the king's affairs, either by supporting and encouraging the Jacobites in some attempt here, or by amusing us with specious and insidious proposals," &c. And Mr. Poyntz, secretary to lord Townshend, declares, in a letter to general Stanhope, August 1716, "that his majesty knew that lord Townshend had long been of opinion, that any further engagements with the regent, particularly with respect to the *succession*, would only serve to strengthen the regent, and to put it in his power to do the king greater mischief." But the king—who entertained higher and juster ideas of the honor and sincerity of the regent, who knew that the emperor regarded his new acquisitions of territory in Germany with a jealous eye, that he had mortally offended the adverse crowns of Russia and Sweden, that Denmark was a feeble and inefficient friend, and Prussia a secret and dangerous enemy—was anxious to secure the support of France. Several delays, arising merely from accidental causes, concurred to protract the signature of the treaty, which the king was persuaded by lord Sunderland to ascribe to the duplicity of Townshend, who had been informed by letter from Stanhope, October 9th, "that the situation of affairs in the North made it absolutely necessary to close with France." And, November 11th, Stanhope, by the express command of the king, wrote to Townshend to hasten the signature, censuring him in terms not very ceremonious for the repeated delays that had taken place as the effect of design and management. This letter of Stanhope was accompanied by another from Sunderland, written in a style of singular insolence, and sufficiently indicating the high favor and confidence to which he had now attained with the king. He acknowledges "that he was originally adverse to this alliance, but *upon his arrival at Hanover* he was entirely convinced that no treaty could be more glorious, nor more advantageous, under the circumstances Europe was likely to be in through the proceedings of the czar," &c. He declares "that, from



his concern for the king's service, he must be plain enough to say, that lord Townshend's conduct wants to be explained, and that he never saw the king resent any thing so much as the delays respecting the signature; his majesty thinking not only Mr. secretary Stanhope, but himself, not well used in that affair. I must not too," says he, "omit acquainting your lordship, that the king is very much surprised at the strange notion that seems at present to prevail, as if the parliament was not to concern themselves in any thing that happens in these parts of the world, which he looks upon as not only exposing him to all kinds of affronts, but even to ruin; and indeed this notion is nothing but the old tory one, that England can subsist by itself, whatever becomes of the rest of Europe, which has been so justly exploded ever since the Revolution."

The astonishment of lord Townshend on receiving this impertinent extra-official letter, and his resentment at the conduct of his friend secretary Stanhope, in suffering it to accompany his own, were equally great. He immediately wrote a very ample vindication of his conduct to the king, who *appeared* to be satisfied with it. This he inclosed to Stanhope, declaring "his heart to be so full with the thoughts of having received such usage from him to whom he had been always so faithful a friend, that he could say no more at that time." To lord Sunderland he did not deign any answer. But though the charge of intentional delay in this business appears to have been unfounded, it was abundantly clear that Townshend and Walpole did not coincide with the Hanoverian cabinet in their general system of politics. While Sunderland and Stanhope were willing to run all hazards for the preservation of Bremen and Verden, Townshend and Walpole were anxious for the preservation of peace, and the cultivation of a good understanding with the emperor. On the 25th of September, secretary Stanhope wrote an extraordi-



nary dispatch to lord Townshend, informing him "that the king of Denmark was under the greatest apprehensions from the attempts of the czar, then with his fleet in the vicinity of Copenhagen, and who had declared that he would quarter his troops in the Danish territories." Sir John Norris was at this time with a British squadron in the Baltic; and Stanhope goes on to say, "that M. Bernstorff thought it necessary to crush the czar immediately, to secure his ships, and even to seize his person, to be kept till his troops shall have evacuated Denmark and Germany." Far from being startled at this wild and desperate proposal, Stanhope professes himself "in his nature ever inclined to bold strokes. But," says he, "the truth is, I see no *day-light* through these affairs. We may easily master the czar if we go briskly to work, and this be thought a right measure; but how far Sweden may be thereby enabled to disturb us in Britain, you must judge. The king now wishes, and so doth your humble servant very heartily, that we had secured France." Lord Townshend, after consulting no doubt with his friend Mr. Walpole, wrote immediately, and in the utmost confidence, a few lines, which he desires may remain a secret for ever. He conjures Stanhope "not to consent to sir John Norris's remaining in the Baltic beyond the 1st of November, nor to the king's engaging openly in the affair about the czar. This Northern war," he declares, "will be their ruin. Is it possible," says he, "for the king to carry it on with only Denmark on his side, supposing even the intended project should succeed? Would it not, therefore, be right for the king to think immediately how to make his peace with Sweden, even though he should be obliged to make some *sacrifice* in obtaining it?" And in his public dispatch as secretary, he states at large his reasons why a rupture with Russia would be fatal to the interests of Great Britain; and concludes with giving it as the opinion of all those who have the honor to be em-



employed in his majesty's service, "that the king's taking any further step in favor of Denmark would be attended with insuperable difficulties; the least of which might be, that the whole of the war against Sweden as well as Muscovy would be devolved upon his majesty."

The change of sentiment in Townshend and Walpole relative to the French alliance admits of an easy solution. While the object of it was defensive, and calculated merely to prevent the Jacobite party from receiving any support from France, it was highly rational. But when it was relied upon as the means of offence, and operated as an encouragement to persevere in the frantic schemes of the Hanoverian cabinet, it appeared to them impolitic and odious. In a subsequent letter, October 16, lord Townshend complains to secretary Stanhope "that the miserable and distracted condition into which the Northern affairs are plunged, gives the discontented and enemies of the king's government hopes that they may be able to raise some disturbances in parliament on that head; and," he adds, "your humble servant and yourself, as I am credibly informed, are to suffer in this attack, though, God knows, we have had no direction in all this Northern quarrel." Strongly suspecting nevertheless, or rather being now fully apprised of Stanhope's recent conversion, he admonishes his friend "that the expecting any money from the parliament towards carrying on that war is a mere delusion, and can end in nothing but breaking the king's friends amongst themselves, ruining the public credit, and preventing us from getting into a method of paying the nation's debts."

Mr. Walpole had given offence to the king, not merely by his entire coincidence in these sentiments, but by his pertinacious refusal to make parliamentary provision for certain troops hired by the Hanoverian ministers of Munster and Saxe-Gotha. And Horace Walpole, at this time envoy at the Hague, speaks, in a dispatch to England, dated October 10, of



“the confusion the affairs of the North are at present in. The letters which the messenger carries,” says he, “will bring you an account how extremely frightened our ministers at Hanover are, and indeed with very good reason.” And, October 21, he says “that a messenger had arrived that morning with repeated orders for him and lord Cadogan to sign with the abbé Dubois; and the only reason that I find for it is,” says this minister, “least the czar should become master of Mecklenburg. I cannot for my life see why the whole system of affairs in Europe, especially in relation to the interest of England, must be entirely subverted on account of Mecklenburg. God knows what will be the consequence of such politics.” So *steadily*, in the opinion of this dextrous courtier, were the interests of Great Britain at this time pursued. The king, enraged at the continued opposition in the English cabinet to the system of Hanover, withdrew entirely his confidence from lord Townshend, while Sunderland and Stanhope rose daily higher, and were each moment more firmly fixed in the royal favor.

But another cause of dissatisfaction and resentment on the part of the king was the court which the English ministers paid to the prince of Wales, who, though constituted regent during the absence of his father, possessed little share of his paternal affection and regard; and who upon all occasions affected to set himself at the head of a party in opposition to the court. At the first Townshend and Walpole were treated by the prince with extreme reserve and *hauteur*; but by degrees so good an understanding prevailed between them, as to excite the utmost jealousy on the part of the sovereign. And (2d November) a dispatch was penned by lord Townshend to secretary Stanhope, which so irritated the king, that the immediate removal of that minister would probably have been the consequence, had not the first emotions of his anger been counteracted by the suggestions of Sunderland and



Stanhope. The dispatch stated, "that by command of his royal highness a meeting of the lords of the council had been held, to consider what heads of business might be proper and necessary to be laid before parliament." After mentioning the correspondence of Goertz and Gyllenburg, he declares the lords to be unanimously of opinion, that, considering the obstinacy and inveteracy of the king of Sweden, the poverty and weakness of the court of Denmark, the treachery and corruption of Prussia, and the little probability there is of any cordial and effectual assistance from the emperor at this juncture, there is scarce any prospect left of the king's extricating himself out of the difficulties into which Northern affairs have plunged him, without coming to a better understanding with the czar—that encouragement should be given to him to pursue vigorously his views against Sweden, and that upon no account should the squadron under sir John Norris be permitted to winter in the Baltic. The dispatch represents the nation as set upon reducing the forces, and upon easing themselves of the burden of taxes; "stating it as, in their lordships' opinion, absolutely necessary for the king's service, that the prince of Wales and the ministers in England should be vested with full discretionary powers to conduct the business here treated of in parliament, agreeably to the present prospect of affairs, in case his majesty does not return in time to open the session in person." This was considered as equivalent to asking for powers to defeat the king's projects in that very assembly where alone they could be supported with effect; and the breach between the English and the Hanoverian ministers became from this moment unavoidable and irreparable. The king had been flattered with the belief "that it might not be impossible"—to use the words of Stanhope to lord Townshend, October 16—"to put this Northern business in such a light as may induce the parliament not to look upon it with indifference." He declared



that no time should be lost in trying to concert measures “with the Dutch; for that if the czar be *let alone* three years, he will be absolute master of the Baltic.” During the stay of Horace Walpole, who was himself the bearer of lord Townshend’s last dispatch, appearances were, notwithstanding the extreme resentment of the court of Herenhausen, sedulously preserved; but three days after his departure, orders were sent for the removal of lord Townshend. These were accompanied by a letter from secretary Stanhope to Mr. Walpole, in which he expresses his “hope and desire that he would endeavour to reconcile lord Townshend to the alteration that had taken place. The king,” he says, “will no longer bear him in the office of secretary, be the consequence what it will. Is the whig interest,” he asks, “to be staked in defence of such a pretension? or is the difference to the whig party whether lord Townshend be secretary or lord lieutenant of Ireland *tanti?*” There is little doubt of the sincerity of Stanhope in wishing lord Townshend to accept; for such acceptance must be construed as an acquiescence in his own political defeat. Stanhope and Sunderland would of course succeed to the chief direction of affairs, and the Hanoverian system would at least not be opposed by Townshend and his friends if they retained their places and preferments: nevertheless, Stanhope plainly avows, that if Townshend and Walpole determine after all to relinquish their posts, they may be supplied, and that the king’s affairs may still go on without their assistance. “In this case,” says he, “the king hath engaged lord Sunderland and myself to promise that his lordship will be secretary, and that I, unable and unequal as I am every way, should be chancellor of the exchequer—the king declaring that as long as he can find whigs that will serve him, he will be served by them.” Lord Townshend peremptorily declined, in a handsome letter to the king, the government of Ireland; and Walpole, in answer to Stanhope, protested that



some parts of his letter astonished him so much, that he knew not what to say or think. "What could prevail on you," says he, "to enter into such a scheme as this, and appear to be chief actor in it, and undertake to carry it through in all events, without which it could not have been undertaken, is unaccountable. I swear that lord Townshend has no way deserved it of you. Believe me, Stanhope, he never thought you could enter into a combination against him. Considering all the circumstances and manner of doing this, nobody could advise him to accept of the lieutenancy of Ireland, and it cannot be supposed that the authors of this scheme either thought he would or desired he should."

Stanhope, however, still continued to urge, in amicable and conciliatory terms, the propriety and necessity of this acceptance, in order to prevent a fatal disunion among the whigs; and as a salvo for the honor of the king. "I hope," says he, in his letter to Walpole, January 1st, 1717, "that you will grow cooler on your side—that even my lord Townshend will sacrifice his resentment to the public good:" and January 16, from the Hague, he writes, "I must and do, for the king's sake, for that of the whigs, and of my lord Townshend himself, most earnestly repeat to you my entreaties that you will dispose my lord Townshend to accept the offer of Ireland. I am at liberty to assure you in the king's name, that when my lord Townshend shall have accepted of Ireland, if in six months, or in a twelvemonth, he should like better some other post at home in the cabinet council, that his majesty will very readily approve of any scheme that his servants shall concert for placing lord Townshend where he shall like." He concludes with saying, "I have, dear Walpole, a very clear conscience; and whilst I am conscious to myself of well doing, I have learnt to be very easy in mind whatever other people think of me." That Stanhope, a man of great and acknowledged probity and sincerity of character, upon



the whole meant honestly and well, cannot be doubted. He was alarmed at the dangerous consequences of the precipitate step which had been taken, and wished to prevent the mischief going further. The court whigs in general, though offended at the rude dismissal of lord Townshend, pressed that nobleman to accede to the proposition now made. The pensionary Heinsius and other leading men in Holland joined their entreaties to those of the friends of both parties in England. The king himself, on his arrival, condescended to apologise to him for whatever steps had been taken to his prejudice, and acknowledged that he had been deceived. Lord Townshend, unable to resist these united importunities, at length accepted the vice-royalty, and, remaining in England, assisted, as usual at the deliberations of the cabinet. But cordiality and friendship were for ever extinguished. To use the language of a courtier of those times, Mr. Brereton, "the difference between the two parties was regarded as a trial between the English and German councils. And in a very few weeks, as before related, the second dismissal of lord Townshend took place, which was followed by the resignation of the Walpoles, Mr. secretary Methuen, Mr. Pulteney, the earl of Orford, the duke of Devonshire, &c. and, after an interval of apparent perplexity and increasing discontent, of the lord chancellor Cowper, a nobleman of great eloquence, address, and popularity.

Lord Townshend bore his fall from power with temper and dignity ; and it is probable that general Stanhope was not, on subsequent reflexion, perfectly satisfied with his own conduct. For, according to an anecdote related by professor Whiston of this military statesman, after remaining a long time one day in a musing posture, he suddenly exclaimed in a kind of agony, "Now I am convinced that a man cannot set his foot over the threshold of a court, but he must become a rogue."



## BOOK VIII.

*Pernicious Consequences of the South-Sea Bill. Proceedings of Parliament thereupon. Death of Earl Stanhope. Disgrace of the Earl of Sunderland. Townshend and Walpole re-instated in Office. Bill for suppressing Blasphemy. Subsidy to Sweden. Civil-List Debts discharged. M. Bestuchef ordered to depart the Kingdom. Treaty of Nystadt. Defensive Alliance between Great Britain, France, and Spain. Congress of Cambray dissolved. Restitution of Gibraltar. Treaty with Morocco. Death of Pope Clement XI. Debates in Parliament. Petition from the Quakers. New Commercial Code. Death of Lord Sunderland—and of the Duke of Marlborough. Conspiracy against the Government. Banishment of Bishop Atterbury. Oppressive Imposition on the Catholics. Transactions on the Continent. Bremen and Verden in Danger. Death of the Regent Duke of Orleans. Parliament convened. Laudable Measures of Administration. State of Ireland. Obnoxious Patent of Coinage revoked. Lord Carteret appointed to the Government. Abdication of Philip V. King of Spain. Alliance between Russia and Sweden. Impeachment of the Earl of Macclesfield. Civil-List Debts a second Time discharged. Order of the Bath revived. Misunderstanding between France and Spain. Cardinal Fleury Prime Minister. Death of the Czar Peter the Great. Treaty of Alliance between Spain and the Emperor. Treaty of Hanover—Parliamentary Debates relative to it. Interposition of the King in Favor of the Polish Dissidents. Projects of the Duke de Ripperda. Disputes with Russia. De-*



*secession of Prussia from the Treaty of Hanover. Disastrous Expedition of Admiral Hosier. Debates in Parliament. Rupture with the Court of Vienna—and with that of Spain. Gibraltar besieged. Sinking Fund insidiously plundered. Death of the Czarina Catherine. Articles of Peace concluded with Spain and the Emperor. Death of King George I. His Character.*

BOOK  
VIII.

1721.

Pernicious  
Conse-  
quences of  
the South-  
Sea Bill.

THE South-Sea act passed in the last session, from which the most enlightened persons in and out of parliament had foreseen and foretold much mischief, was infinitely more alarming in its operation and consequences than its most determined opposers could have conceived. No sooner was the royal assent given to the bill than this mystery of iniquity began to unfold itself. The most artful and insidious methods were put in practice to delude the public with the notion of the vast emoluments eventually to be derived from the commercial intercourse, which it was pretended would, with the consent of the court of Madrid and as an equivalent for the cession of Gibraltar and Minorca, be established with the empires of Mexico and Peru. The successive subscriptions filled with amazing rapidity; and the court of directors declaring a dividend of 30 *per cent.* for Christmas 1720, and 50 *per cent.* for no less than twelve years after, the transfer price of the company's stock advancing in proportion to the public demand, rose, from 130, which was the price it bore while the bill was depending in



parliament, in a very short space of time to 1000 ; BOOK  
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by which means an opportunity was offered to those who were concerned in the project, or rather the plot, to make immense fortunes before the bursting of this mighty bubble. And the stock falling with the same or even greater rapidity than that with which it had risen, vast numbers of adventurers—and such was the general infatuation, that, upon this occasion, the whole nation seemed to have become adventurers—awaking from their golden dreams, found themselves reduced to a state of the most deplorable distress and ruin. England had never experienced so total a destruction of credit ; never was any country convulsed by so violent a paroxysm of despondency and terror. The ministry collectively, and with few exceptions individually, implicated in these proceedings, seemed petrified with amazement and consternation ; and being wholly uncertain what measures to pursue, dispatched express after express to the king at Hanover, to inform him of the extraordinary situation of public affairs ; and the monarch thereupon hastening his return, arrived in England the beginning of November. The parliament having met agreeably to their last prorogation, December 8, 1720, his majesty earnestly recommended, in his speech to the two houses, to consider of the most effectual and speedy methods to restore



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ings of  
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the national credit. The house of commons immediately entered into a severe investigation of this dark and dangerous business, which was styled in the report of the secret committee, “a train of the deepest villany and fraud Hell ever contrived for the ruin of any nation.” The result of the inquiry, as established by the clearest evidence, was, that transfers of the company’s stock to a very great amount had been made to persons very high in office to facilitate the passing of the bill ; that the scandalous artifices practised by the company, and their shameless abuse of the public confidence, had received not only the connivance, but the encouragement of several, at least, of the ministers : and lord Sunderland and Mr. Aislalie were compelled to a precipitate and disgraceful resignation of their offices—the latter being also expelled the house of commons, and committed to the Tower. Mr. Craggs, secretary of state, was exempted only by the stroke of death from a similar fate ; and many other persons of figure and consequence, who were found on inquiry more or less culpable, were, by a very high and unusual exertion of parliamentary authority, variously punished ; though, in the opinion of the exasperated public, not with an adequate degree of severity. Nevertheless the house acted with a spirit and unanimity on this great occasion which reflected on their proceedings the highest



honor, and sufficiently manifested the indignation they felt at having been, under specious pretences, made the unintentional instruments of an injury so extensive, and a deception so dreadful.

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Mr. Waller, son-in-law to Aislalie, to whom South-Sea stock to an immense amount had been transferred, had preserved no minutes of his transactions; and pretended, on his examination, that he could not recollect for what persons or purposes he had accepted it. Sir John Blount, accounted the original projector, and one of the most guilty agents in this business, refusing to answer certain interrogatories put to him in the house of lords by the duke of Wharton, and being supported somewhat too peremptorily in his refusal by lord Stanhope, the duke maliciously observed, “that the government of the best princes was sometimes rendered intolerable to their subjects by bad ministers; thus Sejanus had made the reign of Tiberius, a prince originally of the greatest hopes, hateful to the Romans. That wicked minister first began by weaning the affections of the emperor from his son, and next from his people, and so Rome was ruined.” Conscious of the unsullied rectitude of his conduct, lord Stanhope, in a transport of rage, rose to speak in his own vindication. He acknowledged “that the Roman history afforded striking examples. In return for that which had just been mentioned of



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hope

a bad minister, he must remind the house of an instance of a great man and illustrious patriot, the elder Brutus, who had a son so profligate, that, to gratify his vices and passions, he hesitated not to sacrifice the liberties of his country." In consequence of the vehemence of his exertions, the earl was seized, while in the act of speaking, with a sudden illness, which obliged him to retire; and, after a short interval of languishment and insensibility, he expired in the evening of the next day, February 5, 1721, extremely regretted by his sovereign, and possessing the general esteem and regard of the nation\*.

The great and difficult business of restoring public credit, and of tranquillising the public mind, which had been so dreadfully agitated, was committed chiefly to Mr. Walpole, who performed the task thus imposed upon him to the entire satisfaction of the nation. Through the judicious and vigorous resolutions adopted by parliament in pursuance of his recommendations, order, peace, and confidence were speedily and effectually re-established.

\* The king, as the countess of Chesterfield, who was present on the occasion, related to the respectable author of the Memoirs of the Earl of Chesterfield, Dr. Maty, received the intelligence of this nobleman's death when at supper; and not being able to suppress the emotions of his grief, he rose from table and retired, his eyes being suffused with tears.



The profit of the South-Sea Company in its corporate capacity, on the execution of the project, was found to amount to more than thirteen millions; thirty-seven millions eight hundred thousand pounds having been subscribed, and the stock allotted in exchange not exceeding twenty-four millions five hundred thousand pounds. This was now engrafted into different government securities, and the enormous surplus divided amongst the sufferers, in such modes and proportions as were deemed most equitable—retaining two millions only in lieu of the premium due by the original terms of agreement to the public: but this occasioning much murmur and discontent, was, in the sequel, wisely relinquished. Heavy fines also were levied upon the estates of the leading directors, and others principally concerned in this nefarious business, but the subtilty of some who were supposed most culpable eluded the severest vigilance of inquiry. Knight, cashier of the company, for the apprehending of whom a royal proclamation had been issued, had escaped at a critical moment to the continent; carrying with him the famous *green book*, which was supposed to contain the entire secret of the transaction. Being arrested at Tirlemont, by the vigilance of the English resident at Brussels, application was made to the marquis du Prie, governor of the Low Countries, to deliver him up to justice.



BOOK VIII. 1721. But answer was unexpectedly made by the imperial court, that this could not be done, consistently with the privileges of the States of Brabant—for, by an article of the *Joyeuse Entrée*, no person, against whom a criminal accusation is brought, can be removed for trial out of the province. It was thought that, in a case of this momentous nature, his imperial majesty, for whom England had conquered kingdoms, might have prevailed upon the States to wave their privilege; and very pressing instances were anew made for the surrender of Knight. But, in the interim, he effected a second escape from the citadel of Antwerp—and in the sequel he received a free pardon. Vehement suspicions therefore arose, that Knight's evidence was too decisive to be produced; and that the late minister had still sufficient influence to screen himself from that punishment which the whole nation believed him to merit, and from which his superior adroitness of management only protected him. No less than 172 members of the house of commons divided nevertheless against Sunderland, on the criminatory resolution, in opposition to 233, who joined in the vote of acquittal. On the examination of Knight at the bar of the house of lords, it was suggested to lord Sunderland that it would be proper to move for his immediate commitment. But availing himself of the authority of

Disgrace of  
the Earl of  
Sunder-  
land.



lord Cowper, the minister professed, with much show of candor, his doubts as to the legality of this measure. Very slender credit, however, was allowed him for the purity of his motives, when it appeared, from the report of the secret committee, that fifty thousand pounds South-Sea stock had been accepted by Knight for the earl of Sunderland, without any consideration paid or security given for the same. Knight left behind him a letter addressed to the South-Sea directors, in which he says, "that, although *conscious of his own innocence*, he had withdrawn himself to avoid the weight of an inquiry which he found too heavy for him."—He acknowledges many *indiscretions*, and professes himself sensible "that it would have been impossible for him to have avoided the *appearance* of prevarication and perjury, from the nature and largeness of the transactions." The most astonishing circumstance in this prodigious and complicated scene of knavery and credulity is, that, at the moment in which the national delirium was at the height, France had scarcely recovered from the effect of a similar delusion, in the establishment and consequent failure of the Mississippi company, projected by the famous Law. But it should seem, though individuals frequently gain wisdom by experience, that nations do not; and that a government which possesses in the slightest degree the confidence of



BOOK the people may at any time practise with success  
 VIII. on their passions, their vices, and their follies.

1721.  
 Townshend  
 and Wal-  
 pole re-in-  
 stated in  
 Office.

In consequence of the death of lord Stanhope, and the disgrace of the earl of Sunderland, all political competition was at an end, and Townshend and Walpole were re-invested with the full powers of government. The former resumed his office of secretary of state, and the latter was once more placed at the head of the treasury. The ascendancy of lord Sunderland over the mind of the king remained nevertheless undiminished. By his influence, lord Carleton, formerly Mr. Boyle, succeeded lord Townshend as president of the council, lord Cadogan was placed at the head of the army, and lord Carteret was advanced to the office of joint secretary with lord Townshend; little to the satisfaction of that nobleman. Mr. Walpole's commission as first lord of the treasury bore date April 2d, 1721.

A vehement controversy having recently arisen on the subject of the *Trinity*, chiefly in consequence of the learned tracts published in opposition to the established doctrine by the famous professor Whiston, the university of Oxford, in full convocation, resolved that the solemn thanks of that body should be returned to the earl of Nottingham for his most noble defence of the catholic faith, contained in his answer to Mr. Whiston's letter concerning the eternity of the



Son of GOD and of the Holy Ghost. And at BOOK  
VIII.  
1721.  
Earl of  
Notting-  
ham's Bill  
for sup-  
pressing  
Blasphe-  
my.  
the instance of this theological statesman, elated  
no doubt by this flattering distinction, a bill was  
introduced into the house of peers for the sup-  
pression of blasphemy and profaneness; which  
enacted, that if any one spoke or wrote against  
the being of a GOD, the divinity of Jesus Christ  
or the Holy Ghost, the doctrine of the Trinity,  
the truth of the Christian religion, or the divine  
inspiration of the Scriptures, he should suffer im-  
prisonment for an indefinite term, unless, in a cer-  
tain form prescribed, he should publicly renounce  
and abjure his errors. And by a clause in this  
bill, the archbishops and bishops within their re-  
spective jurisdictions, and the justices of peace in  
their several counties at their quarter-session,  
were authorised to summon any dissenting  
teacher, and to require his subscription to a de-  
claration of faith containing the articles above  
enumerated; and upon his refusal, it was enacted,  
that he should be *ipso facto* deprived of the benefit  
of the act of toleration. The lords being sum-  
moned on the second reading of this bill (May  
1721), Dr. WAKE, archbishop of Canterbury,  
sealed his apostacy from the principles of civil and  
religious liberty, by moving to have it committed.  
Upon which lord Onslow rose, and declared,  
“that though he was himself zealously attached  
to the doctrines of the church of England, he



BOOK VIII. would never consent to support even the truth it-  
 self by persecution ; and he moved that the bill  
 1721. might be THROWN OUT." He was seconded by  
 the duke of Wharton, who said, that, having been  
 himself frequently accused of impiety and irreligi-  
 on\*, he conceived that he could not more

\* This is the nobleman whose character is so happily deline-  
 ated by POPE, in his Epistle to Lord Viscount Cobham.

—" WHARTON, the scorn and wonder of our days,  
 Whose ruling passion is the lust of praise,  
 Born with whate'er could win it from the wise ;  
 Women and fools must like him—or he dies.  
 Though wondering senates hung on all he spoke,  
 The club must hail him master of the joke.  
 Shall parts so various aim at nothing new ?  
 He'll shine a TULLY and a WILMOT too.  
 Thus, with each gift of nature or of art,  
 And wanting nothing but an honest heart,  
 Grown all to all—from no one vice exempt,  
 And most contemptible, to shun contempt ;  
 His passion still to covet general praise,  
 His life to forfeit it a thousand ways—  
 He dies sad outcast of each church and state ;  
 And, harder still—flagitious, yet not great."

There seems a remarkable resemblance between the character  
 of this nobleman and that of the last VILLIERS duke of Buck-  
 ingham, described with such masterly strokes of genius under  
 the appellation of ZIMRI in Dryden's Absalom and Achitophel ;  
 and like him—

" Beggar'd by fools, whom still he found too late ;  
 He had his jest—and they had his estate."

On leaving England with a ruined constitution and fortune, he



effectually vindicate his character from these imputations, than by opposing to the utmost a measure so repugnant to the spirit of Christianity. And taking a Bible from his pocket, he excited the amazement of the house, by reading with much gravity many passages of the sacred volume, containing exhortations to universal charity, meekness, and mutual forbearance. The earl of Peterborough, with uncommon boldness and happiness of expression, declared, that though he was for a parliamentary king, he was not for a parliamentary God or a parliamentary religion; and that if this bill were to pass, he should be ambitious of a seat in the conclave of cardinals, as more honourable than that which he occupied in the British house of peers. Dr. Kennet, bishop of Peterborough, protested that he NEVER would be concerned in the execution of such a law—and he earnestly hoped that his brethren on the bench would not concur in the establishment of a PROTESTANT INQUISITION. The lords Cowper entered into the service of the Pretender, then patronised by the court of Madrid; and receiving, when in that city, a letter from his sovereign the king of England, commanding his return home, he is said to have thrown it scornfully out of the coach window. After running a rapid and astonishing career of profligacy and extravagance, he expired, “with not a friend to close his eyes,” at a convent near Terragona in Spain, A. D. 1731, when he had not completed the thirty-second year of his age.



BOOK and Townshend also spoke with much ability  
 VIII. against this infamous and execrable bill ; by which  
 1721. a pretended regard for the honor of religion was,  
 as usual, made a pretext for the gratification of  
 the most malignant passions—a bill which openly  
 and impudently avowed and adopted the most  
 profligate practices of the Romish church ; and  
 the principle of which, if once admitted, would  
 lead to all the horrors of the rack, the stake, and  
 the wheel\*. It was on the other hand supported

\* It has been justly observed, that every man disclaims the character and appellation of a persecutor. GARDINER and BONNER doubtless professed themselves animated, not by a spirit of persecution, but of *holy zeal* for the preservation of the catholic faith in its genuine purity. And if the earl of NOTTINGHAM had been left to decide upon the fate of the learned professor, his antagonist, he might very possibly have had the *moderation and candor* to say, in imitation of the well-known epistle of king James I. to the States of Holland, in relation to the famous Vorstius, that he would not venture to pronounce what resolutions it might be proper to adopt respecting him ; “but SURELY NEVER HERETIC BETTER DESERVED THE FLAMES.” On account of his temporary junction with the whigs during the administration of Oxford, the earl of Nottingham is satirised in various *jeux d’esprit* of Swift, under the appellation of DISMAL. A humorous parody of the celebrated speech of this nobleman, in opposition to the treaty of Utrecht, thus concludes :

“ Since the tories have thus disappointed my hopes,  
 And will neither regard my figures nor tropes,  
 I’ll *speech* against peace while DISMAL’s my name,  
 And be a true whig, while I am—NOT-IN-GAME.”



by the earl of Nottingham, the lords Bathurst and Trevor, the bishops of London, Winchester, Lich-  
field and Coventry, and various others. But, on a  
division, it was rejected by a majority of sixty  
voices against thirty-one.

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1721.

On the introduction of the bill in question, of which it is impossible to speak in terms of sufficient indignation and abhorrence, a memorable letter was addressed by the celebrated professor Whiston to archbishop Wake, highly meriting the attention of those who regard with emotions of admiration a virtuous man contending with undaunted spirit against the menaces of power and the terrors of persecution. "Your Grace well knows," says this bold confessor and champion of TRUTH, "and all the nation do now know, since you have been removed to Lambeth your sentiments and conduct have been diametrically opposite to your former sentiments and conduct. I, among many others, am deeply

In the "Windsor Prophecy" he is styled, in allusion to his name and original title, Baron Finch of Daventry, "the tall black Daventry Bird." And in the ballad on the surrender of Dunkirk he is again complimented :

"Sunderland's run out of his wits,  
And DISMAL double-dismal looks ;  
Wharton can only swear by fits,  
And strutting Hal is off the hooks.  
Old Godolphin, full of spleen,  
Made false moves and lost his queen."



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1721.

concerned in the consequences of such an amazing change in your grace. Certainly, my lord, this unhappy nation has of late had oaths enow, tests enow, subscriptions enow, imposed upon them. If, however, the church and state do resolve to quench those small remnants of learning, justice, and integrity, which still remain among us, by the introduction of an holy office into these kingdoms, with your grace at the head of it, it would certainly be convenient for its future reputation, that the several sorts of blasphemy referred to in the present bill may be distinguished by several sorts of penalties ; and that blasphemy against Almighty God himself should be punished somewhat more severely than blasphemy against St. Athanasius ; which emendation I would humbly offer to your grace's consideration.—Give me leave to set down here a famous passage out of the principal of the apostolical fathers, Clement of Rome. See what he thought of persecution and persecutors.—His words, according to your grace's own version, are these : ‘Look into the holy Scriptures, which are the true words of the Holy Ghost. Ye know there is nothing unjust or counterfeit written in them. There you shall not find that righteous men were ever cast off by such as were good themselves. They were persecuted, ’tis true, but it was by the wicked and unjust ; they were cast in prison, but they were



cast in by those that were unholy; they were killed, but by accursed men, men abominable, full of all wickedness, who were incensed to so great a degree as to bring those into suffering who with an holy and unblameable purpose of mind worship God—not knowing that the Most High is the protector and defender of all such as with a pure conscience serve his holy name.’”

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1721.

Although the pernicious tendency of the continental connexions of England had been the constant theme of Mr. Walpole's eloquence while in opposition to the court, one of the first measures of his administration was to move for a subsidy to Sweden, with whom an alliance offensive and defensive had been just concluded—a British squadron being also at this very time cruising in the Baltic for the protection of that kingdom against the designs of Russia. So that, as lord Molesworth observed, “we were not only required to assist the Swedes, with whom we had been so long at variance, but to purchase at an enormous price the permission to assist them. His lordship affirmed, that our engagements were inconsistent and contradictory; that our politics were not only variable, but incomprehensible to every man who, knowing merely the state of Great Britain, was unapprised of the several petty interests of the electorate, which were the secret springs of our transactions abroad; that we were in turn the

Subsidy to  
Sweden,  
and Alli-  
ance offen-  
sive and de-  
fensive.



BOOK allies and the dupes of all nations ; that if such  
VIII solicitude for the restoration of the conquests  
1721. made by Russia upon Sweden were reasonable, it  
was incumbent upon Hanover to set the example  
by the restoration of Bremen and Verden, and of  
Prussia our ally by that of Pomerania ; that,  
whatever might be the connexions or engage-  
ments of Hanover, Great Britain had neither any  
interest nor any right to intermeddle in the affairs  
of the empire ; and that the friendship or enmity  
of the powers of the Baltic was of little importance  
to England, as we procured nothing from the  
kingdoms of the North which we could not with  
more advantage import from our own colonies in  
America, were proper encouragement held out to  
them. His lordship acknowledged that the  
distressed condition to which the Swedes were  
reduced would be really worthy of compas-  
sion, could we forget that they had been the  
authors in a great measure of their own misfor-  
tunes, by their tame submission to a despotic  
tyrannical prince, who had sacrificed their sub-  
stance in pursuit of his rash and unjust designs ;  
and that any nation which followed their example  
deserved the same fate.—His lordship touched on  
the affairs of the duchy of Mecklenburg, which  
he insinuated to have been the secret cause of the  
rupture with the czar ; and entered into a detail  
of the treaties of Roschild and Travendahl, in



order to show how widely we had deviated from engagements of which we were ourselves the guaranties. His lordship said he would go as far as any man to maintain and support the honor and dignity of the crown of Great Britain; but he would never consent to squander, in the mode now recommended, what yet remained of the wealth and resources of the nation\*." The vote of supply at length passed, not without much angry objection and difficulty—the voices on the division being 197 to 136.

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In the course of the present session, provision was also made by parliament for the liquidation of a debt of 550,000*l.* on the civil list, incurred by the profligate profusion of Sunderland. But in

Civil-List  
Debts dis-  
charged.

\* This nobleman is deservedly celebrated for his Account of Denmark, in which country he had resided some years as ambassador during the reign of the late king William. So highly was the court of Copenhagen offended at the freedom of his remarks, that a formal complaint was made respecting the publication by the Danish resident in England to that monarch, and satisfaction demanded by the infliction of a punishment adequate to the offence. The king replied, "That in England the press was free, and he possessed no such power." The resident in anger replied, "That if similar provocation had been given to the king of England by a subject of the king of Denmark, his master would have sent him the head of the offender."—"Would you," said the great monarch to whom the resident addressed himself, "wish that I should acquaint Molesworth with this, that he may insert it in a new edition of his history?"—*SUM's Royal History of Denmark.*



BOOK the royal message delivered upon this occasion  
 VIII. by Mr. Methuen, the king declared his resolution,  
 1721. 1st, To cause a retrenchment of his expenses ;  
 2dly, He informed the house of commons that he  
 had ordered the accounts to be submitted to their  
 inspection ; and, 3dly, He proposed that the sum  
 wanting should be raised by a deduction from the  
 salaries and wages of all offices, pensions, and  
 other payments from the crown. And a bill im-  
 posing a duty of sixpence in the pound for this  
 purpose accordingly passed both houses, and  
 received the royal assent. Such was the heavy  
 pressure of public business during this memorable  
 session, that the parliament was not prorogued  
 till the 10th of August 1721, when the king gave  
 his assent to the important bill for restoring pub-  
 lic credit.

M. Bestu-  
 chef or-  
 dered to  
 depart the  
 Kingdom.

About the commencement of the present year,  
 M. Bestuchef, the Russian ambassador, in conse-  
 quence of some very offensive expressions—not  
 particularly specified—in a memorial presented  
 by him at the court of London, was ordered to  
 depart the kingdom in fourteen days. This  
 affront was revenged by the czar in a manner  
 worthy of so great a monarch. In a declaration  
 published at Petersburg, January 29, 1721, he  
 says, “ It is notorious in what an unjust and in-  
 jurious manner our resident was sent away from  
 the court of England, which, having done us a



great and sensible wrong, ought naturally to have engaged us to make reprisals according to what is practised every where else. But as we perceive that all this is done without any regard to the interest of England, and only in favor of the Hanoverian interest—for which the ministers of Great Britain not only neglect the friendship of foreign powers, but do not even spare their own country, which more nearly and more sensibly concerns them—we were unwilling that the English nation, which has no share in that piece of injustice, should suffer for it; and therefore we grant to them all manner of security and free liberty to trade in all our dominions.” Although the czar had refused with disdain the mediation of the king of England, he possessed too much sagacity not to perceive the impolicy of continuing the war against Sweden, now at peace with all other nations, and relying on the powerful protection of Great Britain. He therefore willingly hearkened to overtures of reconciliation; and a definitive treaty was concluded between the two crowns, under the mediation of France, at Nystadt, August 1721, conformably to which the fertile and extensive provinces of Livonia, Ingria, Esthonia, and Carelia, were confirmed to Russia, and the barren deserts of Finland only, with the exception of Wyburg and its district, restored to Sweden. From this æra that remote kingdom,

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VIII.  
1721.

Treaty of  
Nystadt.



BOOK VIII. which possesses no solid or permanent resources, after dazzling Europe by a sort of præternatural and momentary blaze, sunk, fortunately for itself, into its original state of political obscurity.

1721.

Defensive  
Alliance  
between  
Great Bri-  
tain,  
France,  
and Spain.

On the 13th of June, 1721, a treaty of peace was signed at Madrid between Great Britain and Spain. By the terms of this treaty restitution was to be made of all the effects taken on both sides, and consequently of the ships captured at Messina. And on the same day another treaty of defensive alliance was, to the surprise of Europe, signed between Great Britain, France, and Spain. By a secret article of the first treaty Great Britain engaged not to oppose the views of Spain in Italy; and by a secret article of the second, France and Spain guaranteed the possession of Bremen and Verden to Hanover. All remaining differences between the courts of Vienna and Madrid were referred to the congress agreed to be held at Cambray.

The politics of the king of England had now once more varied their direction. Great offence had been taken at the pertinacious refusal of the emperor to grant the investiture of Bremen and Verden upon the terms demanded by the king, who was eagerly solicitous to include in it the imperial city of Bremen. The guarantee of the whole house of Bourbon being now obtained with respect to these famous provinces, the house of Austria



might be safely set at defiance; and the preten-  
sions of Spain, at the ensuing congress of Cam-  
bray, being in consequence strongly supported  
both by France and England, it was, after much  
angry and fruitless discussion, continued year  
after year, finally dissolved without coming to any  
terms of agreement.

BOOK  
VIII.

1721.  
Congress  
of Cam-  
bray dis-  
solved

But Spain had another, and perhaps yet more  
forcible motive, to accede to the alliance of the  
three crowns, with the guarantee of Bremen and  
Verden annexed. Previous to the war of Sicily,  
the king of England, in order to induce the king  
of Spain to desist from his hostile projects, had  
flattered him with the idea of the restitution of  
Gibraltar. And lord Stanhope, who went over  
in person to confer with the duke of Orleans  
upon this subject, had given a verbal promise  
to the regent, or at least what the regent un-  
derstood as such, for the restoration of Gibraltar.  
The regent, thus authorised, had positively and  
formally assured the king of Spain that Gibraltar  
should be restored. And the cardinal Dubois  
declared to the ambassador, lord Stair, "that  
the honor of his highness, as well as that of the  
king was now engaged for its accomplishment;  
and that a failure in this point might be attended  
with disastrous consequences." On the other  
hand, the court of London with reason alleged,  
that an offer of this nature, made with a view to

Restitution  
of Gibralt-  
tar.



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VIII.

1721.

prevent a war, could never be binding as a preliminary of peace: and the king of England affirmed, and the regent did not deny, that he had never given his consent since the rupture to the renewal of the offer. Being however, in present circumstances, passionately desirous to conciliate the regard and friendship of the two courts, after much delay and hesitation he wrote that celebrated letter to the king of Spain, which being considered and relied upon as a virtual promise of restitution, his catholic majesty immediately signed the defensive alliance and guarantee. It is very remarkable that the letter originally contained the important clause *upon the footing of an equivalent*; but the king of Spain expressing great disappointment and dissatisfaction at these words, a second letter was written, in which they were omitted\*. As it was highly

\* Of this celebrated letter from the king of England to the king of Spain, the following is a translated copy from the French original:—

“SIR, MY BROTHER,

“I HAVE learned with great satisfaction, from the report of my ambassador at your court, that your majesty is at last resolved to remove the obstacles that have for some time delayed the entire accomplishment of our union. Since, from the confidence which your majesty expresses towards me, I may look upon the treaties which have been in question between us as re-established; and that, accordingly, the instruments



improbable that the consent of parliament could ever be obtained to the surrender of this invincible conquest, the offer was too evidently made merely to amuse; and a sort of national indignation being excited, when the secret proposal of the court was made subsequently public, the design was ultimately laid aside as wholly impracticable; not however without leaving an apparent stain, or at least casting a certain shade upon the honor of the king.

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VIII.  
1721.

Amongst the numerous treaties of alliance Treaty with Morocco.

ments necessary for carrying on the trade of my subjects will be delivered out; I do no longer hesitate to assure your majesty of my readiness to satisfy you with regard to your demand touching the restoration of Gibraltar, promising you to make use of the first favourable opportunity to regulate this article with the consent of my parliament. And to give your majesty a further proof of my affection, I have ordered my ambassador, as soon as the negotiation with which he has been charged shall be finished, to propose to your majesty *new engagements to be entered into in concert and jointly with France*, suitable to the present conjuncture, not only for strengthening our union, but also for securing the tranquillity of Europe. Your majesty may be persuaded that I on my part will show all facility imaginable, promising myself that you will do the same, for the mutual benefit of our kingdoms—being most perfectly,

“ Sir, my brother,

“ Your majesty’s good brother,

June 1, 1721.

“ GEORGE, R.

“ *To the King of Spain, Monsieur my Brother.*”

HARDWICKE *State Papers*. COXE’S *Memoirs*, vol. i. p. 176.



BOOK concluded in this reign must not be omitted the  
 VIII. treaty signed about this period with the emperor  
 1721. of Morocco, which indeed merits to be classed  
 with the most rational and useful of them; the  
 British commerce being secured by this treaty  
 from the depredations of the barbarians, and  
 a considerable number of British subjects also res-  
 cued by it from a state of slavery.

Death of  
 Pope Cle-  
 ment XI.

Nearly at this time died pope Clement XI, who had sat in the papal chair no less than twenty-one years; a man haughty, but respectable for his talents; inflexible in the maintenance of the papal prerogative, and zealously devoted to the interests of the house of Stuart. He was succeeded by Innocent XIII, of the Italian family of Conti, who, after a short and tranquil reign of three years only, gave place to Benedict XIII, of the ancient and illustrious house of Orsini.

Debates  
 in Parlia-  
 ment.

The first septennial parliament of Great Britain met for the last time October 19, 1721. The king in his speech boasted, and in the address returned was congratulated, upon his success in restoring the tranquillity of Europe. But the vast amount of the navy debt, now estimated at 1,700,000*l.* being stated to the house of commons, in order that a parliamentary provision should be made for its discharge, a most violent debate arose. It was urged by the members in



opposition, that this enormous debt had accumulated by employing more seamen than were provided for by parliament, particularly by sending large fleets to the Baltic and Mediterranean, and keeping the sailors in pay during the winter; that these extraordinary expenses were not necessary for the service of Great Britain; and therefore it was proper to have all the papers relating to the northern transactions, and particularly lord Carteret's private instructions, laid before the house, in order to have full satisfaction concerning the grounds of these expeditions. But the motion brought forward to this effect was over-ruled by a great majority. The court, strengthened by the recent coalition of the whigs, set all opposition at defiance; and the new minister soon proved himself superior to all his predecessors in the art of adroit and dexterous parliamentary management.

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In the house of lords the debates were resumed with no less spirit, and with no better success. The duke of Wharton moving for a copy of the late treaty with Spain, the ex-minister, lord Sunderland, apparently eager to show that, though he had incurred the detestation of the public, he still retained the confidence of the sovereign, declared, "that he was decidedly against advising his majesty to communicate the treaty in question at this juncture; because, *to his*



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*knowledge*, there was in it a secret article which the king of Spain had desired might not be made public till after the congress at Cambray was over ; and his majesty having granted that request, the house would not, he hoped, desire his majesty to break his promise :” and the motion was thereupon rejected.

On a subsequent occasion the earl of Strafford observed, that as the war against Spain was undertaken without provocation, so the peace was concluded without advantage ; that the Spanish fleet had been attacked contrary to the law of nations, without any declaration of war, while amicable negotiations were carrying on at Madrid ; and, by an article of the treaty, we now submitted to the reproachful condition of restoring the ships so captured, or of paying a full equivalent for those previously disposed of : that the trade with Spain, which constituted one of the most valuable branches of the British commerce, had been interrupted and endangered, and at a time when the nation groaned under the pressure of heavy debts, occasioned by a former long and expensive war ; concluding with a motion for an address to his majesty, that he would be pleased to cause the instructions given to sir George Byng to be laid before the house. This was rejected by a majority of sixty-seven to twenty-four voices. But a protest was entered upon the



journals, representing that a motion for admiral's instructions had never before been denied ; that without a sight of the instructions moved for, the war with Spain did not appear justifiable ; nor did it appear that Great Britain reaped any fruits from the injustice. It was now, upon the whole, apparent, that the court system had made a most alarming progress, and that the two houses of parliament could see, without emotion, and much less indignation, the interests of England wantonly and daringly sacrificed to an obstinate predilection for that Germanic system of politics with which the people of England had no national concern.

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In the course of this session a singular petition was presented to parliament from that respectable class of citizens known by the appellation of Quakers. It is a well-known tenet of this sect, distinguished by its harmless peculiarities, that oaths even judicially administered are in their own nature unlawful ; and the legislature had long since wisely and indulgently passed an act to render their solemn affirmation, in all matters of civil concern, equivalent to an oath. The object of the present application was the omission of the words " in the presence of Almighty God," in the legal form of that affirmation ; it being justly alleged, that, while those words remained, the essence of an oath was preserved. But to

Quakers'  
Petition.



BOOK the penalties of perjury, should this affirmation  
VIII. be in any instance violated, they professed their  
1721. willing and cheerful submission. The court, ever  
ready under this reign to extend and establish the  
civil and religious privileges of the subject, coun-  
tenanced and supported this application, and  
a bill for this purpose passed the house of com-  
mons without difficulty. But in its passage  
through the house of lords, the spirit of bigotry,  
now awakened from its transient slumber, dis-  
played itself in all its malignity. Dr. Atterbury,  
bishop of Rochester, observed, that he knew not  
why such a distinguishing mark of indulgence  
should be allowed to a set of people who were  
hardly Christians. And a petition was presented  
by the archbishop of York to the house, from the  
London clergy, expressing “a serious concern  
lest the minds of good men should be grieved  
and wounded, and the enemies of Christianity  
triumph, when they should see such condescen-  
sion made by a Christian legislature to a set of  
men who renounce the divine institutions of  
Christianity, particularly that by which the faith-  
ful are initiated into this religion, and denomi-  
nated Christians.” This petition was rejected by  
the house, not without symptoms of disgust and  
contempt; and the bill finally passed, though  
accompanied with a protest signed by several lords,  
eager to record their own disgrace and folly.



Another very meritorious act of the new ad-  
 ministration in the present session, though of  
 a widely different nature, was the introduction of  
 what might well be regarded as a new commercial  
 code, by the abrogation of a vast multiplicity of  
 duties, payable on the importation of raw mate-  
 rials, and on the exportation of wrought goods.  
 For this grand and highly beneficial regulation,  
 so simple in its principle, and so comprehensive  
 in its extent, the country was indebted to the en-  
 lightened wisdom of Mr. Walpole. The king in  
 his speech from the throne had observed, that  
 nothing would more conduce to the extension of  
 that commerce upon which the riches and gran-  
 deur of the nation chiefly depend than such an  
 alteration as this; and he asserted that the pro-  
 duce of the duties in question, compared with the  
 infinite advantages that would accrue from their  
 abolition, would be found an inconsiderable object.  
 This was an experiment so bold as to excite much  
 doubt and solicitude as to the event; but time  
 soon verified the prediction beyond even the most  
 sanguine previous expectation. On the 7th of  
 March, 1722, the parliament was prorogued, and  
 on the 10th dissolved by proclamation.

The earl of Sunderland did not long survive his  
 dismissal from his high office, but died April  
 1722, leaving behind him a character which bore  
 a striking analogy to that of his father—bold,

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New Com-  
mercial  
Code.Death of  
Lord Sun-  
derland.



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restless, insidious, faithless, ambitious, excelling in all the arts of courtly address, and distinguished by his extent of political knowledge and sagacity, though he attained not to the dignity of true wisdom, which is inseparably connected with rectitude of heart and conduct. The animosity of parties was by no means extinguished by the death of this nobleman, the adherents of whom now looked up to lord Carteret as their head; and the traces of the Sunderland faction were very discernible for many years. It is certain that lord Sunderland, on his fall from power, although he enjoyed to the last hour of his life the highest favor and confidence of the king, engaged in the most dangerous and unprincipled cabals, as well with the Jacobites as with the discontented and disaffected whigs: and Mr. Keene, resident at Madrid, in one of his dispatches at a subsequent period, observes, “that the duke of Wharton and others of the same party were full of eulogiums of lord Sunderland, whose death they lamented as a fatal blow to their cause\*.”

\* What appears most extraordinary and unaccountable in these dark intrigues of Sunderland is, the circumstance that the king himself is liable to the suspicion of having been in some measure consenting to them. Such was the fixed and rooted hatred of the monarch to his only son, that it should seem he could endure to hear, at least, of schemes for his exclusion from the throne, and the consequent restoration of the



Nearly at the same time (June 16th, 1722) expired the celebrated JOHN duke of MARLBOROUGH, to whom Sunderland was closely allied by marriage with his eldest daughter. The memory of this

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Death of  
the Duke  
of Marlbo-  
rough.

banished family. Lord Orford, in his Reminiscences, relates that Sunderland, subsequent to the external appearance of reconciliation between the king and the prince, said to his father, sir Robert Walpole, "Well! we have settled matters for the present, but we must think whom we will have next." To which Walpole replied, "Your lordship may think as you please, but my part is taken."—A still more marvellous anecdote preserved by the earl of Orford is, that, on the death of George I, Q. Caroline found in the royal cabinet a proposal of the earl of Berkeley, then first lord of the admiralty, and in the highest confidence of lord Sunderland, for seizing the prince of Wales, and conveying him secretly to America. It must be remarked that the eldest son of the prince was at this time, and during the whole of this reign, resident at Hanover. This paper is affirmed by lord Orford to have been in the handwriting of Charles Stanhope, brother to the earl of Harrington. Mr. Coxe, in his Memoirs of Walpole, has told nearly the same strange tale, on what authority does not appear; with the material variation, nevertheless, that the paper or memorial in question was from lord Sunderland himself. Certain it is that Charles Stanhope, from some hidden cause, was in a very high degree obnoxious to king George II. And lord Townshend, in a letter to Mr. Poyntz, June 1728, declares, "that, in consequence of sir R. Walpole's recommending him to a place at the board of admiralty, at the earnest desire of lord Harrington, he had offended the king so much as even to hazard the loss of his credit with his majesty for ever." Though weakly authenticated, and exposed to many objections, the story of lord Orford is too remarkable to be passed over in total silence.



BOOK great man has been severely attacked, and he has  
VIII. with many incurred the imputation of base in-  
1722. gratitude in the desertion of his royal master and  
benefactor, king James II. But this desertion  
took place at a time when it was not unattended  
with danger ; and there appears in his conduct at  
that great political crisis nothing inconsistent with  
the supposition that his motives were laudable  
and patriotic ; and surely no private obligation  
can be of force to supersede the duties we owe  
to our country ? It is indeed far more difficult  
to justify the correspondence which he afterwards  
carried on with the abdicated monarch ;—but this  
guilt he appears to have shared with so many  
other distinguished, and upon the whole respec-  
table persons, that it cannot be imputed to him as  
a subject of peculiar reproach. The military talents  
of the duke of Marlborough transcend all praise,  
and may be set with advantage in competition  
with those of any commander ancient or modern.  
In his political capacity he was a most able and suc-  
cessful negotiator ; and though, in consequence of  
his early initiation into the brilliant and dissipated  
circles of the court, necessarily and grossly illite-  
rate, all defects of this nature were more than  
compensated by the native excellence of his un-  
derstanding, the fascination of his manners, and  
his profound knowledge of mankind—the fruit  
not of abstract speculation, but of actual observa-



tion and long experience\*. His person was eminently graceful, and his countenance noble and engaging. His disposition was mild, his deportment affable, and the general tenor of his private and social life regular and unblemished. He has been indeed usually represented as deeply tinctured with the vice of avarice; but though he was doubtless eager in the accumulation of riches, it does not appear that he degraded the dignity of his station and character by the parsimony of his expenses. In the last years of his life he exhibited an affecting proof of the imbecility of human nature, and the vanity of human greatness†; leaving upon the public mind an impression of compassion, which the unexampled pomp of his funeral obsequies did not tend to weaken.

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The king of England might now be supposed to have attained to a situation in which he could rest with satisfaction from his labours, and enjoy in peace his high fortune and unrivalled prosperity. But this was far from being the case. Troubles succeeded incessantly to troubles; and the evening

Conspiracy  
against the  
Government.

\* "Apud subjectos, apud proximos, apud collegas, variis illecebris potens." TACIT. *Hist.* lib. 1.

† In life's last scene what prodigies surprise!

Fears of the brave, and follies of the wise.

From Marlborough's eyes the streams of dotage flow,

And Swift expires—a driveller and a show.

JOHNSON'S *Im.* 10th Sat. *Juv.*



BOOK of his life was destined to be yet less serene and  
VIII. tranquil than the anxious years already passed.

1722.

In his concluding speech to the late parliament he had given plain intimations that dangerous designs against his person were then in agitation. But he professed to entertain “so just a confidence in the affection of his subjects, and in their regard for their own welfare, that he was persuaded they would not suffer themselves to be imposed upon, and betrayed into their own destruction; and he declared the expectations of those to be very ill grounded who hope to prevail with a protestant free people to give up their religion and liberties into the hands of such as are enemies unto both.” The fact was, that, in consequence of the discontents and clamors excited by the failure of the South-Sea project, the partizans of the Pretender had been encouraged to fabricate a plot against the government. Of this the king had, early in the present year, advice from the regent duke of Orleans; and about the month of May he received full information of the persons and designs of the conspirators. Orders were immediately given for an encampment near the metropolis, and Mr. Horace Walpole was sent to Holland to demand the troops which the States had stipulated to furnish by the barrier treaty. Very alarming apprehensions prevailing of the magnitude of the public danger, the funds sunk pro-



digiously in value, and there followed a great run upon the Bank ; but lord Townshend having signified in a letter to the lord mayor, " that his majesty was firmly assured the authors of the present wicked conspiracy neither would be supported nor even countenanced by any foreign power," the alarm in a considerable degree subsided. Loyal addresses were presented from the city of London and many other places ; and the king, instead of repairing, as was his intention, to the continent, thought it expedient to make a tour through various parts of the kingdom ; reviewed a large body of forces encamped near Salisbury, visited Portsmouth, and was everywhere received with great demonstrations of joy. During this interval several persons were apprehended on a charge of high treason, amongst others, Kelly and Carte, nonjuring clergymen ; one Plucket, an officer of invalids at Plymouth, and some persons of more elevated rank.

Early in the month of October, 1722, the king opened the new parliament with a speech from the throne, in which he expressed his concern in being obliged to inform them that a dangerous conspiracy had been for some time past formed, and was still carrying on, against his person and government, in favor of the Pretender. His majesty declared that the discoveries made at home, the information obtained from his ministers



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1722. abroad, and the intelligence received from the various powers in alliance with him in different parts of Europe, had afforded him ample and concurrent proofs of this wicked design. Some of the conspirators were already, he added, secured, and endeavours used for apprehending others; and he referred to the wisdom of parliament the measures necessary to be taken for the safety of the kingdom: expressing at the same time his firm belief that the hopes and expectations of their common enemies were very ill founded, in supposing that the discontents occasioned by the losses and misfortunes of individuals, however industriously fomented, were turned into disaffection and a spirit of rebellion. “Had I,” said this monarch in very animated and dignified language, “since my accession to the throne, ever attempted any innovation in our established religion, had I in any one instance invaded the liberty or property of my subjects, I should less wonder at any endeavour to alienate the affections of my people, and draw them into measures that can end in nothing but their own destruction. But to hope to persuade a free people, in full enjoyment of all that is dear and valuable to them, to exchange freedom for slavery, the protestant religion for popery, and to sacrifice at once the price of so much blood and treasure as have been spent in defence of our present establishment,



seems an infatuation not to be accounted for. Your own interest and welfare call upon you to defend yourselves. I rely upon the Divine protection, the support of my parliament, and the affections of my people, which I shall endeavour to preserve by continuing to make the laws of the realm the rule and measure of all my actions." On the communication of this intelligence, a very great and general alarm was excited in the nation. A considerable augmentation of the forces was immediately voted; the habeas-corpus act was suspended, contrary to all precedent, for no less than twelve months. On the requisition of the king, a body of troops was held by the States General in readiness to embark from Holland, and six regiments were likewise ordered from Ireland; and both houses joined in expressing the strongest detestation and abhorrence of this "traitorous and unnatural conspiracy." Mr. Walpole affirmed to the house, "that this wicked design was formed about Christmas last: that the conspirators had made application to certain foreign potentates for troops; but, being disappointed in their expectation from abroad, they had resolved desperately to go on, confiding in their own strength, and fondly depending upon the general discontent and confusion excited by the failure of the fatal South-Sea project: that the plan was to seize upon the Tower, the Bank, and the Exche-



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quer, and to secure by violence the persons of the king and the prince : that government had received information of this plot ever since May last ; but two terms coming at that time together, it was thought advisable to postpone the apprehending of the conspirators till the long vacation, that no advantage might be taken of the habeas-corpus act. An exact account of this detestable conspiracy he assured the house would in time be laid before them." But the plot itself seems to have been discovered while yet in embryo ; and it is probable that no regular project of invasion or insurrection had been digested or matured ; nor have the circumstances explanatory either of its nature or extent ever been clearly developed. Various persons, however, of high distinction, amongst whom were the duke of Norfolk and the lords Orrery, North and Grey, were apprehended on a very strong presumption of their concurrence in this conspiracy. Pains and penalties were inflicted by act of parliament on several of the conspirators\*. But one only suffered capital

\* Amongst others upon Kelly, who was committed close prisoner to the Tower, under this act, on the 28th of October 1722 ;—whence he made his escape, after a confinement of fourteen years, on the same day of the month, A. D. 1736. In a letter addressed to a friend in London on this occasion from Calais, and afterwards made public, he complains heavily of the severe treatment he received from colonel Williamson, deputy-governor of the Tower. The most remarkable circumstance in the letter, and that for which it deserves to be re-



punishment—Christopher Layer, a barrister of the Temple, convicted of high treason in enlisting men for the service of the Pretender. He was repeatedly reprieved, and much endeavour was used to procure from him a full confession ; but he persisted in a resolute refusal. Beyond comparison, however, the trial which attracted most of the public attention was that of the celebrated Atterbury bishop of Rochester, who was found to be a party in this conspiracy, or at least confidentially privy to it : and he was, by a bill which passed both houses by great majorities, deprived of his episcopal dignity, and sentenced to perpetual banishment. Mr. Yonge, the mover of the bill, declared this prelate to be a disgrace and dishonor to a church conspicuous for its loyalty ; that his holy function and elevated station, with the solemn oaths he had taken, were the most unpardonable aggravations of his crime ; and he concluded with applying to him the denunciation sanctioned by warrant of Holy Writ—“ Let his habitation be desolate, and let no man dwell therein, and his bishopric let another take.”

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Banish-  
ment of  
Bishop At-  
terbury.

membered, is the persuasion he expresses, that, by the indulgence of the government, he had purposely an opportunity given him to escape. “ I heard,” says he, “ that sir Robert Walpole should upon some occasion declare in public he was an enemy to such imprisonment, and did not care how soon I was released from mine.” He died at Avignon about October 1762, aged sixty-nine.



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Extrava-  
gant Decla-  
ration of  
the Pre-  
tender.

The declaration of the Pretender, framed for the occasion, and dated from Lucca, was by both houses voted to be a false, insolent, and traitorous libel, and ordered to be burnt at the Royal Exchange. In this declaration the Pretender, with singular modesty and all the appearance of gravity, proposed, that if king George would relinquish to him the throne of Great Britain, he would in return consent to his retaining the title of king in his native dominions, and would invite all other states to confirm it: and he likewise most graciously engaged to leave to king George his succession to the British dominions secure, whenever, in due course, his natural right should take place. An address was presented to the throne by the two houses, expressing their “astonishment at the extravagant presumption of this declaration, and repeating their assurances to support his majesty against the impotent efforts of an attainted fugitive bred up in the maxims of tyranny and superstition.”

The proofs in support of the charge against the bishop of Rochester being somewhat deficient in legal precision, though sufficiently clear to induce an entire conviction of his guilt, much clamor was excited by the bill of banishment passed by the commons against him; though, had not a spirit of lenity pervaded the proceedings of government on this occasion, he would



scarcely have escaped a bill of attainder. When BOOK  
VIII.  
1722. it came under the discussion of the lords, the duke of Wharton, in a speech of uncommon ability, exposed what he styled the weakness, insufficiency, and contradiction of the evidence against the bishop; and added, that such proceedings, like the stone of Sisyphus, frequently rolled back on those who were the chief promoters of them. Lord Cowper, now in opposition to the court, enlarged much on the danger and injustice of swerving from the fixed rules of evidence. He affirmed, “that the penalties inflicted by this bill were either much greater or much less than the bishop deserved; that whatever might be the nature or extent of the accusation, the law of the land and the established forms of judicial procedure ought to be strictly adhered to, not only in the courts below, but in the high court of parliament itself; that every Englishman had a right to a trial by law; that this was in a more especial manner the privilege of a peer of the realm. And the political necessity which was alleged in vindication of this measure he did not believe to exist; the government was sufficiently secured by the powers vested in the crown in consequence of the suspension of the habeas-corpus act, and the additional troops raised for its defence.” And lord Bathurst, in the course of an eloquent speech



BOOK on the same side, turning to the bench of bishops,  
VIII. sarcastically remarked, "that he could not ac-  
1722. count for the inveterate hatred and malice which  
some persons bore the learned and ingenious  
bishop of Rochester, unless they were intoxicated  
with the infatuation of certain tribes of savage  
Indians, who believed they inherited not only the  
spoils but even the abilities of any great enemy  
whom they killed in battle." Notwithstanding  
the reasonings of lord Cowper, it seems erroneous  
and unsafe to deny the general position, that  
deviations from the established forms of judicial  
procedure in extraordinary cases are justifiable,  
and even necessary, where the public safety is con-  
cerned—provided that the executive justice of the  
State depart not from that *substantial justice*  
which is founded in the nature of things. "There  
are," says a great writer, M. Montesquieu,  
"even in States where the greatest value is set  
upon liberty, laws which violate that blessing  
with respect to one person to preserve it for all.  
Such are, in England, bills of attainder. There  
are occasions when for a moment a veil is to  
be thrown over liberty, as the statues of the  
gods were sometimes covered in Greece and  
Rome."

So entirely opposite were now the politics of  
France from those which had prevailed in the late



reign, that upon this occasion the regent offered twenty battalions of veteran troops to the king of Great Britain, in order to defend his person and government against the attempts of that family which Louis XIV. had employed the whole force of his kingdom to protect and restore: but this offer it was judged prudent to decline.

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That the vengeful and merciless spirit by which the whigs had been actuated when first restored to power was now, notwithstanding the pretended rigor of the late proceedings, most sensibly abated, the reversal at this period of the act of attainder passed against lord Bolingbroke is a decisive proof. The bishop of Rochester, on his arrival at Calais, hearing that lord Bolingbroke was waiting there for a passage, exclaimed, with an emotion from which much was inferred, "Then we are exchanged!" This nobleman, however, though restored to his honors and paternal estate, was still excluded from a seat in the house of peers, through the inflexible opposition of the minister, who clearly discerned and dreaded the consequences which might eventually result from the irresistible force of his eloquence and talents, when exerted in their proper sphere of action. Fired with ambition to resume his former station in public life, and a philosopher only through necessity, he cherished a fixed and



BOOK mortal resentment against sir Robert Walpole ;  
VIII. and, regardless of his recent obligations, in a  
1722. short time joined with eagerness that opposition  
to his administration, so celebrated for the abilities of its members, and which began now to assume a regular and systematic form. The chagrin of lord Bolingbroke was undoubtedly enhanced by seeing his former co-adjutors in office, lord Oxford and lord Harcourt, in full possession of those high privileges which he vainly and incessantly pined to regain. The latter of these noblemen was even received into a high degree of favor at court ; which, it is said, occasioned some severe reflections from the passionate lips of Atterbury, lord Harcourt was provoked to retaliate, by declaring, that on the queen's death the bishop came to him and lord Bolingbroke, and said, nothing remained but immediately to proclaim king JAMES—offering, if they would give him a guard, to put on his lawn sleeves, and head the procession\*.

\* This celebrated prelate, his learned friend Dr. Smalridge, on presenting him, A. D. 1710, to the upper house of convocation, as prolocutor, most elegantly styles, “ Vir in nullo literarum genere hospes, in plerisque artibus et studiis diu et feliciter exercitatus—in maxime perfectis literarum disciplinis perfectissimus.” His eloquence and learning none indeed have presumed to dispute ; and his public character has all that dignity which arises from firmness and consistency. Of the violence and virulence of his temper he gave early proof



Early in the present session, a bill which occupied much of the attention of parliament, and in his reply to the famous treatise of Dr. WAKE, On the Authority of Christian Princes, and the Rights, Powers, and Privileges of Convocations: "Were" (says he) "all that Dr. Wake affirms strictly true and justifiable; yet whether laboring the point so heartily as he does, and shewing himself to be so willing to prove the church to have no rights and privileges, be a very decent part in a clergyman, I leave his friends to consider. But when all a man advances is not only ill-designed, but ill-founded, and his principles are as false as they are scandalous, there are no names and censures too bad to be bestowed on such writers and their writings." One cannot sufficiently admire the effrontery of the insinuation, that, whether the AUTHORITY claimed by the church be well or ill founded, it is at all events incumbent on the clergy, *as such*, to defend and support it. For this performance an honorary degree was conferred upon Atterbury by the university of Oxford. But in animadverting upon it, bishop Burnet happily remarks, "that the applause with which it was received, when the temper and spirit with which it is written are considered, forms a much stronger argument against the expediency of a convocation, than any he brings or can bring in favor of it." And Dr. Wake himself declared, "that such a spirit of wrath and uncharitableness pervaded the whole book, as he had hardly ever met with before; though, to do no injustice to his adversary, he admits that Dr. Atterbury has done all that a man of parts and zeal could do, to defend the cause he has espoused. One thing only was wanting: He had not TRUTH on his side—his work is a MERE ROMANCE." In 1703, when the principles of whiggism began to predominate, Hooper dean of Canterbury, a man distinguished by the steadiness of his attachment to them, was, by an unexpected and unsolicited nomination, raised to the bishopric of St. Asaph, "with a view" (as Dr. Atterbury



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Oppressive  
Tax levied  
on the Ro-  
man-catho-  
lics.

was kept long depending in the house, was introduced and supported by the minister, for levying the sum of one hundred thousand pounds on the estates of all Roman-catholics, upon pretext of “the constant endeavours of the papists to subvert the present happy establishment; though he professed that he would not take upon him to charge any particular person among them with being concerned in the present *horrid conspiracy*. But it was well known, that many of them had been engaged in the *late* rebellion; and the present plot, he averred, was contrived at Rome, and the English catholics were not only well-wishers to it, but had contributed large sums to carry it on. And he thought it highly reason-

tells his friend Trelawney, bishop of Exeter), as he supposes, “to take the lead in the administration of ecclesiastical affairs; in which case,” says he, “I am sure to be oppressed and kept under, as much as if archbishop Tillotson were alive and at the helm—a very ill return for my making that *scuffle* which set him at the head of the lower clergy.” But surely this was a ground of obligation on which few persons would have thought of founding a claim of gratitude. In June 1713, the tories being now triumphant, Dr. Atterbury was advanced to the bishopric of Rochester. His sanguine hopes of attaining to the primacy were, however, quickly blasted by the death of the queen; and at the accession of king George I. he engaged, with all the fervor of party rage and disappointed ambition, in the most violent measures of the opposition; and was at length instigated by passion and revenge to embark in a wild and ill-conducted conspiracy, which terminated in his ruin. He died at Paris, Feb. 1732.



able, that the fomentors of the public disturbances should themselves bear the chief share of the burdens which must be necessarily incurred for their suppression." This proposition was hearkened to with extreme disapprobation, and incurred heavy censure, not only from the partisans of the tory and Jacobite factions, but from many of the most enlightened and intelligent members of the house. And it was so ably combated by Mr. Lutwyche in particular, in a speech delivered on the motion of commitment, as to merit a distinct and most honorable transmission for the instruction of succeeding times.

"The gentlemen" (said this excellent citizen and senator) "who have spoken in favor of this bill have urged the invariable and inveterate enmity of the catholics against the present establishment; and have asserted, that if they did not shew themselves openly against the government in the late conspiracy, it proceeded from motives of prudence, and not from want of zeal in the Pretender's cause. A general charge of this kind may, indeed, form a sufficient ground for a *preamble* to a bill of this nature; but the enacting part ought to be supported by specific facts, clearly and plainly proved; otherwise we may involve the innocent in a punishment due only to the guilty. Because *some* of the Roman-catholics are *suspected* to have been concerned in this con-



BOOK spiracy, shall the whole body be not only charged  
VIII. with the guilt, but actually suffer the penalty?

1722. The law supposes every man to be accountable for his own actions, and doth not require what is in no man's power to perform—that he should be answerable for the conduct of another. As to the disaffection of the catholics in the present instance, I appeal to the house whether any mention is made in the report of any Roman-catholic of eminence, except a noble duke, to whom a letter is supposed to have been written, implying his knowledge and approbation of the conspiracy. How unjust then, upon so slender a suspicion, to inflict the severities enacted by this law upon numerous innocent families who harbour no dangerous designs, and wish for no political revolution! If you abandon the ground of disaffection, and make their religion, supposed so inimical to that established in this country, the pretext for this measure, it is a species of persecution odious in itself, incompatible with the honor of the legislature, and destructive of the freedom and happiness of the subject. Let it not be said, that his majesty's mild and gracious reign has been blemished by an act so rigorous, of which the evident tendency is to confirm the obstinate in their errors and alienate the affections of the well-disposed. There has been, indeed, a political reason assigned for this measure, deduced from its expedi-



ency; and it is said to be intended to deter the Jacobites abroad from rash enterprises, by making their friends here pay the expense which the nation finds necessary for its security. As this is a reason founded on mere speculation, I will venture to oppose one conjecture to another. And it is my opinion, that as the claims of the Pretender are in themselves unfounded and unjust, his only hope of success can be derived from the discontents of the people; the more ground, therefore, there is for complaint, the better prospect he has of success, and the wider scope will be afforded to the Jacobites, to aggravate the errors and faults of the government. If the peaceable and quiet behaviour of the catholics does not entitle them to the protection of the law—if the principle on which this bill is founded be in future adopted as just and equitable—if the most dutiful and unreserved submission cannot exempt them from criminal imputations, and even from the penalties of open sedition and rebellion, will they not embrace any opportunity to free themselves from this intolerable tyranny, thinking that under no form of government they can receive worse treatment? It is alleged that, for many years past, the legal impositions have not been levied from the catholics; and that a much larger sum than the present is actually due from them, if the forfeitures were rigorously ex-

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BOOK VIII. acted. The fact I will not dispute; but the ques-  
1722. tion to be resolved is—Why do you now change  
your lenity into cruelty? The executive govern-  
ment, it is evident, conceived the terrors of the  
penal code to be intended for security, not re-  
venge; and in consequence of the peaceable  
demeanor of the catholics these acts were vir-  
tually suspended. If these statutes were, therefore,  
justly and wisely dispensed with before, why are  
they to be put in execution now? At the æra of  
the revolution, the Roman-catholics were far  
more numerous and powerful than at present.  
It was well known that they held correspondence,  
and were deeply engaged in the interests of king  
James, who was openly supported by France.  
At that period the competition for the crown was  
indeed of a serious nature, and greatly different  
from that originating from the wild and extrava-  
gant pretensions of a forlorn fugitive, expelled  
from all the courts of Europe, and obliged to  
seek for shelter and sanctuary at Rome. But  
king WILLIAM, though warned of the dangers  
of his situation, fully apprised of the severity of  
the laws enacted against the papists, and re-  
peatedly urged to carry them into strict execution,  
resolutely and constantly refused compliance.  
That great monarch knew that no free state could  
long subsist in a departure from the rules of  
equal and impartial justice. It has been said that



the liberties of England can never be in danger but from the Roman-catholics : the truth is, that the chief danger arises from the divisions and animosities subsisting between the various denominations of protestants in this country—animosities arising from an erroneous and contracted policy, and perpetuated by artful and ambitious leaders for their own purposes, by exciting unnecessary fears and groundless jealousies. I know," said this enlightened senator, "no better rule of government, than to punish the guilty, and to protect the innocent ; but precipitately to treat as criminal a body of men, because you suspect them to be guilty, when further inquiry and better information may prove them to be innocent, is no very satisfactory mode of displaying the impartiality of your proceedings. Considering the great vigilance of the ministry, and their diligence in unravelling the most subtle contrivances of the conspirators, I think it very unlikely that any considerable foreign remittances made by the Roman-catholics should have escaped their notice. To single out one set of men, therefore, and upon a mere supposition to inflict penalties upon them, which the clearest proof of guilt only could warrant, is an act impossible to reconcile to that justice and equity which ought invariably to guide and direct the proceedings of this assembly."

This iniquitous bill, which was, in its progress



BOOK through the house, extended to all nonjurors,  
VIII. notwithstanding these irrefragable reasonings,  
1723. finally passed by a majority of 217 against 168  
voices, and received the royal assent; on which  
occasion a speech was made by Sir Spencer  
Compton, the speaker, shewing, or at least en-  
deavouring to shew, the policy and necessity of  
this measure, from the countenance and support  
given by the papists and nonjurors to the "late  
horrid and execrable conspiracy." As no op-  
pression, however, of a similar nature was after-  
wards attempted, there is reason to believe that  
the generous efforts now made in the cause of  
justice and humanity were not wholly lost. And  
if the magnitude of the subject may be deemed  
not such as to require so particular a detail, it  
ought to be remarked, that the arguments of  
Mr. Lutwyche are not of a temporary or local  
kind, but comprise truths of universal and per-  
petual importance and obligation.

"People in general," says a writer of high  
and unquestionable authority\*, "were so terri-  
fied with the apprehensions of not only forfeit-  
ing their estates in possession, if they did not  
take the oaths" (*i. e.* the oaths required to be  
taken to ensure an exemption from the penal-  
ties of this bill), "but also what they had in re-  
version, limitations ever so remote, or the least

\* Arthur Onslow, esq. *Vide* Coxe's Papers, vol. ii. p. 555.



relation to or expectation of any—nay, with regard to their money or effects of any sort—that the whole nation, almost men, women, and children, capable of taking an oath, flocked to the places where the quarter-sessions were holden, that they might, by swearing to the government, free themselves and their families from the danger, as they thought, of losing their fortunes to it. I saw a great deal of it; and it was a strange as well as ridiculous sight to see people crowding to give a testimony of their allegiance to a government, and cursing it at the same time for giving them the trouble of so doing, and for the fright they were put into by it: and I am satisfied more real disaffection to the king and his family arose from it than from any thing which happened in that time. It made the government to appear tyrannical and suspicious, than which nothing can be more hurtful to a prince, or lessen his safety.”

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1723.

On the 27th of May, 1723, an end was put to this long and interesting session by a speech from the throne; in which his majesty expressed in warm terms “his satisfaction at the proceedings of the parliament, and in particular at those exertions of legislative authority which were necessary in this crisis of danger, for the punishment of offenders, of whose guilt there was no room to doubt, but whose wicked arts and prac-



BOOK tices had been brought to such perfection, that  
VIII. they confidently carried on their traitorous pro-  
1723. jects in defiance of the law, from an assurance  
of being able to elude it. Some EXTRAORDI-  
NARY AFFAIRS," his majesty added, "calling him  
abroad this summer, he doubted not but that the  
wisdom and vigilance of his good subjects would  
prevent their common enemies from taking ad-  
vantage of his absence; and that they will at  
length cease to flatter themselves with the vain  
imagination of being able to subvert our religion  
and present establishment."

Previous to his departure, the king displayed  
his native disposition to clemency, by admit-  
ting to bail the principal conspirators still un-  
der confinement in the Tower: and the public  
tranquillity being now perfectly restored, the  
king put in execution his resolution to revisit his  
dominions on the continent, where new and un-  
expected political connexions and combinations  
were taking place by no means favorable to the  
views and wishes of his Britannic majesty. On his  
reaching Hanover, in June 1723, that city became  
the centre of negotiation in Europe. Twelve  
foreign ministers, delegated from the different  
powers of the continent, were ready to congratu-  
late his arrival. The king of Prussia and his  
queen, only daughter of the king of England, re-  
pairing to Herenhausen, added to the festivity



and splendor of the court: and his Britannic majesty soon afterwards returning their visit, was entertained at Berlin with unexampled magnificence: but this external pomp concealed great inward apprehension and perturbation.

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1723.

The peace concluded between the crowns of Sweden and Russia, in the summer of 1721, was soon matured into an union of counsels and designs, which occasioned extreme umbrage and uneasiness to the king of England, who, having ground to believe the immediate object of this coalition to be the restoration of the duchy of Sleswic to the duke of Holstein, nephew to the one, and contracted to the princess Anna Petrowna, daughter of the other, trembled for the safety of his favorite and contiguous acquisitions of Bremen and Verden; the security of all these possessions resting—until the guarantee of Great Britain was insidiously, and almost unknown to herself, obtained—only on the tottering basis of the defensive alliance of Denmark and Hanover. The aspiring views of the house of Lunenburg had ever been displeasing to the court of Vienna; and there was little reason to hope that the emperor would oppose if he did not rather countenance this design; for, since the treaty of Madrid, he had considered himself as abandoned by the king of England, to whose solicitations he still refused the investitures of Bremen and Ver-

Bremen  
and Ver-  
den in  
Danger.



BOOK den, without the payment of an enormous sum,  
VIII. said to be one million sterling, as “*a refreshing*  
1723. *fee* ;” and whose conduct in withholding the accounts of the revenues of Mecklenburg, after repeated orders had been issued for their production, his imperial majesty complained of as highly contumacious\*. Unfortunately also an imperial East-India company had been recently established at Ostend, which was viewed both by England and Holland with the malignant eyes of commercial jealousy. A vote, and in the sequel an act, passed in the British parliament, declaring it to be an high crime and misdemeanour for any subject of Great Britain in any manner to engage in or countenance this undertaking; and repeated remonstrances, much more urgent than reasonable, were made by the English ministry to induce the emperor to abandon this enterprise.

The grand object of the regent of France had, for some time past, been to effect a cordial and permanent union with his catholic majesty, who resented beyond measure the artifice practised upon him by the king of England relative to Gibraltar, and who had little reason to be grateful for the sort of support he had of late received from that monarch during the long and

\* *Vide* Vindication of the Case of the Hanover Forces;—also Tindal, vol. xix. p. 548.



tedious discussions at Cambray. The duke of Orleans had projected a marriage between the king of France and the infanta of Spain, then three years of age, and had actually contracted his two daughters to the prince of Asturias, and Don Carlos, eldest son of Philip V, by his present queen: and a firm junction of these two powers would render the alliance of Great Britain of little comparative value to France.

Repeated conferences had been held at Berlin between the two English secretaries of state, Townshend and Carteret; (neither of whom would risk a six months' absence from the king) with the Prussian ministers, in order to devise effectual means of counteracting the projects of Russia. But the proposals of England were neither rejected nor received;—the court of Berlin, which had not yet risen to the rank of a primary power in Europe, waiting the course of events, and resolving to govern itself according to the existing circumstances. Upon the broken reed of Denmark alone, therefore, was the king of England compelled, in the present emergency, to rely for support.

During this state of things died Philip duke of Orleans, regent of France, unexpectedly, and in the meridian of his age. This prince was possessed of shining talents, which were nevertheless greatly clouded and obscured by an extravagant

BOOK  
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1723.

Death of  
the Regent  
Duke of  
Orleans.



BOOK propensities to pleasure, which he indulged without  
 VIII. reserve or decorum. From the love of fame, in-  
 1723. cident to an elevated mind, he was anxious that  
 his conduct should appear in a favorable light to  
 posterity, and had formed a serious resolution of  
 convoking the estates-general of the kingdom, for  
 the purpose of effecting a grand reformation in the  
 state, from which he was with difficulty diverted  
 by his confidential minister and favorite, the  
 cardinal Dubois\*. The regent frequently ex-  
 pressed his indignation at the wretched state of  
 political degradation to which France was  
 reduced, declaring, that had he been born a  
 commoner, he would have defended the cause of  
 liberty against the oppression of the government.  
 And the first act of his administration was, to re-  
 store to the parliament of Paris the right of judi-  
 cial remonstrance, of which that assembly had

\* On this man, the abandoned high-priest and companion  
 of the nocturnal orgies of the regent, the following epitaph was  
 written :

“ ROME rougit d'avoir rougi  
 Le maquereau qui git ici.”

Gross superstition constituted a remarkable *trait* in the cha-  
 racter of the duke of Orleans, and he was a firm believer in  
 the absurdities of judicial astrology. To this POPE has a  
 pointed allusion when he apostrophises “grave Montaigne or-  
 sage Charron” to say, What made

“ A perjured prince a leaden saint revere,  
 A GODLESS REGENT tremble at a star?”



been arbitrarily divested by the late king. But BOOK  
VIII.  
his voluptuous life, and the profligacy of his 1723.  
morals, were totally incompatible with the pre-  
dominance of public virtue or public spirit in his  
counsels.

The king of England, alarmed at the probable consequences of the death of the regent, who had ever approved himself his firm and faithful friend, hastened his return to London. But while detained by contrary winds in Holland, he received advice that the duke of Bourbon, under the title of Prime Minister, had succeeded to the office of regent: and the most satisfactory assurances were given on the part of France of the good disposition which subsisted to cultivate and even improve the union so long established between the two states. The king arrived in London the 19th of December, 1723, much chagrined at the ill success of his negociation, and the precarious tenure by which, after his unceasing and unwearied exertions, he still held his foreign and favorite acquisitions, Bremen and Verden. "The king's journey," says the honest contemporary historian Tindal, "proved fruitless, and the negotiations might have been as well carried on at London as at Hanover."

The parliament was convened on the 7th of Parliament  
convened.  
January, 1724. It is somewhat unfortunate for  
the reputation of George I, that, in recording the



BOOK events of his reign, History is compelled to dwell  
VIII. largely upon those foreign transactions in which  
1724. this monarch appears to little advantage ; while the domestic government of the king, which with one early exception, transient indeed in its duration, but most unhappily permanent in its effects, was ever merciful and benignant, is thrown comparatively into shade. The speeches of the king from the throne, abstracted from the foreign politics they contained, were uniformly excellent ; and the liberality and generosity of his ordinary course of policy proved that they were not words without a meaning. The great body of the whigs, who had viewed the violence and malignity of the last tory administration of queen Anne with emotions of terror, felt themselves secure and happy under the mild and favoring auspices of Sunderland and Stanhope ; whose deviations from political rectitude, in other respects, they were upon this account but too ready to palliate or to pardon. Townshend and Walpole adopted, though perhaps with somewhat less boldness and decision, the same general plan of domestic policy, and vied with their predecessors in bringing forward for legislative discussion, each session, wise and salutary regulations, civil, commercial, or religious. The speech delivered by the sovereign on the present occasion was in all respects worthy of a British monarch addressing a great, a free, and a loyal



people. "I cannot," said he, "open this session without congratulating you upon the success of your endeavours last year for the safety, interest, and honor of the kingdom. The rise of the public credit, the flourishing condition of our trade and manufactures, and the general tranquillity of my people, are the happy consequences of your prudent resolutions. I desire such supplies only as you shall find absolutely necessary for preserving the peace of the kingdom, and for the security of my people. I must, in a particular manner, recommend to your care the public debts of the kingdom as the most national concern you can possibly take into your consideration. In the present happy situation of our affairs, make use of the opportunity which your own good conduct has put into your hands in considering of such further laws as may be wanting for the ease and encouragement of trade and navigation, for the employment of the poor, and for the exciting and encouraging a spirit of industry in the nation. I am fully satisfied that the trade and wealth of my people are the happy effects of the liberties they enjoy, and that the grandeur of the crown consists in their prosperity." Conformably to the king's recommendation, provision was made for the liquidation of a part of the national debt by means of the large and increasing surplus now arising from the sinking fund.



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1724.

Protections from foreign ministers, peers, and members of parliament, having long been the subject of complaint, the names of the persons so protected being laid before the two houses, it was resolved, that all protections and written certificates be declared void in law.

Laudable  
Measures  
of Admini-  
stration.

A meritorious attempt was, during this session, made by the chancellor of the exchequer to introduce a grand reform into the collection of the revenue, by a partial conversion of the custom-house duties, payable on tea, coffee, and chocolate, imported into inland duties of excise; an alteration by which the public and the fair trader were equally benefited.

An addition to the army of 4000 men had been voted last year on account of the conspiracy. This addition the commons with little or no hesitation thought it expedient to continue for the present year. But in the house of peers it met with great opposition. Not only did the lords Trevor, Bathurst, and others of the same party, contend vehemently against the measure, but also, to the indignation of a great majority of the house, the earl of Orrery, and the lord North and Grey, who, by the favor of government, had been recently set at liberty, though notoriously implicated in the late treason. The duke of Argyle's remarks upon this shameless effrontery were peculiarly happy and apposite. His grace



took occasion in his reply, to say, "that if he saw the nation unanimous in opinion, that our laws, liberties, properties, and holy religion, entirely depend on the present happy establishment, and on the protestant succession in his majesty's royal family, he would readily give his vote for reducing the army. But he was very much afraid that some people so strenuously insisted on the disbanding of the additional troops with no other design than to weaken the government, and thereby have an opportunity of involving their native country into new troubles. And therefore, those noble lords who had spoken for the reduction of the army would do well, when they went down into their several counties, to assure the people, with whom, no doubt, their reasons would not fail of having great weight, that their liberties and properties were entirely safe under his majesty's auspicious government."

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1724.

The motion of disbandment was rejected with the contempt it deserved; and the business of the session being over, the parliament was prorogued by a gracious speech from the throne April 24, 1724.

The state of Ireland had for some time past occupied the serious attention of the government. The duke of Bolton had been succeeded in the vice-royalty of that kingdom, A. D. 1720, by the duke of Grafton, a nobleman possessing many

State of  
Ireland.



BOOK of those accomplishments which fitted him to  
VIII. shine in courts ; displaying on all occasions an  
1724. high sense of honor and rectitude of intention, and  
zealously attached to the principles of liberty as  
established at the revolution ; but of a temper  
accounted somewhat haughty and irritable. Re-  
turning, after a long absence, to his government,  
in the summer of 1723, he found the nation  
wrought up to a great ferment, in consequence of  
a patent granted by the king, previous to the  
resignation of Sunderland, to William Wood, a  
great proprietor and renter of iron and copper  
works in England, for coining farthings and  
half-pence for the kingdom of Ireland to the  
amount of 100,000*l.* sterling, in order to supply  
the acknowledged deficiency of copper coin for  
the purposes of commercial intercourse in that  
country. A most extraordinary clamor was  
raised against the execution of this plan, chiefly  
through the factious artifices and machinations of  
the famous Swift, dean of St. Patrick, who seized  
with eagerness this opportunity of venting his  
spleen and rancor against the government, by  
publishing a series of letters or tracts replete with  
the most sarcastic wit, and the most malignant  
misrepresentations, affirming the coin to be of a  
base and inferior quality ; that it was a scheme for  
impoverishing the nation in order to enrich a few  
rapacious and profligate individuals ; the profits of



the patent being in fact assigned to persons and purposes not the most honorable ; and alarming the whole kingdom with absurd and confident predictions of the mischief which must ensue from the enormity of the abuse\*. The spirit of opposition seized, like a contagion, all orders of men; and the two houses of parliament, inflamed with the national enthusiasm, transmitted addresses to the king, accusing the patentee of "fraud and deceit; asserting the terms of the patent to be violated both in respect to the quantity and quality of the coin; that the circulation of it would be highly prejudicial to the revenue, destructive to the commerce, and of the most dangerous consequence to the rights and properties of the subject." To these addresses the king returned mild and conciliatory answers; and the investigation of this affair being referred to the lords of the council, an assay was ordered to be made of the fineness, value, and weight, of Wood's coinage; and a satisfactory report was subsequently framed by sir

\* The truth was, that Sunderland, whose unprincipled ambition was under no restraint of decorum, had given the disposal of this patent to the duchess of Kendal, the favorite mistress of the king, who sold it to Wood. This secret lord Carteret, educated in the school of Sunderland, insidiously disclosed to Alan Broderick, son of the lord chancellor Middleton, with a view to embarrass the measures of the new ministers, Townshend and Walpole, and to fix an odium upon their administration.



BOOK VIII  
1724. Isaac Newton, then master of the mint. assisted by Mr. Southwell and Mr. Scroope, certifying, that the copper was equal to that used in the English coinage, and far superior to the copper money coined for Ireland in the reigns of king Charles II, king James II, and king William. The popular rage continued, nevertheless, to increase; and many persons of great respectability were unaccountably drawn into the vortex of opposition; particularly the lord chancellor Middleton, a man of excellent understanding, of tried integrity, and invincible fortitude, who had long and deservedly possessed the entire confidence of government in whatever related to the administration of affairs in that country. The conduct of the lord lieutenant, in this critical situation, was not thought to display any striking manifestations of the wisdom and discretion of an experienced statesman; and Mr. Walpole, notwithstanding his personal regard and esteem for the duke, could not avoid expressing his uneasiness and disapprobation of his measures; styling him "a fair weather pilot, that did not know how to act when the first storm arose." He was superseded in the spring of 1724 by lord Carteret, who, with far superior political ability and address, failing equally in his attempts to introduce this obnoxious coinage, a wise resolution was at length adopted in the course of the succeeding year, voluntarily and



graciously to announce, in a formal speech from the throne, the total surrender of the patent; Mr. Walpole declaring himself adverse to the policy of urging any measure, however innocent or even laudable, contrary to the general sense of a whole people.

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By the advancement of lord Carteret to the government of Ireland, an honor forced upon his acceptance, and considered by him as a fall from power, the ministers Townshend and Walpole were relieved from the competition of a man, whose personal interest with the king was very great, whose rivalship was open and avowed, and whom they regarded in the light of a determined and dangerous enemy. The seals of secretary were delivered to the duke of Newcastle, a nobleman of whose capacity no jealousy could be entertained, and who was content to act in entire subserviency to those who had been instrumental to his promotion; and the duke of Grafton, on his return from the government of Ireland, was appointed to the more congenial office of lord chamberlain of the household, of which place he retained possession, through the high personal favor of the sovereign, in all the revolutions of the court, for very many succeeding years.

Lord Carteret appointed to the Government.

About this period, January 1724, Philip V, king of Spain, yielding himself up without re-

Abdication of Philip V. King of Spain.



BOOK VIII.  
 1724. serve to vain and superstitious fervors of devotion, retired to the monastery of St. Ildefonso, whence he made a solemn renunciation of the crowns of Castile and Arragon in favor of his eldest son, Don Lewis, prince of Asturias; so that he might be able—to use his own royal words—“disengaged from all other cares, to meditate on death, and to seek out his salvation—committing his successor and his people to the powerful protection of the HOLY VIRGIN,” under whose auspices the young prince ventured to assume the reins of government, without the usual formality of assembling the Cortez. But, dying soon after his elevation to the throne, the abdicated monarch was reluctantly prevailed upon again to encounter the cares and burdens of royalty. Devoting himself, nevertheless, entirely to monkish exercises of religion, the task of government devolved upon the queen, whose influence in the Spanish councils had been for some years past very conspicuous.

Alliance  
 between  
 Russia and  
 Sweden.

The fears and apprehensions of the king of England were now wrought up to the height, by the certain intelligence that a treaty of alliance had taken place between Russia and Sweden, bearing date at Stockholm February 22, 1724. By a separate article of this treaty, the high contracting parties obliged themselves, “in the most effectual manner, to use their *good offices* for the



restoring the duke of Holstein to the duchy of Sleswic; and, if these proved ineffectual, *other methods should be thought of.* In particular, application should be made to the powers who stood engaged with them to guaranty the said duchy to the said duke—of whom England, by the treaty of Travendahl, was one; leaving it more immediately to his *imperial majesty* to concert such measures as might, with the greatest security, for ever cut off this source of such infinite troubles to the NORTH.” Though the emperor declined compliance with the solicitations of the contracting powers to accede to this treaty in form, the congress of Cambray not being yet dissolved, the king of England well knew how strongly he was disposed to assist in accomplishing the object of it. At the same time the czar sent an ambassador to Copenhagen, formally to demand from his Danish majesty the restitution of Sleswic. It must be remarked, that Sweden had not ceded, and indeed could not pretend any right to cede, this duchy to Denmark; but, in the treaty of Fredericstadt, concluded between these two powers, A. D. 1720, his Swedish majesty had engaged not to oppose whatever stipulations had been made by the mediating powers (*i. e.* England and France) in favor of Denmark respecting Sleswic, and to give no assistance to the duke of Holstein contrary to such stipulations;—

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so that the secret article of the treaty of Stockholm was a palpable violation of public faith; such as their Britannic and Danish majesties were by no means prepared to expect; and were ill able at the present moment, either by policy to counteract, or by force to repel.

The parliament of Great Britain met again on the 12th of November, 1724; but not the most distant intimation was given by the king in his opening speech of the critical state and unpleasant posture of his foreign and electoral concerns. On the contrary, he professed to feel “the highest satisfaction at the prosperous situation of affairs; peace with all powers abroad—at home perfect tranquillity.” Notwithstanding this boasted tranquillity, and though the danger from the late conspiracy was certainly by this time completely obviated, the 4000 additional troops were, not indeed without some angry opposition, continued for another year; and the increase of the regal influence, under the dexterous management of Mr. Walpole, became more and more visible, to the great concern and chagrin of the intelligent and independent part of the nation.

Impeachment of the  
Earl of  
Macclesfield.

This session was rendered memorable by the impeachment of the earl of Macclesfield, lord high chancellor of England, for high crimes and misdemeanours, on the ground of his having made unusual and exorbitant profits from the sale of



places; and also from the abuse of his trust as general guardian of the persons and estates of orphans and lunatics; and, after a trial of twenty days, he was convicted by the peers, and sentenced to pay a fine of 30,000*l.* and to imprisonment in the Tower till the same was paid—an illustrious example of the upright and impartial administration of criminal justice in Great Britain. He was succeeded in the chancellorship by sir Peter King, created Baron King of Ockham in Surry, who had acquired great and deserved reputation in his former station of lord chief justice of England; but to this new and more elevated employment his talents were not deemed equally adapted.

A very extraordinary and unexpected application was made on the part of the crown early in the new year (1725), by a message delivered by Mr. Walpole, for the sum of 500,000*l.* to discharge the debts of the civil list, which had been incurred to that amount in the short space of three years, which had elapsed since they were before liquidated by parliament. The message stated, 1st, “that his majesty had found it impracticable to make any considerable retrenchments; and, 2dly, that the necessities of his government had engaged him in some *extraordinary expenses*, which he was persuaded his loyal com-

Civil-List  
Debts a second Time  
discharged.

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1725.



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1725.

mons would believe had been employed not only for the honour and dignity of the crown, but for the interest and prosperity of his people." Mr. Pulteney, now cofferer of the household, a man of great talents—which he thought not sufficiently noticed and rewarded—on the usual motion for going into a committee of the whole house to consider of his majesty's message, took occasion to observe, "that he wondered how so great a debt could be contracted in three years' time; but was not surprised some persons were so eager to have the deficiencies of the civil list made good, since they and their friends had so great a share in it; and desired to know whether this was all that was due, or whether they were to expect another reckoning." This speech had no other effect than to occasion the dismissal of Mr. Pulteney, who from this time became the leader and oracle of the opposition; for which he was qualified beyond all men by his extensive knowledge, his indefatigable perseverance, and his splendid eloquence. The money required was voted by a majority of 239 against 119 voices; being raised as before on the credit of a general tax or deduction of sixpence in the pound upon the civil-list revenues. How those extraordinary expenses were incurred, which made so extraordinary an application necessary, the majority of



the house of commons, who voted the sum in question, were in all probability the best, if not the only competent, judges. BOOK  
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1725.

On the 31st of May, 1725, the session ended; his majesty declaring, in his closing speech to the two houses, “that their time had been so well employed for the service and interest of the public, that he assured himself it would be to the general satisfaction of the nation.”

At this period the king revived the ancient Order of  
the Bath  
revived. order of knights of the bath—an institution which affords a cheap and honorable recompense to men who have merited of the public, so long as such distinctions retain in the public estimation their present artificial and ideal value. Mr. Walpole was decorated with the red ribband of the order; and was soon after, by an unprecedented mark of royal favor, made a knight of the garter—an honor to which no commoner had from time immemorial been admitted. His eldest son also was created a peer by the title of Lord Walpole; and he was now advancing by hasty strides to the rank of prime minister—not perfectly to the satisfaction of lord Townshend, who had long been accustomed to consider himself as the superior personage, but whose talents for government could by no means endure a comparison with those of his friend, his brother, and colleague in office, sir ROBERT WALPOLE.



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The king having settled his affairs in England, and appointed a council of regency—for the prince of Wales, notwithstanding the ostensible reconciliation that had taken place, was admitted to no share of power or confidence—set out, accompanied by lord Townshend, for Hanover, the 3rd of June, 1725, and arrived the 14th at Herenhausen.

Misunder-  
standing  
between  
France and  
Spain.

The affairs of Europe were still in a very precarious state. The king of France had, in the month of February, this year, been seized with a dangerous fever; and on his recovery, the nation, justly apprehensive of the dreadful consequences of a disputed succession, expressed the most eager impatience for the marriage of the king. It was therefore suddenly resolved in council to send back the infant of Spain, affianced to his Most Christian majesty, and actually resident in Paris, a child of five years of age; to whose person, moreover, the young monarch had conceived a dislike approaching to aversion. On the notification of this resolution by M. Livry, the French ambassador at the court of Madrid, the king and queen of Spain manifested the most extravagant marks of resentment. They refused to receive the letters written by the king of France and the duke of Bourbon, explaining in respectful terms the causes of this dismissal; and would not suffer the ambassador to



remain in their presence, ordering him to quit the capital in nine-and-twenty hours. A determination was immediately taken to send back mademoiselle de Beaujolois, daughter of the late regent, and betrothed to Don Carlos, second son of his Catholic Majesty ; and the king of Spain publicly and passionately protested, that Spain could never shed blood enough to avenge so gross an insult. In an audience which he gave to the British ambassador, colonel Stanhope, he avowed his determination of separating himself from France for ever. In his eager solicitude of revenge, he declared “ that he should order his plenipotentiaries at Cambray to reject the mediation of France, and to submit the final settlement of the points in dispute between him and the emperor to the sole mediation of England.” This proposition, so flattering in various respects, and so advantageous to the interests of Great Britain, the king of England was compelled, not without some apparent hesitation, ultimately to decline—conscious that the acceptance of the proffered mediation on the part of England could be regarded in no other light by France than as an abandonment of her alliance and friendship. This was a too hazardous experiment ; for the imperial investiture and guarantee of the duchies of Bremen, Verden, and still more probably of Sleswic, might, notwithstanding this sacrifice, be



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eventually withheld ; and the king of England, deprived of the support of France, would, as to his electoral interests, be reduced to depend upon the grace and favor of the emperor, whose resentment he had incurred, and who joined with great coldness in the offer of the sole mediation. So apprehensive, nevertheless, was France of a change in the politics of the English court at this crisis, that she not only expressed her readiness to enter into fresh engagements with England, in opposition to those now likely to be formed, but a flattering demand was made of one of the English princesses, grand-daughter to the king of England, as a consort to the young monarch of France. To this proposition the king of England listened with a delighted ear ; and though, by the united advice of his ministers, he was compelled reluctantly to decline this offer, it very sensibly contributed to confirm his prepossessions in favor of France\*. His Most Christian majesty was soon after married, July 1725, to the princess Maria, daughter of Stanislaus, titular king of Poland. Previous to this event, the duke of Bourbon had been unexpectedly removed from the helm of government ; and the bishop of Frejus, preceptor to the king, and now invested with the purple, under the title of Cardinal Fleury,

Cardinal  
Fleury  
Prime Minister.

\* Massillon's Memoirs.



appointed prime minister at the age of seventy years. He discovered, however, at this advanced period of life, no decay of powers corporeal or mental. Though of unbounded ambition, his temper was naturally mild and benignant. His views were pacific, and he aimed to maintain the ascendancy of France, and to humble the pride of the house of Austria—his ruling passion—rather by political address and refinement, than by a declared and open enmity. He adopted the sentiments of his predecessors, the dukes of Orleans and Bourbon, relative to England, with which kingdom he ardently wished to maintain perpetual harmony—knowing how little France had to apprehend from any other power, and how impossible it was for the court of Vienna to retain the superiority she had recently acquired without the aid and support of Great Britain. The foreign policy of France sustained, therefore, no alteration in consequence of this revolution in the court. By the influence of this ecclesiastical statesman—such is the predominance of education and habit over temper—a barbarous edict had been recently promulgated respecting the Huguenots, against which the court of London remonstrated in vain. No other answer could be obtained, than that this was a matter which pertained to the internal government of the kingdom, and the king's edicts must be obeyed. The

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Death of  
the Czar  
Peter the  
Great.

protestants of Alsatia alone, whose religious privileges were founded on the basis of the treaty of Westphalia, and whose political defection was probably the subject of apprehension, were exempted from the operation of them.

Early in the present year (January 28, 1725) died suddenly, in the 53d year of his age, Peter the great, czar of Muscovy. This monarch must ever be regarded as the most extraordinary phenomenon of the age in which he lived. Previous to his accession to the throne of his ancestors Russia was scarcely known as a European power, except by her occasional wars with Poland, and by the commercial intercourse which she maintained with England, through the medium of the remote port of Archangel, situated at the extremity of the Frozen Ocean. PETER, who by a rare conjunction of qualities joined a most daring and ardent spirit of enterprise to a clear and solid judgment, early entertained the vast design of civilising his immense dominions, burning with ambition to occupy a conspicuous and leading station amongst the powers of Europe. With what success he prosecuted and accomplished this grand project, it is foreign to the purpose of the present history to relate. After surmounting, by the incessant labor of thirty years, difficulties insuperable to any other man, he lived to see himself in possession of all which had engaged his



wishes and his hopes—applauded as a hero, venerated as a legislator. By his conquests he had subjected various rich and populous provinces to his dominion; and in the midst of them he had built a magnificent city, bearing the name of its founder, and which will attest to future and successive ages the grandeur and sublimity of his genius. He introduced discipline into his armies; he created a powerful navy; and, in the room of Asiatic ignorance, prejudice, and barbarism, he substituted the arts, the learning, the customs and manners of Europe. His system of improvement and aggrandisement has been eagerly and invariably pursued by his successors in the empire, and with a degree of success which may reasonably excite universal jealousy and apprehension; for, to the rapid and unexampled increase of the power of Russia, no other European state bears a just or relative proportion.

The imperial crown of all the Russias devolved, agreeably to the will of the late sovereign, upon his consort the empress Catharine, who from a low and nameless origin had reached the highest point of human elevation. She was endowed with extraordinary talents, and seconded all the projects of aggrandisement formed by the czar, her husband, with a kindred and congenial spirit. This high-minded princess soon manifested her determination to maintain inviolate all the articles



BOOK of the treaty of Stockholm. She demanded anew  
VIII. of the king of Denmark the restitution of the  
1725. duchy of Sleswic, or an equivalent for the same;  
plainly alluding to the contiguous provinces of  
Bremen and Verden. And when exhorted by  
the senate to suspend the great naval and military  
equipments then preparing, and previously to try  
the mode of negotiation with Denmark, this  
imperial heroine with indignant warmth replied:  
“ Let not any one of you that would be reckoned  
an honest subject, or hope to enjoy the least share  
of my favor, dare to offer me such mean-spirited  
advice. The duke of Holstein, stripped unjustly  
of his hereditary dominions, took sanctuary in our  
country, and threw himself into the arms of my  
deceased lord for protection; he is since contracted  
to my daughter, and is himself as dear to me as  
my own child. I am bound by all the rules of  
honor, as well as the ties of blood, to see justice  
done to that unfortunate prince, in whose cause I  
would not scruple to forego the weakness of my  
sex, and even to draw a sword or to put myself  
at the head of an army. It is for my interest and  
glory, as well as yours, to convince the world that  
I have power to see justice done to my family,  
and that I am resolved to make use of it.” At  
the conclusion of these words, she gave orders in  
their presence to prince Menzikoff and admiral



Apraxin, to have the fleet and troops in readiness by the middle of May at their peril\*.

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Hostilities were, notwithstanding this warlike declaration, suspended, and negociations set on foot between the courts of London, Copenhagen, and Petersburg, which continued during the whole of the summer of 1725, but without effect—the czarina professing herself willing to concede in all other points, but still insisting upon the unconditional restitution of Sleswic, or the substitution of a real and solid equivalent.

On the refusal of the king of England to accept the sole mediation at Cambray, the resentment of the king of Spain was excited against that monarch to an extraordinary degree: orders were immediately sent from Madrid to break up the congress; and full powers granted to conclude an accommodation with the emperor at Vienna without any mediation or intervention whatever. Though years of tedious and fruitless discussion had previously passed, such was the ardor of the two courts at the present moment to terminate their long and deeply-rooted animosity, that in a very few weeks the celebrated treaty, known by the name of the TREATY OF VIENNA, was framed and perfected, being signed April 30, 1725. It consisted of three parts or distinct instruments.

Treaty of  
Alliance  
between  
Spain and  
the Em-  
peror.

\* Walpole Papers.—*Vide* Coxe's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 243.



BOOK By the first of these the two sovereigns confirmed all  
 VIII. the articles of the quadruple alliance, one of which  
 1725. guaranteed the rich successions of Parma, Placentia, and Tuscany, to the infant Don Carlos. Charles VI. renounced his pretensions to the crown of Spain; Philip acknowledged the emperor's right to Naples and Sicily, the Milanese, and the Netherlands, and became guarantee of the Austrian succession according to the PRAGMATIC SANCTION\*. Such was the appellation given to the imperial edict, confirmed and ratified by the diet of the empire, by which the vast dominions of that house were declared to be a perpetual and indivisible fief, limited to the heirs-general of the present emperor. The second was a regulation of commerce, conferring great mutual privileges, and recognising the validity of the charter of the Ostend company. The third was an engagement of mutual defence. These stipulations were in themselves sufficiently obnoxious; and, considering the actual disposition of Russia, there could be little doubt of her eventual accession to the treaty. But the rumors propagated concerning the separate and secret articles of the treaty of Vienna were far more alarming

\* The term "pragmatic," universally applied to this famous edict, is used in a sense so technical, that it may be pardonable to note its derivation from the Greek *πραγματικός*, carrying with it the complex meaning of a public and weighty sanction. It is a term of the civil law.



than the known tenor of the public articles. It was confidently reported that the emperor had engaged, 1st, to give in marriage his daughters the two archduchesses to the infants don Carlos and don Philip; 2dly, to concur in employing force for the restoring Gibraltar to Spain, in case it could not be amicably effected; and 3dly, to concert measures with his catholic majesty for placing the Pretender on the throne of Great Britain. Of the reality of these secret articles, and particularly the last of them, though time has fully demonstrated the futility and falsehood of the opinion, the court of London entertained a most serious belief; and measures were immediately taken by the king of England to ward off the invisible impending blow. Such was the activity inspired by the magnitude of the supposed danger, that on the 3d of September, 1725, a treaty of defensive alliance and mutual guarantee, as respecting the rights both of dominion and commerce, in opposition to the treaty of Vienna, was signed at Hanover by the ministers of Great Britain, France, and Prussia, to which Denmark and Holland soon after acceded, to continue in force for the term of fifteen years. "I must now," says lord Townshend, (thus he expresses himself to Mr. Horace Walpole, in the height of his exultation, at the moment of signature,) "congratulate with you on our having so successfully begun a work, which,



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if cultivated and improved as it may be, will check the ambitious views of the court of Vienna, and secure the tranquillity of Europe; and in order to obtain that great end, no time ought to be lost to engage other powers to accede to this treaty." It is remarkable that this foe to ambition, and friend to tranquillity, had at this very time, and even before the signing of the Hanover treaty, proposed to his colleagues in office a scheme for the conquest of the Austrian Netherlands, and the eventual division of them between France, England, and Holland—a project which the Walpoles treated as wholly visionary and chimerical. In proportion as alarm was excited by the treaty of Vienna, did it seem, by a sort of political re-action, to be communicated to the original contracting parties. Great sums of money were remitted from the king of Spain to the emperor, and great military preparations made on both sides, portending a long and bloody contest. The original object of the imperial and Spanish courts extended however, in all probability, no farther than to obtain, by the most effectual means in their power short of actual violence, the restitution of Gibraltar, and the guarantee of England to the Pragmatic Sanction, the firm establishment of which the emperor had at this time infinitely at heart. And for this purpose they scrupled not to use high and haughty lan-



guage, partly from pride and partly from policy, and with an evident view to intimidation. The Austrian minister publicly boasted that the emperor would now give laws to Europe; and at Madrid open encouragement was afforded to the partisans of the Pretender. The British ambassador was treated with studied indignity; a plan of invasion was delivered in by the dukes of Ormond and Liria, who were frequently in conference with the imperial, Russian, and Spanish ministers; and by way of insult was at this time publicly played at court the famous Jacobite air, "The king shall enjoy his own again."

After an absence of near seven months from England, his Britannic majesty set out from Herenhausen, and on New-year's day, 1726, embarked at Helvoet-Sluys for Harwich. But a violent storm arising, the Carolina yacht, with the king on board, parted from her convoy, who after being tempest-tost for two days, with great difficulty landed at Rye on the coast of Sussex; and the ground being covered with snow to an uncommon depth, the king did not arrive at his palace of St. James's till the 9th of January, 1726. On the 20th of that month the parliament was opened by a speech artfully and ambiguously expressed in which he declared "that *the distressed condition of some of our protestant brethren abroad*, and the negotiations and engagements



BOOK entered into by some foreign powers, which  
 VIII. seemed to have laid the foundation of new troubles  
 1726. and disturbances in Europe, and to threaten the

Treaty of  
 Hanover.

Parliamen-  
 tary De-  
 bates rela-  
 tive to it.

loss of several of the most advantageous branches of our trade, had obliged him to concert with other powers such measures as might give a check to those ambitious views." After a short interval the treaty of Hanover was presented to the house of commons by sir R. Walpole; on which occasion he kept a profound silence, leaving, as far as depended upon him, the treaty to rest upon its own merits. But Mr. Horace Walpole, brother to the minister, a man much employed in foreign transactions, and deeply versed in the labyrinth of continental negotiations, undertook, in a studied and elaborate harangue, to obviate all the objections to which it seemed liable, and explained at great length the different situations and interests of the principal states of Europe from the peace of Utrecht to the present time. This specious orator assured the house, "that the constant care and endeavour of his majesty, since his happy accession to the throne, had been to secure the tranquillity of Christendom, to promote the honor and interest of his kingdoms, and settle the balance of power in Europe on a solid foundation. With these great and laudable views (he said) his majesty had assumed the character both of mediator and gua-



rantee of the barrier treaty concluded in 1715, and of the convention by which it was subsequently confirmed between the emperor and the states. Actuated by the same motives, he had in 1716 signed a defensive alliance with the emperor, and in 1717 another with the Most Christian king and the States General. In order to fortify these treaties, and more effectually to secure the repose of Europe, the king had in 1718 made a convention with his Most Christian majesty for proposing ultimate conditions of peace between the emperor and Spain, and also between his imperial majesty and the then king of Sicily. That this treaty was followed, after a very short interval, by a treaty of alliance between the emperor, the king of Great Britain, his Most Christian majesty, and the republic of Holland; whence this treaty derived its popular appellation of The Quadruple Alliance. That within a few months the king of Sicily was admitted as a party to this treaty; and at length the king of Spain himself was compelled to accede to the terms of it; which was mainly owing to the generous assistance his Britannic majesty gave to the emperor in the Mediterranean. That the remaining points in dispute between their imperial and catholic majesties were referred to the decision of a congress opened at Cambray. After an unsuccessful negotiation of three years, the congress was suddenly dissolved,

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BOOK VIII. upon advice that the emperor and king of Spain  
1726. had adjusted their differences by a separate treaty concluded at Vienna. That this unexpected event had occasioned no little surmise and alarm; and had raised jealousies which a more perfect knowledge of this transaction had fully justified. That this treaty of peace was followed by a treaty of commerce, the principal object of which was the establishment of an India company at Ostend, in violation of our rights, and to the ruin of our trade. That the remonstrances made by his majesty's ministers at the courts of Vienna and Madrid had been received by the ministers of his catholic majesty with coldness, and by those of his imperial majesty with the utmost haughtiness; insomuch that they scrupled not to insinuate, that if his Britannic majesty persisted in adopting resolutions hostile to the treaty of Vienna, his imperial majesty would think himself disengaged from the guarantee of the protestant succession to the crown of Great Britain. And they had even gone so far as to affirm, that such measures might be attended with disagreeable consequences in relation to his majesty's dominions in Germany. Such however was the firmness of his majesty, that no impression could be made on him by these menaces; nor was he by any suggestions to be deterred from concerting with other powers the means of counteracting the



ambitious views of this formidable alliance. And this was the more necessary, because there were just grounds to believe that this extraordinary and unexpected reconciliation was owing to the fixed and favorite purpose of the house of Austria, of rendering the imperial dignity hereditary in their family. In order to that, it might be *supposed* that the treaty of Vienna was to be cemented by a marriage between the emperor's eldest daughter and the infant Don Carlos. Who did not foresee the fatal consequences of this conjunction? The issue of such a marriage might in time inherit not only the imperial crown, and the vast hereditary dominions of the Austrian family, but the entire monarchy of Spain with its appendages; which would entirely overthrow the balance of power, and render the liberties of Europe wholly precarious. If this were not within the contemplation of those two monarchs, how would any one undertake to account for the extensive privileges bestowed by the king of Spain, in contravention of his most solemn treaties with Great Britain, upon the emperor's subjects in the Netherlands; or for the emperor's so far forgetting his obligations to England and Holland, as to persist in supporting the Ostend company, established with no other view than to distress the maritime powers; or for his engaging to assist the king of Spain in the recovery of Minorca and

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BOOK VIII. Gibraltar? In order to put a timely stop to the progress of such alarming and dangerous designs, 1726. his majesty had, *in his great wisdom*, entered into a defensive alliance with his Most Christian majesty and the king of Prussia, to which several other powers, and particularly the States General, were invited to accede. That the grand design of this alliance was to maintain the tranquillity of Christendom and the balance of power, and the respective rights and immunities of all nations, particularly those relating to commerce: and that his majesty, ever attentive to the support and protection of the protestant interest, had engaged, by a separate article of this treaty, the Most Christian king and the king of Prussia, who together with his majesty were guarantees of the treaty of Oliva, concluded between the crowns of Poland and Sweden, A. D. 1660, to interpose in behalf of our distressed protestant brethren in Poland; and to cause reparation to be made for what may have been done at Thorne, contrary to the stipulations of that treaty. And he concluded with passing very lavish encomiums on the wisdom, vigilance, steadiness, and resolution of his majesty, in the conduct of all these weighty and important affairs."

In reply to this imposing speech, the leaders of the opposition, Mr. Pulteney, Mr. Shippen, &c. strongly urged, "that in consequence of this



treaty, represented as so wise, so just, and good, the British nation would be eventually engaged in a war for the defence of the king's German dominions, contrary to an express provision made in the act of settlement, which, as the basis the present family rested their title to the crown upon, ought to be held sacred and inviolable. And the whole scope and tenor of it was said to be diametrically opposed to the uniform policy of Great Britain for a long succession of years ; for by this treaty we had abandoned an alliance upon which the balance of power in Europe, and the preservation of its liberties, were generally and justly believed to depend ; and, with unexampled eagerness and assiduity of folly, had solicited the friendship of a nation whose views and interests stood in direct opposition no less to those of England than of the house of Austria." These considerations had no weight whatever with those to whom they were addressed. On the contrary, the house of commons, admiring the beautiful harmony with which the complicated and apparently dissonant treaties, alliances, and conventions described by Mr. Walpole, concurred in promoting the interest of Great Britain, voted by a prodigious majority, viz. 285 against 107, an address to the king, declaratory of the highest approbation of the treaty of Hanover, and expressive of



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Interposi-  
tion of the  
King in Fa-  
vor of the  
Polish Dis-  
sidents.

the unfeigned gratitude of the house for the measures so wisely concerted by his majesty for obviating and disappointing the dangerous views of the emperor and the king of Spain; and reprobating the treaty of commerce concluded between those powers, as “calculated for the entire destruction of the British trade; and assuring his majesty, that, in vindication of the honor of the British crown, the house will effectually stand by and support his majesty against all insults and attacks that any power, in resentment of the measures so wisely taken, shall make upon any of his majesty’s territories, though not belonging to the crown of Great Britain.”——  
Whatever judgment may, by historic impartiality, be formed of the general policy of the English court respecting foreign concerns, one part of the king’s conduct alluded to by the minister H. Walpole is entitled to indisputable praise—viz. his powerful interposition in behalf of the Polish dissidents, who, by various severe laws passed against them, in the diet recently held at Grodno, in contravention of the toleration established by the treaty of Oliva, suffered at this period under grievous oppression. And there is good reason to believe, that in this instance the king was actuated not less by motives of generosity and humanity than of policy. In a letter written in his own hand to the king of Poland,



he strongly urges the repeal of these oppressive laws, "that the dissidents may," as he expresses it, "for the future enjoy their former liberty of conscience, which cannot be forced by any human power, and over which God hath reserved to himself the **SOLE COMMAND**:"—a just and noble sentiment, worthy to be engraven on the hearts of kings, and of all who are invested with authority in the management of human affairs.

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This unexpected revolution in the political system of Europe, made by the treaty of Vienna, was chiefly effected by the instrumentality of the famous M. de Ripperda, a native of Holland; who, from the condition of a private gentleman, was advanced, after the fall of Alberoni, to the rank of a grandee of Spain, and succeeded to the post of prime minister. He was inspired by a kindred genius, and prosecuted the same projects of aggrandizement by different means. Finding the power of England the grand and perpetual obstacle to the accomplishment of his designs, he frequently indulged himself in very indiscreet and passionate expressions of resentment, and openly affirmed that the interests of Europe required the restoration of the house of Stuart. After the conclusion of the treaty of Hanover, he haughtily exclaimed, "Well, well, we shall teach these petty gentlemen (meaning the electors of Hanover and Brandenburg) to

Projects of  
the Duc de  
Ripperda.



BOOK make treaties!" And he was frequently accus-  
VIII. tomed to say, that cardinal Alberoni made a  
1726. false step, in sending that fleet to Sicily which  
he ought to have sent to England. In a me-  
morial addressed by colonel Stanhope, the British  
minister at Madrid, to the Spanish secretary of  
state, the marquis de la Paz, at a subsequent  
period, heavy complaints are made of the in-  
solent discourses of the duc de Ripperda during  
his embassy at Vienna: "There can be no  
stronger proof" (said the English minister) "of  
their catholic majesties' approbation of M. de  
Ripperda's behaviour, than the great honors to  
which they promoted him, and the entire trust  
they conferred upon him, at his return to Ma-  
drid. And as what he had given out at Vienna,  
relative to Gibraltar, was verified by the peremp-  
tory demand of that fortress; so from that time  
measures were taken to make good what he had  
likewise said there, that the king should be driven  
out of his dominions, and the Pretender placed  
upon the throne of Great Britain. It is freely  
left to the judgment of every impartial person,  
that he who declared there was a secret offensive  
alliance was actually prime minister to his ca-  
tholic majesty, who honored him with his entire  
confidence—that it was he who had himself made  
the treaties of Vienna—that he never denied  
making such declaration, when it was publicly



talked of; and that he was never disowned in it by the king his master, who continued him a long time after in his service; nor was it ever alleged as one of the causes of his disgrace." The Spanish minister, in reply, declares, "that the king of Spain does not consider himself as responsible for the vain and idle discourses of the duc de Ripperda, whose extravagancies had at length induced his catholic majesty not only to divest him of his offices, but to secure the person of a minister as culpable as dangerous. But he acknowledged that the duc de Ripperda was justified in declaring that the good correspondence and friendship of England and Spain depended on the speedy restitution of Gibraltar, agreeably to the positive engagements of the king of England. This extraordinary man, after his disgrace, escaped from the tower of Segovia, where he was closely confined, and sought for refuge in England, where he resided three years in great pomp and splendor: but not finding his wild schemes and projects of revenge likely to be adopted by the British court, he took a sudden resolution to offer his services to Muley Abdalla, emperor of Morocco, by whom they were received with eagerness; and embracing the Mohammedan faith, he was created a pacha, and prime minister and vizier of the empire. After experiencing divers vicissitudes of fortune, he ex-

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Dispute  
with the  
king



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pired at Tetuan, October 1737, professing himself a true and sincere penitent, and being received as such into the bosom of the holy catholic church, in the communion of which he was originally educated; though early in life he had abjured the errors of popery, and embraced the protestant faith, which he afterwards renounced on entering into the service of Spain. On receiving absolution from a monk of Mequinez, he became, although previously agonised with remorse, calm and serene, and at last died with cheerfulness and hope.—Such is the fascination of the Roman-catholic religion!

Dispute  
with Rus-  
sia.

The parliament of Great Britain, after granting large and liberal supplies, conformably to the requisitions of the court, was prorogued on the 24th of May, 1726. Very early in the spring, sir Charles Wager had sailed with a powerful fleet to the Baltic. During the whole of the last year, intrigues had been carried on in Sweden by the Anglo-Hanoverian cabinet, with a view to detach that kingdom from the Russian alliance; and lord Townshend, in his dispatch of July 27, from Hanover, to Mr. Walpole, remarks, with no great novelty of thought or expression, that “our interest there has increased in proportion to the sums that have been distributed.” Still the opposite interest continued to predominate, and in the month of April in the present year



the emperor acceded in form to the treaty of Stockholm. Sir Charles Wager being joined by a Danish squadron, the united fleet proceeded to the gulf of Finland, and on the 29th of May cast anchor before the port of Revel. The British admiral had positive instructions not to suffer the Russian fleets to leave their harbours till the empress had obviated all ground of suspicion by an explicit declaration of her pacific intentions ; for which purpose he deputed an officer to Cronslot with a letter to the czarina, written with his Britannic majesty's own hand, in which he observed, " that as her imperial majesty's great preparations, both by sea and land, could not fail of giving him, as well as his allies in those parts, great and just cause to be alarmed, she would not be surprised that he had sent a strong squadron into the Baltic to obviate any danger that might ensue ; and he professed his astonishment, that while he was carrying on amicable negotiations, and had not given *the least provocation* on his part, measures were taken at her court in favor of the Pretender ; and concluding with an exhortation, that rather than plunge Russia into a war, and the whole north into confusion, her majesty would please to give her people and all mankind convincing proofs of her inclination for peace, and of her good disposition to live in quiet with her neighbours."



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The empress, notwithstanding her high and undaunted spirit, seeing her ports blockaded by a superior force, and even her maritime towns in danger of attack, was compelled to temporise. She therefore in guarded terms expressed her surprise "at not receiving the king's letter till the very instant his fleet appeared on her coasts, and had actually cast anchor before Revel: since it had been more agreeable to the custom established among sovereigns, and more consistent with the amity subsisting between the two countries, had his majesty thought fit to expostulate with her concerning any umbrage he might have conceived, and to expect her answer thereupon before he had taken so offensive a step;—that then his majesty might have been assured by her, that it was so far from her thoughts to disturb the repose in the north, that, on the contrary, all her cares and attention were wholly bent on the security and preservation of it;—that the charge brought against her in relation to the Pretender was a frivolous accusation, serving merely as a pretence for the unkind steps taken against her." Notwithstanding this formal disavowal by the empress of any hostile designs, sir Charles Wager remained in his station near Revel till the month of October, when the season was too far advanced to admit in those stormy seas of any farther naval operations. The czarina, highly pro-



voked, on the other hand took her revenge, by acceding in form, August 1726, to the treaty of Vienna.

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In the month of June, Mr. Poyntz, ambassador at the court of Stockholm, had presented a memorial to that court of a very curious and extraordinary nature—declaring “that his Britannic majesty, always attentive to the peace of the north, had no sooner concluded the treaty of Hanover, but he had communicated it to Sweden, and desired its accession thereto; that it was with great concern he saw this negotiation lengthened out to above six months, and that in the mean time Sweden had entered into engagements with other powers” (alluding to the emperor’s recent accession to the treaty of Stockholm); “notwithstanding which, his majesty, fearing these delays should endanger Sweden, to shew his exactness in fulfilling his engagements, and his attention to the succour of Sweden, was willing to put that crown in possession of the good fruits of its accession, even before it *had* acceded, by sending a powerful squadron into the Baltic *without any requisition thereof*;—that the British admiral had been presented to his Swedish majesty, to assure him, that if he thought himself in any immediate danger from the armament of his neighbours, he was in that case to concert measures with his majesty for the defence of Sweden; but that while the



BOOK VIII. said admiral continued at Stockholm, his Swedish  
1726. majesty had graciously answered in writing, "*that*  
*having a defensive alliance with Russia, he thought*  
*himself in no danger from thence.* If after the  
departure of the English fleet any misfortune  
should happen to Sweden for want of timely pre-  
cautions, it is hoped such misfortune will not be  
imputed to his Britannic majesty. And the am-  
bassador concludes with saying, that his majesty  
cannot imagine that the fear of danger ought  
not to be a sufficient inducement to guard  
against those dangers; nor that the loose and  
uncertain hopes of future advantages from Rus-  
sia can afford a reasonable motive to reject the  
friendship of those powers which have ever been  
the support of Sweden—nor that those imaginary  
and insidious promises can be balanced against a  
clear and net subsidy of 100,000 ducats per  
month, to commence from your majesty's ac-  
cession to the treaty of Hanover, and with a  
prospect of more considerable assistance in case  
of need."—The gravest counsellor in the senate  
of Sweden must surely have found it difficult to  
listen to this memorial with a serious counte-  
nance; for who ever heard before of an arma-  
ment sent out of pure good-will to rescue a na-  
tion from the danger of its own alliances?

The English interest however gradually gained  
ground; and the government of Sweden perceiv-



ing Russia unable to cope with the naval power of Great Britain, and feeling sensibly the operative influence of those *golden showers* which now diffused themselves in rich profusion over that barren land, acceded—a little to anticipate the result of these intrigues—March 1727, to the treaty of Hanover.

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Prussia on the other hand, notwithstanding the near affinity of its sovereign to the king of England, about the same time withdrew from this alliance, and acceded to the treaty of Vienna. For many years past a strict amity had subsisted between the two houses of Hanover and Brandenburg, wholly founded indeed, like all other friendships amongst princes, upon motives of interest. They were embarked in the same cause, as members of the grand confederacy against Sweden, and were alike jealous of the designs of the czar, who had sent a large body of troops into Germany under pretence of assisting at the siege of Wismar; after the reduction of which place they remained as auxiliaries to the duke of Mecklenburg, over whose territories the czar, eager to gain a permanent footing in Germany, flattered himself that the duke would at length be induced to assign to him his rights of sovereignty. But when this project was, by a firm resistance, rendered abortive, and peace concluded between Prussia and Sweden, the jealousy of the

Defection  
of Prussia  
from the  
Treaty of  
Hanover.



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1726. Prussian monarch was transferred from the czar to the king of England, who had obtained a protectorial commission from the emperor, vesting in him the administration of Mecklenburg, and who evidently entertained still farther views of ambition on that inviting contiguous duchy. By a *pactum* long established between the houses of Mecklenburg and Brandenburg, the reversion of this inheritance, in failure of male heirs, was settled upon the king of Prussia; and though the Prussian monarch could not venture to break with England till an *éclaircissement* had taken place with the emperor, no sooner was the renewal of the ancient compact proposed under the guarantee of his imperial majesty, than Prussia entered without hesitation into all the engagements required of him by the court of Vienna. Such is the honour and such the morality of princes!

At the same time that sir Charles Wager sailed for the Baltic, two other powerful squadrons were also fitted out at an immense expense, though, as far as appears, without any determinate object, and indicating only the jealous fears and restless surmises of the king of England. One of these, under the command of Sir John Jennings, with a body of land forces on board, cruised for a considerable time off the coasts of Spain, to the great consternation of the inhabitants, but at-



tempted no act of hostility. Another fleet under rear-admiral Hosier sailed for the West Indies, with orders to block up the galleons in the Spanish harbours; or to capture them, in case they should presume to venture out. But his instructions authorising no farther or more direct act of hostility, and the Spaniards having reconveyed, on the first intelligence of this armament, their treasures from Porto Bello to Panama, this gallant officer was compelled to remain inactive in his station till the greater part of his men, and at length the admiral himself, perished deplorably by the diseases of that destructive climate. This fleet, which had at the first excited universal terror, continued in those seas till it became the jest and sport of the Spaniards, who, perceiving the restrictions they laboured under, ventured, in open defiance of the English, to seize on the effects of the South-Sea company at La Vera Cruz. And the commander is indeed said to have fallen a sacrifice, not so much to epidemical sickness as to the corrosion of chagrin and disappointment\*. The ships also were said to

\* There is something wonderfully picturesque and striking in the machinery of the famous popular ballad of "Hosier's Ghost," written by the author of *LEONIDAS*, on the subsequent conquest of Porto Bello by admiral Vernon. The English squadron, "all glorious from the Spaniards' late defeat," is supposed to be moored in the dead of night opposite to the castles styled the *Bastimentos*, when the apparition arises sud-

BOOK  
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1726.  
Disastrous  
Expedition  
of Admiral  
Hosier.



BOOK be ruined by the worms ; and loud and general  
 VIII. complaints were made in England of the impro-  
 1727. vident and wanton waste of lives and money in  
 this unaccountable and disastrous expedition.

Meeting of  
 Parlia-  
 ment.

The parliament of Great Britain being convened January 1727, the king informed the two houses “ that the alliance, offensive and defensive, concluded between Spain and the emperor had laid the foundation of a most exorbitant and formidable power—a power levelled against the dearest interests and privileges of the English nation—out of the sea, accompanied by a train of spectres uttering shrill and mournful shrieks, and with looks clouded by sorrow “ frowning on the hostile shore.” The reader of imagination and taste will pardon the insertion of the following stanzas :

On them gleam'd the moon's wan lustre,  
 When the shade of Hosier brave  
 His pale bands was seen to muster,  
 Rising from the watery grave.  
 O'er the glimmering wave he hied him,  
 Where the Burford rear'd her sail,  
 With three thousand ghosts beside him,  
 And in groans did Vernon hail :

“ See these mournful spectres sweeping  
 Ghastly o'er this hated wave,  
 Whose wan cheeks are stained with weeping!  
 These were English captains brave.  
 Mark those numbers pale and horrid :  
 Those were once my sailors bold !  
 Lo ! each hangs his drooping forehead,  
 While his dismal tale is told !



tion, which must either surrender Gibraltar to Spain, and acquiesce in the emperor's usurped exercise of commerce, or resolve vigorously to defend their undoubted rights. He assured them that it was a secret article of this alliance to place the Pretender upon the throne of Great Britain; and that Russia was actuated by the same views, which she had however been prevented from taking any steps to accomplish by the recent operations of the British fleet in the Baltic. Two other squadrons (he said) had been also equipped, the advantage and glory accruing to the nation from which sufficiently spoke their praise. And he concluded with informing them, that the king of Spain had actually ordered his

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“ Unrepining at thy glory,  
Thy successful arms we hail;  
But remember our sad story,  
And let Hosier's wrongs prevail.

Sent in this foul clime to languish,  
Think what thousands fell in vain!  
Wasted with disease and anguish,  
Not in glorious battle slain!

“ Hence, with all my train attending,  
From their oozy tombs below  
Thro' the hoary foam ascending,  
Here I feed my constant woe.  
Here, the Bastimentos viewing,  
We recall our shameful doom;  
And, our plaintive cries renewing,  
Wander through the midnight gloom.”



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1727.

Debates in  
Parlia-  
ment.

ambassador to quit the kingdom, leaving a memorial containing a formal demand for the restitution of Gibraltar." The commons, in reply to his majesty's speech, voted a most loyal and zealous address, expressing "their determination to stand by and support his majesty with their lives and fortunes against all his enemies; and engaging not only cheerfully and effectually to raise the supplies necessary for the present exigency, but to enable his majesty to make good his engagements with his allies, in order to preserve the balance of power in Europe and the undoubted rights of the crown of Great Britain." In vain was it urged by the patriots in opposition, "that it was sufficient on this occasion to return thanks to his majesty for his most gracious speech, and appoint a day for taking it into consideration, without precipitately pledging themselves to support measures, the rectitude and wisdom of which they had as yet been furnished with no means to ascertain. That the address implied an approbation of measures taken to prevent dangers. But could this be done with propriety without knowing of what nature those measures were, or whether the dangers alleged were imaginary or real? On this occasion they said the advice of the house might be quite as necessary as its support; that the question of peace and war was the most momen-



tous which could fall under the cognizance of that assembly ; that it was incumbent upon them not rashly to decide, but maturely to deliberate ; and for this purpose it was necessary that those papers which could alone elucidate and establish the facts stated in his majesty's speech should be laid before them." Sir William Wyndham remarked, " that of late years our councils had been in a state of perpetual fluctuation ; that, Penelope-like, we were continually weaving and unravelling the same web—now raising, now depressing, the power of the house of Austria, and engaging in successive quarrels with every power of the continent, under the pretence of preserving the balance of Europe." It was asked by Mr. Hungerford, " by what fleets the Pretender was to be convoyed to England ? and whether he proposed to embark on the floating island of Gulliver ?—a scheme which seemed not more chimerical than the other circumstances of this romantic tale. He hoped that matters were not yet carried to such desperate lengths but that means of accommodation might be found without engaging the nation in a war, which could only prove an aggravation of misfortunes." Sir Thomas Hanmer declared, " that if the dangers which this nation was now said to be threatened with were so real and so imminent as some pretended, he would be one of the foremost in re-

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BOOK commending speedy and vigorous resolutions.

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But he acknowledged his incredulity: these dangers appeared to him mere phantoms, distant and almost indiscernible. And as to the Pretender, though his name might be converted to a political use by foreign princes, in order to frighten and alarm us, his interest was never so low, nor his party so despicable, as at present; and all mention of him in this day's debate ought to be left entirely out of the question. He confessed himself extremely apprehensive that the acquisition of certain foreign dominions had sown the seeds which had now produced these divisions and disturbances, which menaced Europe with a general war; and that we had involved ourselves in our present difficulties by COMPLIANCES, unaccountable on any possible ground connected with the national interests, or which could be dictated by any other motive than the security of those acquisitions." These reasonings, however, were too weak to have the least influence on the decision of the house; and the address was carried, on the division, by a majority of 251 against 81 voices.—In the house of peers the opposition of lord Bathurst was peculiarly eloquent and spirited. His lordship asserted "the probability, notwithstanding the alliances recently formed, that England would eventually have a war to support against two of the greatest



potentates of Europe ; that the indiscreet or violent expressions of the duc de Ripperda were surely no just ground of war, when they had been solemnly disavowed by his catholic majesty ; that the nation was loaded with a debt of fifty millions, and that a war must soon inevitably exhaust its remaining resources. He said that he was neither in the French, nor Spanish, nor German interests—but a true Englishman ; and so long as he had the honor to sit in that house, he would speak and act for the good of his country. What (said he) my lords, can we get by a war if it be a successful one ? I will say it in one word : NOTHING. What can we lose if it be unprosperous ? I will say it in one word, in a syllable : ALL.”—Seventeen peers entered their protest against the resolution of the majority, that the measures his majesty had thought fit to take were honorable, just, and, necessary.

Such was the umbrage given by the king's speech to the court of Vienna, that M. de Palm, the imperial resident at London, was ordered by the emperor to present a remonstrance to the British court, framed in terms unusually bold and pointed, charging the king with “ calumnious misrepresentations, and with hazarding assertions void of all foundation. He affirmed that there was no *offensive* alliance subsisting between the

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Rupture  
with the  
Courts of  
Vienna and  
Madrid.



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1727. imperial and Spanish crowns ; that the article relating to the Pretender was an ABSOLUTE NULLITY ; and that the restitution of Gibraltar, however just the claim of the king of Spain, was foreign to the purpose of the treaty." The two houses expressed, in a formal address to the throne, their indignation at the insolence of this memorial, which they style an extravagant insult upon his majesty, and a presumptuous and vain attempt to instil into the minds of his faithful subjects a distrust of his royal word." As no satisfactory evidence has however yet been adduced to confirm the assertions of the king of England, it is morally certain that the intelligence received respecting this political mystery did not merit that implicit credit which, predisposed by the credulity of habitual apprehension and suspicion, the court of London appears to have given to it—although lord Townshend hesitated not to declare in the house of lords, " that if the safety of the state permitted to lay the advices in possession of government before the house, their lordships would no more question the certainty of such an article than if they had been present at the signing of it." On the other hand, count Palm in his memorial declares, " that his imperial majesty was struck with the utmost astonishment that the king of Great Britain could suffer himself to be prevailed upon to declare from the royal throne



to that most renowned nation, as certain and undoubted facts, things absolutely void of all foundation." And the ambassador declares "that his imperial majesty has expressly authorised and commanded him most solemnly to affirm in his name, and upon his imperial word, that there exists no secret article or convention whatsoever which contains or can tend to prove the least title of what has been alleged." And in another part of this famous memorial he protests "that there exists not even a pretence to say that this treaty can be grievous or hurtful to a nation for which his imperial majesty has the greatest affection and esteem, and whose glorious exploits and important succours no time will efface out of his memory."—The emperor was believed to be envious of the power and grandeur of the house of Lunenburg since its accession to the throne of Great Britain, to a degree which the zealous and uniform attachment of the princes of that house to the interests of the imperial family could never soften. But that he should seriously listen to any proposals from the court of Madrid in favor of the house of Stuart, from whose gratitude he had little to expect, and from whose deeply rooted animosity and revenge he might eventually have every thing to fear, carries with it the face of



BOOK great improbability\*. Highly resenting nevertheless the conduct of the king of England, and  
VIII. 1727. considering himself as finally abandoned by the treaty of Hanover, he had at length entered into intimate connections with the courts most adverse to that of London, or rather of Herenhausen, and had even proceeded to the alarming extremity of acceding to the secret article of the treaty of Stockholm; from which æra the exorbitant power of the house of Austria, and the danger to which the balance of power and the liberties of Europe were consequently exposed, had become the fashionable theme of declamation in the court and parliament of Great Britain. With the memorial also was transmitted from Vienna a letter from the chancellor count Zinzendorf to count Palm, expressly commanding him, in the name of his imperial majesty, after presenting the memorial to the king of Great

\* From the positive and decisive evidence of a remarkable letter from count Zinzendorf to count Palm, recently made public in the Appendix to Mr. Coxe's Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, it is unquestionable that no such secret article relative to the Pretender was appended to the treaty of Vienna. How the court of London could be so grossly deceived is indeed very extraordinary and unaccountable. Lord Townshend, in a letter to the duke of Newcastle, dated Hanover, Oct. 4, 1725, in language similar to that he afterwards used in the house of peers, declares his unalterable belief in its existence.



Britain, to publish it, together with the letter annexed, for the information of the British nation. The chancellor Zinzendorf affirms in this letter, "that it is easy to see that the speech was made for no other purpose but to excite the nation to a rupture and open war with the emperor and Spain, and to make the parliament approve the precipitate and burdensome measures *which the government has taken for private ends too well known.* That on the first report of these false suppositions, the emperor and the king of Spain, in order to silence them, proposed a formal act *de non offendendo*, into which all the contracting parties of the treaties of Vienna and Hanover might enter, till such time as a definitive agreement might have taken place; but that this proposition was rejected." He says, "that the articles of the quadruple alliance are expressly and publicly laid down as the unalterable basis of the treaty of Vienna; and that to affirm that, by a secret pact concluded at the same time, engagements have been entered into by their imperial and catholic majesties repugnant to the same, is an outrageous insult to the majesty of the two contracting powers, who have a right to demand a reparation proportioned to the enormity of the affront; and that the high contracting parties had no other view than that of making peace between themselves, without injuring any one else."

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Diplomat  
beginedProposed  
for  
the  
Peace



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The allegations contained in this letter and memorial seem but too well founded; but the intemperate language of these papers gave high and just offence: and Mr. Shippen, Mr. Hungerford, sir William Wyndham, and all the leaders of opposition in parliament, warmly concurred in the address presented to the throne on this occasion, and which passed the house without a dissentient vote. And an order was sent to M. de Palm, signifying “that the said Palm having delivered into the hands of his majesty, at his late audience, a memorial highly injurious to the honor and dignity of his crown, and having also publicly dispersed the same with a letter from the count de Zinzendorf to him the said Palm, still more insolent than the memorial, his majesty looked upon him no longer as a public minister, and required him forthwith to depart out of this kingdom.”

Gibraltar  
besieged.Prepara-  
tions for  
War.

Vigorous preparations were now made on both sides for war; and before the end of the session the king informed the parliament that the fortress of Gibraltar was actually besieged. The forces of Great Britain were augmented by sea and land. Thirty thousand Swedes, Danes, and Hessians were taken into British pay. And so seriously did France at this period enter into the views of England, or more properly of Hanover, for the abasement of the house of Austria, that,



exclusive of her stipulated quota of troops, she had actually engaged for the payment of an annual subsidy to Denmark of 350,000 rix-dollars for four years, and likewise of 50,000 ducats monthly to Sweden, to commence from the period of her accession to the treaty of Hanover. Amongst other more usual ways and means of providing the supplies called for on this occasion, the king was empowered, by a clause of appropriation in one of the revenue bills of the year, "to apply such sums as should be necessary for making good the expenses and engagements which had been or should be made before the 25th of September next, for the purposes of establishing the security of commerce, and restoring the tranquillity of Europe." And it was in vain urged, "that this mode of asking and granting supplies was in the highest degree unparliamentary—that such an unlimited power ought never to be given under a free government—that such confidence in the crown might be attended, through the influence of evil ministers, with the most dangerous consequences—that no provision was made for the responsibility of those entrusted with the disposal of this money—that the constitution could no otherwise be preserved, than by a strict adherence to the essential parliamentary forms of granting supplies upon estimates, and of appropriating those sup-

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BOOK plies to services and occasions publicly avowed,  
 VIII. and judged necessary—and that such an unwar-  
 1727. rantable delegation of authority transfers that  
 discretion to the crown which can with safety be

The Sinking  
 Fund insidi-  
 ously plun-  
 dered.

vested in the legislature alone.” The sum of  
 370,000*l.* issued in exchequer bills, was also  
 charged on the surplus produce of certain duties  
 appertaining to the sinking fund, towards the  
 expenses of the war, notwithstanding the vigo-  
 rous opposition of sir Joseph Jekyl and Mr. Pul-  
 teney, who demonstrated how essentially the ef-  
 ficacy of the fund would, by such a practice, be  
 impaired. This insidious alienation of a fund  
 hitherto regarded as sacred was the more remark-  
 able, as the house of commons, in reply to the  
 speech from the throne, expressly recommending  
 to their attention the state of the sinking fund,  
 had said—“ And that all who wish well to the  
 peace and quiet of your majesty’s government  
 may have the satisfaction to see that our present  
 necessities shall make no interruption in the pro-  
 gress of that desirable work of gradually reduc-  
 ing the national debt, we will consider of the  
 most proper method for immediately applying  
 the produce of the sinking fund to the uses for  
 which it was so wisely contrived, and to which it  
 stands now appropriated.”

The sum of 125,000*l.* being charged in ge-  
 neral terms, as issued for engagements and ex-



penses above and beyond such as were specified, the house thought fit to address the king for a particular account of the disposition of that money; but they received for answer, that the money was disbursed for services requiring the greatest secrecy. A motion by lord Morpeth, for copies of all such memorials or representations to his majesty from the crowns of Sweden and Denmark as did induce him to send the squadron of the last year into the Baltic, was opposed with great strength, if not of argument, at least of numbers; and Mr. Horace Walpole in a long speech justified all the steps taken since his majesty's accession to preserve the balance of power, the peace of Europe, and the tranquillity of the north. The court having now carried all its measures by great and decisive majorities, the parliament was prorogued on the 15th of May, 1727\*.

The contrast between the two speeches at the commencement and termination of the session was very striking: the former seemed dictated

\* "It is true," says count Palm, in his letter to the emperor, Dec. 13, 1726, "that the ministers have parliament on their side; but that is not to be wondered at upon the foot that matters have been carried on within these few years. When the members are bought with great pensions and employments, it is no great skill to have gained the parliament. Though more than the third part have actually opposed, and



BOOK by the passionate violence of lord Townshend;  
 VIII. the latter breathed the wise and conciliating spi-  
 1727. rit of Walpole, whose pacificatory counsils had  
 happily by this time gained the ascendancy.  
 “The love of peace,” said the king, “has hi-  
 therto prevailed upon me, even under this high  
 provocation”—alluding to the actual siege of Gib-  
 raltar—“to suspend in some measure my resent-  
 ments; and instead of having immediate recourse  
 to arms, and demanding of my allies that as-  
 sistance which they are engaged and ready to  
 give me, I have concurred with the Most Chris-  
 tian king and the States General in making such  
 overtures of accommodation as must convince all  
 the world of the uprightness of our intentions  
 and of our sincere disposition to peace, and de-  
 monstrate to whose ambition and thirst of power  
 the calamities of a war are to be imputed, if  
 these just and reasonable propositions are re-  
 jected.”

The condé de las Torres, general of the Spa-  
 nish army, had opened the trenches before  
 Gibraltar, February 11, 1727; but the garrison

will oppose, yet they can have no effect, because the mini-  
 sters will always get the better by their purchased majority.  
 The nation itself is not satisfied with the parliament, because  
 every body knows that there has not been one, time out of mind,  
 in which the members have been so corrupted and devoted to  
 the court.”—*Coxe's Papers.*



consisting of six thousand men, under the command of a gallant veteran, lord Portmore, well supplied with provisions and stores, no perceptible progress was made in the space of four months, during which the siege was pertinaciously prolonged; while the loss sustained by the besiegers was immense—half their number, as it is said, perishing by slaughter, sickness, or desertion.

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Early in the spring, as usual, a great fleet was sent to the Baltic under sir John Norris. Great Britain being now in alliance with the Scandinavian crowns, Russia was reduced to a state of total inaction, and not a ship of war ventured from the ports of Cronstadt or Revel. Still the determined enmity of so formidable a power was the subject of just uneasiness, leagued as she now was with the courts of Vienna and Madrid; each of these three combined potentates having peculiar and distinct causes of resentment and provocation, and all of them founded, as must in candor be acknowledged, upon incontestible grounds of reason and justice. But the sudden death of the czarina at this critical juncture entirely changed the face of affairs in the north, and the politics of the court of St. Petersburg sustained another revolution extremely favorable to the restoration of the general tranquillity. The throne of the czars was now filled by Peter II,

Death of  
the Czarina  
Catherine.



BOOK a youth only fifteen years of age, son of the  
 VIII. unfortunate Alexiowitz, who ended his days by a  
 1727. most tragical catastrophe during the life-time of  
 his father Peter the Great.

Articles of  
 Peace con-  
 cluded with  
 Spain and  
 the Em-  
 peror.

Meantime, through the seasonable intervention of the court of Versailles, now acting under the auspices of the mild and equitable Fleury, whose views perfectly coincided with those of the English minister Walpole, preliminary articles of accommodation were signed at Paris, May the 20th, 1727, by the ministers of the different belligerent powers; who, though much exasperated against each other, were actuated by no motives of sufficient weight to induce them to involve anew all Europe in the horrors of a general war. These articles imported that hostilities should immediately cease; that the charter of the Ostend company should be suspended for seven years; and that a congress should be opened in four months at Aix-la-Chapelle (afterwards transferred to Soissons) to settle the terms of a final pacification.

The king of England seemed at length to have surmounted all his political difficulties; and if we cannot always applaud the justice or wisdom of his counsels, it must at least be acknowledged that they were enforced with an extraordinary degree of vigor and success. A fair prospect of permanent peace and tranquillity now seemed



to open ; and so many toils and dangers, such long and ceaseless anxieties, were now at last to be rewarded with glory, happiness, and repose. But frail are the hopes and fallacious the expectations of man. Never had the king since his first accession to the crown found himself in a situation so advantageous and agreeable ; and he embraced with his usual eagerness this favorable opportunity of revisiting his electoral dominions, to which he ever retained a fond and partial attachment, and by which he was in a degree not inferior revered and beloved. Embarking at Greenwich, June 3, 1727, he landed in Holland on the 7th, and immediately set out on his journey to Hanover. On the road between Delden and Osnaburg he was seized with a kind of lethargic paralysis ; and feeling himself attacked by the stroke of death, he said to the nobleman who accompanied him in the carriage, “ *C'est fait de moi.*” He appeared, however, extremely anxious to reach the capital of his dominions ; but on his arrival at the palace of his brother, the bishop of Osnaburg, the king being now wholly devoid of sense and motion, it was found impossible to proceed ; and on Sunday the 11th of June, 1727, he expired, in the 68th year of his age, and 13th of his reign—leaving issue by his consort Sophia Dorothea, heiress of the house of Zell, George, successor to the crown, and a daughter, married, previous to the accession

BOOK  
VIII.

1727.

Death of  
King  
George I.



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His Character.

of the Brunswic family to the royal dignity, to Frederic William, king of Prussia.

If this prince was not distinguished for shining talents or heroic virtues, much less can we discern, on a general review of his character, any remarkable deficiency of understanding or propensity to vice. Acceding to the crown of Great Britain when far advanced in life, he seemed ever to consider himself rather as elector than as king; and the influence and power of Great Britain were of little estimation in his eyes, when directed to any other end than the aggrandisement of his native country. With respect to the internal government of his kingdoms, the rectitude and benevolence of his intentions were always apparent: but he was, from the nature of his situation, compelled to throw himself into the hands of a party; and from the easiness of his disposition he was too often persuaded to acquiesce in measures which a more perfect acquaintance with the real state of facts and opinions would have shown to be as contrary to his interests as there is reason to believe they frequently were to his inclination\*. In the view of Europe at large, he sustained the character of a prudent, an able,

\* The following pleasing *trait* of the characteristic *good-nature* of this monarch was communicated by a nobleman of distinguished literary taste and knowledge, "Soon after the accession of George I. to the throne, the duchess of Buckinghamshire (natural daughter of James II.) was refused a passage



and a fortunate prince. And if, in contempla-  
ting the history of this reign, we have just cause  
to lament the weakness and defects of the ex-  
ternal system of policy by which its counsels  
were influenced, we have ample reason, on the  
other hand, to express our ardent wishes that  
the noble speculative principles of government,  
and of liberty civil and religious, which this  
monarch was not only ready but anxious on all  
occasions to avow, and by which the general  
tenor of his conduct was regulated, may never  
cease to be the distinguishing and favorite charac-  
teristics of the royal and electoral house of  
BRUNSWIC.

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VIII.  
1727.

With respect to the general state of literature  
and the arts during this reign, it may suffice to  
observe, that, notwithstanding the total neglect  
of the court, and the violence of party rage, de-  
scriptive of this as well as of the former reign,  
they continued to flourish in a very high degree;  
and we view with surprise, amidst scenes of conten-  
tion and turbulence, a constellation of geniuses

in her carriage through St. James's park. She in consequence  
wrote a letter to the king, abusing him in the grossest language,  
affirming, that he was an usurper—that she had a better  
right to go through the park than he, &c. &c. The king,  
instead of being offended, only laughed, and said, "*Oh la folle !  
la folle ! qu'on la laisse passer !*" and gave orders that she  
should have liberty of going through the park at her pleasure.



BOOK  
VIII.  
1727. shedding a peculiar lustre over this period of British history. Scarcely had LOCKE, TEMPLE, and DRYDEN, the departing luminaries of the former age, sunk below the western sky, when ADDISON, SWIFT, POPE, SHAFTESBURY, and BOLINGBROKE, arose in the east. The writings of Addison, in particular, merit a most distinguished and honorable mention. Amidst the din of hostile and malignant factions, they exhibit an almost cloudless picture of urbanity, candor, good sense, and beneficence. The advantage which the community has reaped from the wide and almost boundless diffusion of them no power of calculation can ascertain. And exclusive of their moral and political merit, his exquisite delineations of life and manners will charm as long as our nation and language exist. In poetry, Pope rose far superior to all his contemporaries; and if inferior to any in that mode of versification which he chose to adopt, he is inferior to Dryden alone. In wit, in harmony, and propriety, and, adverting to the Rape of the Lock at least, in imagination and fancy, his merit is of the highest class: but in the epistle of Eloise only, perhaps, has he spoken the genuine language of passion, or penetrated the inmost recesses of the heart. In the province of architecture, Gibbs and Kent, with unequal steps and at almost viewless distance, followed the celebrated sir Christopher Wren; of



whom the magnificent plan for rebuilding the city of London in 1666—an effort of genius which can never be contemplated without admiration and indignant regret—would have alone sufficed to perpetuate the memory. And at this period the English school of painting could produce (a Thornhill excepted) no greater artist than Jervas, whose name is indeed immortalized—not by the “warmth divine” of his own performances, but of “the verse eternal which embalms the dead.” During the course of this reign, sir ISAAC NEWTON terminated his long career of life; but that of his fame and glory will be coëval only with the world itself, whose laws he has developed and explained, with an energy and sagacity wholly stupendous, and approaching, perhaps, the limits of supernatural intelligence.

\* \* \* \* \*

SOPHIA DOROTHEA, consort of GEORGE I, died November 2, 1726. She was married to that monarch when hereditary prince of Hanover, A. D. 1682, at the age of sixteen. But this match proved very unhappy. The heart of the princess was said to be already engaged, and the affection of the prince was soon alienated from her. Count Koningsmark, the favored lover, arriving at the court of Hanover several years afterwards—the prince being then with the imperial army in Hungary—the mutual passion of the unfortunate



BOOK pair revived. And it being discovered that the  
VIII. count was admitted secretly to the apartments of  
1727. the princess, he was, by order of the reigning  
elector, assassinated by persons placed purposely  
in or near the palace to intercept him. The  
princess was at the same time put under arrest,  
and confined in the castle of Alden, upon the  
banks of the river Aller, where she remained a  
close prisoner no less than forty years. An in-  
teresting account of this mysterious story, which  
abounds in affecting incidents and picturesque  
scenery well calculated for the drama, may be  
found in Coxe's Memoirs of Walpole, vol. i.  
p. 267.

The narrative of Mr. Coxe, as to the principal  
circumstances, is strongly corroborated by the  
late earl of Orford, who received his information  
from his father, sir Robert Walpole\*. The pro-  
cess, in consequence of which a sentence of sepa-  
ration, not of divorce, was pronounced, after an  
interval of eight years, by the ecclesiastical consis-  
tory, December 28, 1694, has never been made  
public; and the equity of it has therefore always  
been regarded as a subject of doubt. Popular  
report, extremely favourable to the princess, who  
is universally described as in the highest degree

\* Lord Orford's Works, vol. iv. p. 280.—*Vide* also Wrax-  
all's Memoirs of the Court of Berlin, vol. i. p. 25.



amiable and accomplished, has represented the countess of Platen, mistress of the reigning elector Ernest Augustus, as the vile contriver of a plot to ruin the count and the princess, in revenge for slighted love. The incontrovertible fact is, that the count was privately introduced, under cover of the night, into the apartment of the electoral princess—but merely, as is pretended, to bid her for ever adieu—and that he was assassinated immediately on his leaving her; the spot where the murder was committed being still marked by tradition. He was buried, as queen Caroline informed sir Robert Walpole, under the floor of an anti-room leading to the apartment of the princess. Presumptions were irresistibly forcible; and the duke and duchess of Zell, her father and mother, appear, from the good understanding they ever maintained with the court of Hanover, to have been convinced of the justice of her sentence. On the other hand, though she acknowledged her partiality for Koningsmark, the asseverations of innocence and unsullied honor on the part of the princess were peculiarly striking, solemn and frequent, to the latest period of her unfortunate existence. Both king George II. and queen Caroline believed her entirely free from crime; and sir Robert Walpole, who had often heard the particulars of this romantic story from the queen, adhered to the same opinion.



BOOK  
VIII

1727.

On the very morning after the intelligence arrived of the death of king George I, the picture of a lady in royal robes was seen for the first time in the new king's bed-chamber. This was no other than the portrait of his mother, whom he purposed to have acknowledged as queen dowager had she outlived the late monarch. This picture came afterwards into possession of the princess Amelia, who bequeathed it with her other immense property, by a capricious and injurious disposition, to the landgrave of Hesse. Count Koningsmark was brother to the nobleman of the same name who was supposed to be accessory to the assassination of Mr. Thynne in the reign of king Charles II, commemorated by a well-known monument in Westminster-abbey. It is asserted as a positive fact, that the prince twice made proposals of reconciliation—1st, on the death of his father the elector Ernest Augustus, and 2dly, on his accession to the throne of England; and that on both occasions she refused the offers made to her with the highest indignation. “If I am guilty,” said she, “I am not worthy of the prince: if I am innocent, he is not worthy of me.”



# DISSERTATION III.

## ON

### THE TREATY OF HANOVER

CONCLUDED A. D. 1725.

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THE treaty of Hanover was more than half a century ago styled by lord Chesterfield "that universally exploded treaty." That it originated in German views, German hopes, and German fears, is evident even from a very general knowledge of the history of the times: but as there are those who will still contend "that the interests of England were not sacrificed to those of Hanover, but those of Hanover to England, by this treaty," and who profess to regard it as merely "affording a theme for political obloquy\*," it may be proper, in the form of a dissertation, to state, somewhat more at large than the nature of a general history would permit, the proofs and authorities upon which the narrative is founded.

The policy of the English government at the accession of George I. was simple and obvious. All the leading powers of Europe were at this period disposed to maintain the relations of peace and amity with the crown of Great Britain. The power and prosperity of the nation were very great, and its reputation stood proportionably high. The projects of the Jacobites had been completely disconcerted by the death of the queen. The new monarch had been received

\* *Vide* COXE's *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, with a view chiefly to which the present dissertation was originally penned.



with general acclamation. A mild and liberal conduct at home, combined with an equitable and generous policy abroad, was alone wanting to make England the arbitress of Europe. By errors the most gross and fatal, in a short time the king of England found himself surrounded with an host of foreign and domestic enemies; and he boldly launched into a sea of troubles, escaping political shipwreck through the unmerited favor of fortune, much more than by any efforts of virtue or of wisdom.

No sooner did the Hanoverian monarch find himself firmly fixed upon his throne, than he began to consider in what mode the power and riches of England might be made subservient to his views of exaltation and aggrandisement, as a prince of the empire. Bremen and Verden on one side, and Mecklenburg on the other, presented objects irresistibly tempting to the ambition of the elector king; and within the lapse of a very few months his schemes began to unfold themselves. In the summer of 1715, that fatal treaty, *the source of all our woes*, was concluded with Denmark, by which the duchies of Bremen and Verden, unjustly wrested by the Danish monarch from the crown of Sweden, were, *flagrante bello*, ceded to Hanover; and Hanover in return engaged to become a party in the war against Sweden, and to guaranty the possession of Sleswic—another of the recent usurpations of Denmark—to the Danish crown. A transaction more palpably injurious, more incapable of extenuation, more calculated to excite a lively and permanent resentment in the breast of the injured party, history does not exhibit. Almost equal provocation was offered to Russia, by opposing her views of gaining a settlement in the empire; and with much greater reason, by offering to join with Sweden, in order to compel Russia to restore her Swedish conquests, as a compensation for the cession of Bremen and Verden. To the emperor extreme offence was given, by the open and undisguised indulgence of a spirit of lawless and boundless



ambition; and he refused, with firmness and dignity, to countenance a system of conduct so odious and unjustifiable. For the sake of conciliating his favor, the quadruple alliance was formed, and the pride of Spain was mortally wounded, at the same time that her interests were injured in the tenderest part by the attack upon her fleet at Messina. In consequence of this interposition, Spain was made a determined enemy, although the emperor was not converted into a friend. The investitures were still refused, the attempts on Mecklenburg were still repelled; and disappointment and chagrin changing by degrees to alienation and resentment, the court of London at length totally abandoned the ancient alliance with Austria, threw herself into the arms of France, and by the treaty of Hanover, to adopt the words of lord Chatham, "destroyed that building which we afterwards in vain endeavoured to raise again, and weakened the only power which it was our interest to strengthen." This is not an invidious or exaggerated statement of facts, but corroborated by the most decisive testimonies of the greatest statesmen whom this nation has produced. "That the treaty of Hanover," says lord Chesterfield, "was calculated only to support and defend the new possessions and claims of the electorate of Hanover, is beyond all controversy; as likewise that the exorbitant power of the house of Austria was no better than a political bugbear, to be found no where—no, not in the brain of those who endeavoured most to have it mistaken for a reality. Were our fluctuating measures, our contradictory treaties, for and against Sweden, for and against Russia, for and against the house of Austria, unknown to any informed man in the kingdom, or the true motives of them secrets to any discerning one? Rather than suffer Bremen and Verden to be forced out of the gripe of Hanover, all Europe was to be embroiled, or even sacrificed, so important were these



places become, and so sacred their connexion with that upstart electorate\*.”

Fully to state the sentiments of the most enlightened and illustrious patriots of those times respecting the Hanoverian system, would be to transcribe a large proportion of their speeches, letters, and political publications. “The interest of Britain at the æra of the Hanoverian accession,” says lord Bolingbroke, “required, no doubt, that we should turn our eyes from the continent to our own island, and that we should improve the opportunity and the advantages which a peace gave us. Whatever prejudices have been propagated industriously against that of Utrecht, thus much at least is certain, we were obliged no longer by treaties to assume any other part in the affairs of the continent than that which the immediate interest of our own country required. The opportunity and the means of diminishing taxes, reviving commerce, and paying debts, were open to us: this should have been the scheme of our policy, but unhappily it was not. The late king, as elector of Hanover, had reason no doubt to desire the acquisition of Bremen and Verden; our nation contributed to it with her money, and forced it with her arms; though it was made in contradiction to the engagements that the crown of England had taken, when king William gave his guarantee to the treaty of Travendahl. This acquisition became the first link of a political chain, by which we were dragged back into new and expensive broils, the consequences whereof we feel at this hour. As long as there were hopes of obtaining an *extraordinary* investiture of Bremen and Verden” (*i. e.* an investiture which should include the imperial city of Bremen) “we flattered the emperor at no small expense. As soon as it became apparent that this investiture could be obtained in no other manner

\* Vindication of the Case of the Hanoverian Forces.



than it had been granted formerly, we insulted him; we imputed to him designs he has constantly disowned, and we have never proved: after which we complained of his ingratitude, we threatened war, and we prepared for it, by maintaining with great profusion a standing army of Hessians in Germany. The same men who complained so lately that France had been left too powerful by the treaty of Utrecht, and that great danger would arise from her close connexion with Spain, complained now of the too great power of the house of Austria, and of the danger that would arise from a good understanding between the emperor and king Philip. In short, our politics were not only variable, but incomprehensible to every man who knew the state and interest of Great Britain, but was not so well apprised of the several turns of interest which were to be served abroad\*."

"On the death of Charles XII," a late writer, on the authority of original and authentic documents, informs us that "George, though involved in disputes with Spain, yet secure of the co-operation of France, dispatched Carteret and Bassewitz to break up the congress of Aland, and to prevent the pacification between Russia and Sweden, from a dread lest their union should render his mediation unnecessary, and induce Sweden to decline confirming the cession of Bremen and Verden. Carteret succeeded in his negociation, and is applauded, though not without regret, by the Swedish historians, for the consummate address with which he prevailed on Sweden to conclude a separate peace with Hanover. Before the pacification was finally concluded, Sweden suffered severely for breaking off the congress of Aland; the Danes took Marstrand, and threatened Gotheburg; forty thousand Russians landed in different parts of Sweden, and, carrying havoc and destruc-



tion into the kingdom, reduced eight towns and above 1300 villages to ashes. Carteret supported by the presence of an English fleet in the Baltic, deluded Sweden with promises to assist in wresting from Russia the conquered provinces, and prevailed on her to confirm the cession of Bremen and Verden\*." A more odious picture of Machiavelian policy is perhaps no where to be found. The congress of Aland, by the insidious artifices of the court of London, was broken off, and a horrid and destructive war, which had already lasted eighteen years, was indefinitely prolonged, in order that the views of Hanover on Bremen and Verden might not be ultimately frustrated. These are amongst the innumerable facts connected with the Hanoverian system, which have excited the utmost indignation of the advocates of rectitude, justice, and humanity.

But the prevailing opinion of foreigners, whether friends or foes, relative to the policy of the English court and its pernicious tendency, entirely corresponded with that of all intelligent persons at home. Count Broglio, in his secret correspondence with the king of France, declares the "king of Great Britain to be more engaged with his German ministers in the affairs of Hanover than of England." "*Toute son ambition étoit d'aggrandir ses états d'Allemagne,*" says M. Voltaire—*Histoire de Charles XII.* M. Rousset, after having given an account of the congress of Cambray, expresses himself, by way of introduction to the treaties of 1721 and 1724 concluded between Sweden and Russia, to the following effect: "While they seemed to labour in that city (Cambray) for the pacification of the southern parts of Europe, quiet and tranquillity succeeded to a long and cruel war in the north; but, at the same time, certain interests were made of the basis of many transactions which bid fair to set all that part of Europe in a flame. By this," as he informs us, "is to be understood the cession of the duchies

\* Coxe's Memoirs of sir Robert Walpole, vol. i, p. 161.



of Bremen and Verden to the elector of Hanover, and the invasion of the duchy of Sleswic; a hint of which is all that can be expected here, because it would require a volume to shew the influence which these two transactions had upon many subsequent events." So absurd and unaccountable did the policy of the English court appear to that of France respecting these affairs, that lord Stair declares, in a dispatch to secretary Craggs, June 1719, "that the cardinal Dubois is firmly persuaded the English ministers know nothing of all the business of the north, and that M. Bernstorff keeps all those matters entirely to himself\*." Even lord Townshend, in a letter to secretary Stanhope, dated October 1716, did not hesitate to say, "I perfectly agree with you, that England as well as the rest of Europe ever had, and always must have, a great interest in the preservation of the balance of the North; and yet I cannot help being of opinion, that if the northern affairs were brought into parliament by his majesty's order, upon the foot they now stand, his majesty would be so far from obtaining any assistance on that head, that there would be great danger from such a step of ruining his credit and influence in both houses. The arguments for maintaining a balance in the North will be turned against all that has been doing ever since the siege of Stralsund; and they will tell us, I fear, that had the intended descent succeeded, in the way and with the troops designed for that expedition, the balance of the North had been effectually ruined, and the czar made master of all the trade of the Baltic†." Unfortunately, when re-instated in power, this nobleman seemed altogether to have discarded his former notions; and the complaisance of parliament being now sufficiently tried and manifested, he appeared disposed to go the same dangerous and unwarrantable lengths in support of the

\* Hardwicke State Papers,

† Coxe's State Papers.



Hanoverian system as his predecessors Stanhope and Sunderland. So strongly, nevertheless, were the minds of all true patriots impressed with the mischiefs of this detested system, that when sir Robert Walpole, at a subsequent period, and in the decline of his power, imparted to the speaker Onslow a design then in contemplation, of a royal message to the house of commons, proposing to declare, by act of parliament, after the death of the reigning king, the same person incapable of inheriting the crown of Great Britain with the electorate of Hanover; and questioned him in these terms, "What will you say, speaker, if this hand of mine shall bring such a message from the king?" Mr. Onslow answered, "Sir, it will be as a message from heaven\*." In truth, no man saw more clearly, and, so far as his influence went, opposed more steadily, the system in question than sir Robert Walpole, of whom it is now not adulation to say, that a minister of juster views and more enlightened wisdom never swayed the councils of any kingdom; he did all that any man in his situation could have done for the advantage of the nation; he governed the state for more than twenty years, not so well certainly as he was solicitous to have done, but as well as the sovereign, the parliament, and the people themselves would permit him to govern it. He invariably declared that foreign affairs did not appertain to his department; he even frequently affected to say, that he had not studied, and did not profess to understand them; but that, when he was called upon as a member of the council to give his opinion, he advised those measures which he thought most conducive to the security, peace, and prosperity of the country. It would be the highest injustice to his memory not to acknowledge, that there exists the most indubitable evidence of the veracity of this general assertion, and it is strikingly confirmed and corroborated by the papers recently published by Mr. Coxe. From these papers, as well as

\* Coxe's Memoirs of Walpole. Appendix.



from innumerable pre-existing documents, it clearly appears that sir Robert Walpole never professed an unreserved and unqualified approbation of the treaty of Hanover. Adverting, in his celebrated speech on the motion of Mr. Sandys for removing him from the presence and councils of the king, to that memorable treaty, which has always been regarded as the *crisis of projection* with respect to the Anglo-Germanic system, he thus expressed himself: "As to foreign affairs, I must take notice of the uncandid manner in which the gentlemen on the other side have managed the question, by blending numerous treaties and complicated negotiations into one general mass. To form a fair and candid judgment of the subject, it becomes necessary not to consider the treaties merely insulated, but to advert to the time in which they were made, to the circumstances and situation of Europe when they were made, to the peculiar situation in which I stand, and to the *power* which I possessed." The quadruple alliance, universally reprobated as one of the most exceptionable of those treaties, he declared himself to be in no degree responsible for, either in respect to its articles or its effects, not being then a member of the administration. That this treaty originated in the Hanoverian cabinet he knew too well to be either willing or able to deny. So early as November 1716, secretary Stanhope, speaking of the situation of Victor Amadeus of Savoy, in a dispatch to lord Townshend from Hanover, used these words: "He will think himself very happy if the king can secure his peace with the emperor at the expense of Sicily, *so that we may boldly offer Sicily to the emperor, and may, I hope, secure his assistance for these* NORTHERN AFFAIRS." ON his return to power he found the nation committed, and the honor of government pledged, by the terms of this treaty. Passing on to the treaty of Hanover, he protested to the house, "that if he were at liberty to give the true history of that treaty, he could fully justify his own conduct. He then observed, that his late



majesty had such information as convinced not only him, but those of his council both at home and abroad, that dangerous designs had been formed between the emperor and Spain, at the time of their concluding the treaty of Vienna, 1725—designs dangerous to the liberties, not merely of England, but of Europe. The object of them was not merely to wrest Gibraltar and Port Mahon from this nation, and force the Pretender upon us, but to marry the eldest archduchess to the infant Don Carlos, who might, and probably would, thereby eventually unite in his own person the crown of Spain with the imperial dignity. It was therefore highly reasonable, both in France and England, to take the alarm at such designs, and prevent the execution of them: for this purpose an alliance was necessary; and that we might not trust too much to the assistance of France, it became requisite to form alliances also with the northern powers and some of the princes of Germany.” Here the question is placed upon the proper foundation: he virtually admits, that by an indefensible policy, for which he was in no wise accountable, we had made those great powers of Europe our enemies whose friendship we ought most to have cultivated, and were thereby compelled to embrace the alliance of France to ward off the immediate impending danger, however the balance of Europe might be, and really was, in consequence, endangered by it. Being precluded, by the nature of his situation, from entering into the particulars of the negotiation, he could not, as he intimates, offer a complete vindication of his conduct in this instance: it is for posterity, therefore, to do that justice to his memory which he could not render to himself. SO far back as the summer of 1723, we find sir Robert Walpole extremely anxious to obviate the effects of lord Townshend’s intrigues in the North, and to put some limit to the extravagance of the secret expenses. “The 150,000*l.*” says he, July 23, in a letter to lord Townshend, “may certainly be had; at the



same time, I cannot but wish from my heart that this money may not be demanded. If we enter precipitately into any engagement upon this occasion," *i. e.* the accession of the king of Sweden (Frederic of Hesse-Cassel), "we shall not carry the nation, nor perhaps the parliament, along with us: in a word, my politics are, to keep free from all engagements as long as we possibly can. You'll forgive my sudden, and possibly very improper, thoughts upon a subject that I am but little acquainted with; *but I am mightily inclined to be cautious.* France has, I apprehend, been a long time in negotiation with the czar—What part will France act upon this occasion? In short, I wish to God we may, at least for a little time, remain neuters and look on, if all the rest of Europe does the same thing." In July 1725, during the interval between the signing of the Vienna and Hanover treaties, lord Townshend being then at Hanover with the king, we find great coldness prevailing between that nobleman and sir Robert Walpole, and a great difference of opinion subsisting, relative to foreign politics. Sir Robert Walpole remonstrates against Mr. Poyntz's drawing, by order of lord Townshend, for so large a sum as 100,000*l.* for secret service, and informs him "that it must either be provided for out of the *civil list*; or, if paid out of funds already appropriated to other purposes, it must give publicity to those apprehensions which it is thought advisable should be kept private." Lord Townshend, in reply, talks of the danger from the czarina; upon which subject he reminds sir Robert Walpole "that he had the *happiness* of reasoning some hours with him at his own house before he left England," and he is zealous enough to assert "that Mr. Poyntz was, in his opinion, only too frugal."

In September, soon after the signing of the treaty of Hanover, the duke of Newcastle, secretary of state, informs lord Townshend, by whose influence he was advanced to that post, "that he had laid before the lords of the regency—



having lord Townshend's letters before him to justify his accounts—a particular relation of our present situation with respect to the courts of Vienna and Madrid; and had endeavoured to shew how *unprovoked* the behaviour of the latter was to his majesty, and *how* it was entirely owing to the dictates and suggestions of the court of Vienna, whose resentment the king had drawn upon himself, *upon no other account* than his endeavours to procure for the court of Spain the advantages they were justly entitled to by their treaties. He also explained to their lordships the inducements of the court of Spain, which was solely under the direction of the queen, to act this *extravagant and unjust part* towards his majesty, which *could* be only the marriage of her catholic majesty's son with one, if not the eldest, of the archduchesses." Upon the whole, it appears from this tedious and absurd letter\*, that the articles of the treaty of Hanover were either approved of, or silently acquiesced in, by all the lords of the regency, of whom sir Robert Walpole was one, though certainly not upon the precise grounds and for the precise reasons stated by his grace. Lord Townshend, in reply to the duke, dwells largely on the danger to be apprehended from Russia, and of the preparations making at Petersburg for an invasion of Great Britain; and he says "there can be no doubt but Spain is deeply engaged in this scheme: the impossibility that any power, except Spain, should furnish the money required, and the whole conduct of the king and queen of Spain, leave no room to doubt, that they intend, in conjunction with the czarina, to make an attempt upon us next spring. As to the court of Vienna, we may certainly conclude they have their share in this project, since Spain is so evidently engaged in it, the queen having done nothing some time but by their directions." "I have been," he adds, "for some months thoroughly per-

\* The letter may be seen at length in the Appendix to Coxe's Memoirs.



suaded, that Spain and the court of Vienna, when they concluded the late treaty, entered into a strong engagement in favor of the Pretender by a secret article. I acquainted your grace some time ago with this intelligence, which I had from so good hands, that I no more doubt the truth of it than if I had actually seen the article." From the next dispatch of sir Robert Walpole (October 2, 1725) to lord Townshend it may be gathered, that though he would not take upon himself the responsibility of opposing the present measures of security, he is far from being convinced of the reality of the danger. "Should ships from Russia," says he, "trading to Spain, be intercepted, without farther evidence or satisfaction to the world, it would be such an act of hostility as would make us be deemed the aggressors in case of a rupture. If we are to be engaged in a war, which I most heartily deprecate, it is to be wished that this nation may think an invasion by a foreign power—or an evident design of such an invasion, the support of the Pretender—and the cause of the protestant succession, are the chief and principal motives that obliged us to part with that peace and tranquillity, and the happy consequences thereof, which we now enjoy." Lord Townshend having transmitted to London the sketch of a warlike speech, with which it was judged proper at Hanover to open the session, sir Robert Walpole engages (Nov. 1725) to give "his thoughts upon it on his lordship's arrival; but," says he, "it is necessary that I should suggest to your lordship, that if the parliament is to be opened in that manner, and the measures are to be put in execution which seem resolved by the tenor of your lordship's several dispatches, it will be advisable that the parliament should sit about the middle of January. The Pulteneys build great hopes upon the difficulties they promise themselves will arise from the foreign affairs, and especially from the Hanover treaty. The last foreign mail brought a letter from count Staremburg to William Pulteney, giving him



great expectations of the materials he should furnish him with."

Lord Townshend, apparently chagrined at the continued and systematic opposition of Walpole, declares, in his answer, December 1725, "that nothing can prevent a war, in the present state of things, but vigorous resolutions on the part of parliament, which cannot be unless occasion is given from what the king shall say to them from the throne. The emperor's views, at this juncture, are as extensive and as dangerous to Europe in general, and to our country in particular, as ever those of Lewis XIV. were; and if we do not in time shew the world that we are determined to oppose him, we shall be involved in difficulties, and left alone with France, &c.; whereas shewing a spirit now will secure us friends." Lord Townshend was a man of honor and probity, and, in the present heated state of his mind, he probably thought nearly as he spoke; but the falsehood and adulation of Sunderland himself could not, when employed in supplanting this minister, have exceeded this stretch of absurdity. It had been the object of the two last general wars to restore the balance of Europe, by elevating the house of Austria to its just level with the house of Bourbon. This great end was now in some measure attained by the annexation of the two Sicilies, Milan, and the Low Countries, to the hereditary dominions of the emperor: and in this state of things the power of the house of Bourbon being still confessedly superior, lord Townshend sought to unite with France, in order to depress that very power which we had so recently shed oceans of blood and expended millions upon millions of treasure to strengthen and exalt. Fortunately, the calm wisdom of Walpole prevailed over the rashness and violence of Townshend, and the danger was ultimately and happily avoided. Count Palm, the imperial ambassador, writes to the emperor, April 1726: "Count Bothmar, who continues still to be for a good understanding



between the king and your imperial majesty, laments the violent proceedings. The king himself does, in my humble opinion, not much like the conduct of his English ministry." This is explained by a letter, dated May 16th, 1726, from M. Pozobueno, the Spanish ambassador, to the duc de Ripperda. "The king of Great Britain," says he, "suspects more and more, that if the king of Prussia conceives that the treaty concluded at Vienna, between the emperor, Russia, and Sweden, will be prejudicial to his interests, he will recede from the treaty of Hanover; and on this event the king's German dominions will be exposed to invasion, should a war be occasioned by the treaty of Vienna. This reflexion has considerably agitated the king's mind, for it is evident that his wishes tend to the preservation and augmentation of his electorate; and his inclination is so great, that he cannot dissemble it. Besides these subjects of disquiet, the king of England feels no less chagrin in having lost the confidence of the emperor. The king is no less troubled with the suspicions which he entertains, that the emperor is revolving to annul the treaty of Hanover, as opposite to the constitution of the Germanic empire. The Hanoverian party here encourage these suspicions, and insinuate, that an electoral assembly will be convened, for the purpose of declaring the treaty unconstitutional, and of exhorting the king and Frederic William, as electors of Hanover and Brandenburg, to retract it; and, in case of refusal, to put them under the *ban* of the empire." From a subsequent letter of M. Pozobueno to the duc de Ripperda (May 23, 1726), we find, that the duchess of Kendal, with whom the empress had deigned to correspond on this subject, was desirous of peace, "from an apprehension of being exposed to certain misfortunes which threaten her. Her principal care is to prevent those misfortunes from happening unexpectedly. To obtain that end, she would use all her efforts; for if a rupture with the emperor should take



place, she would be precluded from carrying her designs into execution, which are to retire into Germany, and convey away the large sums of money which she possesses in England. Fabrice concluded that the motive which induces the duchess of Kendal to lean to the opinion of Walpole to avoid a war, is not, as she declares, because it is the interest of England, but from self-interest. The misunderstanding between Townshend and Walpole daily increases."

May 30, 1726, M. Pozobueno describes to the duc de Ripperda the division subsisting between Townshend and Walpole as very great. "Whatever care," he says, "ministers may take to conceal every unpleasant fact, and to keep a guarded silence, yet the nation is apprised, that whatever hostilities arise in the North they will pay dearly for them. They observe that most of the facts disclosed to them respecting our treaties with Vienna are not truly stated."

Count Palm, in a second letter to the emperor, December 1726, declares, "that two-thirds of the English nation not only abhor the war with his imperial majesty and Spain, but also the strict alliance and union with France. That these precipitate and dangerous measures can be imputed to none else but the English ministry; that is to say, my lord Townshend, who has the entire direction of foreign affairs, which," he says, "Walpole does not meddle with: and as to the duke of Newcastle, it is known to every body that he is nothing but a figure of a secretary of state." He adds, "that the Ostend commerce is a grievance industriously enhanced by the ministry to animate the nation; and the majority of parliament are *bought over* with great pensions and employments." The count describes the king as himself of a peaceable nature, and deceived by the misrepresentations and false suggestions of lord Townshend, whose presumption and violence seem indeed to have carried him to far greater lengths than the caution and natural good



sense and temper of the king could approve. And the ambassador says, that "the king listened with attention to the discourses of M. Fabrice, gentleman of his bed-chamber, who frequently took an opportunity to speak of the conduct of his English ministers."

In a very remarkable letter from the imperial minister, count Zinzendorf, to count Palm, December 21, 1726, that nobleman says, "The English ministry cannot support themselves otherwise than by troubling and confounding matters. We must wait to see whether the nation will suffer themselves to be led away blindly any longer. Do they say that there is a secret engagement entered into in the offensive alliance respecting Gibraltar? That is the greatest untruth, as the treaty itself shews. Do they say that an agreement is made concerning the Pretender? That is likewise the greatest untruth that can be imagined. Let them ask all the Jacobites, whether they have heard one word from us or from Spain that could be construed to mean such an enterprise, so long as we do not enter into a war: but then we shall help ourselves as well as we can. As to the commerce of Ostend, we have already made such steps as shew the peaceable desires of his imperial majesty, *and we are ready every moment to go farther.* Do they talk of a marriage between an archduchess and Don Carlos? It is very wonderful that they would prevent by a war *now* a case that is so far from happening; which would not be avoided by a war were it intended; which is a case put, but not granted. What danger can Europe undergo by that? This only; that Don Carlos being a prince of the house of Bourbon, the strict union between France and Spain and this house will be promoted. But if France itself, as it seems, opposes this, and don't care that a cadet of that family should rise so high, then this fixes a disunion between France and Spain, which was attempted to be fixed by so long and bloody a war,"—



alluding doubtless to the war of the succession. This letter resolves the famous political problem, whether the court of Vienna had really at this period entered into serious engagements with Spain for the restoration of the Pretender. It always appeared highly improbable to all reflecting and impartial persons that this *should* be the fact, notwithstanding the positive assertion of the king of England in his speech from the throne; and it is now manifest, to an historical demonstration, that the intelligence upon which the court of London relied in this instance was wholly erroneous, from whatever quarter, or with whatever view or intention, it might have been communicated.

*Lastly*, M. Riva, resident of the duke of Modena in London, writing to his sovereign, December 1726, says: "Fa-brice, a Hanoverian gentleman, and in high favor with the king, has told me in confidence that he has had the courage to tell his majesty, that the animosity of the English ministers engages him in affairs which may prove the ruin of his states in Germany. And that if a war should be made, France might, with the money of England, conquer the Low Countries, in which case there will be a necessity to make a new war in conjunction with old friends, to take out of the hands of the French the said Low Countries; and that France does not for the sake of England and Holland shew so much eagerness for a war but for her own. Fa-brice has told me, that he spoke in this bold manner to the king, and that his majesty gave great attention to it, ordering him to speak freely to him of affairs, as he had already begun. I cultivate the friendship of this person, because I can by that means, *brevi manu*, learn many things that come from the fountain-head.

To sum up all, it is evident to demonstration, that by a series of unjust and impolitic measures, the result of a determination at all events to retain possession of the pro-



vinces of Bremen and Verden, the three great powers of Austria, Russia, and Spain, were made the inveterate enemies of Britain. In order to resist the designs of so potent a confederacy, the court of London was reduced to the necessity of forming an anti-coalition, and of throwing itself, with its whole immense weight, into the scale of France, in opposition to the house of Austria, its natural ally. If the interests of Great Britain, and not the aggrandizement of the electorate of Hanover, had been the real object of the king of England, he would undoubtedly have restored Bremen and Verden to Sweden; he would have withdrawn his guarantee of Sleswick from Denmark; he would have relinquished his claims upon Mecklenburg, and have acceded to the edict of the pragmatic sanction. The confederacy of Vienna would by this means have been at once dissolved; the enmity of the emperor would have been converted into friendship and gratitude; the Ostend company would have been annihilated, and all things would have reverted to their natural and ancient state. In lieu of which obvious and rational policy, the king of England, resolute to retain his usurpations and to enforce his claims, strengthened himself on all sides in order to resist the combination of Vienna; and incurred the imminent risque of involving Europe in a new and more destructive war than that recently terminated by the treaty of Utrecht, rather than abandon his favorite project of engrossing the entire dominion of the circle of Lower Saxony. Fortunately, the pacific counsels of Walpole, assisted and confirmed by various secret co-adjutors, were not unavailingly employed in counteracting, and ultimately gained a complete ascendancy over the wild and extravagant projects of Townshend. On the most accurate and severe investigation of this part of his public conduct, sir Robert Walpole stands not only clear of reproach, but he is entitled to the highest approbation and applause. For more than twenty years he was the grand pacificator of



Europe, in a great variety of difficult and critical situations, deporting himself with uniform mildness and moderation; displaying at once an extraordinary knowledge of mankind, a generous and enlarged spirit of benevolence, and the most profound and unerring political sagacity.



HISTORY  
OF  
GREAT BRITAIN.

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GEORGE II.

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BOOK IX.

*Accession of K. George II. Characters of the principal Ministers and Courtiers delineated. Political Influence of the Queen. Civil List raised to 800,000*l*. Hessian, Swedish, and Wolfenbuttle Subsidies. Incroachments on the Sinking Fund. Arrival of the Prince of Wales from Hanover. Congress of Soissons. Differences with the Court of Vienna. Depredations of Spain in the West Indies. Wise Government of Lord Carteret in Ireland. Victor Amadeus, King of Sardinia, resigns his Crown. Death of the Czar, Peter II. —and of Pope Benedict XIII. Deposition of the Grand Signor, Achmet III. Convention of Seville. Affairs of the Continent. Dissensions in the Ministry. Decline of Lord Townshend's Influence. Session of Parliament. Treaty of Seville reprobated. Vehement Resentment of the Court of Vienna. Bill to prevent Foreign Loans. Great Strength of Opposition. Pension Bill rejected. Charter of the East-India Company renewed. Measures of Government unpopular. Resignation of Lord Townshend. Earl of Harrington Secretary of State. Critical Situation of Affairs. Complex Negotiation at the Imperial Court. Second Treaty of Vienna. Debates in Parliament. Depredations of Spain in the West Indies resented. Bill for carrying on Processes*







manded the members to be sworn anew, and de-BOOK IX.  
clared to them his firm purpose to preserve invio-  
late the constitution in church and state; and to  
cultivate those alliances which his father had made  
with foreign princes. All the great officers of  
state were continued in their places; and it was  
at once apparent that the political system esta-  
blished by the late king would suffer no essential  
alteration.

However extraordinary the opinion may now  
appear, it is nevertheless certain that a belief was  
prevalent amongst the courtiers, that had the late  
king lived to return from Hanover, lord Boling-  
broke would have been declared minister. It is  
ascertained that this nobleman was admitted to  
a private audience of the monarch previous to his  
departure, in which he delivered to him a memo-  
rial respecting the state of affairs, from which he  
had conceived the highest hopes, which were sud-  
denly and totally frustrated by the death of the  
king\*.

\* Sir Robert Walpole was so sensible of the dangerous pre-  
dicament in which he stood, that he entertained serious  
thoughts of resigning previous to the king's leaving England;  
from which he was dissuaded chiefly by the arguments of  
the princess of Wales.—*Vide* ONSLOW'S Remarks, COXE'S  
Papers.

Lord Bolingbroke, by his arts of insinuation and ad-  
dress, had entirely gained over the duchess of Kendal, who  
maintained to the last her ascendancy over the king. When



## BOOK IX.

1727.

Characters  
of the prin-  
cipal Mini-  
sters and  
Courtiers  
delineated.

Sir Robert Walpole, upon whom the weight of business chiefly rested, seemed even to possess an higher and more exclusive share of confidence than ever. Lord Townshend, secretary of state for foreign affairs, a nobleman not destitute of knowledge or talents, open, generous, and sincere, but impetuous in his disposition, and rough and repulsive in his manners, was alone able to preserve some share of independent political consequence. He had for some time past seen and felt with keen sensibility the increasing influence and rising ascendancy of Walpole.

The duke of Newcastle, his colleague, was a man illustrious by his birth, affable and popular in his address, liberal in his sentiments, and magnificent in his expenses. But his capacity was very inadequate to his elevated station. Vain

sir Robert Walpole ventured to inquire into the contents of the memorial presented by Bolingbroke, the king answered slightly, *Bagatelles, bagatelles*. But this minister acknowledged very freely to his confidential friends his apprehensions of the result of these intrigues. *Vide* Lord ORFORD'S Works, and COXE'S Memoirs of Walpole.—Bolingbroke always spoke of the death of king George I. as an event most unfortunate for him. In a letter to sir William Wyndham, written long after this period (February 1736), he says, "Though the king durst not support me openly against his ministers, he would have plotted with me against them:—it is therefore a satisfaction to me, that I was not wanting to my friends, to my country, and to myself, in a conjuncture the advantages of which were defeated by nothing but sudden death."



of his high rank, and jealous of every species of superiority, "he seemed to regard the thoughts of another, as reflexions upon his own\*." As a man of business, he was remarkably deficient in method and arrangement; and it was said of him, "that he did nothing in the same hurry and agitation as if he did every thing†."

Mr. Pelham, secretary at war, and brother to the duke, was esteemed for his probity, respected for his talents, and beloved for his candor. The earl of Chesterfield, ambassador at the Hague, and soon afterwards appointed lord steward, who seemed ambitious to form himself upon the model of lord Bolingbroke, though he rose not to an equality with that great and unrivalled original, was at once a man of wit, of pleasure, and of business. The high polish of his manners, approaching perhaps the verge of frivolity, indicated rather the accomplished courtier than the commanding statesman; and left an impression somewhat unfavorable to the solidity of his judgment, though his political opinions appear to have been uniformly clear and just. As a speaker, his elocution was elegant, his style flowing and chaste; and his capacity, naturally excellent, was improved by diligent literary cultivation.

John duke of Argyle was distinguished beyond all his cotemporaries by an uncommon union of

\* Lord Townshend.

† Lord Hervey.



BOOK IX. civil and military talents. He had occupied the  
1727. post of high commissioner to the Scottish parliament, convened A.D. 1705, with great reputation, and had signalised himself, in the wars of Flanders, under the late duke of Marlborough, while yet in early youth, by a sagacity of conduct surpassing his years, and by a spirit of gallantry which rose to heroism. As commander in chief of the forces in North Britain, he was eminently instrumental in quelling the rebellion of 1715. And the firm and hereditary attachment of his family to the principles of liberty and whiggism rendered the name of Argyle dear to the majority of the people of Scotland, where his influence and popularity were almost boundless. His speeches in parliament were characterised by a vehemence and energy which rendered him as a political adversary very formidable. He was not wanting in a very exalted idea of the importance of his services and the lustre of his talents. The high and lucrative offices which he held under the crown he seemed to regard rather as what it were injustice to withhold than favor to confer. He was imperious, passionate, and capricious; but honest, undisguised and magnanimous; troublesome as a friend, but dangerous as an enemy.

Lord Carteret was, however, unquestionably the only man connected with this administration of whose abilities or designs the premier



could entertain any reasonable jealousy or apprehension. Dignified, and even stately in his deportment, the habitual superiority he appeared to assume was sustained by an extraordinary energy of genius and extent of knowledge. Deeply versed in the labyrinths of foreign politics, in which he himself had taken too large a share, he at once discerned and despised the littlenesses of that system by which the English court had been governed from the period of her connexion with Hanover. Aspiring in his views, resolute in his temper, and diverted by no inferior or collateral object from the pursuit of his ambition, he seemed, by the potency of his alliance, to menace the minister whom he deigned to honor with his support.

It was regarded as a matter of great uncertainty, by the public at large, at the accession of George II, whether the chief administration of affairs would remain in the hands of Walpole and Townshend. During their secession in the late reign, these ministers had paid assiduous court, and been well received at Leicester-house; and Walpole had been principally instrumental in effecting the external and decorous reconciliation which had taken place between the prince of Wales and the king. After their re-admission to power, a civil intercourse was still kept up with the prince: but his confidence was placed elsewhere; and amongst those

BOOK IX.

1727.



BOOK IX. whom he distinguished with marks of his favor,  
1727. sir Spencer Compton held the highest place.  
Political But Walpole had diligently cultivated the friend-  
Influence ship of the princess of Wales, a woman endowed  
of the with an excellent understanding, which she had  
Queen. greatly improved by reading, reflexion, and an  
habitual intercourse with persons of liberal and  
enlightened minds. Her person was dignified,  
her air majestic ; her temper, though lofty and  
ambitious, pleasant and equable ; her conduct in  
all respects guarded and discreet ; and she had  
gradually acquired an influence almost unlimited  
over the prince, whose affection was combined  
with that fixed and rooted esteem which could  
best ensure its durability. This princess had the  
discernment to perceive the extraordinary merit of  
sir Robert Walpole as a statesman. She saw his  
great superiority over all his rivals and contem-  
poraries. She entered cordially into his wise and  
peace views ; and gave him, to the latest period  
of her life, the fullest and firmest support. Sir  
Spencer Compton himself, on the suggestion of  
the king's gracious intentions in his favor, hesi-  
tated at the idea of assuming the lead in a new  
administration ; and, either from timidity or ge-  
nerosity, acknowledged Walpole to be far more  
competent to the task of government. All com-  
petition therefore being at an end, the existing  
administration was continued ; and sir Spencer



Compton was created a peer under the title of BOOK IX.  
 earl of Wilmington ;—being also, after no very 1727.  
 long interval, appointed lord privy seal, and then  
 president of the council ; which last office he oc-  
 cupied with reputation for many successive years.

The parliament being immediately convened, Civil List raised to 800,000l.  
 the entire produce of the civil list revenues, esti-  
 mated at 800,000*l.*, was, on the motion of sir Ro-  
 bert Walpole, settled on the king for life, instead  
 of the clear annual revenue of 700,000*l.* granted  
 to the late monarch—not however without some  
 debate and opposition. The incorrupt and in-  
 flexible Shippen observed, “ that the sum of  
 700,000*l.* was, at the accession of his late majesty,  
 considered by all as an ample royal revenue ; and  
 it was to be hoped that, in this reign, many per-  
 sonal expenses, particularly those incurred in the  
 frequent journeys to Hanover, would cease. He  
 affirmed that the civil list revenue, in the reign of  
 the late queen, did not in general exceed the sum  
 of 550,000*l.*; and that the parliament was called  
 upon only once in a reign of thirteen years to pay  
 the debts contracted in her civil government ;  
 and these were occasioned by the unparalleled  
 instances of her piety and generosity—especially  
 by her devoting 100,000*l.* per annum to the pub-  
 lic service during the war. But in the late reign,  
 500,000*l.* had been twice voted for the discharge  
 of the civil-list debts ; and last session, he said, the



BOOK IX. sum of 125,000*l.* was granted for purposes not  
yet explained. Notwithstanding which there  
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and therefore, he supposed, contracted in a man-  
ner not fit to be owned, or swallowed up in the  
bottomless gulf of secret service. This amaz-  
ing extravagance, he said, had happened under  
the conduct of persons pretending to surpass all  
their predecessors in the knowledge and care of  
the public revenue. But, instead of granting  
any addition to the civil list, he should move  
that the duties appropriated to this purpose  
should be continued to his majesty, so as to  
make up the clear yearly sum of 700,000*l.* The  
amendment however was rejected without a  
division: and in lieu of it a resolution, founded  
upon a royal message, delivered to the house by  
sir Paul Methuen, for settling the sum of 100,000*l.*  
*per annum*, as a jointure upon the queen, passed  
without difficulty.

The parliament being dissolved in August, a  
new parliament was convened January 1728, of  
which Arthur Onslow, esq. was chosen speaker;  
and which seemed to vie in all expressions of  
duty and loyalty with the most loyal of its pre-  
decessors. The king assured them, in his speech  
from the throne, of “ the absolute necessity of  
continuing those preparations which had hitherto  
secured the nation; the execution of the prelimi-



naries recently signed having been retarded by BOOK IX.  
 unexpected difficulties, raised chiefly by the <sup>1728.</sup>  
 obstinate opposition of Spain, although the rati-  
 fications had been actually exchanged with the  
 emperor." The court of Madrid had indeed so  
 far acceded to the articles of pacification as to  
 agree to suspend all further attacks upon Gibralt-  
 ar; but this was more a measure of compulsion  
 than of choice, and she was much displeased at  
 the want of firmness manifested by her imperial  
 ally. Cavils were started, and the signing of  
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 Wager therefore, with the British fleet, conti-  
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 dation of the remaining difficulties to the future  
 congress. As this was an event by no means  
 previously certain, the parliament thought pro-  
 per to vote the sum of 280,000*l.* for the main-  
 tenance of the Hessian and Swedish auxiliaries,  
 and a subsidy of 100,000*l.* payable in four years  
 to the duke of Wolfenbuttle; who in return took  
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the public revenue. But, instead of granting  
any addition to the civil list, he should move  
that the duties appropriated to this purpose  
should be continued to his majesty, so as to  
make up the clear yearly sum of 700,000*l.* The  
amendment however was rejected without a  
division: and in lieu of it a resolution, founded  
upon a royal message, delivered to the house by  
sir Paul Methuen, for settling the sum of 100,000*l.*  
*per annum*, as a jointure upon the queen, passed  
without difficulty.

The parliament being dissolved in August, a  
new parliament was convened January 1728, of  
which Arthur Onslow, esq. was chosen speaker;  
and which seemed to vie in all expressions of  
duty and loyalty with the most loyal of its pre-  
decessors. The king assured them, in his speech  
from the throne, of “ the absolute necessity of  
continuing those preparations which had hitherto  
secured the nation; the execution of the prelimi-







BOOK IX. vice a corps of 5000 men during the same term\*.

1728.

This notable alliance occasioned however some severe animadversions; and sir Joseph Jekyl, master of the rolls, a firm and zealous whig, but one who carried not his complaisance to the court so far as to abandon on any occasion what he conceived to be the true interest of his country, in reply to sir Robert Walpole, who had launched out into a specious panegyric of the treaty of Hanover, affirmed, "that whatever gloss might be put upon such measures, they were repugnant to the maxims by which England in former times had steered and squared its conduct with relation to its interests abroad; that the navy was the natural strength of Great Britain, its best

\* To this treaty the lord chancellor King refused to affix the great seal, till it was ratified, and the money actually voted by parliament. "What," says an able political writer of the last reign, "our histories may hereafter say of this transaction I know not: but the persons then at the head of the opposition took the liberty to declare upon that occasion, that we paid for a great many forces to be in readiness on account of the Hanover treaty; and, last of all, the good-will of his highness the duke of Wolfenbuttle was obtained, who engaged to guaranty ALL his majesty's dominions with a body of 5000 men, not to be moved out of Holland or Germany, at so small an expense as 25,000*l.* per annum for four years." *Case of the Hanoverian Forces.* Upon the presumption of a war in Germany, however, the alliance of Wolfenbuttle was very necessary, it must be acknowledged, to the defence and security of HANOVER, and indeed of the whole circle of Lower Saxony.



defence and security ; but if, in order to avoid a war, they should be so free-hearted as to buy and maintain the forces of foreign princes, they were never like to see an end of such extravagant expenses." The house was even prevailed upon, during the suspension of its good humor, to address the king for a particular and distinct account of the sum of 250,000*l.* charged in the general statement of national expenditure to have been issued "for preserving and restoring the peace of Europe." His majesty, nevertheless, declined to comply with their request ; but informed them, in general terms, that part of the money had been disbursed by his late majesty, conformably to the powers vested in him by parliament, and the remainder by himself, for carrying on necessary and important services which required the greatest secrecy. And he hoped that the house would repose the same confidence in him, and be assured that the money had been necessarily expended, agreeably to the ends for which it was granted." This answer the house, upon deeper consideration, thought fit to approve—sir Robert Walpole affirming it "to be impossible that public services should be carried on, considering the great complication of interests on the continent, if *every shilling* that was expended for the advancement of the common cause, and for maintaining

BOOK IX.  
1728.



BOOK IX. the balance of Europe, was made known to the  
 1728. whole world\*." Mr. Pulteney, now in habitual  
 opposition to the court, inveighed against this  
 vague and loose mode of accounting for the ex-  
 penditure of the public money, as tending to  
 render parliament altogether insignificant, to en-  
 courage and invite the most shameful embezzle-  
 ments, and to screen corrupt and rapacious mi-  
 nisters from even the possibility of detection and  
 punishment. No impression however, was made  
 by these reasonings, as too plainly appeared by  
 the discretionary vote of credit passed, at the re-  
 quisition of the court, by 237 voices against 101,  
 previous to the close of the session.

Incroach-  
 ments on  
 the Sinking  
 Fund.

A loan having been negotiated by the board  
 of treasury with the bank of England for the sum  
 of 1,700,000*l.*, for which certain duties, by right  
 appertaining to the sinking fund, were proposed  
 to be mortgaged, a violent debate arose; and

\* Gay has happily parodied this pleasant apology in his  
 satiric apologue of the Ant in Office.

"Consider, sirs, were secrets told,  
 How could the best schemed projects hold?  
 Should we state mysteries disclose,  
 'Twould lay us open to our foes.  
 My duty, and my well-known zeal,  
 Bid me our present schemes conceal;  
 But, on my honor! all the expense,  
 Though vast, is for the swarm's defence.

They passed the account as fair and just,  
 And voted him implicit trust."



Mr. Pulteney declared, "that by charging new BOOK IX.  
loans upon old and appropriated surpluses the 1728.  
public were grossly deceived; that by these expedients to put off the evil day, taxes would be perpetuated; and that, notwithstanding the great merit assumed by the inventors of this boasted scheme of redemption, the national debt had really increased since the setting up of that pompous project." This peremptory accusation gave rise to the appointment of a select committee; by whose report, as subsequently stated in a formal representation of the house to the king, it appeared that the sum of 6,480,000*l.* had been issued from Christmas 1716 to Lady-day 1728, towards the discharge of the national debt; and that the new debt contracted during the same interval amounted only to 3,927,000*l.*; which, notwithstanding the objections raised by the leaders of opposition, appears to have been a fair and accurate computation. The surplus of the sinking fund had now increased by the diminution of interest, and the enlargement of commerce, to the sum of 1,200,000*l.*; and the king, in his answer to the representation of the commons, declared his extreme satisfaction in the prospect they now had of seeing the old debts discharged, without any necessity of incurring new ones. On the 28th of May, 1728, his majesty put an end to the session.



BOOK IX.

1729.  
Arrival of  
the Prince  
of Wales  
from Ha-  
nover.

In the course of the present year arrived in England Frederic prince of Wales, who, though now in his 22d year, had hitherto resided at Hanover, as if it were determined to perpetuate the Hanoverian system, by suffering no interruption of the original associations and attachments of the reigning family. About this time died Ernest Augustus, bishop of Osnaburg, only brother of the late king, and created by him duke of York; but never resident in England. He was succeeded in the bishopric by the elector of Cologne, agreeably to the *pactum*, by which Osnaburg is alternately possessed by a prince of the house of Brunswic and that elector.

Congress of  
Soissons.

The eyes of all Europe were now fixed upon the congress, which, on the 19th of June (1728) was opened at Soissons; where the ministers of the emperor, France, Spain, Great Britain, Holland, and the northern courts, were actually assembled. The soft and insinuating arts of cardinal Fleury had by this time effected an entire reconciliation of the two courts of Versailles and Madrid. The jealousy and resentment of the king and queen of Spain were excited by the ambiguous conduct of the emperor; and a categorical answer was demanded from his imperial majesty on the subject of the marriages between Don Carlos and Don Philip with the archduchesses. Vague and illusory profes-



sions only being returned, all appearance of friendship between the two courts was at an end; and Spain at length, her credulity and her patience being equally exhausted, began in earnest to desire a renewal of her former connexions with England.

The differences between the emperor and the king of England were far from being accommodated. The court of Vienna still espoused the interests of the ducal houses of Holstein and Mecklenburg; and the court of London, in revenge, refused to listen to any proposition of guarantee respecting the pragmatic sanction. In the month of September, 1728, the king of England expresses, in his private correspondence with lord Townshend, his anxiety “to obtain such a declaration as shall entirely secure the possession of Bremen, and free him from the obligation of an equivalent.” In November he writes, “that as there is no likelihood of an accommodation with the emperor, he thinks it right to be in as great a friendship and intimacy with France as possible\*.”

During this state of things the parliament of Great Britain met, January 21, 1729; and the king, in his speech to the two houses, acknow-

\*Coxe's State Papers, vol. ii. p. 522.











BOOK IX. in explicit terms, all claim and pretension to  
 1729. Minorca and Gibraltar." After a violent debate, the motion was negatived, but not without a strong protest; and a second motion, "that the house did entirely rely upon his majesty, that he would, for maintaining the honor and securing the trade of this kingdom, take effectual care in the present treaty to preserve his undoubted right to Gibraltar and Minorca," passed in the affirmative. The lower house concurring in this motion, a joint address was presented to the throne conformable to the purport of it. It is singular, that another address being presented to the king by the commons, desiring to be informed in what manner a large sum, stated to have been expended for *restoring the peace of Europe*, was disposed of, an answer exactly similar to that returned to the address of the last year on the subject was again hazarded; in which the house had again the complaisance to acquiesce\*.

In the course of the session the sum of

\* The year revolves—their treasure spent

Again in secret service went:

His honor too again was pledg'd

To satisfy the charge alleg'd;

Again, without examination,

They thank'd his sage administration.

GAY.



115,000*l.* was voted to the crown, under pre-BOOK IX.  
tence of arrears due to the civil list; though not 1729.  
without great opposition—no deficiency in the  
produce of the civil list revenues being proved,  
or even unequivocally alleged; and a futile provi-  
sion was made for the repayment of the money at  
the decease of the sovereign.

On the 14th of May, 1729, the king ter-  
minated the session with a most gracious speech,  
in which he highly extolled the wisdom and  
patriotism of his parliament. Previous to the  
recess his majesty declared his intention of visit-  
ing his German dominions, leaving the queen  
sole regent; during whose mild and equitable,  
though at the same time firm and vigilant, admi-  
nistration no cause of discontent or disaffection  
arose. And this wise princess acquired great  
reputation, not in England only but throughout  
Europe, for her political ability and talents for go-  
vernment.

At the accession of the present sovereign lord Wise Go-  
Carteret had been confirmed in his vice-royalty vernment  
of Ireland; which country was now fast recover- of Lord  
ing from that paroxism of folly and faction into Carteret in  
which it had been thrown, chiefly by the ma- Ireland.  
lignant artifices of SWIFT; a man whose mind was  
devoured by the corrosions of disappointed ambi-  
tion, and who in revenge degraded his excellent  
and admirable talents by the prostitution of



BOOK IX. <sup>1729.</sup> them to the basest purposes\*. On his first arrival in Ireland lord Carteret was compelled to issue, in his official capacity, a proclamation offering a reward for the discovery of the author of these seditious and libellous publications: notwithstanding which, this haughty and factious priest ventured to appear at all places of public resort as usual; and had, even in the presence chamber of the castle of Dublin, the boldness to expostulate with the lord-lieutenant upon the pretended tyranny and iniquity of this proclamation; and presumed to ask, "how it was possible that his excellency could suffer it to be issued?" To which lord Carteret, indulging the sympathies of friendship and genius, with equal elegance and magnanimity replied, "*Res dura et regni novitas me talia cogunt moliri.*" Under the administration of this nobleman peace and order were restored and established; various

\* "I was three years," says dean Swift to his friend Gay, "reconciling myself to the scene and business to which Fortune had condemned me; and stupidity was what I had recourse to." The incident of Wood's patent furnished however an unexpected and glorious scope for active mischief. How little of the spirit of philosophy entered into the composition of this extraordinary man appears from what he styles, "The History of the last Four Years of Queen Anne;" which, as lord Bolingbroke truly told him, was unfit for publication; adding, "that it might have made a seasonable pamphlet in the time of their administration, but it would be a dishonor to the name of history."



excellent laws were enacted for the encourage-  
ment of manufactures, commerce, and agricul-  
ture; and many salutary regulations adopted in  
the civil departments of government. The bene-  
ficial effects of a liberal and enlightened policy  
were universally felt; and the parliament of that  
kingdom, in their unanimous approval of the mea-  
sures of their present governor, paid that homage  
to wisdom which it had frequently been known to  
refuse to power.

BOOK IX.  
1729.

In the course of this year Victor Amadeus, King of Sardinia, resigned his crown, after a reign of fifty years, to his son, Charles Emmanuel; and, retiring to the castle of Chamberri, espoused, at the advanced age of sixty-four the countess of St. Sebastian; who refused with disdain the title, as she could not participate in the power, of royalty. In October 1729 died Peter II. czar of Muscovy, after a short reign of two years. He was succeeded by the princess Anne Iwanowna, duchess of Courland, second daughter to the czar Iwan, elder brother to Peter the Great. The nobility of the metropolis assembling, previous to her being proclaimed empress, drew up an instrument of government which greatly limited the imperial power. This the princess was compelled to sign: but no sooner was she firmly established on the throne than she commanded the paper she had sub-

King of Sar-  
dinia re-  
signs his  
Crown

Death of  
the Czar  
Peter II.











BOOK IX. very arbitrary in the collection, in order to defray  
1729. the expense of this war, three janisaries, named Calil, Muslu, and Ali, very obscure men, feeling or fancying themselves particularly aggrieved by it, assembled, in the absence of the grand seignor and grand vizier, then at Scutari, a considerable number of their comrades in the *Atmeidan*, where they presented to them a naked sword on which they had themselves sworn, and required of all who engaged with them to swear the death of the grand vizier, the caimacan, and the reis effendi. The aga of the janisaries repairing in haste to the *Atmeidan*, Calil demanded if he were come to join the brave Mussulmen who were resolved on a reformation in the state, and the punishment of the tyrants? The aga, being destitute of force to suppress the revoltors, retired in silence. The sultan, attended by the vizier, returned with precipitation on the first intelligence of this insurrection at Constantinople, where they arrived at midnight. On the next morning, by order of the emperor, the standard of Mahomet was displayed, but without effect; and the number of revoltors continually increasing, the seraglio was on the day following formally invested. Measures being now in preparation to force the gates of the palace, their astonishment was great to see the dead bodies of the proscribed ministers brought out on litters,







BOOK IX. ment from whence he had taken Mahmoud, there  
1729. to end his life. Thus in the space of about eighty years no less than four emperors had been successively dethroned at Constantinople by lawless and popular violence. A demonstration so striking of the instability and insecurity of military and despotic governments might surely suffice to reconcile the proudest despot to the establishment of a regular and permanent system of liberty\* !

The congress of Soissons still continued sitting, though to no visible end or purpose. The breach between the courts of London and Vienna seemed rather to increase than diminish. By the sole authority of his imperial majesty, and the aulic council, the duke of Mecklenburg had been suspended from the exercise of his government, and the administration of the country assigned to a prince of the same family. But the king of England, into whose hands the revenues

\* It is said that a grand vizier of Turkey once inquiring of Mr. Montague, the English ambassador at Constantinople, whether it were really true, as he had been informed, that the English nation had struck off the head of one of their kings on a public scaffold? the ambassador answered, that it was. And the vizier further inquiring at what distance of time this incredible act of wickedness and rebellion had been committed, the ambassador told the vizier, with great coolness, that, to the best of his recollection, it was in the very same year in which the grand seignor Ibrahim was deposed and strangled by the janisaries.



of the duchy had been sequestrated, refused to BOOK IX.  
relinquish his commissorial power; and an impe- 1729.  
rial rescript was published, peremptorily requiring him to render up his accounts, and to desist from his claims. In the month of June, 1729, lord Townshend, and count Kinski the imperial ambassador, held a conference at Hanover, from which they separated with mutual dissatisfaction; and in October following lord Townshend boasted to the king, "that his measures were so arranged as to facilitate any views his majesty might have upon any part of the country of Mecklenburg\*." The courts of London and Madrid being now equally alienated from that of Vienna, it was found by no means a matter of insuperable difficulty for France, who acted as the mediatorial power, to effect an accommodation of differences between them. Colonel Stanhope, who had retired from his embassy in Spain, returned thither at the latter end of the summer in order to negotiate this business; and on the 9th of November 1729 a definitive treaty or con-Convention  
vention was signed at Seville, consisting of four- of Seville.  
teen articles, agreeably to the tenor of which peace and friendship were at length restored to the contending countries. By this treaty, which imported the renewal of all former treaties, Spain

\* Coxe's State Papers.



BOOK IX. <sup>1729.</sup> virtually and silently relinquished her claim to Gibraltar; and, in return, Great Britain agreed that 6000 of his catholic majesty's troops should be immediately introduced into Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia, in order to ensure the succession of those duchies to the infant Don Carlos. By the 6th article, commissaries were to be appointed in four months for the final adjustment of all commercial disputes. This convention, which excited the general attention and surprise of the continental powers, was considered by the emperor as a flagrant violation of justice; and he filled all Europe—Germany more especially, the diet being then sitting at Ratisbon—with rescripts and remonstrances against the indignity thereby offered to the imperial court and the Germanic body, by the forcible introduction of foreign troops into Italy. From the positive refusal of France, during the conferences at Soissons, to listen, in the most distant manner, to the mention of the pragmatic sanction, it might with certainty be inferred that she harboured deep and dangerous designs respecting the imperial succession; which indeed M. Chauvelin, who, next to the cardinal, possessed most influence at the court of Versailles, scarcely affected to disguise. In present circumstances, however, the imperial courts of Vienna and Petersburg still continuing their protection to the house of Holstein, the

Affairs of  
the Conti-  
nent.



king of England was compelled to rely, though BOOK IX.  
not without secret uneasiness, upon the French 1730.  
alliance for the security of his Germanic acquisitions; and the succession of Parma became for a time of more importance than that of Austria. It appears from the confession of Mr. Horace Walpole, that France was eager to restrain England, by a treaty at this time in contemplation, and in a train of negotiation with divers of the princes of the empire, from engaging at any future time, without their previous consent, in the Austrian guarantee. But this was too gross a snare for the Walpoles to fall into, though lord Townshend appears to have been completely the dupe of it, "I will not," says Mr. Walpole, November 1729, to his correspondent Mr. Poyntz, then resident at Paris, "conceal from you that I think lord Townshend more zealous for it than in my opinion is at present for his majesty's service, considering the nature of the treaty, and the situation of affairs in Europe. I am convinced by the daily conduct of the *garde des sçeaux*, M. Chauvelin, that he is so earnest for the conclusion of this treaty for the sake of the 7th article, *i. e.* the article relative to the succession. I do not mean that England and Holland should immediately hearken to the emperor's propositions, and by that means create any jealousy or uneasiness against them on the part of France and



BOOK IX. Spain ; but that we should not put it out of our  
1730. power to do any thing, *at any time*, for a guarantee of the emperor's succession : for until we have done something decisively and as long as we continue free in that respect, the fears of France, with regard to the settlement of the succession, may, on one side, keep this court (*i. e.* of Versailles) firm to the present system, and to the friendship of England ; as, on the other side, the hopes which the emperor may entertain, that we shall be disposed to do it one time or other, may keep him within some bounds, and from coming to extremities with his majesty as king or ELECTOR ; and therefore, as it is not our interest to disoblige France by any hasty step in favour of the emperor, so I think we should not render the emperor desperate by a treaty which he will soon come to know, and by which he will lose all hope of our friendship for ever, by putting it out of our power to do the only thing that he has most at heart\*.” Here is the true key to the otherwise unaccountable policy of the court of London. When the affairs of Bremen, Verden, Sleswic, Holstein, and Mecklenburg were settled to the satisfaction of that court, the king of England would have leisure to turn his attention to the great and permanent interests

\* Coxe's State Papers, vol. ii. p. 662—7.



of Europe. The caution of the Walpoles gave, BOOK IX.  
as might be expected, to lord Townshend, whose 1730.  
projected treaty with the Germanic electors was Dissen-  
deemed by them so extremely exceptionable, sions in the  
very high offence; and finding himself not firmly Ministry.  
or steadily supported by the king, whose favor  
he aimed by these violent counsels to obtain, in  
opposition to the modified system of sir Robert  
Walpole, secretly but strongly protected by the  
queen, he now declared, without reserve, his de-  
termination to resign. Resolving, however, to  
exert one strenuous effort more to retain, or ra-  
ther to recover, his political ascendancy, he drew  
up, March 1730, a dispatch in all points con-  
formable to his own conceptions of things, and  
leading to a direct attack upon the emperor, ad-  
dressed to the resident at Paris, which he laid  
formally and officially before the king, who de-  
clared his perfect agreement in every thing con-  
tained in it, and directed intructions to be  
transmitted to Paris accordingly. "Could your  
majesty," says lord Townshend, in his letter to  
the king, "get this plan of operations settled, I  
am entirely of opinion that this single step would  
free you from all your present difficulties. I am  
firmly persuaded, that, upon the first news of  
this plan being fixed, the king of Prussia would  
submit, and will not wait till the declaration pro-  
posed be made to him; and when the emperor



BOOK IX. shall have lost him, and shall see your majesty  
 1730. and your allies in a condition to make good their engagements, he will think it agreeable to his honor, as well as to his interest, to accept of *any* declaration that shall be made to him in the name of your majesty and your allies." Such was the presumption of this rash and confident minister. At this period the Walpoles had little faith in his professions of resignation. Mr. Horace Walpole tells Mr. Poyntz, that his lordship is "still as active and eager in business as ever;" and "his violence," as he adds, "against keeping any measures at all with the emperor, and his endeavours to make all *measures electoral*, preferable to all other considerations, *which is entirely agreeable to the king's sentiments*, make some think that his lordship has no thoughts of resigning. But I am of opinion, that when the parliament is up, *if any thing should happen contrary to his desire*, he may offer to quit, as he has already done to the king, and will be taken at his word; and will some way or other *jostle* himself out of place." The whole influence of the Walpoles was now exerted to counteract this new and dangerous attempt of Townshend. Previous to the disclosure of the project approved by the king, the duke of Newcastle, in concert with the Walpoles, had framed a dispatch of a nature and tendency totally different, and ex-

Decline of  
 Lord Town-  
 shend's In-  
 fluence.



pressing extreme disapprobation of an attack on BOOK IX.  
 the Netherlands; but, as he tells the resident 1730.  
 at Paris, “after lord Townshend’s paper, he  
 despaired of the king’s suffering it to go.” But  
 sir Robert Walpole took the dispatch to the  
 queen;—“and, in short,” says he, “we have  
 carried our point, notwithstanding all that had  
 past; and the king is extremely pleased with the  
 letter as it now is. His lordship has represented  
 us as giving up Hanover quite;—I must beg you  
 would do what you can about the German points.  
 Let us have some strong assurances about Ha-  
 nover, and we shall be able to defy him and all  
 he can do.”

The parliament of England assembling in Ja- Session of  
 nuary 1730, the king, in his speech from the Parlia-  
ment.  
 throne, declared the peace of Europe to be firmly  
 established by the treaty of Seville, which was  
 built, as he asserted, on the foundation of the  
 quadruple alliance. He affirmed, that Spain had  
 agreed to an ample restitution and reparation  
 for all unlawful seizures and depredations; that  
 the free and uninterrupted exercise of British  
 commerce was fully secured; and that all rights,  
 privileges, and possessions, belonging to him and  
 his allies were confirmed and solemnly guarantied.  
 Violent opposition was made to the terms of this Treaty of  
 treaty when submitted to the investigation of Seville re-  
probated.  
 parliament; though it must be acknowledged



BOOK IX.  
1730. that some of the objections urged by the patriots, when viewed through the long vista of years which has now intervened, appear rather minute and captious. They affirmed that the article by which the British merchants were required to make proof of their losses at the court of Madrid was injurious to them, and dishonorable to the nation; and that there was little probability of obtaining that redress by means of commissaries which was refused to plenipotentiaries. They complained that the right of Great Britain to Gibraltar and Minorca was not formally and explicitly acknowledged in this treaty; they disliked the guarantee of Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia, to Don Carlos and his successors, as a concession which might involve Great Britain in future quarrels about a country with which we had no concern. But by far the most serious objection, and that which constituted the chief ground of the high offence taken by the emperor, was founded upon that article of the treaty by which England not only guaranteed the succession of these duchies to the infant, but engaged to convey a body of Spanish troops to Italy, in order to secure those possessions without waiting for the imperial investiture; which was not only an open and flagrant affront offered to the imperial dignity, but likewise a palpable deviation from the letter of the quadruple alliance, by



which neutral troops only were to be admitted till the investitures were granted. And if any obstacles arose in carrying this article of the convention of Seville into execution, the contracting parties, in conjunction with France, under whose mediation it was concluded, agreed by force of arms to obtain the accomplishment of it. So much incensed was the court of Vienna at the insult, still more perhaps than the injury, offered in the treaty of Seville, that his imperial majesty issued an edict, prohibiting the subjects of Great Britain from trading in his dominions; and made great military preparations and demonstrations of a determination to assert his rights by a declaration of war.

BOOK IX.  
1730.

Vehement  
Resent-  
ment of the  
Court of  
Vienna.

In the course of this session, and while things remained in this posture, a very warm debate arose in consequence of a bill introduced by the minister to prevent any subject of Great Britain from advancing money by way of loan to foreign princes or states, without licence first obtained from his majesty under his privy seal. This bill was ably opposed by sir John Bernard, one of the representatives of the city of London, a man of strict integrity and extensive commercial knowledge, as "a measure which would render Holland the mart of money to the nations of the continent. He said that by this general prohibition the English were disabled from assisting their best

Bill to pre-  
vent Fo-  
reign  
Loans.



BOOK IX. allies; that the king of Portugal frequently bor-  
1730. rowed money of the English merchants residing within his dominions; that the licensing power was liable to dangerous abuse; and that the clause which empowered the attorney general to compel the discovery on oath of such loans would convert the court of exchequer into a court of inquisition." In consequence of these arguments the bill was modified in such a manner as to render it much less exceptionable; and it was declared, "that the object of it was merely to prevent the subjects of the state from assisting the enemies of the state. It was well known that at this very time the emperor was negotiating a loan in the metropolis, and it was manifestly impolitic and absurd to permit individuals to enrich themselves by any mode of traffic detrimental to the general interests of the kingdom." The bill at length passed; and it must be acknowledged, that the principle on which it is founded appears perfectly equitable, and that no inconvenience has, in fact, been found to result from it.

On the annual motion for continuing the Hessian and Wolfenbuttle subsidies, the opposition at once took fire; and it was urged with all the ardor of patriotism—perhaps with more than the ardor of patriotism merely—that if the engagements the ministry had entered into with France, Spain, and Holland—the States General having



acceded to the treaty of Seville—were good for any thing, Great Britain could have nothing to fear from all the world besides. For what purpose could so large a body of foreign mercenaries be retained so long in the national pay if they were not intended to support some evil design upon the constitution of the kingdom? This insinuation was repelled by the ministers as highly disrespectful and injurious to his majesty; and it was affirmed that the conduct of the emperor indicated a fixed resolution to disturb the peace of Europe, which it behoved Great Britain to guard against; and, that the keeping those troops some time longer in the pay of Britain would, in the main, be a great saving to the nation. Such assertions were little calculated to give satisfaction either in or out of the house; and upon the division 169 members—such was now the strength of opposition—voted against the motion, which was nevertheless carried by a majority of seventy-one voices.

Great  
Strength of  
Opposition.

A bill passed by the commons in the course of this session “for making more effectual the laws in being for disabling persons from being chosen members of parliament who enjoyed any pension during pleasure, or for any number of years, or any office holden in trust for them,” was rejected on the second reading by the lords. Sir Robert Walpole, unwilling to oppose so popular a measure,

Pension  
Bill re-  
jected.



BOOK IX made but a faint resistance to its progress through  
 1730. the lower house, well knowing the ill reception it would meet with in the upper. Lord Townshend expressed to the king his dissatisfaction that the bill should pass by connivance in the commons; but his majesty was persuaded by the Walpoles of the policy of this measure, though he reprobated the bill itself, to use his own royal phrase, as “a villanous bill, not doubting that lord Townshend and others, who were zealous against the measure, would tear it to pieces in every particular\*.” Two protests were, in different stages of the business, entered upon the journals of the house by the advocates of the bill, each signed by near thirty peers.

Charter of  
 the East-  
 India Com-  
 pany re-  
 newed.

The term of the charter granted to the East-India Company being now expiring, a petition was presented by a number of persons of high mercantile consideration against the renewal of the monopoly. The petitioners offered to redeem the fund or capital stock of the present company, amounting to 3,200,000*l.* in two years, at five different payments; and they proposed not to trade with a joint stock, or in a corporate capacity, but to keep the trade open to all the subjects of Great Britain, upon licence from such proposed new company, upon certain terms and

\* Memoirsof Walpole. King's correspondence with lord Townshend.



conditions. This important petition was sup-BOOK IX.  
ported by sir James Bernard and other distin-  
guished commercial characters in the house;  
and there is good reason to believe that the pri-  
vate sentiments of the minister were by no means  
averse to it ; but, all circumstances considered,  
it was apparently deemed too bold a measure to  
venture upon. The charter of the existing com-  
pany was therefore renewed, and prolonged to  
the year 1766, on condition of their paying into  
the exchequer, by way of fine, the sum of  
200,000*l.*, and reducing the interest of the money  
advanced to the public from five to four *per cent.*,  
which made an annual saving of 32,000*l.* The  
petition was rejected by a majority of 223 against  
138 voices.

By an act of indulgence, calculated for the ac-  
quisition of temporary popularity rather than  
permanent approbation, the duties upon salt,  
which, being an article of universal consumption,  
had proved very productive, were entirely sup-  
pressed. Nor was the purpose answered ; for  
the duties themselves being extremely moderate,  
the abolition of them causing no sensible relief,  
excited no emotion of gratitude or expression of  
applause.

Measures  
of Govern-  
ment unpo-  
pular.

An act passed this session, permitting rice to  
be exported from the Carolinas directly to any  
part of Europe south of Cape Finesterre, dis-



BOOK IX. covered much commercial liberality and sagacity  
1730. on the part of the minister, and conduced greatly to the prosperity of those rising settlements.

On the 15th of May, 1730, the king went to the house of lords, and closed the session with a speech in which very harsh and angry mention was made “of those incendiaries, who, by *scandalous libels*, labored to alienate the affections of his people, to fill their minds with groundless jealousies and unjust complaints, in dishonor of him and his government, and in defiance of the sense of both houses of parliament.”

The allusion was supposed to be chiefly levelled at the periodical papers regularly published for some time past, entitled “The Craftsman,” supported by the ablest political writers of the age—lord Bolingbroke and Mr. Pulteney being themselves of the number; and in which the measures of the administration were attacked with equal animosity, wit, and argument. So transient, however, is the fame attached to controversial politics, that this publication, so admired and celebrated in its day, is already consigned to obscurity, and almost to oblivion. The re-iterated efforts of these assailants did not, however, fail to make a great impression upon the public mind. Relying upon his parliamentary majorities, the minister seemed to place little stress upon those occasional vindications of his conduct, which, un-



der his own patronage, appeared from the press ; and, when measures highly exceptionable in themselves and the perpetual theme of eloquent invective, were weakly and unskilfully defended, the general effect must have been, and evidently was, extremely unfavorable to the reputation of the minister. The grand plea or palliation, that he had in fact opposed the system of the court as far as any minister of the crown could venture to oppose ; and that he had, by his wisdom and moderation, prevented matters, ever in a state of irritation, from coming to extremity, could be urged neither by himself nor his advocates ; and he was reduced to the hard necessity of supporting measures in public which he reprobated in private, and which he had used every means in his power to defeat : thus acting, from situation, policy, and habit, with a degree of dissimulation wholly adverse to his nature.

No sooner had the parliament risen than lord Townshend resigned the seals of secretary of state, which were immediately given to colonel Stanhope, late ambassador at Madrid, now created earl of Harrington—a man long conversant in business, of a grave and solemn deportment, an even and steady temper, persevering application, and moderate talents. This appointment gave much satisfaction to the Walpoles, who dreaded the advancement of lord Carteret or lord

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1730.

Resignation of Lord Townshend.

Earl of Harrington Secretary of State.



BOOK IX. Chesterfield, regarding them in the light of eventual rivals rather than colleagues.

1730.

Lord Townshend retired from office with an high character for honor, integrity, and disinterestedness. Upon what ground he was able to justify to his own cool reflections in solitude his unbounded compliances, during the latter years of his administration, with the prejudices of his sovereign—endeavouring, as it should seem, rather to anticipate and exceed than fall short of the royal expectation and desire—it is fruitless to inquire, perhaps impossible to ascertain. His fall from power he sustained with great dignity, residing constantly at his seat in Norfolk, never once revisiting the metropolis, and employing himself with great advantage to the country in rural pursuits and agricultural experiments. In a letter written by him to the grand pensionary Slingelandt, he assigns his ill state of health as the cause of his resignation, “wishing to pass the remainder of his days in repose; but he will not conceal,” he adds, “from the pensionary, that he has been fortified in that inclination by the misintelligence that had taken effect between the chevalier Walpole and himself.” On being urged upon some important occasion, subsequent to his resignation, to attend a debate in the house of lords, he declared, “that he would no more engage in political contests. He knew the warmth



of his temper ; and he recollected that lord Cow-BOOK IX.  
per, though a zealous whig, had been betrayed <sup>1730.</sup>  
by personal pique and private resentment, in the  
vehemence of opposition, to throw himself into  
the arms of the tories." Lord Townshend lived  
in this retirement nine years, wholly secluded  
from the world—a statesman cured of ambition,  
and contentedly cultivating his paternal acres\*.

The duke of Newcastle writing to his friend  
and present colleague lord Harrington, on the  
eve of lord Townshend's resignation, says, "I  
have had too free conferences with the king and  
queen ; Hanover is lord Townshend's great me-  
rit, and we have been all represented as wanting  
zeal. The king told me his dependence for Ha-  
nover must now be upon you and I.—I would  
submit to you whether it may not be proper for  
you to take this occasion of writing a letter of

\* A cotemporary poet of no ignoble fame—the associate of  
Pope in his translation of the Odyssey—has celebrated the  
praises of this respectable nobleman in the following elegant  
lines :

" —TOWNSHEND, whom all the world admires,  
From all the world illustriously retires ;  
And calmly wandering in his Raynham, roves  
By lake or spring, by thicket, lawn, or groves ;  
Where verdant hills or vales, where fountains stray,  
Charming each thought of idle pomp away ;  
Unenvied views the splendid toils of state,  
In private happy, as in public great."

BROOME.



BOOK IX. thanks to the king, with assurances that may  
 1730. comprehend ALL his majesty's interests." So ready and eager was this nobleman, in the new and more elevated situation in which he now found himself, to establish an independent interest with the king; and in the sequel he proved scarcely less troublesome to the Walpoles than his more able and haughty predecessor.

Spain still continued her insolent depredations upon the British commerce in the West Indies; and though all former treaties were renewed and confirmed by the convention of Seville, they were construed rigidly and literally, and not in the spirit of amity and good will. The Bourbon courts were displeased with the resignation or rather dismissal of lord Townshend, whom they knew to be far more disposed than the Walpoles to measures of violence against the emperor; and though the necessity of their affairs compelled the king and queen of Spain to come to terms of agreement with England, they retained a deep resentment at the forcible retention of Minorca, and more especially of Gibraltar, so contrary to the hopes and expectations they had been most improperly led to entertain.

Critical Situation of Affairs.

Affairs were now in a state extremely critical. Though engaged with France and Spain in a league against the emperor, the present ministers eagerly wished for a fair opening of reconciliation



with the court of Vienna. This could not escape the sagacity of the court of Versailles. Mr. Horace Walpole, in a private dispatch to his brother, dated from Paris June 14, 1730, says, "They will not be persuaded but the removal of lord Townshend, and the disposition of places, have arisen from secret springs and motives; and apprehend that there is something at bottom that affects the present measures and system of affairs\*." This made them extremely reluctant to engage in hostilities against the emperor; fearing lest England, after having effected her own purposes, should abandon her allies to their fate, as had once already been the case in a very memorable, and yet recent, instance; or even possibly change sides, and combine against them in like manner as she had, during the last reign, acted with Russia against Sweden, and with Sweden against Russia.

The court of London had not only objected to an attack upon the emperor in the Low Countries, but even in Italy; and recommended an invasion of the island of Sicily, which the English ministers flattered themselves would be sufficient to induce his imperial majesty to make all the concessions required of him, and which might, in case of need, be easily recovered for the emperor

\* Coxe's State Papers, vol. iii. p. 6.



BOOK IX. by the superiority of the naval arms of Britain.

1730.

But the object of cardinal Fleury was, to act upon the emperor by intimidation only ; hoping that he would assent to the article relating to the Italian duchies rather than involve himself in a war with so powerful a confederacy. Were the Bourbon courts to commence hostilities against him, he would be compelled to come to an accommodation with the maritime powers upon any terms; all the German points would be conceded, the guarantee of the pragmatic sanction probably granted, and the house of Bourbon left to carry on the war without the assistance of England and Holland, or perhaps with their weight ultimately thrown into the opposite scale. “ The cardinal’s sentiments were divided between his extreme desire of a general pacification without a war, and his great aversion to join in the guarantee of the pragmatic sanction\*.”

Complex  
Negotiation at  
the Imperial Court.

Such on the other hand was the pride of the imperial court, that no step whatever was taken on their part to obviate the effects of this extraordinary alliance of the maritime powers with the house of Bourbon in opposition to the house of Austria. Although the emperor had the general guarantee of his succession so much at heart, he

\* Coxe’s Papers. Letter of Mr. Horace Walpole to sir Robert Walpole, August 2, 1730.



would not vouchsafe to say that he would agree to the execution of the treaty of Seville for the sake of that guarantee. On the contrary, rather elated by the inactivity of the allies than depressed by the consideration of their superior power, he had caused a large body of troops to enter the Italian duchies, in order to resist by force the introduction of Spanish garrisons. And a formidable army was stationed on the frontier of the Sardinian territory, with a view to prevent the accession of Savoy to the Bourbon confederacy. Notwithstanding therefore the zeal and even eager desire of the Walpoles to effect an accommodation with the emperor, the conduct of the imperial court made any separate negotiation on the part of the maritime powers extremely hazardous, as they might thereby lose the friendship of France, and even of Spain, without being by any means certain of obtaining that of the emperor, or of ultimately securing the points in contest.

In this situation the court of London, which secretly deprecated the depression of the Austrian power, indicated, and really felt, a disposition to adopt measures of vigorous hostility, in order to put an end to the contest, and force the emperor into submission; while France, which aimed at the eventual subversion of the Austrian greatness, was slow and reluctant to enter into a



BOOK IX. war which, it was foreseen, must throw the  
 1730. emperor into the arms of the maritime powers, who wished for nothing more ardently than a reconciliation with the court of Vienna upon their own terms. "France," says sir Robert Walpole himself, in a dispatch to his brother at this crisis, "will certainly do nothing this year. England is ready to act immediately in the expedition upon Sicily. For, to distress the emperor, and by success in making acquisitions to make him feel the weight of the allies of Hanover, is the only way of bringing him to reason." And he acknowledges that the obstinacy of the emperor has "brought the whole affair to a very great and almost insuperable dilemma."

From this dilemma the minister (contrary to the opinion of his brother, Mr. Walpole) at length determined to relieve himself by a direct and explicit application to the court of Vienna\*. In a secret and important dispatch from lord Harrington to Mr. Robinson, resident at the imperial court, dated September 25, 1730, and

\* "I lay it down as an undoubted maxim," says Mr. H. Walpole, in his letter of September 10, 1730, to sir Robert Walpole, "that any advances, or insinuations, or soundings, on our part, to the imperial court, will not have the least effect upon them, but to amuse, to gain time, to misrepresent us to our allies, to put it in the power of France of making us ill with Spain; and in short, in setting us entirely afloat, with too much sail and no ballast."—COXE's *Papers*, vol. iii.



penned with much precision and perspicuity, BOOK IX,  
it is announced, "that his majesty having just 1730.  
grounds to apprehend that the object of France  
is either to keep matters in the same intolerable  
state of uncertainty and expense which they are  
now in, or else, not content with the bare exe-  
cution of the treaty of Seville, to engage the  
allies in such a general war as must inevitably  
overturn the balance of Europe, has been induced  
to hearken to and encourage any proposal con-  
ducive to the preservation of the public tran-  
quillity, even at the price of entering into such a  
new engagement as, though not contrary to his  
treaties with any of his allies, would inevitably  
not only be highly disagreeable to France and  
Spain, but even lose his majesty the confidence  
and friendship of most of the powerful princes in  
Germany—THE GUARANTEE OF THE PRAGMA-  
TIC SANCTION." In return for this concession, "of  
such vast importance and service to the emperor,"  
it is affirmed "that the court of Vienna cannot  
but be convinced of the justice, and even the  
necessity, there is, *not only* that the strictest  
friendship and union should be at the same time  
established between the two courts, by finally  
and effectually adjusting *all* matters at present in  
dispute between them, but also that the emperor  
should heartily concur in all such reasonable mea-  
sures and proposals as shall be made to him on



BOOK IX. the part of his majesty, as well *for the present*  
 1730. *quiet enjoyment of his possessions in Germany, as*  
*to secure them against any future attempts* that  
 may be made upon them by any of the neigh-  
 bouring powers." More specifically it is said,  
 "The king expects that the emperor should con-  
 sent to the introduction of the Spanish garrisons,  
 according to the treaty of Seville; that he will  
 give such security respecting the marriage of the  
 archduchesses as may quiet the apprehensions of  
 Christendom; that the points of the Ostend  
 trade, EAST FRIESLAND and MECKLENBURG,  
 should be adjusted to his satisfaction; and like-  
 wise, that such further particulars *as may be*  
*necessary to his majesty's security in Germany*  
 should be settled." To this purpose "the king  
 has ordered his minister at Ratisbon, Mons. de  
 Dieden, immediately to repair to Vienna, and to  
 lay before the imperial ministers his particular  
 demands as elector." And the English ambassa-  
 dor is directed "to receive M. Dieden with the  
 utmost confidence, to take his information from  
 him as to the king's electoral concerns, to sup-  
 port his arguments, and obtain satisfaction on  
 his demands."

Second  
Treaty of  
Vienna.

The plan or draft of a treaty between the king  
 of Great Britain and the emperor was in a short  
 time transmitted to Mr. Robinson, conformably  
 to the purport of lord Harrington's letter. To



this the ministers of the imperial court, equally surprised and delighted at so unexpected an overture, made very little serious exception; but their objections turned, as Mr. Robinson in his dispatch of January 3, 1731, tells lord Harrington, upon the declaration to be given to his majesty's demands as ELECTOR.

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The celebrated prince Eugene, who took a very active part in this business, shewed himself particularly earnest to restore the good understanding anciently subsisting between great Britain and the house of Austria. The manner in which Robinson, a minister of very circumscribed views and capacity, speaks of this great man is not a little amusing. The prince, it seems, had mentioned to him with great concern the impossibility of gratifying the king of England's demands as elector. He said "there were four or five points diametrically opposite to the constitution of the empire." The minister Robinson adds, "Having observed by some part of prince Eugene's discourse that, according to a *prejudice* rooted in him, he would have distinguished between the king and the elector, and even *presumed* to appeal to me as an English minister, besides what I thought necessary to say to his highness upon the spot, to convince him of his error, if he imagined there was any other than ONE AND THE SAME INTEREST AND CAUSE, I took care,



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by the next morning, to have ready a translated extract of your lordship's dispatch, as the best model I could take for the direction of my efforts to eradicate this notion\*." In a conference the ensuing morning with the chancellor count Zinzendorf upon the same subject, that minister told him, "that the emperor would not sign the declaration, though 100,000 men were at the gates of Vienna. He added," says Mr. Robinson, "*which offended me the most*, What would the nation and all Europe say, if, for the particular affairs of the elector of Hanover, all Christendom should be plunged in a war?"

Amongst the other extraordinary circumstances attending this negotiation, M. Dieden was empowered merely to offer the declaration relative to the electorate to the emperor for signature, and to enforce the justice and propriety of the electoral claims by reasoning and argument; but not to make an *iota* of alteration in the terms of it. "The pride of the imperial court had," as Mr. Robinson remarks, "never been so sensibly touched since the time of Gustavus Adolphus." Prince Eugene observed, "that it was a most unfortunate manner of negotiating, to oblige an emperor to sign in three days what would require as many months' mature delibera-

\* Coxe's Papers. Letter to Lord Harrington, January 16, 1731.



tion—That M. Dieden had given in his demands BOOK IX.  
—The emperor had answered—If M. Dieden had 1730.  
no powers, it was impossible to bring matters nearer. And count Zinzendorf declared it to be the greatest misfortune imaginable that no means or expedients could be thought of to adjust the electoral demands to his majesty's satisfaction. The emperor, he said, had offered all that was in his power.—Even according to the common forms of business, M. Dieden ought to reply to the emperor's paper; and that it was an unheard-of way of proceeding—at least for thirty-five years that he had been in business he had never known, especially in so critical a juncture, that a minister of such experience and abilities should at such a distance be tied down in such a manner to and by his instructions. And it was urged upon Mr. Robinson, as no less a matter of wonder than concern, that he should refuse to treat and sign till his majesty's affairs as elector were finished; and should, out of an obstinacy that did not become an English minister, suffer those of Europe to stand still, and perhaps run the risk of being more embroiled than ever. Having acknowledged that he could not sign independently of others, it was the same thing as if he had no powers to treat at all."

The chancellor going to receive his imperial majesty's last orders, returned with a paper pur-



BOOK IX. <sup>1730.</sup> reporting "the astonishment of the emperor, that the minister of Great Britain should, for the sake of very unreasonable demands made by his master as elector of Hanover—demands as injurious to the dignity of the chief of the empire, as contrary to its constitution—refuse to put the last hand to a treaty, which was so far advanced, for the public good and the tranquillity of Europe."—"Such at least (Mr. Robinson tells us) was the tenor of the paper, so far as his indignation would permit him to give attention to it."

About the same time that this dispatch arrived from Vienna, lord Chesterfield, ambassador at the Hague, addressed a letter to lord Harrington on the same subject, in terms so striking and impressive as could not fail to produce an immediate and powerful effect. This distinguished nobleman reminds the secretary of state of his prediction, that M. Dieden's demands would create the chief difficulties; though he is very sure that the court of Vienna was resolved to bring all possible facilities to the negotiation. "I should be wanting," such are his own words, "to the regard and friendship I profess for your lordship, if I did not lay before you the fatal but natural and even necessary consequences that will attend the breaking off of this negotiation upon electoral points, in which you are more particularly concerned, as being in your depart-



ment. The negotiation is already known to many, and suspected by all : should it break off, we shall be more in the power of France than ever. But this is not the worst neither : for it is impossible that this negotiation, so far advanced, can now break off without additional acrimony on both sides. And in that case it cannot be expected but that the emperor will take the natural advantage of declaring to the nation, and to this republic, that the public tranquillity might have been restored, that he had agreed to all the points that related to England and this country ; but that electoral considerations only prevented the conclusion of so desirable a work, and plunged us in so destructive a war. What effect this will have I need not say : our enemies will tell us with pleasure. I think it is impossible to describe the fatal consequences that must result from it, both to the king, the ministry, and the nation.'''

This letter apparently caused a great sensation. In the ensuing public dispatch of lord Harrington to Mr. Robinson, January 28, he declares that matters must forthwith be brought to a conclusion one way or another ; that the secret of the negotiation had been discovered by France and Spain, and even that an avowal of it had been of necessity made by the king's ministers at those courts ; that Spain, impatient and dissatisfied at



BOOK IX. the delays in carrying the treaty of Seville into  
1730. effect, had declared the obligations of it on her  
part suspended ; and he concludes with recommending, in the strongest manner, the procuring  
*at the same time* all possible satisfaction to M. Dieden. This dispatch was accompanied by a private letter, very cautiously and artfully worded, and professing “ *the most perfect cordiality and sincere affection.* ” — “ Delay,” says this minister, “ is death to us. It is heartily to be wished that the emperor would be induced to give entire satisfaction upon all the points which M. Dieden is charged to negotiate : *but*, when every thing is obtained that is possible to be got, you will, I am *persuaded, according to your instructions*, sign the treaty, insisting at the same time, that all that cannot be adjusted be finally settled afterwards by an amicable negotiation. I heartily wish you all imaginable success, and beg you will be assured of my most warm affection and esteem.” Also, for the purpose of carrying on the plot, Tilson, under-secretary of state to lord Harrington, subjoined to his lordship’s letter the following curious postscript : “ January 28, 1730-1, I hope you will sign, as *I take it* you are authorised to do ; and if our plan is agreed upon in the main, I do not see how you can decline putting the last hand to it on your part, for all or any *collateral difficulties*, if there are



not any essential ones." By this insidious letter, Robinson, the unfortunate object of lord Harrington's cordial esteem and affection, was, notwithstanding his extreme pliability and obsequiousness, involved in a most singular and perplexing dilemma. If he signed separately, he acted not *according* to his instructions, as lord Harrington pretended, but in direct opposition to them; incurring thereby the imminent risk of drawing upon himself solely the anger and indignation of the king. If he refused to sign separately, he made himself liable to the terrible responsibility of plunging the nation, by his want of courage and patriotism, into a most unjust, unpopular, and destructive war.

From this difficult and even perilous situation Mr. Robinson, roused even to a display of energy, extricated himself with unexpected felicity. After exerting his utmost efforts in vain to obtain the signature of the declaration, conjointly with that of the treaty, he wisely resolved at all events to sign the latter; which was actually done on the 16th of March (1731). But at the same time he declared "that this new-born friendship would not outlive the six weeks fixed for the ratifications, unless his majesty received satisfaction as to the former; and that he had determined not to dispatch the courier, though all Europe depended upon it, till the elector of Hanover could be the

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BOOK IX. first to reap the fruits of the peace, which as king  
1730. of England he had given to the world."

The emperor, having now carried the point of honor, in a few days signed the declaration, with alterations so trivial that M. Dieden himself acknowledged the concessions of the imperial court to have exceeded his utmost previous expectations. "I will not pretend," says Mr. Robinson to lord Harrington, "to excuse the manner in which things have been done; but one thing I am sure of, that, right or not, nothing could have been done in any other manner whatever. My lord, I would not pass another month as I have done this last for a kingdom, nor all the kingdoms guarantied to the emperor; and yet, God knows, till I have the honor to hear from your lordship, I have at least as bitter a month to come." The anxious cares and more anxious fears of this minister had shortly after a happy termination, in the delightful intelligence transmitted by lord Harrington, that his conduct had met with universal applause, and that the king and all his servants thought it impossible for an angel from heaven to have acted better."

But success itself cannot allay the contempt and indignation excited by the servile meanness and adulation apparent in the general tenor of the minister Robinson's conduct throughout this business. And it is curious to remark, how



the terms "honor," "duty," and "reason," are BOOK IX.  
perverted and prostituted in his application of 1730.  
them. "When I had," says he, in a letter to  
lord Chesterfield, dated April 7, 1731, "my first  
instructions, not to give the king's guarantee  
without procuring satisfaction for the elector, I  
boldly, out of *honor and duty*, suspended the  
affairs of all Europe." And he acknowledges to  
lord Harrington, "that when he first saw his  
majesty's demands as elector, he was indeed  
frightened. Prince Eugene said, more than  
once, that he believed every minister at Hanover  
had thrown in his mite to make his court to the  
king." Yet had this minister so little sense of  
decorum, as almost immediately to add, "God  
be praised, I have not been long enough here to  
be so much habituated to this court, and am not  
so little *a devoted servant* to the king, as to think  
that they have had the least shadow of *reason* in  
their manner of acting."

As the emperor would not condescend to  
become a party in the convention of Seville,  
the articles of the present treaty—commonly  
styled the second treaty of Vienna, though in  
great measure copied from it—were declared to  
be merely an extension of the quadruple alliance.  
And the feudality of Tuscany, Parma, and Pla-  
centia, to the empire, was distinctly specified



BOOK IX. as the only just foundation of the claim of Don  
1730. Carlos to those duchies.

The faith and honor of Great Britain were indeed maintained, by avoiding to insert any condition into this treaty inconsistent with the engagements entered into at Seville ; and especially by obtaining the consent of the emperor to the introduction of the Spanish troops into Italy. But at the same time the king of England gave mortal offence to France by assenting to the guarantee of the Austrian succession ; and to Spain, by exacting, as an article of the treaty, that no marriages should take place between the archduchesses Maria Teresa and Marianne, daughters of the emperor, and the infants Don Carlos and Don Philip, younger sons of his catholic majesty.

In order to preserve unbroken the unity and integrity of this important and instructive negotiation, the order of time has been in some degree necessarily anticipated. Early in the year 1731 (January 21) the parliament was again convened, and the session opened by a remarkable speech from the throne, indicating a very extraordinary and alarming situation of affairs. The king declared, “ that in consequence of the measures formerly taken, and the conclusion of the treaty of Seville, the dangerous consequences so justly apprehended from the treaty of Vienna



were entirely obviated ; and that union which had alarmed all Europe not only dissolved, but the treaty of Hanover strengthened by the additional power of the crown of Spain. His majesty observed, that from this situation of affairs just hopes were entertained that the conditions of the treaty of Seville would have been complied with, without the necessity of coming to extremities ; but that this desirable event had been hitherto delayed : and as the treaty imposed an obligation upon all the contracting parties to prepare for the execution of it, we must be in readiness to perform our part, in order to procure the satisfaction due to our allies. The resolutions of parliament were expected by foreign powers with impatience, and the great event of peace or war would be very much affected by their first decisions. He said, that *the plan of operations for the execution of the treaty of Seville by FORCE was now under consideration* ; that their just concern for the true interest of their country would, he doubted not, induce them to grant the supplies necessary to make good his engagements, with that cheerfulness and affection which became a British house of commons tender of the honor of the crown, careful and solicitous for the glory and prosperity of the kingdom." Never was the truth more apparent than at the present moment, of the memorable observation of lord Molesworth

Great Britain embarrassed on account of Bremen and Verden.



BOOK IX. on a former occasion, and which well deserves the  
1731. repetition, "that to a man acquainted only with the situation of Great Britain, and unapprised of the several petty interests of the electorate of Hanover, the conduct of the English court would appear not only fluctuating and capricious, but absolutely unintelligible and incomprehensible." For what shadow of pretence, connected with the interest of Great Britain, could be devised to justify or palliate an outrage upon the emperor so flagrant as the forcible introduction of foreign troops into Parma and Placentia by a British fleet, for the purpose of transferring those duchies, which were acknowledged fiefs of the empire, to the king of Spain, previous to the investiture of his imperial majesty, and in direct contradiction to the laws and constitutions of the empire; by this means wantonly and voluntarily incurring the eventual risk of a war with the house of Austria, the ancient, natural, and faithful ally of Great Britain? The key to this apparently unaccountable and extravagant conduct is, however, perfectly easy. The two imperial courts of Vienna and Petersburg had not yet relinquished their designs in favor of the duke of Holstein; and still flattered that prince with the hope of procuring, either by amicable or hostile means, the restitution of the duchy of Sleswic, guaranteed originally by Hanover, and afterwards by



England, to the king of Denmark. So long, BOOK IX.  
1731. therefore, as this project was entertained, so long did the elector-kings of England consider their favorite acquisitions of Bremen and Verden, which were the price and reward of that guarantee, as in the most imminent danger. For the sole purpose of counteracting this project was the treaty of Hanover concluded; for this purpose was the insidious policy of France countenanced and encouraged by a continued refusal, on the part of England, to assent to the edict of the Pragmatic sanction; for this purpose was the ambition of Spain gratified by the forcible introduction of troops into the Parmesan. In vain was it alleged, in opposition to the proposed Debates in  
Parliament. address of approbation and support, "that our ancestors were never so complaisant as to declare their approval of measures without full and regular information respecting them. Why was it that the house pledged itself for the support of *any measures* of the executive government? Doubtless, on the ground of their being just and reasonable. But who could pronounce the measures in contemplation just, when no one could say what they were, or what they might ultimately prove to be? Every one, indeed, knew the enormous expense which this nation had incurred in their endeavours to reduce the exorbitant power of France, which, by a fatal negli-



BOOK IX. gence, had been suffered to rise to a height  
1731. which menaced the general liberties of Europe.  
But by joining the house of Bourbon in this war against the house of Austria, France might be enabled to extend her conquests beyond the Rhine, or, perhaps, to annex the Low Countries to her empire, and become more formidable than ever. It was affirmed, that French alliances had ever been fatal to England; that our kings, by a connexion with France, had been led to imbibe the love of arbitrary power, and encouraged to entertain designs against the liberty of their subjects; and that Gallic faith was to be depended upon no further than their interest was concerned in adhering to it; that their enmity to England was inveterate; and that we should, in the end, pay dear for any temporary favors which they may seem to confer." And an amendment to the address was offered, "that his majesty should be desired not to concur in a war against the emperor, either in Flanders or upon the Rhine.

The Walpoles, and the courtiers in general who took part in the debate, maintained, in opposition to these objections, "that his majesty's prudence was so great, and had been so strikingly manifested in his whole conduct since his happy accession, that no suspicion could reasonably be entertained of the propriety of his



present or future measures ; that the amendment now proposed was an encroachment on his majesty's prerogative. They acknowledged that France ought not to extend the bounds of her empire, and his majesty would, *no doubt*, take proper precautions to prevent the inconveniences apprehended from the weight of the confederacy against the house of Austria ; that the design of the potent alliance formed against the emperor was to convince him of the impossibility of a successful resistance : it would be grossly impolitic, therefore, if the allies were restrained from attacking him in Flanders, or on the Rhine, where he was most vulnerable. By enfeebling the operations of the war, such restraint would virtually and proportionally add to the strength of the emperor, and thereby make a pacification hopeless and impracticable." Another amendment was then proposed, far more judicious and comprehensive : " That the house would support his majesty's engagements so far as they related to the interest of Great Britain ;" and it was urged by Mr. Wyndham, the mover of it, " that the act of settlement, by virtue of which his majesty held the crown of these realms, expressly provided that this nation shall not be obliged to enter into a war for the defence of any dominions not belonging to the crown of Great Britain ; and that the house *could not* therefore, agreeably to this

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act, go further than the amendment imported.” To this the minister and the courtiers replied, “ that the adoption of this amendment would *seem to insinuate* that his majesty *had* entered into engagements that did not relate to the interests of Great Britain; which would be the highest disrespect and ingratitude, when those who had the honor to serve his majesty could testify, that the interest of Great Britain was the sole object of his majesty’s solicitude. They said that every member of the house was, they hoped, convinced that his majesty never would enter into any engagement that was not absolutely necessary for the happiness and safety of his people, and therefore it was wholly unnecessary to narrow the assurances of support in the address by any such limitation.” The house, seeming, however, to pause upon the validity of these arguments, more fit indeed for a Turkish divan than a British senate, Mr. Heathcote arose, and declared, “ that the offering of advice to his majesty could never be regarded by him as an encroachment on the prerogative, since it was the proper business of parliament, which was the king’s great council, to advise the crown in all matters of importance—it was what many parliaments had done, and what they were obliged in duty to do; that to support any hostile operations against the emperor in Flanders, or upon the Rhine, was ab-



solutely destructive to the interest of England, BOOK IX.  
tending evidently to the total subversion of the 1731.  
balance of power ; and the house had, therefore,  
good reason to believe that no minister would  
**DARE** to advise his majesty to concur in such a  
measure. Upon that account only he considered  
it as superfluous to advise his majesty against it ;  
that unanimity in their resolves was certainly  
desirable, and would undoubtedly add great  
weight to his majesty's endeavours to effect a  
general accommodation of differences ; that, for  
his part, he looked upon all addresses containing  
assurances of support as in their nature general,  
and no further obligatory than the measures to  
be supported shall be found conducive to the  
public interest ; that he, therefore, willingly con-  
curred in the address as originally moved, taking  
it at present for granted that the engagements al-  
luded to were such as the interests of Great Britain  
required ; but leaving himself at full liberty to  
object to any specific measures which should be  
moved by the ministers of the crown in pursuance  
of this address, if they appeared to him in any  
respect inconsistent with the public welfare. He  
was sure that his majesty could mean nothing  
but what was for the advantage of the nation ;  
and if the engagements in question proved other-  
wise, he should consider them as the engagements



BOOK IX. of the minister, not of the king." Sir Joseph  
1731. Jekyl and several other respectable and independent members declaring, that they regarded addresses precisely in the same light and agreeably to the explanation now given, the opposition acquiesced, and the question passed in the affirmative without a division. But it could not escape the penetration of the minister, how repugnant to the feelings of the house was the idea now suggested of carrying on an offensive war against the house of Austria, in concert with the two branches of the house of Bourbon. Ever since the conclusion of the treaty of Hanover, a very large body of auxiliaries had been kept, at an immense expense, in constant pay, from the incessant apprehension of a war. But when the estimate for the charge of maintaining 12,000 Hessians came before the house, it was objected against as entirely superfluous. It was said, that if fears and apprehensions would justify the waste of money thus lavished in subsidies, we should never be free from these burdens; that it was time enough to hire troops when we were actually involved in war; and there was no doubt, from the disposition of the European princes, that men might be always had for money. These objections, however, were over-ruled, and the troops continued in pay, under the idea that to



dismiss them at the present crisis, though their ac-  
tual services might not be called for, would tend  
to encourage the emperor in his contumacy.

Notwithstanding the recent convention of Se-  
ville, complaints were renewed from all parts of  
the depredations and cruelties committed by the  
Spaniards in the West Indies: and the house of  
commons, satisfied of the truth of these allega-  
tions, presented an address to the king, desiring  
“that his majesty would be graciously pleased to  
continue his endeavour to prevent such depreda-  
tions for the future; to procure full satisfaction  
for the damages already sustained; and to secure  
to the British subjects the full and uninterrupted  
exercise of their trade and navigation to and  
from the British colonies in America.”

A very judicious bill was at this period intro-  
duced into parliament, and passed into a law,  
for preventing delays of justice occasioned by the  
use of the Latin tongue in proceedings at law,  
and enacting that all those processes and plead-  
ings should be entered in the English language.  
There are not wanting, however, at all times  
many inveterate enemies of INNOVATION, “who  
cherish old prejudices because they are preju-  
dices,” and who have in all ages been found  
equally eager and obstinate in opposing the most  
salutary reforms; and it was urged by this class  
of men, on the present occasion, that this bill

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Depreda-  
tions of the  
Spaniards  
in the West  
Indies.

Bill for car-  
rying on  
Processes  
at Law in  
the English  
Language.



BOOK IX. would render useless the ancient records, which  
1731. were written in that language—and, far from expediting, would introduce confusion and delay of justice, by altering the ESTABLISHED form and method of judicial proceedings. These reasonings, however, did not prevail; and this law remains an incontrovertible proof, that INNOVATION may *possibly* be the medium of improvement.

In the debate on the pension bill, now for the second time passed by the commons and rejected by the lords, Dr. Sherlock, bishop of Bangor, gave high offence, by declaring “that an independent house of commons, or an independent house of lords, is as inconsistent with our constitution as an independent, that is absolute, king; and that a lover of his country will no more desire to see the one than the other.” This proposition, nevertheless, understood in a sober and qualified sense, cannot be justly controverted; for a parliament absolutely independent of the crown would in a short time infallibly reduce the crown to a state of absolute and abject dependence upon itself. And, unquestionably, it is not by the perpetual conflicts of authority, but by the reciprocal dependence of the different branches of government, that the balance of the constitution, and the harmony of its movements, are most advantageously and



effectually preserved; and a total annihilation of that influence, the prodigious and dangerous preponderance of which this bill was wisely calculated to check, would be attended with a train of new and alarming political evils. Lord Carteret, who had recently relinquished his government of Ireland to the duke of Dorset, and at the same time his connexion with the court, now openly joining the opposition, defended the principle, and practical operation of this bill, with great eloquence and energy. In consequence of the bishop of Bangor's invidious opposition of it, a motion was made for leave to bring a bill into the house of commons, to prevent the translation of bishops; which—the utmost influence of the court being exerted against it—passed, on a division, in the negative.

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Bill to prevent the Translation of Bishops rejected.

On the 7th of May, 1731, the session was terminated by a speech, in which his majesty informed the two houses, “that a treaty of peace had been signed at Vienna\*, and the ratifications exchanged between him and the emperor. As this treaty (he said) principally regarded the execution of the treaty of Seville, it was communicated to the courts of France and Spain, as parties to that treaty; and it was now under the consideration of the States General, who had been

Treaty signed at Vienna between Great Britain and the Emperor.

\* March 16, 1731.



BOOK IX. invited to accede to it. He added, that the  
1731. new engagements entered into by him on this occasion were agreeable to the necessary concern which this nation must always have for the security and preservation of the balance of power in Europe: and he expressed his assurance, that all malicious insinuations to the prejudice of his measures must vanish, when it so evidently appeared that his first and principal care had been for the interest and honor of this kingdom." By this treaty his imperial majesty agreed that Spain should take possession of the duchies of Parma and Placentia for the infant Don Carlos, in the mode prescribed by the treaty of Seville; and that the Ostend company, which had given such umbrage to the maritime powers, should be totally dissolved, on condition that England and Holland should become guarantees of the Pragmatic sanction. And the duke of Parma dying at this juncture, an English fleet under sir Charles Wager was fitted out, which having joined the Spanish fleet at Barcelona, convoyed the Spanish troops destined for Italy to Leghorn, Don Carlos himself taking the route of France; when, the imperial forces which had marched into Parma being withdrawn, the infant took peaceable possession of his new territories.

Thus at length was terminated the violent and



acrimonious contest, which for the space of ten BOOK IX.  
years had divided the house of Austria from 1731.  
Great Britain, its ancient and faithful ally. And Remarks  
nothing can be more clear and evident, from an on the poli-  
impartial review and summary of facts, than tical Con-  
that the quarrel originated solely in the unfortu- duct of the  
nate connexion formed by this nation, at the ac- Court of  
cession of the present royal family, with the elec- London.  
torate of Hanover, whose interests stood almost  
constantly and diametrically opposed to those of  
England. Jealous of the aspiring views of the  
house of Lunenburg in the empire, the emperor  
could never be brought cordially to concur in the  
measures concerted for the security of the new  
acquisitions of Bremen and Verden, and still less  
in the insidious designs of the court of Heren-  
hausen upon the duchy of Mecklenburg; al-  
though, to merit the favor of the court of Vi-  
enna, the king of England scrupled not to en-  
gage in a war with Spain, with whom Great Bri-  
tain had then no imaginable pretence of dispute,  
and actually effected the transfer of the island of  
Sicily from the house of Savoy to the house of  
Austria. Finding the emperor still cold and  
intractable, it was thought necessary to enter  
into stricter connexions with France, who rea-  
dily gave her countenance and support to the  
petty schemes of electoral aggrandisement, so  
long as the house of Austria was deprived, by



BOOK IX. <sup>1731.</sup> this artful policy, of the strength she derived from the powerful alliance of Great Britain. The treaty signed, therefore, between England and Spain, at Madrid, A. D. 1721, was accompanied by a secret defensive alliance between England, France, and Spain, to which the Dutch were left at liberty to accede, and all the late acquisitions of Hanover secured by an **EXPLICIT GUARANTEE**: and, in return, Spain was artfully and insidiously flattered with the hope of the restitution of Gibraltar. After the conclusion of this treaty, the court of London was very little solicitous to obtain for the emperor advantageous or satisfactory terms of pacification with Spain; and the congress of Cambray, which was convened under the pretended mediation of England and France, after a long and tedious negotiation, broke up *re infectâ*. But the court of Spain, in process of time finding her expectation of recovering Gibraltar wholly delusive, and enraged at the affront offered to the infanta by France, became anxious to establish a real and permanent amity with the emperor—not, however, without inviting the king of England to become the sole arbitrator of their differences. Though nothing, certainly, could be more favorable to the interests of Great Britain than this happy occasion of detaching Spain for ever from her connexion



with France, it was rejected, from the apprehension of giving umbrage to that power, upon whom Hanover at this period relied for the support of her new acquisitions and further schemes of aggrandisement. A treaty of peace and alliance, nevertheless, between Spain and the emperor being quickly signed at Vienna, without the intervention of any foreign power, the memorable treaty of Hanover was concluded between England and France, to which all the powers of Europe under their influence were urged to accede. In order to give a plausible colour to this treaty, so contrary to the interests of Great Britain, much was said on the necessity of reducing the exorbitant power of the house of Austria, which England had lately been at such an immense expense of blood and treasure to establish; and a violent and absurd clamor was raised against the imperial East-India company of Ostend, as creating a rivalship fatal to the commercial interests of Great Britain. But the real object of the treaty of Hanover, on the part of the king of England, was evidently no other than to counterbalance the designs of the two imperial courts, now in strict alliance with Spain, for the restoration of Sleswio, Bremen and Verden, the evacuation of Mecklenburg, and the final annihilation of the ambitious projects of Hanover. The views by which France was actuated were,

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1731. however, of a far more elevated and comprehensive nature. For the great object of the policy of the court of Vienna, at this period, being to secure to the eldest daughter of the emperor the undivided succession of the house of Austria, France could discover no other method so certain to defeat that design, and to lay the foundation of the ruin of that house, and its own consequent unrivalled pre-eminence, by the dismemberment of its vast possessions, whenever the dissolution of the emperor, now in the decline of life, should take place, as to detach Great Britain entirely from its ancient and natural ally. The treaties of Vienna and Hanover, A. D. 1725, in which almost all the powers of Europe were parties, had nearly given rise to a general war; which, however, was with much difficulty averted by the preliminaries signed at Paris, in May, A. D. 1727. At the ensuing conferences for a final pacification at Soissons, France having found means to effect a reconciliation with Spain, the court of Vienna, which still espoused the interests of the dukes of Holstein and Mecklenburg, found itself greatly overbalanced, and almost deserted. The imperial minister's demand of the guarantee of the Pragmatic sanction was treated with neglect and contempt; and the English ministers, *after having conferred with those of France*, answered, "that the Prag-



matic sanction was not the point in question; that, not being the object of the present disputes, it ought not to be a subject of the present negotiations, and that the proposition was not *traitable*." The plenipotentiaries of Holland, however, who were not under the same artificial and extrinsic bias, refused to join in this answer; declaring, on the contrary, that they thought it a point which might hereafter so highly affect the tranquillity of Europe that it deserved consideration at least, and an inquiry what the emperor would do in exchange for it. Thus the congress of Soissons broke up, like the former congress of Cambray, to the mutual satisfaction of France and Hanover, leaving the security of the Austrian succession to the decision of chance and fortune. It was now the policy of France to accommodate the differences subsisting between the courts of Madrid and London, and to unite them both in a firm opposition to the emperor. For this purpose the treaty of Seville was concluded, under the mediation of France, and mortal offence given to the emperor, by the stipulated introduction of Spanish troops into the duchies of Parma and Placentia, previous to the granting the imperial investiture. Upon such high ground did the court of London, or rather of Herenhausen, now conceive itself to stand, that it presumed to insult the emperor by an

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BOOK IX. offer, made (1730), in conjunction with her allies,  
 1731. France and Spain, to guaranty the succession of  
 the Austrian dominions—in ITALY *only*—to the  
 archduchess Maria Theresa, eldest daughter of  
 the emperor, on the condition that the affairs of  
 SLESWIC and MECKLENBURG were regulated to  
 their joint satisfaction. This proposition, how-  
 ever, was rejected with disdain; and his imperial  
 majesty appearing determined to risk a war  
 with the house of Bourbon—a war in which  
 England had, with the grossest and most culpa-  
 ble inattention to her interests and even to her  
 safety, and the extreme hazard of entirely sub-  
 verting the balance of power in Europe, involved  
 herself as a principal—the ministers of the crown,  
 who had ventured to the edge of the precipice,  
 as the crisis approached, recoiled at the view of  
 the gulf into which they were about to plunge.  
 Apparently alarmed at the rashness and absurdity  
 of their own projects, they suddenly resolved to  
 set on foot a negotiation at Vienna; as the basis  
 of which, an offer was made of the guarantee of  
 the Pragmatic Sanction, including the whole  
 Austrian succession, by Great Britain. This  
 the emperor readily and gladly embraced. In  
 return, the investitures of Bremen and Verden  
 were conceded; Hanover was to receive a stipu-  
 lated sum in lieu of all its claims upon Mecklen-  
 burg; and, “*to preserve the peace of LOWER*

Guarantee  
 of the Prag-  
 matic Sanc-  
 tion.



SAXONY, and to put an end to the CAUSE of troubles BOOK IX.  
in the NORTH," the emperor and Russia guaran- 1731.  
tied SLESWIC to the king of Denmark, upon con-  
dition that one million of rix-dollars were paid to  
the duke of Holstein as an *equivalent*—500,000  
down, and 100,000 *per annum* till the whole was  
completed\*." And however reluctant the duke  
of Holstein might be to part with Sleswic upon  
such terms, he was compelled to accept of this  
pretended equivalent, or seek elsewhere for pro-  
tectors.

The treaty of Vienna being concluded without the participation of France, and wholly incompat- Conse-  
quent Dis-  
satisfaction  
of France.  
tible with the spirit of her policy, and the general  
tenor of her views, all real amity between the  
two courts of London and Versailles was now at  
an end; and a cold exterior civility succeeded to

\* It is a curious circumstance, that Denmark declared  
itself under no obligation to make good this equivalent—  
having been long in actual possession of Sleswic, under the  
guarantee of Hanover. And though his Danish majesty  
afterwards consented to the payment of this sum, it will  
be found, conformably to the accounts delivered into par-  
liament, February 10 and 12, 1735, that the sums paid, or  
to be paid, on different pretences, to Denmark, within a  
certain specified time, amount to the complete sum of one  
million of rix-dollars; so that there exists a strong presump-  
tion that the duchy of Sleswic, thus bought and sold by  
contract of two foreign potentates, was at last paid for out  
of the pockets of the honest and unsuspecting people of  
Great Britain.



BOOK IX. that confidence which had subsisted without interruption for the space of fifteen years. The treaty of Hanover was considered on both sides as virtually renounced by the late treaty of Vienna, to which the States General soon acceded, and which seemed to establish, by the guarantee of the maritime powers, the Pragmatic Sanction, so much the object of Gallic jealousy and aversion, on a firm and solid basis. The politics of Europe now reverted to their ancient and regular order. But it is obvious that England and Holland had undertaken this guarantee at a period far less favorable than that which had occurred at the former treaty of Vienna, six years before; and that, through a preposterous predilection and attachment to the views and interests of Hanover, a most propitious opportunity of dissolving for ever the political connexion of Spain and France was irretrievably lost; and that, by the re-union of those powers, France was encouraged to persist in prosecuting those schemes of ambition which she had long cherished for the future humiliation of the house of Austria; and which, in the sequel, England thought it necessary to employ such mighty efforts to oppose and defeat. "Truth," says a noble cotemporary writer, "should be made known; and it should be known to those whom it most imports to know it. Those are the best



friends to the king and kingdom, who, by shewing how incompatible the interests of the electorate are with those of Great Britain, may suggest the prudent and necessary measure of separating the dominions themselves, and supplying that great defect in the act of settlement, which every body now wishes had been done, and wonders was not\*.”

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In the autumn of the present year, 1731, England was visited by the duke of Lorraine, a young prince of great merit and accomplishments, whom his imperial majesty, by a judicious choice, had secretly fixed upon as the future consort of the eldest archduchess Maria Theresa, the sole heiress of his vast dominions. After being entertained with great magnificence and all possible demonstrations of regard by the British court, and divers persons of high rank, he returned to the continent in December, highly pleased at the polite and generous reception he had met with in that celebrated island, which,

Duke of  
Lorraine  
visits Eng-  
land.

\* *Vide* a series of tracts styled “Case of the Hanover Forces,” with a first and second Vindication of the same, ascribed to the Earl of Chesterfield. The first of these tracts was answered by Mr. Horace Walpole in a publication styled “The Interests of Great Britain steadily pursued.” Lord Chesterfield, in his Vindication, shrewdly remarks, “that the three years in which the writer of the pamphlet declared himself so violently against Hanover projects ought at least to be excepted out of the British scheme of politics, which he undertakes to demonstrate hath been so steadily pursued.”



BOOK IX. notwithstanding all the defects of its policy, and  
1731. the errors of its government, has been so long an object of wonder and admiration to the surrounding nations.

The happy effects of the treaty of Vienna were every day more apparent. Cardinal Fleury was of a temper much too pacific to resent seriously the indignity offered to the Gallic nation: probably he was not, in secret, greatly chagrined at an event, which, though very contrary to the political views and interests of France, relieved him personally from much embarrassment: and his eminence was pleased to declare himself satisfied with the positive assurances given to him—in order to obviate the suspicion that the king of England had entered into engagements with the emperor to oblige France to guaranty the Pragmatic Sanction—that his majesty had neither directly nor indirectly entered into such stipulation with the emperor, or with any other power. On the other hand, his imperial majesty repeatedly expressed the highest pleasure at the renewal of friendship with the maritime powers. In the joy of his heart he laid aside the project entertained by him of establishing a navy in the Adriatic; and an absolute change appeared in his looks, disposition, and discourse, in all that related to Great Britain\*.

\* Dispatch from Mr. Robinson. Coxe's Papers, vol. ii. p. 106.



On this occasion Spain was the power which, BOOK IX.  
 notwithstanding the accomplishment of her views 1731.  
 respecting the Italian duchies, appeared most discontented. Reluctant, to a degree almost of infatuation, to relinquish the hope so long cherished of the advancement of Don Carlos to the eventual possession of the imperial throne, by marriage with the archduchess Maria Theresa, their catholic majesties, previous to the late treaty of Vienna, had sent the duke of Liria to that court with a view to renew upon any terms, as was reported and believed, their former connexion with the emperor. But the real predilection of that prince was entirely in favor of a strict and intimate union with the maritime powers; and Mr. Robinson declared to lord Harrington, in his dispatch of March 28, 1731, "that it had been owned to him that the marriage was never intended, if it could possibly be avoided; and, at present, the thing was not so much as thought of."

At this period sir Robert Walpole seems to High Reputation of the Minister.  
 have attained to the zenith of his influence, prosperity, and reputation. The restoration of the ancient connexion with the house of Austria was highly pleasing to the English nation. Great Britain was now on terms of professed and apparent amity, at least, with all the great European powers. The navigation and commerce of



BOOK IX. the kingdom were in a state of rapid and progressive increase. The public finances exhibited evident symptoms of returning vigor ; and public credit was fully and firmly established. Under these auspicious circumstances the parliament was convened January 13, 1732, when the king made an elaborate speech to both houses, containing a very high eulogium upon his own conduct. He congratulated the parliament "on the restoration of the general tranquillity ; and he affirmed, that the part taken in the late transactions by the crown of Great Britain had redounded much to *the honor and interest* of the nation. By the treaty of Seville (he said), that union of the imperial and catholic crowns, which had given such universal alarm, had been dissolved ; and the execution of that treaty, supposed to be attended with insurmountable difficulties, was at length happily accomplished. Parma and Placentia were in the actual possession of Don Carlos, and the reversion of Tuscany secured by an express convention with the great duke. Parliament had seen (he said) the happy effects of their zeal and resolution, and now reaped the fruits of the confidence which they had reposed in him ; and it must be a great satisfaction to them to reflect that the expense incurred had been so amply recompensed." It is observable, that in the whole series of royal

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Session of  
Parliament.

1732.



speeches and messages in this and the preceding BOOK IX. reign, not a syllable is mentioned of Bremen, <sup>1732.</sup> Sleswic, or Mecklenburg, the secret springs of every resolution taken by the English court respecting the affairs of the continent for almost twenty years past. And with a firm reliance on the complaisance of the parliament, and the ignorance of the people, a bold—for a harsher epithet would be indecorous—a bold attempt was now made to establish the idea that the quarrel between Great Britain and the emperor respected solely the investiture of the duchies of Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia ;—although, had this indeed been the fact, scarcely would it have amounted to an extenuation of the folly. For to whom these duchies should belong, was an object wholly beneath the attention of Great Britain : and, admitting the necessity of preserving the equipoise of power, they could be considered as little more than dust in the balance. If king WILLIAM has incurred just censure for involving this nation too deeply in continental politics—if the blood and treasure of Great Britain were in his reign lavished with a too unsparing hand—at least it must be acknowledged, that the ends he had in view were in the highest degree noble, just, and disinterested. The *grand alliance* was not projected by that renowned monarch in order to procure the cession of a district to be added to



BOOK IX. his principality of Orange, but for the glorious  
 1732. purpose of asserting the liberty and independency  
 of Christendom, in opposition to the aspiring  
 aims of an haughty tyrant ; and of fixing an in-  
 surmountable barrier to the further progress of  
 his triumphs. Absorbed in the contemplation of  
 this great object, his ideas rose infinitely above  
 all those miserable artifices of petty aggrandise-  
 ment, which had, for so many years previous to  
 this period, perplexed the councils, and inter-  
 rupted the repose, of nations.

Debates on  
 the Ad-  
 dress.

When an address was moved by lord Her-  
 vey\*, in the usual style of courtly adulation and  
 submission, the indignation of the patriots seemed  
 uncommonly excited ; and the incoherency and  
 absurdity of the whole political system of the  
 court were ably and vigorously exposed. Sir  
 Wilfred Lawson, who first rose, observed, “ that

\* This nobleman long occupied a place in the foremost  
 rank of courtiers, and was a frequent speaker in parliament,  
 though with little claim to historic notice. His endowments  
 appear to have been very superficial, and his manners effemi-  
 nately frivolous ; though, by a duel with Mr. Pulteney, he suf-  
 ficiently established his character for personal courage. Lord  
 Hervey’s quarrel with POPE is well known. The portrait  
 drawn by that vindictive satirist of this nobleman, under the  
 name of Sporus, is replete with malignity and distortion ;  
 though, had it been perfectly just, the poet stands deservedly  
 condemned by his own previous acknowledgment :

Satire or sense, alas ! can Sporus feel ?

Who breaks a butterfly upon a wheel ?



the treaties, respecting which so much had been said, were not yet before the house ; therefore he was not prepared to join in the approval of them. It appeared, however, sufficiently plain, that, notwithstanding the great things we had done for Spain, very little satisfaction had as yet been received for the injuries done to us. He knew of nothing—a vague order of his catholic majesty to the governors of his ports in the West Indies against illegal depredations excepted—upon which any construction they thought proper might be put ; but this surely could not be considered as a sufficient reparation of past injuries.” Mr. Shippen “ confessed himself so unfashionable, that he neither pretended to judge without information, or to applaud without reason. The servile and flattering addresses now in vogue (he said) were unknown in former times ;—in opposing them, he shewed his regard for the honor and dignity of that house ; and for his reputation as a courtier he felt little concern. He moved, therefore, to leave out the complimentary paragraphs, and to restrain the address to a general expression of thanks to his majesty, and of the satisfaction at the establishment of general tranquillity.” But the most interesting and eloquent speech on this occasion was made by Mr. Pulteney, who declared, “ that if we were now right, he was certain that the time had long ago elapsed when

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1732.

Speech of  
Mr. Pul-  
teney.



BOOK IX.

1732.

we might have been *as right* with infinitely less expense and trouble. But at the period to which he alluded, the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction was represented as inconsistent with the interest and happiness of the nation by the very persons who now plume themselves, and demand the applause of the house for assenting to it. For his part (he said), he neither considered the Pragmatic Sanction in so formidable or in so favorable a light as the present ministers had, at different times, done. Admitting it to be agreeable to the general interests of England, that the Austrian succession should be transmitted whole and undivided, he greatly doubted the policy of our obliging ourselves, by an explicit and positive guarantee, to maintain this succession, at a future and indeterminate period, when England might, for reasons impossible to foresee, find it very incompatible with her interest to engage in a foreign war upon any account; and no alternative would be then left us, but to violate our faith, or to risk our safety. To violate the national faith, indeed (he observed), was no new thing with the present ministers; for the treaty of Vienna itself was concluded in violation of the treaty of Hanover, to the conditions of which, though Prussia had withdrawn herself, France and Holland had strictly adhered. He could not therefore allow, that, in the late transactions,



either the *interest* or the *honor* of the nation had been consulted ; nor indeed had any one treaty signed within these sixteen years been made or even intended for the good of these kingdoms. With regard to the forcible introduction of Don Carlos into Italy, that prince, whose name had, for several years past, been converted to such commodious uses, and who, according to a ludicrous observation in the course of this debate, was either a *giant* or an *infant* as it suited the purpose of the court—Mr. Pulteney declared that he thought it very likely to prove the origin of fresh troubles. But if, upon the whole, our affairs abroad were now wisely adjusted, and our domestic grievances were to be at the same time completely redressed, the minister at the helm of government might be compared to a pilot, who, though there was a clear, safe, and straight channel into harbour, took it into his head to navigate the ship through rocks, sands, and shallows ; and, after much danger and much damage, at last, by chance, hits the port, and triumphs in his good conduct.”

In reply to Mr. Pulteney, Mr. Horace Walpole, upon whom the minister willingly devolved the task of defending his system of foreign politics, undertook to demonstrate “ the wisdom and rectitude of those measures of administration, so contemptuously derided, and so injuriously ar-

BOOK IX.  
1732.

Reply by  
Mr. Horace  
Walpole.



BOOK IX. <sup>1732.</sup> rained. He wished (he said) to be informed to what period of time the observations of the last speaker were intended to refer. He knew that the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction had been proposed to us some years ago; but then it was in a style so dogmatic, that it was inconsistent with the honor of his majesty and of the nation to pay the slightest attention to it. Besides, there was just reason to fear that Don Carlos was the person fixed upon by his imperial majesty as his successor; and it was manifestly against the interests of Great Britain to contribute to the establishment of a prince in the entire possession of the Austrian succession, who held in his own right dominions so considerable in Italy, and who was so nearly related to the crowns both of Spain and France. This guarantee was again offered when the treaty of Seville was in agitation; but it was again rejected, because it was well known to be intended only to *disturb the negotiation*. But as soon as the treaty of Seville was concluded, and the emperor became reasonable in his proposals, we embraced the opportunity, and joined without reserve in the guarantee. As to any inconvenience which might arise from a supposed eventual inability to maintain our engagements, he would take upon him to assert, that were the imperial house in danger of subversion, we *must* engage in their rescues, let



our circumstances be at the time what they will ; BOOK IX.  
for our own ruin was closely and inevitably con- 1732.  
nected with theirs. This guarantee (he affirmed)  
it would have been highly desirable to have en-  
tered into sooner, on account of the fatal conse-  
quences which might have ensued in case of the  
demise of the emperor. But it was impossible to  
agree to it, till his imperial majesty had given sa-  
tisfaction to Spain respecting the Italian duchies,  
and to England and Holland in regard to the  
Ostend company, which his majesty, by the wis-  
dom, vigor, and *steadiness* of his measures, had at  
last procured. He begged leave to repeat the  
expression, the *steadiness* of his majesty's mea-  
sures ; for, (he said) though the means were vari-  
ous, the objects of those measures were uniform —  
the preservation of the balance of power, and the  
assertion of our commercial rights. We had en-  
gaged by the quadruple alliance to see the infant  
Don Carlos settled in the succession of the Ita-  
lian duchies ; and Spain *could not be easy* till this  
was effectuated ; nor could we or our allies, the  
Dutch, *be easy*, till we saw the Ostend company  
absolutely demolished. As soon as these two  
grand points were conceded by the imperial  
court, we began to think seriously of establishing  
the future tranquillity of Europe, and the balance  
of power, on a solid foundation ; for which pur-  
pose we had at length agreed to the formal gua-



BOOK IX. rantee of the Pragmatic Sanction. How then  
1732. could it be affirmed that the honor and interest of the nation had not been consulted in our foreign negotiations, or that our engagements had not been fulfilled? France had no reason to be dissatisfied, having declared that her sole object was the preservation of the general tranquillity, agreeably to the terms of the quadruple alliance, which was accomplished by the treaty of Vienna: and the fact was, that the court of Versailles had declared itself satisfied\*. As to the commercial differences between England and Spain, they were referred to the decision of commissaries, who, there was every reason to believe, would settle all points in dispute in an amicable manner." This speech was no less favorably received by the majority of the house than the harangue formerly made by this minister in vindication of the treaty of Hanover; and the address, as originally moved, was presented to his majesty, who declared in reply, "that he had no doubt of the continuance of the affection and confidence of the house, and that they should ever find his views tending to the honor, interest, and security, of his crown and people."

\* Upon the same principle, doubtless, on which SHYLOCK, after "recording a gift of all his wealth," declares, in answer to the question, "Art thou contented, Jew?"—"I am content."



The nation being at length allowed, and BOOK IX  
 asserted on the highest authority, to be in a 1732.  
 state of actual and perfect security, a grand Ineffectua  
 effort was thought adviseable by the patriots in Attempt to  
 opposition, or the *country-party*, as they were reduce the  
 now generally styled, to effect a reduction of Standing  
 the standing army. This rooted and habitual Army.  
 grievance the courtiers endeavoured to disguise  
 and soften, by bestowing upon it the appellation  
 of a *parliamentary army*, as voted and maintained  
 by parliamentary authority. They pleaded, that  
 this force was necessary to secure the interior  
 tranquillity of the kingdom, and to overawe mal-  
 contents, though too inconsiderable to excite the  
 jealousy of the people even under an ambitious  
 monarch, and much less under a prince who  
 could not be accused, or even suspected, of  
 entertaining the remotest wish of infringing  
 upon the liberties of his subjects. In favor of  
 the reduction it was argued, “that a standing  
 military force in time of peace had, previous to  
 the æra of the revolution, always been accounted  
 not only superfluous, but unconstitutional and  
 dangerous; that the internal tranquillity of the  
 country might be secured, as heretofore it had  
 been, by the civil power aided by the militia,  
 which, under proper regulation, was as capable  
 of discipline, and as active in exertion, as a  
 standing army; that the number of malcontents



BOOK IX. was altogether contemptible ; but that the most  
1732. effectual means of increasing it was the obstinate  
perseverence in measures odious and arbitrary ;  
that, though they had all imaginable confidence  
in his majesty's regard for the liberty of his sub-  
jects, should a standing army be ingrafted into  
the constitution, another prince might arise of  
more dangerous talents and of deeper designs,  
and employ it for the worst purposes of ambi-  
tion : that other nations had been enslaved by  
standing armies ; and though the officers were at  
present men of honor and probity, these might  
be easily discarded, and the army new-modelled,  
in order to effect the subversion of the constitu-  
tion. The expense of this great military force  
was also insisted upon as extremely burdensome  
and oppressive to the nation ; and it was as-  
serted, that the money raised for the subsistence  
of 18 or 20,000 men in England would maintain  
60,000 French or Germans. Previous to the  
revolution, it was well known that the people of  
England did not raise above two millions for the  
whole of the public charge ; but now the current  
expense far exceeded that sum, and the civil list,  
the interest due to the public creditors, and the  
sinking fund, added together, composed a bur-  
den of six millions yearly ; and though at so  
recent a period as the accession of the late king  
the army did not exceed 6000 men, it was aug-



mented, on various pretences to more than three times that number: and further pretences would never be wanting, were parliament willing to listen to them, for further augmentations." These arguments, however, proved wholly fruitless and unavailing \*: and, in proportion to the frequency of their repetition, the impression seems to have been impaired and weakened; for it is unhappily, though unquestionably, certain, that, for almost a century past, the standing army has been a *progressive army*, and that every effort for its reduction has terminated in its increase and enlargement. Such was the offence given by Mr. Pulteney to the court by the zealous part he took in this and other political questions at this period, that the king, calling for the council-book, with his own hand struck out his name from the list of privy counsellors; which, however, only served to extend his fame, and establish his popularity.

Notwithstanding the indiscriminate support given by sir Robert Walpole, after the example

Character  
of Sir Ro-  
bert Wal-  
pole.

\* The numbers on the division were 241 against 171 voices. Lord Hervey urging the multiplicity of seditious writings as an argument against any reduction of the military force, Mr. Plumer replied, "that if *scribblers* gave the government uneasiness, they ought to employ *scribblers*, and not soldiers, to defend them from the danger." It must be remarked that lord Hervey was himself a noted *scribbler* of pamphlets.



BOOK IX. <sup>1732.</sup> of his predecessors, to the long-established royal system of continental politics, and without which he well knew the impossibility of maintaining possession, even for a day, of his high and precarious office, it ought not to be supposed that this minister was absolutely indifferent to the interest and welfare of the kingdom over whose councils he presided. This it would be flagrant injustice to affirm. His situation was, in many respects, critical and hazardous ; and if just allowance be made for the difficulties and embarrassments which he perpetually experienced from the prevalence of Hanoverian prejudices on the one side, and Jacobite prejudices on the other, it will not perhaps be too much to assert, that a man, upon the whole, better adapted to the station which he occupied, or better qualified to discharge the various and complicated duties of it, could no-where be found. To change the minister would have availed nothing without a radical change of system ; and so long as the nation at large shall continue to approve or acquiesce in this corrupt and defective system, where is the minister to be found, who shall, with sincerity and earnestness, labor to accomplish any comprehensive plan of political reform ? or, indeed, what right have we to expect from any man such an heroic, and at the same time useless, effort of virtue ? The celebrated states-



man whose character and conduct we have now BOOK IX.  
been contemplating—and whose actions have 1732.  
been brought to the test of that fiery ordeal  
of relentless truth and justice which human frailty  
is so incompetent to abide, and over whose burn-  
ing plough-shares no man ever yet with impunity  
passed—was possessed, nevertheless, of talents  
admirably calculated for public life. An under-  
standing clear, masculine, and vigorous, was in  
him combined with a temper mild, equable, and  
dispassionate : and by the most perfect accuracy  
and regularity of method, the toils of govern-  
ment were rendered apparently easy and pleasant.  
He was fully sensible of the folly of that warlike  
spirit which had predominated in the British  
councils since the æra of the revolution. The  
favorite object of his administration was to pre-  
serve and maintain the general tranquillity ; and  
the treaty of Vienna, recently concluded at a  
moment so critical, strongly indicated his ex-  
treme solicitude for the continuance of peace.  
He conceived the prosperity of the nation to be  
most effectually advanced by the encouragement  
of manufactures and commerce, the true princi-  
ples of which he perfectly comprehended and  
steadily pursued. His return to office had been  
distinguished by a most beneficial alteration of  
the commercial system of Great Britain, in the  
abrogation of a multiplicity of duties payable on



BOOK IX. the importation of raw materials, and the exportation of raw goods. And it has been affirmed, that he found the English book of rates almost the worst, and left it the very best, in Europe.

1732.

His Projects of Improvement in Revenue and Finance.

At this period he had formed a project, to which he appears to have been incited by the clearest conviction of its utility, for effecting a radical alteration in the national system of taxation. The principal branches of the revenue might at this time be divided into port-duties or customs—duties of excise—and taxes levied on immoveable property, such as the duties on land, houses, hearths, and windows. This latter description of duties the minister considered as of a nature highly oppressive, partial, and inequitable. And the various taxes on consumable commodities, to which every citizen contributes in an exact proportion to his consumption; and which, being included in the price of the commodity, are easily and insensibly paid; constituted, in his opinion, incomparably the most eligible mode of raising the supplies necessary for the public service. He also well knew the gross and shameless frauds daily practised in the collection of the customs; and which, from the very nature of those frauds, and the extreme facility of committing them, he had no hope to remedy. He thought, therefore, that to convert the greater part of the customs into duties of excise would be equally advantage-



ous to government and to the fair trader ; and BOOK IX.  
that the laws of excise might be so ameliorated, 1732.  
that, notwithstanding the odium generally attached to them as oppressive and arbitrary, no just or real ground of complaint should remain. With a view, therefore, to an essential change in the first species of taxation, and to the eventual annihilation of the last, he brought into the house, in the month of February 1732, a bill for the revival of the salt-duties, which had been repealed some years back, as a substitute for one shilling in the pound of the land-tax ; and if this proposal met the approbation of the house, he signified his intention—the land tax being at this time two shillings only in the pound—altogether to abolish that tax in the course of the ensuing session ; in which he declared he should rejoice, as the annihilation of a most grievous and intolerable burden. “The duty on salt,” he said, “affected, it was true, all classes of citizens, the poor as well as the rich ; but the burden of this tax being so equally and generally diffused, the sum contributed by the lower classes of the people would be found, on computation, so trifling, as scarcely to deserve the mention. This tax, while it existed, was never the subject of complaint ; and, when it was repealed, no one seemed to think himself benefitted. He knew,” he said, “the reproaches he had to expect on



BOOK IX <sup>1732.</sup> this occasion ; but he had been long accustomed to be affronted and insulted, both within the walls of that place and without : and while he knew his intentions to be upright, and his only aim to serve his country to the best of his knowledge and the utmost of his power, he should continue to disregard those reflexions which he was conscious he did not deserve." After very vehement and obstinate debates, in which the minister was repeatedly charged with deep and malignant designs against the liberties of his country, and the welfare and happiness of his fellow-citizens, which no one perhaps seriously suspected him to harbour, the bill passed by a majority of 207 voices against 135. And it must be acknowledged, that the opposition against the measures of sir Robert Walpole's administration was so invariable, and at times so intemperate, that the bounds of patriotism and faction seem to have been divided by a very slender partition.

Pension  
Bill a third  
Time re-  
jected by  
the Lords.

In the course of the present session the pension bill was a third time passed by the commons, and rejected by the lords. And on the 1st of June, 1732, the king terminated the session with a speech, in which he informed the parliament of the formal accession of the States General to the treaty of Vienna ; and declared his intention of visiting his electoral dominions ;



and of leaving the queen, as before, sole regent BOOK IX.  
during his absence. On his arrival in Germany, 1732.  
he had the satisfaction, at length, to receive the  
investitures of the duchies of Bremen and Ver-  
den, so long solicited, and so long delayed by  
the policy, pride, or resentment of the emperor.

During this summer Victor Amadeus, the  
abdicated monarch of Sardinia, was discovered  
to be deeply engaged, at the instigation of his  
wife the marchioness of St. Sebastian, in in-  
trigues for the resumption of the crown—upon  
which his person was seized, by order of his son  
the reigning king, and conveyed to Rivoli; and  
the marchioness committed close prisoner to the  
castle of Seva: and the world had a new proof,  
little wanted indeed, how weak are the ties of  
gratitude and affection when placed in competi-  
tion with the suggestions of ambition and in-  
terest.

At this period, a royal charter was granted Colony of Georgia settled.  
for the settlement of a new colony to the south-  
ward of the Carolinas, to which the name of  
Georgia was given: and general Oglethorpe, a  
man distinguished for the activity and ardor of  
his benevolence, was appointed governor\*, and  
embarked at Greenwich, with a number of fami-

\* “ One—driven by strong benevolence of soul—

Shall fly like OGLETHORPE from pole to pole.”

POPE.



BOOK IX. lies, who founded a town called Savannah, on  
1732. the river of that name. This enterprise excited the jealousy and apprehension of the Spaniards; and as it was difficult, or rather impossible, to ascertain the precise limits of the English colony of Georgia and the Spanish settlement of Florida, a foundation of future dispute and contention between the two nations was unavoidably laid. Previous to the final decision of government respecting this measure, seven chiefs of the Cherokee and other southern Indian tribes were conveyed to England; and being introduced to the king, surrendered, by a formal deed, in the name of their countrymen, all right of property and dominion in the lands now about to be occupied by the new colonists: and in amazement at the riches and magnificence of the British court, they are said to have laid their crowns and ensigns of dignity at the king's feet, requesting to be received in the number of his subjects.

During the king's residence at Hanover, the decree of the Pragmatic Sanction was, chiefly through his influence, ratified and confirmed by the diet of the empire, assembled at Ratisbon, notwithstanding the opposition of the electors of Saxony, Bavaria, and the Palatinate. His imperial majesty, on the other hand, demonstrated his regard for the king of England by interposing, at his request, in behalf of the protestant



inhabitants of the archbishopric of Saltzburg, BOOK IX.  
 where religious persecution raged in all its fury, 1732.  
 and in direct contravention of the treaty of West- Persecution of the  
 phalia, under the barbarous caprice of a priest Saltzburg-  
 and a despot. In the sequel, a great number of hers.  
 these wretched victims, abandoning their native  
 homes, took refuge in England; and a parlia-  
 mentary provision being made for their subsis-  
 tence, they for the most part crossed the At-  
 lantic Ocean, and joined the new settlers in the  
 infant colony of Georgia.

Spain having now a considerable naval and  
 military force ready for action, originally raised  
 in expectation of a war with the emperor, con-  
 ceived it to be a favorable opportunity to at-  
 tempt the recovery of the city of Oran on the  
 coast of Barbary; which, after being possessed  
 by that nation for 200 years, had been captured  
 by the Moors during the war of the succession:  
 and landing no less than 25,000 men, under the  
 command of the count de Montemar, an officer  
 of great skill and valor, near the place, both Oran cap-  
 the city of Oran and the strong castle of Mazal- tured by  
 quiver, in the vicinity, were, in consternation, the Spa-  
 evacuated by the infidels. In a short time, niards.  
 nevertheless, collecting in great force, they at-  
 tacked the Spaniards in their turn with the  
 utmost fury; but were finally repulsed with much  
 slaughter. And the Spanish general, after put-



BOOK IX. <sup>1733.</sup> ting garrisons into the conquered fortresses, returned in triumph to Spain.

Early in the year 1733 died the celebrated viscount Torrington, immortalised in the naval annals of Europe by his victory over the Spanish fleet off Messina. He had been for several years at the head of the admiralty department, and was now succeeded by sir Charles Wager, an officer of long experience and great professional ability.

Progress of  
the Dis-  
putes with  
Spain.

Parliament being convened as usual, early in the year 1733, a motion was framed and approved for an address to the king, to know what satisfaction had been made by Spain for the depredations committed on the British merchants: to which the king replied, “that the meetings of the commissaries of the two crowns had been delayed by unforeseen accidents, and that a perfect account of their proceedings could not as yet be laid before the house of commons.” In fact, no real progress whatever had been made towards the settlement of these tedious and perplexing disputes. On the 18th of January, 1732, a *cedula* was signed by the king of Spain at Seville, directed to the governors of the Spanish ports in the West Indies, in general and evasive terms “prohibiting all unjust seizures of English merchant-ships navigating the American seas—so long as they keep *in their proper distances*, and are



not concerned *in any illicit trade*; and commanding BOOK IX.  
 restitution to be made of vessels and cargoes un-  
 lawfully confiscated." As if this were too great a  
 concession, Mr. Keene, on the 8th of February  
 following, signed a declaration in the name of the  
 king of Great Britain, engaging "that his Bri-  
 tannic majesty's ships of war shall on no pretext  
 whatever convoy or protect ships carrying on an  
 unlawful trade with the states belonging to his  
 catholic majesty." The general effect of these  
 reciprocal declarations was to constitute Spain  
 sole judge of the doubtful and difficult questions  
 in dispute, through the medium of the decisions  
 pronounced in her courts of admiralty, to re-  
 strain and enervate the exertions of the British  
 naval commanders in the West Indies, and to  
 encourage the Spaniards in the continued prac-  
 tice of their bold and insolent depredations. A  
 particular instance was produced by Mr. Pulteney,  
 in the course of the debate which arose on the  
 motion now made, in which a Spanish ship was  
 seized by a captain of a British man of war in  
 the West Indies, in requital of an unjust seizure  
 of a British trading vessel. Orders for reciprocal  
 restitution being subsequently issued by the two  
 courts, the Spanish ship was accordingly deli-  
 vered up; but, notwithstanding the *peremptory*  
*orders* of the court of Madrid, the Spanish gover-  
 nor, on various futile pretences, as the minister

1733.



BOOK IX. himself acknowledged, refused compliance. From  
 1733. the general tenor and spirit of the negotiation, the court of Spain could not fail to perceive how little the court and ministry of Great Britain were in earnest in this business; and of how slight importance the protection of the British commerce in the West Indies appeared in their eyes, in comparison of the investiture of BREMEN, or the guarantee of SLESWIC.

Bill imposing Port-Duties in America.

Considerable attention was at this period excited by the revival of an important commercial bill introduced the preceding session, and passed by the house of commons, though lost in its progress through that of the lords. It was entitled "A Bill for the better securing and encouraging the Trade of his Majesty's Sugar Colonies in America." The object of this bill was to annihilate the commercial intercourse which, since the treaty of Utrecht, had been carried on with great advantage between the northern colonies of America and the French West-India islands: which, in return for the corn, lumber, and cattle of New England, made large returns of their rums, sugars, and melasses, to the prejudice of the British islands. By the proposed bill, which at length passed into an act, heavy duties were imposed on all foreign rums, sugars, and melasses, imported into the American colonies. The policy of this bill was, however, very doubt-



ful ; for, in the same proportion that the trade of the sugar colonies was encouraged, that of the northern colonies was discouraged and depressed : and the French islands being compelled to procure lumber and provisions from Canada, that remote and barren province rose in a few years to great wealth and importance. In another and very different view this act was still more remarkable, as the first instance in which an actual and express taxation of America was attempted by the British parliament. But so obviously and exclusively was this act intended for the regulation of trade, and so little was the idea of raising a revenue from America in contemplation, that the produce of the duty, not being appropriated by any clause of the act, and too trivial in its amount for parliamentary or ministerial attention, lay unclaimed and unheeded for many years in the royal exchequer. And the Americans, not harbouring an idea that this act would in future times be adduced as a precedent for a regular and permanent system of taxation, seem to have discovered no alarm, but what was of a nature purely commercial, at a measure in a political view so dangerous and unconstitutional.

On the motion relative to the army estimates, in the committee of supply which differed not

BOOK IX.  
1733.  
Opposition  
to the  
standing  
Army  
revived.



BOOK IX materially from those of the last year, a violent  
 1733. debate arose ; and the arguments formerly urged were again repeated and anew enforced. Mr. Horace Walpole, in reply, hesitated not to assert, “ that the number of troops then proposed was absolutely necessary to support his majesty’s government, and would be necessary so long as the nation enjoyed the happiness of having the present illustrious family on the throne.” Mr. Shippen remarked upon this assertion, “ that the question seemed at length to have taken a new turn ; for, in former debates, the continuance of the army *for one year only* had been contended for ; but now the mask was thrown off, and the house was given to understand that it was intended to be PERPETUAL. This he would not believe could come from his majesty. His majesty KNEW how much the nation was loaded with debts and taxes, and how *inconsistent it was with our constitution to keep up a standing army in time of peace.*” Mr. Shippen, being called vehemently to order for these last words, declared himself “ peculiarly unfortunate ; for that, in a former parliament, he had incurred the severe displeasure and censure of that house, for asserting that the late monarch *was unacquainted* with the constitution ; and he now gave high offence, by declaring that his present ma-

Mr. Shippen’s peculiarly unfortunate Declaration.



Majesty *was not unacquainted* with the constitution." BOOK IX.  
 On a division, the motion was carried by 239 1733.  
 votes against 171.

In deliberating upon the supplies to be granted for the ensuing year, sir Robert Walpole moved that the sum of 500,000*l.* should be issued out of the sinking fund for current services. Between the years 1727 and 1732 various new loans had been made, the interests of which were charged upon different surplusses originally appertaining to the sinking fund, the operations of which were in consequence proportionably weakened. But this being the first open and direct attack upon it, produced a most animated and indignant remonstrance from the patriotic party, who warned the minister, though in vain, that he was drawing down the curses of posterity upon his head—and expatiated upon the iniquity of pilaging, in a time of profound peace, this sacred deposit; and demonstrated the folly of sacrificing the inestimable advantages arising from the undisturbed and progressive operation of this fund to a little temporary ease; and conjured him not to demolish with his own hand the fairest monument of his fame. Sir William Wyndham acknowledged, “ that he had never been without apprehension that violence might be offered to this fund by an enterprising minister, in case of exigency, and in a time of war; but to see



BOOK IX. <sup>1733.</sup> attempts made upon it in a season of perfect tranquillity was what he never expected. Is the public expenditure," exclaimed this patriotic speaker, "never to be lessened? Are the people of England always to groan under the same heavy and grievous taxes? Surely, if there is any intention of diminishing the present enormous debt of the nation, now is the time for doing it. What can be said in vindication of those who are thus loading posterity? Can they imagine that there will ever be less occasion for public expense? or can they imagine that our descendents will possess greater ability for discharging these incumbrances than ourselves? Surely not—unless far other and wiser measures of government should be adopted than any which have yet originated from the present administration." No impression, however, could be made upon the predetermined purpose of the minister; and the measure received without difficulty the sanction of the house of commons: and though in the house of lords it was again attacked with the united powers of argument, wit, and eloquence, by the lords Barthurst, Chesterfield, and Carteret, it finally received the royal assent.

The practice of alienating the sinking fund having once been assented to by parliament, was continued without intermission; and, in



order to spare the ungrateful repetition of the subject, it may be remarked, that in the succeeding year, 1,200,000*l.*, or the whole produce of the fund for the year, was taken from it : and in 1735 and 1736 it was anticipated and mortgaged\*.

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The compliant disposition of parliament now encouraged the minister to bring forward, in pursuance of the grand plan of revenue reform before mentioned, his famous bill for subjecting the duties on wine and tobacco to the laws of excise. But, probably to the surprise, certainly to the chagrin of the minister, on moving his primary resolution, " that the duties on tobacco do from the 24th of January 1733 cease and determine," no less than 205 members divided against it—the majority, in a house of 471 members, being only 61.

Sir Robert  
Walpole's  
Tobacco-  
Excise-Bill.

No man, perhaps, at this time stood higher in public or parliamentary estimation than sir Paul Methuen. His long experience, his extensive political and commercial knowledge, the high offices he had successively occupied, the respectability of his private with the moderation and equanimity of his public character, and the dignified candor with which he always opposed, when he deemed it necessary to oppose, the

\* Price on the National Debt.



BOOK IX. measures of administration, though long removed  
1733. from power by the superior ascendancy of Walpole, all combined to give the decided part which he took on this occasion, as an opponent of the bill, the greatest weight ; and his opinion was supposed materially to have influenced very many of the most respectable members who voted in this formidable minority. Sir John Barnard also, the purity and patriotism of whose motives were above all imputation, declared the question to be, whether we should sacrifice the constitution to the prevention of frauds in the revenue. “ For my own part,” added he, “ I never was guilty of any fraud, and therefore I speak against my own interest when I speak against any method of preventing frauds. But I will never put my private interest in balance with the interest or happiness of the nation. I had rather beg my bread from door to door, and see my country flourish, than be the greatest subject of the nation and see the trade of my country decaying, and the people enslaved and oppressed.”

A prodigious clamor, instigated, without doubt, in a great degree by those persons whose fraudulent practices this plan was intended to counteract, was artfully and industriously raised against the bill ; which was indeed deemed dangerously inimical to the constitution by many very intelligent and impartial persons, to whose judgment



much deference is due ; though it has in our own times been carried substantially into effect without causing any public alarm, or even exciting any very uncommon share of attention—justifying in its operation the ideas and expectations of the ministers with whom it originated. On this occasion, however, the opposition against the bill might with propriety be styled national ; and sir Robert Walpole persisting to urge this favorite project with a very improper, and with him a very unusual degree of heat and passion—applying the contumelious expression of “sturdy beggars” to the merchants who attended in the lobby of the house of commons with petitions against the bill—the public discontent was heightened into rage. The avenues to Westminster-Hall were occupied by immense crowds of people ; and the persons of those members who voted in favor of the bill were grossly insulted, and even their lives endangered. At length sir Robert Walpole thought proper to move that the second reading of the bill might be postponed to a distant day. The defeat of the scheme was celebrated with general rejoicings ; and the minister was burned in effigy and loaded with execrations, though his conduct appears no otherwise censurable in this business, than as it exhibits some symptoms of pride and obstinacy. It is related, nevertheless, to his praise, that, on the evening previous to the re-

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port, a meeting was convened, by the minister, of the members who had supported this obnoxious measure. Their unanimous opinion was, to persevere; but sir Robert Walpole declared, "that in the present inflamed temper of the people, the act could not be carried into execution without an armed force, and he would not be the minister to enforce any system of taxation at the expense of blood; for if supplies were to be raised by the sword, there is an end of British liberty. He was therefore resolved to adjourn the report for six months; or, should his opinion be over-ruled, to make an immediate resignation of his office." The unfortunate pension bill, passed for the fourth time, in four successive years, by the house of commons, was for the fourth time thrown out by the house of peers; although, as a measure which solely regarded the purity and integrity of the national representation, these repeated rejections appeared particularly harsh and invidious on the part of the lords. On the 11th of June, 1733, the king closed the session with a speech, in which severe notice was taken of "the wicked endeavours that had been lately used to inflame the minds of the people, by the most unjust representations."

Death of  
Augustus II.  
King of  
Poland.

EUROPE was now destined to be involved in fresh troubles. These were occasioned by the death of Augustus, king of Poland and elector of




Saxony, January 1733. The candidates for the vacant crown were, Augustus son to the late king, and Stanislaus, whom Charles XII., in the zenith of his prosperity, had elevated to the throne, and which on the decline of that monarch's fortune he had been compelled to relinquish. Louis XV, king of France, having married the daughter of Stanislaus, supported the pretensions of this prince with all his power ; and the Polish primate, and a majority of the diet, being gained over by the intrigues of the French ambassador, proceeded to the election, and Stanislaus was unanimously chosen king at Warsaw, September 1733, and proclaimed with loud acclamations.

The imperial courts of Vienna and Petersburg, however, between whom it is remarkable that a strict and almost uninterrupted harmony has subsisted from the period that Russia assumed her proper rank as a European power, espoused with warmth the interests of the house of Saxony ; and protesting by their respective ministers against the election of Stanislaus as null and void, an army of Austrians was assembled on the frontier of Silesia ; and 50,000 Russians under general Laschi actually entered Poland, on the side of Lithuania. Being quickly joined by a body of Saxons and Poles of the electoral party, the elector of Saxony was proclaimed king of Poland by the bishop of Cracow, and crowned

Consequent  
Hostilities  
on the Con-  
tinent.

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BOOK IX.  on the 17th of January, 1734. King Stanislaus, finding himself wholly unable to resist so great a force, abandoned Warsaw, to his rival, and retired to Dantzic, where he was pursued and closely besieged by the Russians and Saxons. This prince, however, found means to escape, previous to the surrender of the city, which was followed by a general submission to the authority of Augustus, and a general amnesty was in return granted to the partisans of Stanislaus. Though the court of Versailles failed in their grand object in Poland—in order to be fully avenged upon the emperor, who had been the principal obstacle to its accomplishment, and whose dominions lay much more open to attack than Russia—the duke of Berwick received orders to pass the Rhine at the head of a numerous army in October, and Fort Kehl was in a short time compelled to capitulate. The winter months having passed over, he renewed his operations with great vigour. After the reduction of Traerbach, the duke invested the important town of Philipsburg, and, visiting the trenches, was killed on the 12th of June, 1734, by a cannon-ball, leaving behind him an high reputation for valor and military skill. The French general had been opposed, during the whole of this campaign, by the celebrated prince Eugene, now far advanced into the vale of years, in a state of languishment



and infirmity, and retaining little resemblance of the hero of Blenheim and Belgrade. Notwithstanding the loss sustained by the French in the death of their commander, Philipsburg was obliged, after a brave defence, to surrender, though upon the most honorable terms. During these transactions the French king had concluded a treaty with Spain and Sardinia, in conformity to which those powers declared war against the emperor. And the *maréchal duc de Villars*, the ancient rival of Marlborough and Eugene, was prevailed upon to take the command of the French army in Italy\*; which, being joined by the forces of Savoy, expelled the imperialists from the Milanese. He survived, however, but a short time the fatigues of the campaign, in which he fully sustained the glory of his name

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\* M. Voltaire tells us that the *maréchal de Villars*, on being solicited to resume his military honors, and to place himself at the head of the army destined for Italy, repeated with energy and enthusiasm the following lines from Racine's tragedy of *Bajazet*:

“ Quoi ! tu crois, cher Osmin, que ma gloire passée  
Flatte encore leur valeur et vit dans leur pensée !  
Tu crois qu'ils me suivroient encore avec plaisir,  
Et qu'ils reconnoitroient la voix de leur visir ? ”

The undiminished vivacity of his genius also perhaps equally appeared, when, towards the conclusion of the siege of the capital of the Milanese, being accidentally asked his age—  
“ Quel âge avez vous, monsieur le *maréchal* ? ” he happily and briskly replied, “ Dans peu des jours j'aurois MIL-AN.”



BOOK IX. and nation, dying at Turin early in the ensuing  
1734. spring, at the age of eighty. After the death of  
this great man, the command devolved upon the  
maréchal de Coigné; between whom and the im-  
perial generals, the count de Merci and maréchal  
Königseg, various fierce and bloody but indeci-  
sive encounters took place, into the particular  
narration of which it is not necessary to enter.  
Whilst the Austrians were thus driven from the  
Milanese, and with difficulty maintained their  
ground in the Mantuan, the Neapolitan nobility,  
irritated and oppressed under the government of  
the count de Visconti, the imperial viceroy, joined  
in an invitation to Don Carlos, the infant duke  
of Parma, to attempt an invasion of that king-  
dom. He accordingly entered the Neapolitan  
territories at the head of a considerable army,  
and was received in the metropolis with loud ac-  
clamations, as the national deliverer. The count  
de Visconti, having retreated into Apulia, was fol-  
lowed thither by the Spanish general, the count  
de Montemar; who, attacking the Austrians at  
Bitonto, May 25, 1734, gained a most complete  
victory. Don Carlos, being now proclaimed and  
acknowledged king of Naples, immediately de-  
termined upon the reduction of Sicily; and the  
count de Montemar, landing in that island in the  
month of August, proceeded with great rapidity  
in his conquests, the natives displaying every-



where a disposition rather to assist than to op-<sup>BOOK IX.</sup>  
pose the progress of his arms ; and on the arrival <sup>1734.</sup>  
of Don Carlos in person, the imperialists were  
compelled finally to evacuate the island. The  
emperor, finding himself unable to cope with his  
adversaries, applied for succour in this emergency  
to his powerful ally, the czarina, who immedi-  
ately ordered a body of thirty thousand men to  
march to his assistance. But, before they could  
arrive at the scene of action, a general armistice,  
both in Italy and upon the Rhine, took place,  
which was soon followed by a defensive treaty of  
peace, concluded early in the year 1736, on the  
terms proposed by the maritime powers ; agree-  
ably to which, Naples and Sicily were yielded to  
the infant Don Carlos ; and Parma and Placen-  
tia, the patrimonial possessions of the infant, were  
ceded to the house of Austria, to whom also  
the other conquests of the allies in Italy and Ger-  
many were restored, and France acceded to the  
guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction. The re-  
version of the grand duchy of Tuscany, now for-  
mally relinquished by Spain, was conferred as a  
fief of the empire, at the demise of the grand  
duke, last of the illustrious house of Medicis, upon  
the duke of Lorraine, who was destined for the  
future husband of the eldest archduchess Maria  
Theresa, a princess distinguished for her personal  
and mental accomplishments, and sole heiress,



BOOK IX. under the *Pragmatic Sanction*, of the vast domi-  
 1734. nions of the house of Austria. The elector of Saxony was acknowledged as king of Poland, and the duchy of Lorraine was ceded to Stanislaus—who was permitted to retain the title of king,—and, after the death of the titular monarch, to be for ever united to the crown of France, which thus made, under the unambitious and pacific administration of cardinal Fleury, an acquisition of superior importance and value than any which had resulted from the most splendid successes of Richelieu, Mazarine, or Louvois. The king of Sardinia was gratified by the cession of some small districts of the Milanese; which is said to have been compared, by one of the ancestors of this monarch, to an artichoke, which, from its magnitude not being digestible at once, must be devoured leaf by leaf.

Ineffec-  
 tual At-  
 tempt to  
 repeal the  
 Septennial  
 Act.

On reverting to the regular progression of domestic events, we find the session of 1734 distinguished by a very vigorous effort to repeal the act for septennial parliaments—as a flagrant encroachment upon the rights of the people—as having a dangerous tendency to increase the influence of the crown—and as being actually productive of very pernicious effects. The opposition being challenged to adduce a single instance in which the interests of the nation had been injured by the operation of this bill, or by any un-



due exercise of the royal prerogative as connected with it, sir William Wyndham observed, " that it was reasonable and just to argue against the continuance of a bill of this nature, not merely from what had happened, but from what might happen. Let us suppose then (said he) a man of mean fortune and obscure origin, abandoned to all notions of virtue and honor, and pursuing no object but his own aggrandisement, raised by the caprice of fortune to the station of first minister: Let us suppose him palpably deficient in the knowledge of the interest of his country; and employing, in all transactions with foreign powers, men still more ignorant than himself: Let us suppose the honor of the nation tarnished, her political consequence lost, her commerce insulted, her merchants plundered, her seamen perishing in the depths of dungeons—and all these circumstances palliated or overlooked, lest his administration should be endangered: Suppose him possessed of immense wealth, the spoils of an impoverished nation; and suppose this wealth employed to purchase seats in the national senate for his confidential friends and favorites:—In such a parliament, suppose all attempts to inquire into his conduct constantly over-ruled by a corrupt majority, who are rewarded for their treachery to the public by a profuse distribution of pensions, posts, and places under the minister:

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BOOK IX. <sup>1734.</sup> Let us suppose this minister insolently domineering over all men of sense, figure, and fortune, in the nation; and, having no virtuous principle of his own, ridiculing it in others, and endeavouring to destroy or contaminate it in all:—With such a minister, and such a parliament, let us suppose a prince upon the throne—uninformed, and unacquainted either with the interests or inclinations of his people—weak, capricious, and actuated at once by the passions of ambition and avarice:—Should such a case ever occur, could any greater curse happen to a nation, than such a prince, advised by such a minister, and that minister supported by such a parliament? The existence of such a prince, and such a minister, no human laws may indeed be adequate to prevent; but the existence of such a parliament may and ought to be prevented; and the repeal of the law in question I conceive to be a most obvious, necessary, and indispensable means for the accomplishment of that purpose.” Notwithstanding the admiration excited by this sudden burst of eloquence, and the ability with which the motion of repeal was supported by various other speakers, combined with the great popularity of the object, it was negatived on the division, though not by the accustomed ministerial majority, the numbers being 247 against 184.

The duke of Bolton and lord Cobham being



about this time arbitrarily divested of their military commissions, on account of their parliamentary opposition to the measures of the court, a very dangerous—the more dangerous, indeed, because a very plausible—motion was made by lord Morpeth, eldest son of the earl of Carlisle, for leave to bring in a bill for securing the constitution, by preventing the removal of officers not above the rank of colonels, otherwise than by judgment of a court-martial, or by an address of either house of parliament. The court, alarmed in the highest degree by this motion, exerted the whole force of ministerial ability and eloquence in the house of commons, in order to defeat it. It was strongly urged, “that the great danger to be guarded against in all armies is the raising them to a state of independency. The most important of all restraints on the military in this country is the prerogative vested in the crown, of displacing officers on suspicion, or even at pleasure : but should this power once be transferred to the army, a time may come, nor may the period be far distant, when the whole of our constitution shall be at its mercy. At present, the army itself depends upon the king and parliament for its very duration and existence. But give the officers a permanent interest in their commissions, by the adoption of a measure which would convert them as it were into freeholds, and

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Dangerous Motion of Lord Morpeth.



BOOK IX. the king and parliament would soon find them-  
1734. selves dependent upon the army. By this bill a door would be opened for the uncontrolled and uncontrollable commission of every species of military licence and oppression. And should a reduction of the army at any future period be determined upon, is it to be imagined that these military chieftains, with swords in their hands, would contentedly lay them down, and retire to their respective homes, at the requisition of the civil power? No: they would exclaim, Where are our accusers? We are by law amenable to own courts-martial only, and to them alone we will submit." The minister remarked, "that the two noblemen lately removed were succeeded by others—the duke of Argyle and lord Pembroke—in no respect inferior. And should the motion pass into a law, the government of England would have an irresistible tendency to a *stratocracy*, or a military constitution. Supposing," said this sagacious statesman, "the charges so often urged by the zealous partisans of this motion against a late celebrated general to be well founded—that he cherished views of ambition, contrary to the spirit of the constitution—that he aspired to perpetuate his authority, and to rise above all control, by obtaining a commission constituting him general for life—how would the existence of a law such as is now recommended



have facilitated the success of those daring projects ! And how would such a motion have been received by the gentlemen who now urge it as equitable and wise, had it been brought forward under the auspices of the duke of Marlborough ? And what should induce us to believe that measure to be now beneficial which would then have been universally reprobated as pernicious and unconstitutional ?” The question, being put, was carried in the negative, without a division.—A far more reasonable and moderate motion was then made by Mr. Sandys, “ for presenting an humble address to his majesty, that he would be graciously pleased to inform the house by whose advice it was that his majesty was pleased to discharge his grace Charles duke of Bolton and the right honorable lord viscount Cobham from the regiments lately under their command, and what offences were alleged against them as the occasion of their dismissal.” The weight of argument being now on the other side, the minister contented himself with calling for the question ; and on a division the motion was negatived by a majority of 252 against 193.

The very same day on which lord Morpeth made his famous motion in the house of commons, the duke of Marlborough presented a bill of similar import to the house of lords. The debate which ensued was rendered memorable by



BOOK IX. the eloquent speeches of the lords Chesterfield  
 1734. and Scarborough, the former—who had recently resigned his post of lord steward—in support of, the latter in opposition to, the bill. These two noblemen, who ranked amongst the most distinguished ornaments of the English court, had long maintained a mutual and inviolable friendship. To the accomplishments of the courtier lord Scarborough joined the ardor of patriotism and the enthusiasm of virtue. He might with propriety be regarded as the FALKLAND of the age—and the great qualities he possessed were unfortunately clouded by the same dark tinge of melancholy. Such was his high sense of honor, that, thinking it necessary to take a decided part in opposition to the bill in question, he previously resigned his place of master of the horse, lest, by an injurious imputation, he should be supposed actuated by any interested motive. Not satisfied with the negative put upon the motion for the second reading of the bill, he urged the rejection of it by the house, which was agreed to without a division\*.

Singularly  
 noble Con-  
 duct of the  
 Earl of  
 Scarbo-  
 rough.

\* “ When I confess there is who feels for fame,  
 And melts to goodness, need I SCARBOROUGH name?”  
 POPE.

The character of this nobleman has been delineated by lord Chesterfield with the glowing pencil of sensibility and affection. According to this *finished portrait*, lord Scarbo-



In the same session a very important bill, which BOOK IX.  
 had at various times been proposed and rejected, 1734.  
 was revived by Mr. Sandys, entitled, “a Bill for Place Bill  
 securing the Freedom of Parliament, by limiting moved by  
 the Number of Officers, civil and military, in the Mr. Sandys, and  
 House of Commons.” In opposition to this bill, rejected.  
 the minister contended, “that the constitution  
 was already sufficiently secured, by the provision  
 which orders a re-election when a member ac-

rough possessed in the highest degree the air, manners, and address, of a man of quality—politeness with ease, and dignity without pride. He had the advantage of a fine person; and, when cheerful, the most engaging countenance imaginable. His knowledge, classical and historical, was very extensive; and it was accompanied with a just and delicate taste. In his common expenses he was liberal; but in his charities and bounties his generosity was unlimited. In parliament, though not an ambitious or florid speaker, truth and virtue, which never want and seldom wear ornaments, seemed only to borrow his voice. He was a true constitutional and yet practicable patriot; a sincere lover and a zealous assertor of the natural, the civil, and the religious rights of his country. Though bred in camps and courts, his moral character was so unsullied, that what a celebrated historian formerly said of *Scipio*, might, almost without any allowance for the imperfections of humanity, be applied to him: “*Nil non laudandum aut dixit, aut fecit, aut sensit.*”—“This small tribute of praise,” says the noble writer, “I owe to the memory of the best man I ever knew, and the dearest friend I ever had. If he had any enemies—for I protest I never knew one—they could only be such as were weary of always hearing of *Aristides the Just.*”



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cepts of a place ; that to disable any gentleman or citizen from sitting in parliament merely because he has the honor to serve the crown, was really taking from the people their inherent right of choosing such representatives as they deemed best qualified to exercise the functions of their delegation ; and that the state would be divided by it into factions, those acting under the executive power not coalescing with, but constituting a formidable phalanx against, those who composed the legislative ; and that it argued an hostile distrust of the crown not compatible with the genius of the constitution." The motion was, however, in itself plausible and popular, and it received additional weight from the near approach of a dissolution of parliament ; so that on the question of commitment it was negatived by a majority of 39 voices only in a house of 426 members.

Extraordi-  
nary Vote  
of Credit  
moved by  
Sir Robert  
Walpole.

Although a very large addition to the naval force of the nation had, in the early part of the session, been unanimously voted, on the 28th of March, a prorogation being now almost daily expected, a message was delivered by sir Robert Walpole from the crown, acknowledging " the zeal and affection shown by the parliament, and desiring that his majesty might be enabled, during the recess or interval of parliaments, to make good such engagements with foreign powers as honor, justice, and prudence, may call upon him



to fulfil or contract, and such augmentation of <sup>BOOK IX.</sup>  
 his forces by sea and land as might be necessary <sup>1734.</sup>  
 for the honor and defence of his kingdoms, and  
 as the exigency of affairs may require, the war  
 on the continent still unhappily continuing.”  
 On this occasion all the patriotic ardor was  
 again awakened, and the impolicy, the folly,  
 and the danger of entrusting such dictatorial  
 powers in the hands of the monarch were  
 exposed with all the energy of truth and elo-  
 quence. Mr. Shippen in particular distinguished  
 himself by a speech worthy of the English Cato.  
 He said, “that when the address was moved, in  
 reply to his majesty’s speech at the commence-  
 ment of the session, he had expressed his fears  
 and suspicions, from certain expressions in both,  
 that a vote of credit was in contemplation ; but  
 he had then been assured that there was not the  
 least ground even to imagine so improbable a  
 thing, although we were now told that, from his  
 majesty’s manner of expressing himself upon that  
 occasion, every gentleman in the house must  
 have expected a demand of this nature—a de-  
 mand for no less than a total surrender of all  
 the rights of parliament ; for we are now called  
 upon to give the king a power of raising what  
 money he pleases, and also what military force  
 he pleases, which are the rights on which all  
 other rights depend ; and all this without any



BOOK IX. necessity, or even any plausible reason alleged to  
1734. us. Is invasion by a foreign enemy to be apprehended? Is any dangerous domestic conspiracy discovered? No: the right honorable gentleman himself says that he believes the nation to be in safety, but does not desire that its safety should depend on his belief. God forbid that it should! and happy would it be for us that it did not depend upon his administration. But this unlimited delegation of power is, it seems, designed to guard against new counsels, against any *sudden alteration* of measures. Surely, sir, this is not meant to be seriously urged; for can this plea ever be wanting? Are we not in as great danger of sudden and alarming changes in a time of profound peace, as when the powers of Europe are engaged in a bloody war, and courting with eagerness our assistance, or at least our neutrality? If we now, therefore, agree to grant such powers, we may expect in future the demand regularly repeated, and never refused. Never can such requisitions on the part of the crown be made with less colour of necessity; never can compliance on our part be yielded more unconstitutionally. When not only an expiring session, but an expiring parliament, grants such powers, how easily may they be extended, before the next parliament is suffered to meet, beyond all possibility of control! The



precedents that have been adduced to justify the present demand are wholly inapplicable. In the year 1702 a vote of credit passed the house in consequence of a message from the late queen; but this message contained no such demand or requisition as the present. It simply stated the danger to which our allies, the States General, were at that period exposed from France; and this danger was not only asserted, but proved by papers laid before the house: we were then ourselves actually engaged in a war, and it was not merely pretended that we might be eventually endangered by a change of counsels. Even in this situation the queen was far from asking such powers as were now demanded. She did not in fact ask any thing; saying only in general terms, that she doubted not but the house would adopt such measures as would most conduce to the honor of her crown, the safety of her kingdoms, and the support of her allies. On the other hand, the house were far from granting such powers as are now asked. The vote was restrained to a power of increasing the forces destined to act with those of the States General, and limited by the condition that England should not be charged with the pay of such additional troops, but from the day that all commerce and correspondence between the subjects of the States and those of France and Spain should be totally

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BOOK IX prohibited. As to the message in the year 1715,  
1734. it was sent to the house at a time of actual rebellion and expected invasion; and it was not granted at the termination of a session, and much less at the expiration of a parliament. The message in 1719 was similarly circumstanced: the nation was in danger of being invaded, and would have been invaded, had it not been for the disasters which the Spanish fleet met with after leaving their ports. The last precedent of the year 1725, it must be allowed, approaches nearest to the present case. We then did, as we are now desired to do, grant away millions in the dark without any cause or reason assigned; but then this was a precedent of the right honorable gentleman's own making, which may be thought perhaps somewhat to diminish its authority. The right honorable gentleman has, however, improved upon his own precedent; for the nation was not, at the period alluded to, in a state of absolute tranquillity; nor did the message ask for a discretion so unlimited as the present, but merely for an indefinite power to add to the *naval* force and to negotiate treaties. But if his majesty is invested with the powers now demanded, nothing will remain for the crown to ask but a parliamentary resolve, empowering his majesty to make, repeal, suspend, or alter such laws, and in such manner,



as he shall judge necessary for the public safety. BOOK IX.  
And where indeed is the difference between 1734.  
granting this power at once, and putting the crown in a capacity to assume it whenever it may choose so to do? Such complaisance as this must surely render us most despicable in his majesty's eyes: he might justly say of us as the Roman emperor of the Roman senate, '*O homines servire paratos!*' But we are told that an account is to be rendered to the next parliament of whatever may be done in pursuance of these powers. Sir, I have been so often deceived by ministerial promises, that I am ashamed ever to have placed any degree of faith in them. How often, when I and others have called for such accounts, have we been told that matters were not ripe for laying them before parliament, or that it would be dangerous to the state to reveal the secrets of government! and the highest satisfaction we could ever obtain was to be told, that the expences incurred were *necessarily* incurred for foreign and secret services. Whence that necessity arose was ever kept from the knowledge of parliament: we had the word of the minister to rest our faith upon; and the same implicit resignation will be required, doubtless, from every succeeding parliament. When at the termination of the session we return to our several counties, and are requested to assign our



BOOK IX. reasons for this very extraordinary vote—a vote  
1734. by which such vast additional burdens may be imposed on the nation—how satisfactory must it be to our constituents to be informed that, though we are at present in amity or actual alliance with all the powers of Europe, military preparations, by sea and land, must be made, in order to guard against a *variation* of foreign counsels! Sir, in my opinion, the resolution now moved is neither necessary, nor safe, nor founded upon precedent. Precedents, indeed, there may be, which resemble it in a certain degree; but were they ever so numerous, and in all respects analogous, it would be no argument with me for agreeing to what is proposed. Whatever may have been the duration or extent of the practice, it is now high time to put a stop to it, and to establish a PRECEDENT OF REFUSAL; otherwise parliaments will become wholly useless, or serve, by a sanction so pernicious, to make ministers the more daring, and the oppressions of the people the more grievous.”

In answer to this eloquent and patriotic speaker, Mr. Horace Walpole ventured to attempt a vindication of the measure thus indignantly arraigned. He said, “that, after all the pains taken to point out a dissimilarity between the case now under discussion and the precedents adduced in support of it, he could discern no material difference.



It had been evidently the practice of parliament, BOOK IX, in times of danger, to grant extraordinary powers <sup>1734.</sup> to the crown, and in this particular way. For his part, he acknowledged he thought the precedent of 1702 a bad one, because the parliament discovered so much diffidence and distrust; and the ill effects of their slow and lukewarm proceedings ought to induce us to strengthen the hands of his majesty at the present juncture. It was surprising," he said, "to him to hear it asserted by gentlemen, that nothing had been laid before the house to shew the necessity of granting the powers now asked for. Did not his majesty, in his speech at the opening of the session, inform us of the war then begun in Europe? Does he not, by the present message, acquaint us that the war still continues? And is not every gentleman convinced, by what he knows of the situation of Europe, that the balance of power in Europe entirely depends on the event of that war? Supposing either side to prevail too far, the balance of power must be overturned; and this nation will be under an obligation to interpose in order to prevent so fatal an effect. Besides, does not every gentleman know that the French have lately fitted out a very powerful naval armament, which, with more probability, threatened Great Britain than any other place in the world, unless we excepted the city of Dantzic? He be-



BOOK IX. <sup>1734.</sup> lieved, indeed," he said, "that it was designed against Dantzic; but if that affair should blow over, can we imagine ourselves in security, while so large a squadron lies within a few hours' sail of the English coast? Our allies, the Dutch," he said, "were in a very critical state: their barrier in Flanders was in a very weak and defenceless condition; and if we should sit still and do nothing, they might be tempted to throw themselves entirely into the arms of France. They had not indeed," he acknowledged, "done any thing as yet themselves by way of augmentation of their forces; but then they had postponed that reduction of 10,000 men, which, previous to the war, they had meditated; and they were now desirous to go hand in hand with us\*. Gentlemen," he said, "might, if they pleased, call this a vote of credit; but his majesty having expressly promised an account of the expenditure, it was in his opinion only a vote of confidence, which, by showing the entire reliance we place on the wisdom of his majesty's measures, will give his instances with foreign powers that weight which is so necessary to the preservation of the balance

\* It is observable, that this ridiculous pretence of danger to the Dutch barrier had been already completely obviated by a convention of neutrality, comprehending the whole of Austrian Flanders, signed, November 1733, between the States General and the king of France.



of power in Europe, without which this nation BOOK IX.  
can never be in any safety or security." The <sup>1734.</sup>  
debate was unusually prolonged by a succession  
of very able speeches: and sir John Barnard  
particularly attracted the attention of the house,  
by declaring "that the assertions hazarded in  
royal speeches or messages were not to be im-  
plicitly depended upon; for that the crown  
might assert, and in fact had asserted, in conse-  
quence of hasty or treacherous information, what  
afterwards proved not to be true. Parliament  
had," he said, "been assured by a solemn speech  
from the throne, that an alliance had been en-  
tered into between the emperor and Spain, in  
conformity to the secret articles of which Gi-  
braltar was to have been wrested from us, and  
the Pretender placed by force on the throne of  
Great Britain. Considering the situation and  
circumstances of the contracting powers at that  
period, this intelligence appeared to many at the  
time romantic and incredible; and it was now  
known to be false, though it was then represented  
as highly disrespectful to the crown so much as to  
doubt it. We were now called upon, in a man-  
ner still more extraordinary, to give credit to a  
surmise of danger from France, which the right  
honorable gentleman himself does not profess to  
believe; and in consequence of this groundless  
apprehension, to devolve for six months the



BOOK IX. whole power of parliament upon the crown—a  
 1734. demand which deserved to be treated with ridicule, and rejected with indignation.” Sir Robert Walpole immediately rose, and protested, “that while he had the honor to serve the crown he could not sit still and hear it so injuriously reflected upon. His late majesty’s assertion, relative to the secret articles of the treaty of Vienna,” he said, “was as true and as well founded as any that ever came from the throne. It was indeed insolently contradicted by M. Palm, the imperial ambassador: but the king received his information from those who could not be deceived—and the minister declared himself to be as certain that there were such articles, as if he had been present at the framing of them\*: and however indiscreet this declaration might be thought in actual circumstances, he could not, in justice to the memory of the late king, say less.” In conclusion, the question being put, upon the motion for the address, it was carried in the affirmative by 248 voices against 147—although Mr. Pulteney, who terminated the debate, had given it as his opinion, that “the message before the house was of a nature so extraor-

\* This declaration is still more surprising than the similar assurance given at the time by lord Townshend. The correspondence of the Austrian ministers Zinzendorf and Palm, recently published, entirely confutes this unaccountable opinion.—*Vide COXE’S State Papers.*



dinary, and involved in it such culpability, that if the spirit of liberty—that spirit which brought about the revolution, and established the present family upon the throne—was not absolutely extinguished in the nation, we might expect to see a future parliament not only censure, but condemn and punish, those who have been the chief advisers of such a measure.” On the 16th of April the king put an end to the session by a speech, in which he declared, that “ he should think himself inexcusable if he parted with this parliament without doing them the justice to acknowledge the many signal proofs they had given, through the course of seven years, of their duty, fidelity, and attachment to his person and government, and their constant regard to the true interest of their country.” The parliament, having now sat nearly the full term prescribed by the septennial act, was dissolved on April 18, 1734, and a new parliament immediately convoked by royal proclamation.

In the spring of this year the marriage of the princess royal with the prince of Orange was celebrated with great magnificence and public rejoicings; and the parliament, as a testimony of their entire approbation of this alliance, voted the sum of 80,000*l.* as a portion to the princess, and an annuity for life of 5000*l.* payable out of the civil list. His serene highness the prince is thus fa-

BOOK IX.  
1734.

Marriage of  
the Prince  
of Orange.

His Cha-  
racter.



BOOK IX. vorably described, in a letter to lord Townshend,  
1735. secretary of state, from the earl of Chesterfield, ambassador at the Hague.—“The prince of Orange has extreme good parts; is perfectly well-bred; with an ease and freedom that is seldom acquired but by a long knowledge of the world. The acclamations of the people are loud and universal. He assumes not the least dignity, but has all the affability and insinuation that is necessary for a person who would raise himself in a popular government.”

The new parliament, being convened in January 1735, quickly discovered a disposition to support, with zeal not inferior to that of their predecessors, the measures of the present administration. The king, in his speech, expressed “his concern at the present commotions on the continent; and though he had hitherto resisted the pressing solicitations of the court of Vienna for aid in this war, he hoped that his good subjects would not repine at the necessary means of placing him in a situation to act that part which might eventually be incumbent upon him.” The house, in a grand committee of supply, voted, in consequence of this suggestion, near 60,000 men for the sea and land-service of the year; though not without the vehement opposition of the patriots, who demonstrated the folly of taking any part whatever in these unintelligible and



everlasting broils upon the continent, upon pre-  
 tence of which this alarming augmentation of our  
 military force was founded: and sir William  
 Wyndham remarked, “that, notwithstanding the  
 long continuance of peace, such had been the  
 exorbitant charges and expenses by subsidies and  
 armaments, that the people had not been relieved  
 from the burden of a single tax imposed during  
 the preceding war.”

BOOK IX.

1735.

A clause being inserted in the address, assur-  
 ing his majesty “that this house will cheerfully  
 and effectually raise such supplies as shall be  
 necessary for the honor and security of his ma-  
 jesty and these kingdoms”—it was moved that  
 the following words be added, “so soon as the  
 proper information of the state of public affairs  
 should be communicated to this house, and in  
 proportion to such efforts as shall be made by  
 such of the allies who are under the same engage-  
 ments as this nation, and who are not involved  
 in the war.” On the division the amendment  
 was rejected, by 265 votes against 185—a mi-  
 nority plainly indicative of the reluctance of the  
 house to engage as parties in the present war;  
 respecting which it seemed that England had in-  
 terfered so far, as to give extreme umbrage to the  
 courts of Versailles and Madrid, though not far  
 enough to render any real service to the emperor,

Hostile In-  
clination of  
the Court.Parliament  
averse to  
War.



BOOK IX. who had flattered himself with the hope of a revival of the grand alliance in his favor.

1735.

Subsidy to  
Denmark  
ridiculed,  
exposed,  
and  
granted.

Mr. Horace Walpole was not discouraged, however, from almost immediately moving for a subsidy to Denmark, pursuant to a treaty entered into by his majesty with the king of Denmark for that purpose; and which originated, according to the allegations of the mover, in a just and proper regard to the preservation of the *balance of power* in Europe\*—an expression so incessantly in the mouth of this minister, that he was commonly known under the ludicrous appellation of *Balance-master*. The leaders of opposition treated the motion with indignant contempt. “All the powers of Europe,” it was affirmed, “were as much or more interested in

\* The secret history of this Danish subsidy has already been transiently alluded to. It is a *mystery of state*, involved in too much obscurity and perplexity to be fully and completely developed. By this treaty, eighty crowns were allowed for each horseman, and thirty for every foot soldier: one half to be paid immediately on signing the treaty, and the remainder when the troops shall be *delivered*. Besides this, his majesty the king of Great Britain engages to pay to his majesty the king of Denmark the annual sum of 250,000 crowns *banco*, till such time as the said troops shall be taken into full pay, and the sum of 150,000 crowns yearly afterwards. What a happiness for Britain, that the equipoise of the political balance, whenever disordered, may be so easily re-adjusted by the judicious application of these golden weights!



the preservation of this *balance* as England ; and BOOK IX.  
1735. should it ever be really endangered, they would certainly engage in its defence, without being hired to do so by British subsidies. But were England perpetually the first to take the alarm, and should this practice of subsidising be established, every state would expect a gratification for doing what it would otherwise be obliged to do for its own preservation, and the whole charge of maintaining this balance would fall upon Great Britain. Even our allies the States General might at last refuse to assist in trimming this balance, unless the grand pensionary of Holland were also to become the *grand pensionary* of England." The question being put, the motion was approved, and the subsidy granted by the house, though no less than 178 members gave their unavailing voices against it. The session closing in May (1735), the king thanked his faithful commons for the supplies they had granted with such cheerfulness and dispatch ; and immediately after the prorogation his majesty embarked for the continent, leaving the queen, as usual, sole regent during his absence.

For several years past, a strict amity had subsisted between the two courts of Madrid and Lisbon, which was, in the year 1728, cemented by a double marriage of the royal families—the prince of Asturias espousing the eldest princess



BOOK IX. of Portugal, and the prince of Brazil the infant  
1735. of Spain, formerly affianced to Lewis XV. king  
of France—the courts meeting in a temporary  
edifice erected over the bed of the Coya, which  
divides the two kingdoms, where the princesses  
were exchanged. In the course of this year,  
however, the good understanding between them  
was unhappily interrupted by a frivolous dispute,  
originating in a real or pretended violation of  
the privileges of the ambassador of Portugal  
resident at Madrid. The quarrel ran so high,  
that the ministers of the two crowns were re-  
called, and warlike preparations made on each  
side. The king of Portugal, conscious of his  
inability to encounter the power of Spain, nomi-  
nated Don Antonio d'Alzeveda as his ambassador  
extraordinary to the court of London, to solicit  
the aid and protection of his ally the king of  
Great Britain. By the efficacious assistance of  
England had the independency of Portugal and  
the rights of the ducal and royal house of Bra-  
ganza been ultimately established, after a con-  
test of twenty-eight years; and as a just com-  
pensation for this great service, very important  
commercial privileges were conceded to the  
English nation by the crown of Portugal. Thus  
the interests of that opulent but feeble kingdom  
became inseparably connected with those of  
Great Britain; and upon this potent alliance

Dispute  
between  
Spain and  
Portugal.



she chiefly depended, and still depends, for her BOOK IX.  
 existence as a distinct and sovereign power. 1735.  
 Don Pedro, who succeeded to the throne on the  
 deposition of his brother Alphonso, died A. D.  
 1706, after a reign of thirty years. His son,  
 Don Juan, faithfully adhered to the political  
 engagements entered into by his father as a  
 party in the grand alliance against the house of  
 Bourbon: but after the conclusion of the treaty  
 of Utrecht, the court of Lisbon had cautiously  
 avoided involving herself in the various conten-  
 tions of the European powers. Upon the present Powerful  
Interposi-  
tion of  
Great Bri-  
tain.  
 occasion, the court of London adopted, without  
 hesitation, measures the most vigorous and de-  
 cisive. A powerful fleet, under the command of  
 sir John Norris, sailed for the Tagus (June 1735,) in  
 order to protect the coasts and the commerce of  
 Portugal; and particularly to convoy the Bra-  
 zil fleet, then shortly expected richly laden,  
 in safety to Lisbon. And Mr. Keene, the Bri-  
 tish envoy at Madrid, was expressly commanded  
 to communicate to his catholic majesty the reso-  
 lution of the king of England to grant effectual  
 succours to his ally. Notwithstanding some  
 angry complaints on the part of Spain of the  
 partial conduct of England; this interposition  
 completely answered the purpose intended by it;  
 and an accommodation took place between the



BOOK IX. courts of Spain and Portugal before the conclusion of the year.

1736.

Session of  
Parliament.

The parliament met for the second time January 15, 1736. After mentioning the happy turn which the affairs of Europe had taken, and observing that a plan of pacification had been proposed by England in conjunction with the States General, and that the emperor and France had separately concerted the preliminaries for obtaining that end, the king said, "It appearing upon due examination that these articles do not essentially vary from the plan proposed by me and the States, nor contain any thing prejudicial to the equilibrium of Europe, or to the rights and interests of our respective subjects, we thought fit, in pursuance of our constant purpose to contribute our utmost towards a pacification, to declare, by a joint resolution to the courts of Vienna and France, our approbation of the said preliminaries, and our readiness to concur in a treaty to be made for bringing them to perfection." On this occasion the addresses in both houses were carried without a division; the wisdom of the measures adopted by the ministry, and the beneficial result of them, being such as to silence all opposition. Of these measures, so justly applauded for their prudence and policy, it cannot, at the close of this perplexing



business, be unacceptable to exhibit a general and connected view.

BOOK IX.

1736.

In December 1733 we find, from a very valuable paper extant in the hand-writing of sir Robert Walpole\*, that sagacious minister reasoning deeply with himself upon the part which it might eventually be incumbent upon Great Britain to take in the present circumstances. His conclusions are, 1st, That this is not a *casus fœderis*; the alliance with Austria being defensive merely, and the emperor by his imprudence having given the first cause of offence. 2dly, That upon no account would it be adviseable for England to enter, except conjointly with Holland, into this war, of which (says he), *when once begun no man can foresee or determine the conclusion.* 3dly, As to the concessions proper to be made in order to avoid so great an evil, he seems to entertain no doubt but that an accommodation might be effected, if Spain were gratified in her eager wish to accomplish a marriage between Don Carlos and either of the archduchesses. "To the emperor," says he, "we shall be inexcusable if we obstruct this only measure of saving himself from destruction, and do not at the same time assist him in what he calls his just demands. To Spain our conduct will be thought most provok-

Sagacious  
Policy of  
the Mini-  
ster.

\* Coxe's State Papers.



BOOK IX.

1736.

ing if we defeat their most favorite scheme, and rather choose to enter into a war against them than submit to their terms of reconciliation with the emperor. If the chief apprehension is, that such a marriage would tend to aggrandise the house of Bourbon, and make them hereafter upon future events formidable to all Europe, let it be considered how great and imminent is the present danger; and whether the course of another year's successful campaign may not make the house of Bourbon immediately masters of all Europe; in which case we should bring immediately upon ourselves the mischiefs which we only apprehend may happen in future times. Has consanguinity or relation by marriages ever among princes outweighed the present interest of the princes concerned? What has been hitherto the case between France and Spain? What regard has France shown to the court of Turin but for interest? What effect has the alliance between the houses of Hanover and Berlin?"

All this is sound and excellent political reasoning; but in reality, the emperor, jealous in the extreme lest the Austrian succession should eventually devolve to any branch of the house of Bourbon, had never for a moment seriously harboured the intention of bestowing either of the archduchesses upon Don Carlos. By gross imprudence he now found himself entangled in a



situation from which it was not possible, by any BOOK IX.  
 exertion of force or device of policy, for his <sup>1736.</sup>  
 friends to extricate him without loss and dis-  
 grace. Possessed however with an high and <sup>Pride and</sup>  
 even extravagant idea of the power of Great <sup>Obstinacy</sup>  
 Britain, in consequence, doubtless, of the splendid <sup>of the Em-</sup>  
 successes of the duke of Marlborough in the war <sup>peror.</sup>  
 of the succession—yet recent in his memory—he  
 not only neglected to take the necessary precau-  
 tions for his own defence, but resolutely persisted  
 in refusing to make those concessions which the  
 exigency of his affairs demanded; relying with  
 the utmost confidence on the eventual interposi-  
 tion of the maritime powers.

The emperor had even omitted to engage in  
 his interests the king of Sardinia, whose alliance  
 had on all former and similar occasions been  
 considered as of the highest importance, and  
 whose predilections were strongly in favor of  
 the house of Austria. In a letter addressed by  
 this monarch to the king of Great Britain,  
 March 1734, he says—"Votre majesté trouva  
 mieux de travailler elle-même à m'unir avec  
 l'empereur. Je lui confiai tous mes sentimens,  
 et j'eus lieu de croire qu'elle les trouva raisonnables.  
 Mais le mépris bien marqué que la cour de Vi-  
 enne affecta à mon égard dans tout le cours de  
 cette longue négociation m'en firent enfin des-  
 espérer le succès." Such being the absurd policy



BOOK IX. of the imperial cabinet, the courts of London  
 1736. and the Hague showed themselves very reluctant

Discretion  
 and Mode-  
 ration of the  
 States Ge-  
 neral.

to become parties in the quarrel. The States General had even already concluded a convention of neutrality with France for the Austrian Netherlands ; and they declared without reserve to Mr. Horace Walpole, on his arrival at the Hague (April 1734), their opinion “ that the emperor should be undeceived in his views and expectations, and given to understand, that, since the war began from the Polish election, in which the maritime powers have no concern, and since the losses in Italy arose from his own weak and defenceless condition, it cannot be expected that England and Holland should go into a war to recover dominions for the emperor lost by his own neglect ; and, consequently, that he should think of losing something to save the whole, whilst he is in no condition to withstand so formidable an alliance\*.”

In the month of July, 1734, the emperor, in a long dispatch to count Kinski the imperial ambassador in London, states the causes of his discontent and uneasiness with regard to England. His imperial majesty declares, that, since the conclusion of the treaty of Vienna in March 1731, he has taken no step without the advice and concur-

\* Coxe's State Papers, vol. iii. p. 164.



rence of the king of England, particularly in all that related to Poland. He speaks of the Walpoles as his determined enemies; and that he had represented to the king himself, hitherto without effect, the imminent danger which threatened to overwhelm not only the house of Austria but all Europe. He commands his ambassador to let the king of England know, that he never will consent to the plan of pacification then in agitation, and had rather suffer the worst extremities than accede to such disadvantageous terms. In October 1734 we find Mr. H. Walpole complaining, in a secret letter to queen Caroline, of the pride and invincible pertinacity of the emperor. He predicts that the Austrians will be driven out of Italy next spring; and he urges, that his imperial majesty should be undeceived in thinking that their majesties of Great Britain are for him, but that the British ministry is against him. This notion of the emperor was however not altogether unfounded: the king was strongly inclined to adopt vigorous, or, more properly speaking, violent measures in favor of the emperor, whose hopes were kept alive by the tenor of count Kinski's dispatches, though it was morally certain that England, by embarking in the war, could have given him no effectual assistance. Lord Harrington paid his court to the king by fostering these dangerous prepossessions;

BOOK IX.  
1736.

Imprudent  
Ardour of  
the King.



BOOK IX. but the queen employed her whole influence  
1736. in support of the pacific system of the Walpoles. In November 1734, lord Harrington penned the draft of a secret dispatch to Mr. Horace Walpole breathing a very warlike spirit. He declares the king to be more and more convinced of the necessity there is for his majesty and the States to be prepared against all events—"His majesty has a very considerable fleet ready for service in his ports; he is raising near 10,000 additional landsmen, has already contracted for 6000 Danes, and is negotiating the same number in Sweden." The ambassador is commanded "to press with the greatest warmth a speedy augmentation of the Dutch forces; and, in case the States will in secret authorise the king to give assurances to the emperor of their favorable disposition, he will endeavour to prevail on his imperial majesty to detach a body of forces from the Rhine to the Low Countries, and also send himself 10,000 men to assist in the defence of their frontier."

This imprudent letter was transmitted to sir Robert Walpole, then at Houghton, who with little ceremony, and greatly to the chagrin of lord Harrington, declaring his entire disapprobation of it. An indigested plan of preliminaries, drawn up by the same nobleman, met with the same fate. The king, as the duke of Newcastle



informs sir Robert Walpole, was much embar-  
 rassed with this difference of opinion amongst  
 his ministers. At length, January 1735, an  
 admirable letter, *signed* by lord Harrington,  
 was transmitted to Mr. Robinson, envoy at  
 Vienna, not only stating with perspicuity, but  
 enforcing with the highest display of ability and  
 energy, the terms on which the maritime powers  
 proposed, and believed themselves competent to  
 obtain, an immediate and general peace—*Namely*,  
 that the Sicilies should be ceded to Don Carlos in  
 lieu of the duchies of Parma and Placentia, and the  
 reversion of Tuscany transferred to the emperor ;  
 that the Milanese should be restored, excepting  
 the districts of Novara and Tortona, actually in  
 possession (together with the entire duchy of  
 Milan) of the allied powers, to the king of Sar-  
 dinia ; that the elector of Saxony should be ac-  
 knowledged king of Poland, Stanislaus retaining  
 the regal title ; and that the Bourbon crowns  
 should join in the guarantee of the Pragmatic  
 Sanction.

Though the envoy Robinson was ordered to  
 urge upon the consideration of the imperial court  
 “ how extremely different was the present situa-  
 tion of the emperor from that of the powers with  
 whom he was to treat—both what is to be yielded  
 to him, and what he is to yield, being already in  
 their possession”—the Cæsarean pride seemed in

BOOK IX.

1736.

Terms  
proposed  
by the  
Maritime  
Powers.



BOOK IX. no wise abated ; and a clear and specific answer  
 1736. could by no means be obtained. It was only demanded whether the maritime powers would arm in defence of the house of Austria, if the allies should reject the plan. To this artful and unpleasant inquiry a plain and positive declaration was after some delay returned, that they would not on any consideration engage in the war. The truth was, that the Walpoles very justly conceived the balance of power in Europe to be little if at all affected by any exchanges of territory in Italy ; and they would not be precluded from acceding to any reasonable modification of the proposed plan on the part of France. But this declaration was received at Vienna with a mixture of rage and despondency. Count Zinzendorf protested, “ that the only means left for the emperor was to set fire to the four corners of the world ; and to perish, if he must perish, in the general conflagration.” Even prince Eugene affirmed, “ that the wisest measure the emperor could follow was to recall all his forces into his hereditary dominions, and suffer France to take the rest, if the maritime powers had no concern for them.” The enemies of the house of Austria, it was said, would surely not require Vienna.

Indignant-  
ly rejected  
by the  
Court of  
Vienna.

In Italy, the affairs of the emperor were now reduced to extremity. Count Konigsegg was



compelled to retire into the Tyrol ; and Mantua BOOK IX.  
1736.  
alone remained of all the imperial possessions in that country. Such was the conflict of contending passions in the mind of the emperor at this period as to excite alarming apprehensions of the consequences. “ During the dead of the night,” writes Mr. Robinson to lord Harrington, “ and while singly with the empress, he gave a loose to his affliction, confusion, and despair\*.” Firm, nevertheless, to its purpose, and equally unmoved by the menaces and supplications of the emperor, the court of London proceeded in its pre-concerted plan of pacification. In August 1735, the English ambassador at Paris, lord Waldegrave, held a secret and confidential conference with cardinal Fleury on the subject of peace ; and Tuscany being mentioned, the cardinal declared, peremptorily, that the emperor could not have it. Lord Waldegrave then proposed the ultimatum of the maritime powers ; viz. the exchange of that duchy for Lorraine. His eminence immediately cleared up his countenance, and owned it was the only thing that could satisfy the French nation. A good understanding being thus established between the courts of London and Versailles, and the court of Vienna having now had time to cool, Mr. Robinson was ordered to propose to the imperial ministers the alternative of

\* Coxe's Memoirs of Walpole, vol. i. p. 462.



BOOK IX. <sup>1736.</sup> this plan, or that of the marriage of Don Carlos with an archduchess. To the latter they manifested a fixed and insuperable aversion; but to the former they hearkened with symptoms of secret complacency. The emperor in person condescended to intimate to Mr. Robinson the possibility of his acceding to this proposition. But still irritated at the failure of his lofty expectations, he determined that England should not have the honor of mediating the peace. A direct negotiation was therefore set on foot with the court of Versailles; and in November Mr. Robinson received from prince Eugene a project or *précis* of articles, as agreed upon by the two courts, to which the assent of the maritime powers was requested. And the court of London, little solicitous as to the mode of reconciliation, signifying her entire concurrence in the plan, preliminaries of peace were signed by all the belligerent powers early in the following year, 1736—not however without extreme reluctance and chagrin on the part of Spain, whose ambitious projects of aggrandisement in Italy both France and Sardinia were, fortunately for the emperor, strongly inclined to oppose and counteract. His Sardinian majesty, conformably to the subtle policy of the house of Savoy although his forces were acting in concert with those of France and Spain hesitated not in a letter to the king

Peace of  
Europe re-  
stored.



of England, to avow his purpose of joining the BOOK IX.  
 maritime powers in any measures of hostility 1736.  
 necessary to prevent the Spanish branch of the  
 house of Bourbon from effecting the expulsion of  
 the emperor from Lombardy; knowing, as he  
 said, that he himself should be the next sacri-  
 fice.

Such was the wise and excellent conduct by  
 which that able minister who now presided over  
 the affairs of Britain brought to a speedy and for-  
 tunate termination his anxious endeavours to re-  
 store the tranquillity of Europe, threatened with  
 the prospect of an universal and most destructive  
 war: and so striking was the contrast between  
 his caution, mildness, and moderation, and the  
 rashness, arrogance, and folly, which have cha-  
 racterised the more presuming statesmen of mo-  
 dern times.

The present session of parliament was distin-  
 guished chiefly by a motion made in the house of  
 commons, March 1736, for the repeal of those  
 clauses in the test act which barred or obstructed  
 the admission of *protestant dissenters* to civil  
 employments. This motion, though ably sup-  
 ported, seems to have been somewhat unadvised  
 and unseasonable—as being brought forward not  
 merely without the concurrence, but contrary to  
 the inclination of the court, and at a juncture in  
 no respect favorable to its success. It is not,

Motion for  
 a Repeal  
 of the Test  
 Act.



BOOK IX. however, to be inferred, that the court was really  
1736. adverse to the purport of the motion abstractedly considered; but the minister well knew the risk and obloquy which might attend his open and avowed support of this measure. He recollected, doubtless, that the utmost influence of the crown had been unavailingly exerted in the late reign to procure the repeal of these clauses, when a bill for that purpose was moved by the late earl Stanhope. His popularity had lately sustained a rude shock, in consequence of the attempt made to extend and invigorate the operation of the laws of revenue; and he dreaded lest the cry of DANGER TO THE CHURCH should produce effects still more detrimental to his credit and safety than that which still vibrated in his ears, of LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND NO EXCISE! Although he had, previously to the late election, flattered the dissenters with the hope of relief, he thought proper, therefore, when the motion was actually made, to oppose the repeal, as in present circumstances inexpedient, impolitic, and improper; in consequence of which it was rejected by a very great majority\*. The motion

\* "An affair," says the historian Tindal, "happened this year (*i. e.* the year preceding the general election of 1734), which made a great noise with the public. The dissenters, having always EMINENTLY distinguished themselves in support of the present establishment, thought it was hard that



was, by a fruitless and injudicious perseverance, revived in a subsequent session of this parliament, when it was again negatived by the same ministerial majority. It is remarkable, however, that no considerable or lasting resentment appears to have been excited in the breasts of the dissenters in consequence of this disappointment, so well was it understood that the king was himself strongly disposed to favor the repeal, and that the minister was actuated by motives, not of animosity, but of an urgent and over-ruling political necessity. It must not be omitted, that in this session the parliament repealed the laws which required that dissenters should lie under the lash of the disqualifying laws of the corporation and test acts, which were originally meant only to disqualify papists. They therefore had several meetings, and at last chose a committee, to consider when, and in what manner, to apply for the repealing, or explaining, part of those acts.—Though the minister and all his friends in both houses were extremely well disposed in favour of this application, yet he was afraid of encouraging it. The least spark, considering the temper the nation was in, might have set it in a flame. He had seen what dreadful effects had attended the ridiculous outcry of the CHURCH being in DANGER. He knew the influence of his enemies without doors, and their readiness to lay hold of every circumstance that could distress his person or the public service—He took great pains to explain all those particulars to the chief men amongst them who came to solicit him for his interest, and he had the good fortune to succeed so well as to convince them of the reasonableness of their desisting from their application for that time."



BOOK IX. ancient statutes against conjuration and witchcraft, thereby relieving the English judicial code from a small part of that heavy load of trumpery, absurdity, and oppression, by which, in the worse than Egyptian darkness of past ages, it had been so unhappily and dreadfully disgraced.

1736.

Ancient  
Statutes  
against  
Conjura-  
tion and  
Witch-  
craft re-  
pealed.

Origin and  
Progress of  
the Metho-  
dists.

About this time a new sect of religionists arose, distinguished by the appellation of *Methodists*, who soon appeared to be divided into two distinct classes under their respective leaders, Whitfield and Wesley—priests of the English church, regularly educated and ordained—the first of them adopting the Calvinistic, the latter the Arminian dogmas in theology; corresponding in this respect to the sects of Jansenists and Molinists in the Gallican church. Professing still to adhere to the communion of the church of England, of which they boasted themselves to be the only true and genuine members, they yet indulged in the wildest flights and extravagancies of sectarian fanaticism—preaching in the fields to vast multitudes—suffering with patience every insult and outrage—and persisting, at the extreme peril of their lives, in those spiritual labors to which they conceived themselves called by a sort of supernatural impulse\*. Many respecta-

\* “God in the Scripture,” says one of the leaders of this sect, in very elevated language, “commands me, according to my power, to instruct the ignorant, reform the wicked, and



ble persons were of opinion, that the government BOOK IX.  
ought in some mode to interfere in order to check 1736.  
these novel and dangerous ebullitions of enthusiasm. But to the honour of the government, not only was the idea of persecution in every form rejected with abhorrence, but the protection of the law was extended to them upon all occasions: and the wisdom of maintaining inviolate the grand principle of TOLERATION has rarely appeared in a more striking point of view. In a few years the fanatical fervors characteristic of a new sect, not being irritated and inflamed by the opposition of the civil powers, gradually subsided; and though the number of proselytes was prodigious—part remaining in, and part seceding from, the established church—no injury to the community has resulted from this diffusion of methodistic principles. On the contrary, the good effects of their moral and religious instructions, though still blended with much speculative absurdity and mysticism, are at this time appa-

confirm the virtuous. A dispensation of the Gospel is committed to me, and woe is me if I preach not the Gospel! In whatever part of the world I am, I judge it meet, right, and my bounden duty, to declare unto all that are willing to hear the glad tidings of salvation. This is the work which I *know* God hath called me unto. And if it be his pleasure to throw down the walls of Jericho, not by the engines of war, but by the blasts of rams' horns, who shall say unto him, What doest thou?

HAMPTON'S *Life of Wesley*.



BOOK IX. rent in the orderly and virtuous conduct of thou-  
sands in their communities, who would otherwise  
have been sunk in the depths of ignorance, vice,  
and barbarism. And truth and justice require  
the acknowledgment, that many, both of the  
clergy and laity, who now pass under the vague  
and popular denomination of methodists, are per-  
sons of the highest worth, talents, and respecta-  
bility.

Remarkable Tumult  
in Edinburgh.

The tranquillity which prevailed throughout  
the kingdom at this time was unhappily inter-  
rupted by a tumult of a very singular nature,  
which took place in the city of Edinburgh dur-  
ing the absence of the king. It happened that  
at the execution of a man convicted under cir-  
cumstances of peculiar hardship, by trial in the  
court of admiralty, as a smuggler, the military  
guard which attended were grossly insulted by  
the populace; in revenge of which, captain Por-  
teous, the commandant, was provoked to order  
the soldiers to fire upon the people without the  
previous sanction of the magistrate. In conse-  
quence of this rash and precipitate order, several  
innocent persons suffering the loss of their lives,  
Porteous was tried for murder, convicted, and  
received sentence of death; but the queen, as  
regent, thought fit to grant him a reprieve. The  
populace of Edinburgh, nevertheless, exasperated  
in the highest degree at the conduct of this offi-



cer, who was well known to be a man of abandoned morals, determined that he should not escape punishment ; and on the very evening of the day on which, according to his sentence, he was destined to suffer, the prison of the Tolbooth was forced with such order and deliberate resolution, as afforded a strong presumption that it was the result of a plot formed by persons far above the rank of those usually concerned in similar outrages. Leaving the delinquent suspended by the neck from a dyer's pole, they quickly and quietly dispersed ; nor was it ever discovered who were the perpetrators of this daring act of violence, notwithstanding a reward of 200*l.* was offered by a proclamation for such detection.

In the course of the session, which commenced Feb. 1, 1737, the government, inflamed with resentment at this atrocious violation of the laws, instituted a parliamentary inquiry into the circumstances of this extraordinary affair ; in the course of which three Scottish judges in their robes were examined as witnesses at the bar of the house of lords. And though it did not appear that the magistrates had been anywise deficient in their duty upon this occasion, a bill was brought in for disabling Alexander Wilson, lord provost of Edinburgh, from holding any office of magistracy in Great Britain—for imprisoning the said Alexander Wilson—for abolishing the

Proceed-  
ings upon  
it in Par-  
liament.



BOOK IX. <sup>1737.</sup> guard of that city, and for taking away the gates of the Nether-bow-port, which during this transaction had been shut in order to prevent the troops quartered in the suburbs from entering the city. This bill was opposed by almost all the Scottish representatives, and many other respectable members of both houses, with great vehemence; and the duke of Argyle, in particular, arguing against the principle of it, said, “that he could not think of a measure more harsh or unprecedented than the present bill; and he believed there was no instance of the whole weight of parliamentary indignation falling upon any individual, and far less upon any community, for crimes that were within the reach of the inferior courts of justice: that should the present bill pass into a law, the lord provost and citizens of Edinburgh would suffer by a cruel, unjust, and fantastical proceeding—a proceeding of which the worst use might be made if ever the nation should have the misfortune to fall under a vindictive, arbitrary, and tyrannical administration”—an observation which, after an interval of near forty years, recurred very forcibly to the public recollection.

The opposition in the house of commons—where the bill was defended certainly with faint, probably with reluctant, efforts by the minister, whose sagacity was clearly awake to the folly of this



procedure—was still more vehement than in that of the lords. In support of the petitions against it, four acts of the Scottish parliament before the union were read, which accurately pointed out the penalties to be inflicted upon magistrates deficient in their duty ; but in no wise countenancing any violation, such as the present bill contained, on the franchises of the city. The act of union itself ratified and established the rights and privileges of the royal burghs in the strongest terms ; and the evidence adduced in support of the criminal allegations of the bill was—to use the language of a cotemporary historian—“ so vague, confused, and uncertain, that nothing but the respect owing to her majesty’s person and government could have saved it from being thrown out ; for, when it came to be committed, the commitment of it was carried by a majority of no more than six votes—124 against 118\*.” It was indeed evident to common sense, that this was a case which neither required, nor consequently justified, so extraordinary an interposition of legislative power—the existing laws being fully adequate to the punishment of the offences affirmed, but never satisfactorily proved, to have been committed by the magistracy of the Scottish metropolis. The most obnoxious clauses

BOOK IX.  
1737.

\* Tindal, vol. xx. p. 342.



BOOK IX.

1737.

Extraordi-  
nary Pe-  
nalties im-  
posed.

were at length rejected, and the whole reduced to an act, disabling the provost from holding any office under government, and imposing a fine of two thousand pounds upon the corporation of Edinburgh for the benefit of the widow of Porteous. The bill in its altered state was returned to the lords, who agreed to the amendments.

This was accompanied by a second bill, containing extraordinary provisions for the more effectual bringing to justice the murderers of captain Porteous; and which was ordered to be read for a stated time by the Scottish clergy from their pulpits. Both bills were received with great and inexpressible indignation by the whole Scottish nation. None were ever legally convicted of the murder, notwithstanding the publicity of the fact; and this rash and passionate attempt to vindicate the honor of the crown, by insulting the majesty and wounding the feelings of the people, afforded a new proof of the truth and justice of the observation of the celebrated chancellor Oxenstierne, "that it is wonderful by how small a portion of wisdom the world is governed." In the stead of these impolitic measures of revenge and degradation, occasion might have been taken from this incident, supposing it to indicate any want of energy in the executive power, had a more liberal spirit prevailed, to restore to Scotland those distinctions of national honour and



authority, of which that kingdom had been un-BOOK IX.  
necessarily and invidiously divested by, or since, 1737.  
the treaty of union. There appears no just reason why Scotland should not have its own resident great officers of state; why its privy council should be annihilated; why the high commissioner of the crown should not, as in the times preceding the union, be enabled to support his elevated rank and station in a manner suitable to the national dignity: and why the royal palace of the kings of Scotland should be suffered to exhibit a picture of melancholy and decay, scarcely to be distinguished from the ruins of Balclutha.—“I have seen,” says the ancient bard of Caledonia, the walls of Balclutha, but they were desolate. The fire had resounded in the halls, but the voice of the people is heard no more. The stream of the Clutha is removed from its place by the fall of the walls. The thistle shook there its lonely head; the moss whistled to the wind. The fox looked out from the windows; the rank grass of the wall waved round his head. Desolate is the dwelling of Moina; silence is in the house of her fathers.”

In the spring of the preceding year, April 1736, Marriage of  
had been celebrated the marriage of the prince of the Prince  
Wales, now considered as the determined enemy of Wales.  
of the minister, and the head of the opposition,  
with Augusta princess of Saxe Gotha; and in the



BOOK IX. <sup>1737.</sup> course of the present session a motion was made by Mr. Pulteney, and seconded by sir John Barnard, for an address to the king, that he would be pleased to settle 100,000*l.* per annum out of the civil list revenues upon the prince. This was violently opposed by the courtiers as an encroachment upon the king's prerogative; and it was finally negatived by a majority of thirty voices, the numbers being 234 to 204, though not without producing an entire alienation between the two courts of St. James's and Leicester-House. The prince of Wales highly resented, and with great apparent reason, that, out of a civil list of 800,000*l.* *per annum*, a revenue of 50,000*l.* *per annum* only should be allotted to him, although his father, when prince, had 100,000*l.* *per annum* out of a civil list of 700,000*l.* Nor does the sum required by the prince appear to have been more than adequate to the superiority of his rank and station. As this resolution of the prince to appeal to parliament embarrassed many who held places under the government, and were at the same time desirous to keep on fair terms with the successor, he was advised by Mr. Doddington (afterwards lord Melcombe), whom he admitted into his confidence, to apply for an additional grant of 50,000*l.* *per annum*; but the prince replied with a generosity truly noble, "that the nation had done enough for his family already, and that he



would rather beg his bread from door to door than be a further charge to them." Many of the stories, regarding the motion as dangerously democratic, left the house in a body previous to the division, though sir William Wyndham had taken upon him to answer to the prince for their concurrence.

BOOK IX.  
1737.

The theatre in the metropolis of Britain having been recently, in various instances, abused, as in ancient times at Athens, to the purposes of personal and political satire, a bill was at this period introduced for the prevention of this great and growing evil : agreeably to the provisions of which, no new dramatic pieces could be exhibited without the express license first obtained of the lord chamberlain. This bill passed through both houses with little opposition, excepting that which it met with from the earl of Chesterfield, who combated the principle of it with much animation and eloquence. His lordship declared, " that he regarded this measure as of a very extraordinary and dangerous nature ; as a restraint not on the licentiousness merely, but on the liberty of the stage ; and as tending to a still more dangerous restraint on the liberty of the press, which was intimately and inseparably connected with the general liberty of the subject. He affirmed the laws, as they at present stood, to be sufficient for the purpose of punishing seditious or

Bill for  
licensing  
the Drama.

Animated  
Opposition  
of the Earl  
of Chester-  
field.



BOOK IX. immoral performances. The best and indeed  
1737. the only mode of avoiding public ridicule and  
censure was, he said, to avoid ridiculous and vicious actions; for the people will neither ridicule those they love and esteem, nor suffer them to be ridiculed. An administration destitute of esteem or respect among the people will be censured and ridiculed, nor will the severest edicts be found of force to prevent it. If we agree to the bill now before us, what shadow of excuse can be suggested for refusing to proceed a step further, and to extend the prohibition to printing and publishing those dramas which are deemed unfit for public exhibition? Still political satires will appear under the title of Novels, Secret History, Dialogues, &c.; but will you allow, my lords, a libel to be printed and dispersed only because it does not bear the title of a play? Thus, from the precedent before us, we shall be gradually prevailed upon to revive a general IMPRIMATUR, and then adieu to the liberties of Great Britain! I admit, my lords, that the stage ought not to meddle with politics; but for this very reason, among others, I object to the bill before us! for I fear it will be the occasion of its meddling with nothing else—it will be made subservient to the politics of the court only. This we know was actually the case in king Charles the Second's days; we know that Dryden, the poet-laureat of



that reign, made his wit and genius thus subser-BOOK IX.  
vient to the designs of the court. When the se-  
cond Dutch war was in contemplation, he wrote  
his 'Amboyna,' in which he represents the  
people of Holland as avaricious, cruel, and un-  
grateful. When the exclusion bill was moved  
for, he wrote his 'Duke of Guise,' in which those  
who were zealous for preserving and securing the  
liberties and religion of their country were ex-  
posed as a faction leagued together for the pur-  
pose of excluding a virtuous and heroic prince  
from that throne which was his lawful right, on  
account of his adopting a faith different from their  
own. The peculiar province of the stage, my  
lords, is, to expose those vices and follies which  
the laws cannot lay hold of; but, under the re-  
straint of an arbitrary court license, it will be en-  
tirely perverted from its proper use. To a man  
bred in the habits of a court, that may appear to  
be a libel against the court which is only a just  
and salutary satire upon its vices and follies.  
Courtiers, my lords, are too polite to reprove one  
another; the only place where they can meet  
with any just rebuke is a free though not a liden-  
tious stage. But by this bill, instead of leaving  
it what it now is, and always ought to be—a  
scourge for fashionable vices—it will be converted  
into a channel for propagating them throughout  
the kingdom. Let us consider, my lords, that



BOOK IX. arbitrary power has seldom or never been intro-  
1737. duced into any country but by slow degrees, step  
by step, lest the people should perceive its ap-  
proach. When the preparatory steps are made,  
the people may then indeed see slavery and ar-  
bitrary power making huge and hideous strides  
over the land, when it is too late to avert the im-  
pending ruin. The bill before us I consider as a  
step very necessary to this purpose ; and should  
such design ever be formed by any ambitious  
king or guilty minister, he would have reason to  
thank us for having so far facilitated his attempt ;  
though such thanks, I am convinced, every one of  
your lordships would blush to receive, and scorn  
to deserve.” The ill effects apprehended by this  
generous and patriotic nobleman have not, how-  
ever, been as yet very apparent ; and it must be  
acknowledged, that in a very few instances only  
does the invidious discretion vested by this bill in  
the lord chamberlain seem to have been capri-  
ciously or improperly exercised\*.

\* The GUSTAVUS VASA of Brooke, the MUSTAPHA of Mallet, and the EDWARD and ELEONORA of Thomson, were in the number of the dramas rejected under the authority of this act. The first of these performances is animated throughout by a noble and enthusiastic spirit of liberty ; but the writer protests in his prefatory remarks, “ that he had nothing to fear or hope from party or preferment—his attachments were only to truth ; that he was conscious of no other principles, and was far from apprehending that such could be of-



In the course of the same session the house of commons having resolved itself into a grand committee to take into consideration the state of the national debt, sir John Barnard, member for the city of London, a man whose patriotism was fensive." There were, however, some passages in this tragedy which could not fail to be invidiously applied, if they could be supposed not invidiously designed. A specimen or two may suffice.

BOOK IX.  
1737.  
Motion of  
Sir John  
Barnard  
for redu-  
cing the  
Interest of  
the Public  
Debt.

"Are ye not mark'd, ye men of Dalecarlia,  
Are ye not mark'd by all the circling world?  
—Say, is not liberty the thirst, the food,  
The scope and bright ambition of your souls?  
Why else have you and your renowned forefathers,  
From the proud summit of their glittering thrones,  
Cast down the mightiest of your lawful kings  
That dar'd the bold infringement? What but liberty,  
Through the fam'd course of thirteen hundred years,  
Aloof hath held invasion from your hills,  
And sanctified their shade? And will ye, will ye  
Shrink from the hopes of the expecting world?  
Bid your high honors stoop to FOREIGN INSULT?  
And in one hour give up to infamy  
The harvest of a thousand years of glory?"

\* \* \* \* \*

"Where is that power whose engines are of force  
To bend the brave and virtuous man to slavery?  
Base fear, the laziness of lust, gross appetites,  
These are the ladders and the grovelling footstool  
From whence the tyrant rises on our wrongs.  
Secure, and sceptred in the soul's servility,  
He has debauch'd the Genius of our country,  
And rides triumphant, while her captive sons  
Await his nod—the silken slaves of pleasure."



BOOK IX. dignified by the extent of his knowledge, the  
1737. soundness of his understanding, and the benevo-  
lence of his heart, moved for a bill to enable his  
majesty to raise money either by the sale of an-  
nuities, or by borrowing at an interest not ex-  
ceeding three *per cent.*, which sum so raised  
should be applied towards the redemption of the  
South-Sea annuities, allowing the preference of  
subscription to the annuitants. Sir John Bar-  
nard remarked, “ that even those public securities  
which bore an interest of three *per cent.* only  
were now considerably above *par*; therefore there  
could be no room to doubt that the subscription  
would immediately fill, were it a condition of the  
contract that the principal should be made irre-  
deemable for the term of fourteen years. When  
the South-Sea annuitants were thus reduced, the  
same plan might be adopted for redeeming the  
capital of the other trading companies, and in  
time of the whole public debt, without any vio-  
lation of the public faith; that, by this means, the  
sinking fund would be so much increased, that in  
a few years the parliament would be able to an-  
nihilate those taxes which lay heaviest upon the  
laboring and manufacturing poor; and that the  
remaining part of it, if faithfully applied, would,  
in a short time, free the nation from all incum-  
brances.” By this motion, at once so popular,  
feasible, and beneficial, the minister seemed much



embarrassed; and it was clearly discernible that the executive government entertained no real wish or intention that the public debt, which so materially added both to its influence and its security, should ever be liquidated. In order, therefore, to counteract the effect of a motion, which it would have been too hazardous openly and directly to oppose, Mr. Winnington, a zealous partisan of the minister, moved that all the public creditors, as well as the South-Sea annuitants, should be comprehended. To this sir John Barnard objected, "that it might be easy for the government to borrow money at three *per cent.* sufficient for the redemption of a certain proportion of the public debt, though it might be extremely difficult, or even impracticable, to borrow money enough at once to liquidate the whole, amounting at this time to almost forty-eight millions." A bill was, however, ordered in upon the basis of Winnington's proposition, which being in the sequel warmly attacked, and faintly defended, was finally lost on the motion of commitment; the division on that occasion being 249 against 134 voices; though it is remarkable that the original resolutions were on the report carried by a majority of 220 to 157 voices. The speech of sir Robert Walpole on this occasion, stating the incompatibility of the measure with the principles of equity and humanity in relation to the



BOOK IX. creditors of the public, must be acknowledged  
1737. very striking and impressive; though there is  
great reason to believe, from the success of a  
similar and more recent attempt, that the pa-  
triot in opposition formed an erroneous judg-  
ment respecting the difficulties attending its  
execution.

Death of  
Archbishop  
Wake.

Early in the present year, Jan. 1737, died Dr.  
William Wake, who had filled the metropolitan  
see of Canterbury twenty-one years. Previous  
to his elevation to that high dignity, he had  
very honorably distinguished himself by the li-  
berality of his sentiments, and the vigor of his  
exertions, both in convocation and in parliament;  
particularly in his contest with Atterbury on the  
nature and extent of ecclesiastical authority; and  
in a most conspicuous manner at the ever-me-  
morable trial of Sacheverel. As one of the  
ablest and firmest champions of the LOW CHURCH  
PARTY, he was advanced, on the death of Dr.  
Tennison, A. D. 1716, to the archiepiscopal chair;  
but he soon made it apparent, that "lowliness is  
young Ambition's ladder;" and when he had "at-  
tained the topmost round," he adopted, like his  
famous predecessor Becket, a totally new plan of  
principles and conduct. By the vehemence and  
pertinacity of his opposition, he essentially im-  
peded on all occasions the meritorious endeavours  
of the court for the advancement and security of



the general system of civil and religious liberty ; and in a more especial manner he labored to counteract the grand effort made by that generous and beneficent statesman, lord Stanhope, under the auspices of the late king, for the annihilation of those odious distinctions which divided, and which continue to divide, the nation, and to perpetuate the animosities of contending factions. Dr. Wake was succeeded by Dr. Potter, translated from the see of Oxford—a man morose in disposition, and in deportment haughty, but of extensive learning and exemplary morals.

BOOK IX.  
1737.

Scarcely had hostilities ceased on the continent between the houses of Austria and Bourbon before a new war broke out between the Muscovite and Ottoman empires, occasioned, as was pretended, by certain incursions of the Tartar chiefs and tribes into the Russian territories, but in reality by the ambitious and eager desire of the court of St. Petersburg to regain possession of the maritime city of Asoph—one of the earliest acquisitions of the emperor Peter the Great, but which that monarch was afterwards compelled to sacrifice in order to extricate himself from the perilous extremity to which, in his last war with Turkey, he found himself reduced on the banks of the Pruth. Asoph was accordingly besieged and taken ; and, when satisfaction and reparation were offered by the Porte for the injuries sustained by Russia, the czarina declared her resolution not to

War between Russia and Turkey.



BOOK IX.

1737.

Misfor-  
tunes of the  
Emperor.

relinquish her conquest. The emperor of Germany, strictly connected with Russia, and impatient to obtain an indemnification for his recent losses, became in a short time a principal in the war, which proved to him very disastrous. The imperial armies, no longer led by prince Eugene, were repeatedly defeated; and a peace was at length purchased at the expense of Orsova, Belgrade, and the entire province or kingdom of Servia, which were ceded by the emperor to the Turks. The Russians, who had, under the conduct of the famous *maréchal* Munich, made great and rapid progress in the reduction of the provinces north of the Danube, on their part restored Oczakow, Choczim, and Bender, with the surrounding territory; and the possession of Asoph, the key of the Euxine, was confirmed to them by the Porte.

Wise Con-  
duct of the  
Minister.

On this occasion, as on the former, respecting the war occasioned by the contest for the Polish crown, the sagacity of sir Robert Walpole conspicuously displayed itself. Knowing the attack upon the Turks to be a preconcerted and pre-determined measure, he forbore, though strongly urged by the Dutch, to offer the mediation of England till he saw it could be done with dignity and effect. "Nothing," says he, in a dispatch to his brother Mr. Horace Walpole, "is said that implies any desire of our mediation. We are in this case to wait for events and proper applications, and to be well assured of the real



sentiments of both the imperial and Russian BOOK IX.  
courts, before we offer our good offices, and take 1737.  
any step which may possibly disoblige, without  
a probability of doing any good." In a short  
time that mediation was solicited, which, had it  
been offered prematurely, would in all likelihood  
have been refused: and by the treaty of Bel-  
grade the emperor was once more rescued from  
ruin, through the powerful interposition of Great  
Britain\*.

A dispute arising respecting the eventual suc-  
cession of the duchies of Berg and Juliers between  
the houses of Brandenburg and Sultzbach, the  
king of England displayed no small eagerness to  
convert this contest to his own advantage, by en-  
deavouring to secure the reversion of East Fries-  
land, on which he had some obscure pretensions,  
as a consideration for granting his guarantee of  
Juliers to the K. of Prussia. From this project he  
was with difficulty dissuaded by the arguments of  
his minister. "I cannot think," says this cautious  
and wary statesman, "the state of affairs in any  
part of Europe settled enough to make us desire  
to be engaged sooner or more than we shall ne-  
cessarily be called upon to be so. Let us wait  
and see how things will turn out, and then deter-  
mine what part to take. The late treaties with

\* The preliminaries of peace between Austria and Turkey  
were not signed till the 1st September 1739.—Belgrade being  
at that time closely invested by the Ottoman army.



BOOK IX. Denmark and Sweden have been burdensome  
 1737. and expensive, and our subsidies will never be  
 unwelcome to them\*.”

Good  
 Under-  
 standing  
 with the  
 Court of  
 Versailles.

Fortunately for Europe, never were the two great monarchies of France and Britain actuated by juster views, or governed by more equitable counsels, than at the present time. Cardinal Fleury and sir Robert Walpole, perfectly satisfied with the rectitude of each other's intentions, cherished a reciprocity of esteem and confidence—very unusual with politicians and statesmen. The French minister declared, “that he should value himself more upon being called the pacific cardinal, than his predecessors could do upon their great and extensive conquests:” telling lord Waldegrave, the English ambassador, that he should ever prefer a strict union with England to any other connexion, notwithstanding that applications were made to him from many parts—“*l'on nous recherche de beaucoup d'endroits*†.” This constant harmony between the two courts was the more remarkable, as their political propensities differed at bottom very widely. The favorite object of the cardinal, and which he prosecuted by all the arts of finesse and intrigue, was to lower the pride and power

\* Sir Robert Walpole to Mr. Horace Walpole, June 1736.  
 COXE'S *State Papers*.

† COXE'S *State Papers*.



of the house of Austria, which he had persuaded himself, and took infinite pains to convince others, was still formidable to Europe. On the other hand, the English court, and the Walpoles in particular, were anxious to establish the imperial dominion on a firm and solid basis, as the only continental power which could be opposed with effect to France; though, from their reluctance to involve the British nation as a party in contentions excited by the emperor's presumption and imprudence, that monarch regarded them as hidden and determined enemies. From this cause the court of London received with exterior civility only the eager advances of the cardinal towards a more close and intimate union with England, by a renewal of the alliance virtually dissolved in consequence of the last treaty of Vienna.

BOOK IX.

1737.

The principal uneasiness of the British ministry at this time arose from the general state not of foreign but domestic politics. Several causes at this time concurred to impair the credit and weaken the influence of the Walpole administration. Amongst these, one of the most obvious was the decided part now taken by the prince of Wales in opposition to the court, by which he had long conceived himself very ill treated. A most improper occasion was unexpectedly seized by the prince to display his indignation and resentment, by

Misunder-  
standing  
between  
the Prince  
of Wales  
and the  
Court.



BOOK IX. suddenly, and without any previous notice, re-  
1737. moving the princess, when actually in labor, from the palace of Hampton-Court, at which the royal family then resided, to St. James's, July 31 (1737), where she was that night delivered of a princess\*." This produced a message from the king, ordering his royal highness to leave St. James's, with all his family, when it could be done without prejudice or inconvenience to the princess.

Lord Bolingbroke, the head of the opposition, at this time in France, declared in strong terms to his friend sir William Wyndham his chagrin at the prince's indiscretion. "It seemed plain," says he, "that an entire rupture between the father and son had been long unavoidable. I have therefore waited to see what the immediate occasion or pretence of this rupture would be; for I always believed the counsellors of his royal highness would think it of great importance to render this not only plausible but popular. But I am at a loss to find the plausibility or popularity of the present occasion of rupture. There is nothing, as far as I can discern, to interest the public in the cause of his royal highness. The resolution he has taken to pay his debts, and to live like a man of quality who has a good estate,

\* Augusta, the present duchess of Brunswic.



deserves great commendation—there is honor, BOOK IX  
sense, and dignity in it.” Upon the whole, the <sup>1737:</sup>  
accession of the prince of Wales added great <sup>Opposition</sup>  
weight to the opposition, already sufficiently <sup>becomes</sup>  
powerful. <sup>formidable.</sup>

Another cause of the decline of the minister's influence was the succession of political tracts and pamphlets continually issuing against him from the press, and for the most part composed with great art and ability. In a letter from Mr. Horace Walpole to his brother sir Robert, dated from Hanover October 1736, he complains “that the people have been frightened by the Craftsman and other papers ; and he wishes something to be done to make the government more popular.”—His majesty's subjects here,” says he, “are highly delighted that the king has been with them two years together, and that he stays so long with them this year, and particularly keeps his birth-day here.” The king did not in fact return this winter from Germany till the latter end of January 1737, the parliament being prorogued to the month of February upon that account : and the session had been peculiarly inauspicious from the nature of the bills introduced and the motions rejected.

The depredations of the Spaniards in the West Indies still continued, and the best friends of the minister were compelled to admit, that the long



BOOK IX. and unexampled forbearance manifested in this instance approached the limits of tameness and pusillanimity. But by far the greatest and heaviest blow which the interest of the brother-ministers at this period received, or which it could at any time sustain, was most severely experienced in the death of the queen, who expired, after a short illness, November 20, 1737. This accomplished princess was a model of virtuous and exemplary conduct from her earliest years to the maturity of age. Though the prince of Wales was not permitted during the closing scene to enter her presence, she sent him her blessing, and a message of forgiveness ; and she told sir Robert Walpole that she would have seen him with pleasure, but prudence forbad the interview. At the approach of death she discovered no symptoms of fear, but maintained to the last moment her accustomed fortitude and serenity of temper. She declared, “ that she had made it the business of her life to discharge her religious and social duties. She hoped God would pardon her infirmities, and accept the sincerity of her endeavours to promote the king’s honor and the prosperity of the nation. She protested that she was an hearty well-wisher to the liberties of the people ; and that, if she had erred in any part of her public conduct, it arose from want of judgment, not from intention.” When drawing near her

1737.  
Death of  
the Queen  
—Her Character.



end, she repeated a collect of her own composing, BOOK IX.  
 fraught with devout and touching eloquence. 1737.  
 Then desiring those around her to join aloud  
 in prayer, that she might hear, as the Lord's  
 prayer was concluded she waved her hand and  
 silently expired. Words cannot express the  
 sensibility and affection of the king during her  
 illness, and his regret for her loss. When the  
 first passionate burst of grief had subsided, he  
 soothed his emotions by talking of her in terms  
 of endearment, and recounting her virtues. He  
 continued the salaries of all the officers of her  
 household, and commanded a list of her nume-  
 rous benefactions to be laid before him, saying it  
 was his intention that nobody, as far as possible,  
 should be a sufferer besides himself.

On her death-bed the queen had testified to the  
 king the high opinion she entertained of the ca-  
 pacity and rectitude of the minister sir Robert  
 Walpole. Turning to him, who was also stand-  
 ing by her bed-side, she said, "I hope you will  
 never desert the king:" and, after a little pause,  
 "I recommend his majesty to you." Sir Robert  
 Walpole was fully sensible of the magnitude of Critical  
Situation of  
the Mini-  
ster.  
 his loss; and anticipated the difficulty of guiding  
 the capricious and impatient temper of the king,  
 and directing the public counsels amid the jea-  
 lousies of a discordant cabinet. Impressed with  
 these sentiments, he thus closed a letter to his



BOOK IX. brother Horace Walpole, in which he communi-  
cates the fatal intelligence of the queen's death—  
1737. “I must have done—our grief and distraction  
want no relation—I am oppressed with sorrow  
and dread\*.”—Succeeding events but too well  
justified these melancholy forebodings.

\* Coxe's Papers, A. D. 1737.

END OF THE THIRD VOLUME.

Printed by J. Adlard, Duke-street, Smithfield.



# APPENDIX

## STATE OF NEW YORK

### THIRD VOLUME

#### RECORDS OF THE SENATE

OF THE YEAR 1847

1848

It has been a great pleasure to me to have been able to contribute to the knowledge of the public mind, and to the advancement of the cause of truth and justice, by the publication of this volume. The records of the Senate of the State of New York, for the year 1847, are here presented to the public in a form which will enable them to see the proceedings of the body in all their details, and to judge for themselves of the wisdom and justice of the measures which have been adopted. The volume is divided into two parts, the first containing the proceedings of the Senate from the opening of the session to the adjournment, and the second containing the proceedings of the Senate from the adjournment to the close of the year. The first part is divided into three sections, the first containing the proceedings of the Senate on the 1st of January, the second containing the proceedings of the Senate on the 1st of February, and the third containing the proceedings of the Senate on the 1st of March. The second part is divided into two sections, the first containing the proceedings of the Senate on the 1st of April, and the second containing the proceedings of the Senate on the 1st of May. The volume is printed in a clear and legible type, and is bound in a neat and durable cover. It is a valuable addition to the library of every person interested in the history and proceedings of the State of New York.







# APPENDIX:

CONTAINING

*STATE PAPERS AND AUTHORITIES,*

TO THE

THIRD VOLUME.

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DANGER OF THE PROTESTANT SUCCESSION

DURING THE FOUR YEARS PRECEDING THE  
DEATH OF QUEEN ANNE.

A. D. 1714.

**I**T has long been regarded as a problem in English history, whether the protestant succession in the house of Hanover was really endangered under the administration of which the earl of Oxford and lord Bolingbroke were the chief leaders; who rose to power by courting the favour and cherishing the prejudices of the tory faction, and who maintained themselves in possession of it by a general proscription of the principles, and persecution of the persons, of their political rivals and antagonists the whigs. It is not indeed pretended, that any direct proofs exist of a fixed and settled design to restore the banished family to the throne, but it is alleged that the concurrence of numerous and strong presumptions render it highly probable. In order, therefore, to form a right judgment upon this point, it will be necessary to take into consideration the general state of parties at the



period alluded to, and the characters and views of particular individuals. And,

I. As to the general state of parties, it must be acknowledged by all historical inquirers, that the great body of the tories, as well as of the whigs, were, from the æra of the Revolution, invariably attached to the succession in the protestant line. The act of settlement itself was the act of a tory minister and a tory parliament. They universally expressed, in their addresses to the throne, their indignation, in common with the whigs, at the violation of the treaty of Ryswick, by Louis XIV. in his recognition of the title of the pretended prince of Wales. They projected the design of inviting over the next protestant heir to reside within the realm during the life-time of the queen. They saw for a series of years new sanctions added to facilitate and strengthen the claims of the house of Brunswick; many of these sanctions obtaining their full approbation or acquiescence, and during the prevalence of their power, in no instance did they attempt to abrogate them. If their zeal and ardor in this cause were less conspicuous than those of the whigs, their sincerity was as manifest and as unimpeachable. That many concealed jacobites were blended with the tory party, passing under the same general denomination, must be admitted; but it is evident they constituted comparatively a very small proportion of it, because they were never able, by their utmost efforts, and when the tories were most powerful and popular, to carry a single point in favour of the exiled family. When the famous act of security passed in the Scottish parliament, by which the protestant succession in that kingdom was really endangered, a sudden and universal alarm was excited amongst the tories as well as the whigs throughout England; and when the act of union took place, by which the protestant succession was assured, it diffused as general and complete a satisfaction—the parliamentary op-



position to the union being very feeble, and equally contrary to the sense of tories and whigs, as declared in innumerable addresses of congratulation to the throne. If, therefore, the great leaders of the tory administration, Oxford and Bolingbroke, during the last years of queen Anne, entertained any serious design of repealing the act of settlement, it could not be with the view of recommending themselves to the favour even of their own party, and much less to that of the nation at large; but they must have been incited to this desperate attempt by motives peculiar to themselves as individuals.

II. It is proper, therefore, to consider the proofs or *presumptions* arising from the characters and views of the great leaders in question, upon which the opinion of the danger to which the protestant succession was exposed under their administration, was founded.

1. It is certain that the earl of Oxford gave assurances to the jacobites of his secret attachment to the cause of the pretender, and of his desire to contribute to his restoration. But artifice or cunning was the characteristic feature of Oxford's administration. By deceiving the court of St. Germaine's he obtained the confidence and support of their friends in England, and he was enabled effectually to traverse their schemes and frustrate their designs: and so far his insidious policy, for a time at least, succeeded. "We wrote," says the duke of Berwick, "to all the jacobites to join with the court. This contributed to make the queen's party so superior in the house of commons, that every thing was carried according to her wishes\*." But being by observation and experience perfectly convinced of Oxford's duplicity, he tells us that they exerted themselves, by means of lady Masham, to remove the treasurer, as it was not possible to conduct the affair while he remained in office. 2. It is alleged that the queen herself

\* Vol. ii. p. 183



was disposed to favour the restoration of the pretender, and gave evident proofs of her partiality for him. But if the queen, when princess of Denmark, concurred in the deposition of her own father, on account of his alienation from the protestant religion, it is in the highest degree improbable that she would engage in measures of the greatest difficulty and danger, in order to reinstate a more distant relative of the same religion ; and that there ever existed the remotest hope or prospect of a change of sentiment, is not pretended. The partiality of the queen, therefore, could amount to no more than secret relentings of compassion, and the workings of natural affection, which might sometimes vent themselves, when discoursing freely and confidentially, in tender and fruitless wishes. The queen was politically timid in a remarkable degree ; but to attempt a reversal of the act of settlement, corroborated by so many legal sanctions, and confirmed on her part by so many solemn and public declarations, would have required the most daring and determined resolution. 3. But the tory administration, of which Oxford and Bolingbroke were the heads, did not content themselves with mere words and fair professions in relation to the jacobites ; they permitted the advocates of the court of St. Germaine's publicly to defend its claims and pretensions in elaborate treatises from the press. The partisans of the pretender, or those who were universally regarded as such, were advanced to offices of trust and dignity ; and what was still more alarming, many officers of the army, signalized by their zeal for revolution principles, were deprived of their commissions, and the vacancies in many instances supplied by men whose attachment to the banished family was believed to be their chief recommendation. In answer to this it must be remarked, that the parliamentary support of the jacobites, who were estimated at not less than fifty in number, members of the house of commons, being in the present divided state of parties absolutely essential to



the permanency of the new administration, it was necessary to give some evidence by deeds as well as words, that they were not excluded from the favour, or forbidden to look up to the protection of the court; and their collective strength was far too inconsiderable to justify any real apprehension. As to the dismissal of so many officers distinguished for their resolute adherence to the whig party, and in general respecting the plan said to be in contemplation for new modelling the army, it must be remembered, that there is undoubted evidence of the existence of dangerous machinations among the whigs, for rendering the protestant succession effectual by other means than the securities of law; and though these machinations and cabals proceeded not to any fixed or formed design, they were the subject of great and just alarm to the queen and her ministers. Prince Eugene, when in England, and the duke of Marlborough, themselves, are said to have been present during several of these dark and dangerous consultations; at one of which it was proposed, as there is ground to believe, that the metropolis should be set on fire in different places; that the duke of Marlborough should, in the midst of the confusion, appear at the head of a party in arms, possess himself of the Tower, the Bank, the Exchequer; seize the person of the queen, dissolve the present parliament, and call a new one, for the purpose of investigating and punishing the delinquencies of ministers. These wild and atrocious suggestions, which were probably rejected without hesitation, were reported, no doubt with exaggeration, to the ministers by one Plunket, a wretch in their pay, who had by some means obtained the confidence of count Gallas, the imperial ambassador. From them the accounts were communicated to the courts of Versailles and St. Germaine's; but they appeared to M. de Torcy, as his mode of expressing himself evinces, little worthy of credit. "If we can depend upon the relations of some people, who perhaps were misinformed."—Again,



“ the ministry received advices of real or fictitious plots,” &c. “ These advices perhaps were groundless.” Amid the great number of persons admitted to the secret consultations of the whigs, it is not to be wondered at that some nefarious projects should be broached, which by a very great majority would be reprobated with horror. In every party, individuals are to be found, who are capable of going any lengths in order to gratify their own selfish and ambitious views. But these transactions were no doubt conceived by the ministers, to render the projected changes in the army a requisite measure of self-defence; and in the number of dismissions the jacobites would of course come in for their share of promotion in the military as well as civil line of advancement.

Of late, it seems indeed to be not unusual to exculpate the earl of Oxford from the guilt of jacobitical practices, and to rest the charge of criminality chiefly upon lord Bolingbroke. But there is no ground for this distinction. The Bolingbroke correspondence, recently published, contains the most demonstrative proofs that no designs were entertained by that nobleman to the prejudice of the protestant succession: it is highly probable, that he was deterred from engaging in the cause of the pretender more from policy than principle. The plain and evident truth is, that lord Bolingbroke, a man of extraordinary talents, of strong passions; of aspiring views, unrestrained by scruples moral or political, had thrown himself without reserve into the hands of the tory party. Perceiving himself the object of the dread and detestation of the whigs, he soon contracted a reciprocal and implacable hatred against them. And though entirely free from that miserable taint of religious bigotry which characterized the genuine high church faction, he was prompted both by resentment and interest to urge things to extremity, in order at once to crush his enemies and re-animate his friends, then newly rising to popularity; adopting, from the ne-



cessity of his situation, though naturally open and generous in his disposition, and daring in his infidelity, the contemptible cant of the church being in danger. He despised the indecisive and mysterious policy of Oxford, and aimed by the most vigorous and resolute measures to secure such a permanent ascendancy to the tories as should reduce the whigs to a state of political insignificance, and compel the court of Herenhausen to abandon that favourite connexion. "The queen has it now in her power," he tells the duke of Shrewsbury, then ambassador at Paris, (April 1713) "to establish such a plan as she may pursue for the rest of her reign." And in a succeeding dispatch more explicitly: "I cannot help saying in the fulness of my soul to your grace, that if we do not establish ourselves and the true interest of our country, it is the queen's and treasurer's fault; the clamour of jacobitism seems to be the only resource of our enemies." Had the queen survived a few years longer, the great political ability of lord Bolingbroke, directed to the permanent aggrandizement of the tories, would in all probability have been ultimately successful. Since the fatal business of Sacheverel, the tories were become the popular party: but the excellent understanding of lord Bolingbroke could not fail to perceive, that any attempt to repeal the act of settlement must terminate in ruin. For as the popularity of the tories was founded in the prevailing folly, or rather madness, respecting the danger of the church, a measure openly and avowedly calculated to pave the way for a popish pretender to the throne, would instantly and inevitably transfer that popularity to the whigs, who, as lord Bolingbroke, with his characteristic ingenuousness, remarks, "made the same factious use of the supposed danger of the protestant succession, as the tories had endeavoured to do of the supposed danger of the church\*;" and who exerted

\* Letter to Sir William Wyndham.



their utmost efforts to excite the belief, or at least to awaken the suspicion, that the ministers of the crown had the repeal of the act of settlement in contemplation. In the spring of 1713 the duke of Shrewsbury informs lord Bolingbroke, “that several English gentlemen of the St. Germaine’s court have asked to visit him, among whom was the duke of Berwick, but he had let them understand that he desired to be excused.” Of this conduct lord Bolingbroke expressed, in strong terms, the royal approbation. Is this reconcileable with the existence of a plot for bringing in the pretender? But the duke of Shrewsbury, though acting with the tories, was distinguished by his zeal for the Hanoverian succession. He therefore may be supposed to have been kept purposely in the dark as to the designs of the court. If there was any person more in the confidence of Bolingbroke than another, it was perhaps the celebrated Matthew Prior. The letters of the secretary of state are those of Harry to Matt. and are answered in the same strain of intimate familiarity. In a dispatch from Mr. Prior, then resident at Paris, to lord Bolingbroke, dated August 1712, he says, “that the young gentleman, *i. e.* the pretender, is gone to Châlons very melancholy, but much resigned.” In September, the pretender being then at Bar, Mr. Prior remarks, “there is not one thing that young man can do, nor one word he can say, but will be told by Lorraine to the emperor, and from that court will be communicated to the whigs in England.” And yet the whigs in England professed to be alarmed at the pretender’s residence in Lorraine.

Writing to the earl of Orrery, minister at Brussels, and certainly a secret jacobite, nearly at this time, lord Bolingbroke says, “I cannot foresee, besides the clamour of jacobitism, and the danger of popery—which, except a few old women, nobody is in earnest about—any theme for lord Nottingham’s eloquence to display itself upon.”



“ On les accuse,” says M. de Torcy, speaking of the conduct of the English ministers during the negotiations of Utrecht, “ de transactions secrète en faveur du prétendant, dont il n’avoit été parlé de leur part que pour demander qu’il fut obligé de sortir de France comme condition essentielle à la paix\*.” At the commencement of the ensuing year, 1714, little more than six months previous to the queen’s decease, Mr. Prior continues in profound ignorance respecting the projects of the court against the protestant succession. He is in consternation at the precarious state of the queen’s health. “ If that,” says he, “ should happen, which one hates even to think of, what sort or set of men are to be our task-masters? What would become of us all? The thought, I grant you, is very mean—What would become of *me*? but humanity is frail and querulous.”

Lord Bolingbroke, writing at this period to the earl of Anglesea, recommended in the most energetic language union among the tories. “ He is sure,” as he affirms, “ that the whigs will be united, and he should be sorry to see it, in any degree, made the interest of the house of Hanover to give into that party whose tyranny the nation has so long felt.”

February 1714, he declares his sentiments to the earl of Strafford, ambassador at the Hague, who was subsequently impeached as an accomplice in the traitorous designs of Oxford and Bolingbroke, in the following remarkable terms: “ For my part, I sleep in perfect tranquillity. We are in the true interest of our country: we have no aims which we need be ashamed to own. The great load we have lain under has been the pretended insecurity of the succession. This the queen has taken an effectual method to remove. Mr. Harley, who will set out immediately, has orders, when he renews those assurances



which have been so frequently given by the queen, of her firm resolution to support the succession of the family of Hanover, to take notice to the princess Sophia and the elector, that these inclinations of the queen continuing the same, the laws on which their right to the crown is established continuing the same, and the oaths of the people, in which we are all bound in the most solemn manner, continuing likewise the same, it will be very unjust, and very disagreeable to her majesty, if they themselves, or any employed by them, should give the least encouragement or countenance to the clamours raised by a faction, who mean nothing less than the real advantage of that family, and whose only view is to regain the power which they abused, even at the expense of the public tranquillity. He is farther to represent, that the queen determines to bring the question about the security of their succession to a short issue, and therefore has commanded him to ask of them, whether they have any additional securities to propose? If they have none, he will say that the queen must understand them to be satisfied with those which now subsist. If they have any, he has orders to assure them beforehand, that in case the proposals they make are consistent with the queen's honour, her safety, with the terms of the laws by which the crown is entailed, her majesty will not only consent to, but promote all such proposals."

To the same nobleman lord Bolingbroke writes, March 1714, "It is indeed, my lord, surprisingly strange, that alliances with Denmark, Prussia, or any other foreign power, can be esteemed at Hanover as true expedients for securing the succession to the crown of Britain. Our laws, our oaths, a just concern for our religion and liberty, will keep the nation firm and steady in their adherence to a protestant, and in their opposition to a popish prince."

Mr. Prior, April 1714, in allusion to the famous debate on the motion of lord Wharton, respecting the dan-



ger of the protestant succession, says, in a private dispatch to lord Bolingbroke, “ We are all in admiration at what you have been doing in England, and I pity those whose business it is to keep others in their senses. The pretender, *abandoned* by France, yet dreaded from Lunéville and Bar-le-duc, by those men who made a jest of king James attacking us, though *supported* by this kingdom, and either at St. Germaine’s or on the coast of Normandy, seems a paradox, till one tells M. de Torcy that those men were then in power, and are not so at present.”

April 23, 1714, lord Bolingbroke informs the earl of Strafford, “ that the queen has forbid M. Schultze, the Hanoverian envoy, the court, for demanding of the lord chancellor the writ for the duke of Cambridge, without the decency of giving her majesty the least intimation of it. Indeed, my lord, at this rate the dispute will not be between the house of Hanover and the pretender any more; the queen will become a party. To come hither with an air of defiance to the queen, and on the foot of a party, is surely the unwisest and most unnecessarily desperate resolution that ever yet was taken. Lord Paget will be going to Hanover very soon, to bring that court, if possible, to a better notion of their own interest.”

In a subsequent letter, May 18, he says, “ I am heartily glad to find there are at present no farther thoughts entertained of sending the duke of Cambridge over: and I am glad of it, because I wish well to the protestant succession. The plain interest of the house of Hanover is to live well with the queen, and after her decease to ascend the throne with a national concurrence.”

In a dispatch, dated May 20th, to the lord chancellor of Ireland, sir Constantine Phipps, a flaming high church bigot, strongly and justly suspected of jacobitism, to whom, if to any man, lord Bolingbroke, if engaged in designs against the protestant succession, would surely



have spoken without reserve, that nobleman declares, "that he hoped the whole church interest would, as one man, have laid hold of this favourable conjuncture to support the queen, exclusive of all other assistance, *to vest all power in themselves*, and by these means to establish themselves for the present age and for futurity. This," says he, "made no impression, and as long as the succession remained in danger, nothing else was, it seems, to be regarded. The danger of the succession was the subject of many private debates, and very fatally, in my opinion, to the church, the cause of some public debates. When it was asked what remedy, what farther security, should be provided? those who expressed their fears had none to offer, but expected that they who saw no distemper should prescribe a method of cure.

In a farther dispatch, dated July 28th, immediately on the dismissal of the earl of Oxford, to the lords justices of Ireland, who were the lord chancellor and the archbishops of Armagh and Tuam, lord Bolingbroke expresses his hopes "that things will soon settle into order, and be conducted with vigour." He gives no intimation that the queen's health was at this time particularly affected, and much less that her death was apprehended. But conscious that the fall of Oxford would add to the terrors, or at least to the clamours, of the opposite party, he adds, "one would imagine that the vigilancy used in discovering, and the severity used in prosecuting, such as were listed, or have listed others, for the pretender, might be sufficient to calm the minds of men, by shewing them they are safe through the care, and under the protection of the government."

July 31, he writes again to their lordships, to apprise them, in a few interesting and important lines, of the then situation of affairs. "I have," says he, "just time to tell you, that the queen draws apace to her latter end. All



possible care has been taken to put the kingdom into a condition of passing quietly under that government which the law has established."

On the 3d August, 1714, he writes to congratulate the new monarch on his auspicious accession to the crown, amidst the acclamations of his people. "*C'est ce même esprit,*" to transcribe his own memorable words, "*qui agit généralement tout le monde et les factions qui ont accoutumées d'agiter ce gouvernement paroissent être cessés. DIEU veuille que la sagesse et la fermité de votre majesté les puissent empêcher de renaître.*"

Upon the whole, it is manifest that those who are most sceptical upon this point are the persons most credulous,—and nothing of real weight remains to be said in opposition to the authorities of history upon this subject.

*Hardwicke Papers, Bolingbroke Correspondence, Somerville's Appendix, Memoirs of Torcy and M. Berwick, Tindal, &c.*

#### LETTER OF THE EARL OF MAR TO KING GEORGE THE FIRST.

A. D. 1714.

THE general disposition of the high church and jacobitical party, after the death of the queen, quietly to submit to the government as vested by law in the house of Hanover, appears evident and incontrovertible. So peaceable and prosperous was the state of things, that the king did not think it requisite to leave Herenhausen for several weeks after he had received intelligence of that event. And the lord chancellor Harcourt, as chief of the council of regency, assured the parliament, by his majesty's command, "that if the safety of his dominions had



required his more immediate presence, he would without the least delay have repaired hither :” and, “ that his majesty did very particularly express his great satisfaction in the loyalty and affection which his people have universally shewn upon his majesty’s accession to the crown.”

But by the proclamation issued for calling the new parliament, and more especially by the king’s speech at the opening of the session, March 1715, war seemed to be denounced against the partisans of the late ministry. All the passions by which the human mind can be agitated and inflamed were awakened and put in motion; and henceforth the whole powerful faction of the tories, actuated by the desire of self-preservation, on the one hand, and vengeance on the other, became the inveterate enemies of the new establishment.

Soon after the accession of George I. the earl of Mar, who, during the latter period of the queen’s reign, had occupied, and still continued to occupy, the post of secretary of state for Scotland, and who was regarded as the head of the Scottish tories, addressed a letter to the king (dated August 30, 1714), couched in terms of respect and compliment approaching to adulation. But the harshness with which this distinguished nobleman was treated, soon drove him into measures of violence, and in less than a year induced him to set up the standard of revolt and rebellion in Scotland.

“ Having,” says the earl, in the letter alluded to, “ the happiness to be your majesty’s subject, and also the honour of being one of your servants, as one of your secretaries of state, I beg by this to kiss your majesty’s hand, and congratulate your happy accession to the throne. I am afraid I may have had the misfortune of being misrepresented to your majesty, by some here, upon account of party; or to ingratiate themselves by aspersing others, as our parties here too often occasion: but I hope your majesty will be so just as not to give credit to



such misrepresentations. The part I acted in the bringing about and making the union, when the succession of the crown was settled for Scotland on your majesty's family, where I had the honour to serve as secretary of state for that kingdom, doth, I hope, put my sincerity and faithfulness to your majesty out of dispute. I was happy in a good mistress, and she was pleased to have some confidence in me, and regard for my services: and since your majesty's happy accession to the crown, I hope you will find that I have not been wanting in my duty, in being instrumental in keeping things quiet and peaceable in the country to which I belong, and have some interest in. Your majesty shall ever find me as faithful and dutiful a subject and servant as ever any of my family have been to the crown, or as I have been to my late mistress, the queen. And I beg your majesty may be so good not to believe any misrepresentation of me, which nothing but party hatred, and my zeal for the interest of the crown, doth occasion; and I hope I may presume to lay claim to your royal favour and protection. As your accession to the crown hath been quiet and peaceable, may your majesty's reign be long and prosperous; and that your people may soon have the happiness and satisfaction of your presence among them, is the earnest and fervent wishes of him who is, with the humblest duty and respect, &c. &c.

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PAPERS RELATING TO LORD BOLINGBROKE'S CONDUCT IN FRANCE.

A. D. 1716.

THE rage of the bigots attached to the cause of the pretender was, after the suppression of the rebellion in Scotland, inflamed beyond measure against lord Boling-



broke, who occupied the post of secretary of state at the court of Commerci, and who was boldly and openly accused of acting, not merely a negligent, but a treacherous part in that capacity. The charge of treachery, and even of negligence, does not, however, appear to have been very justly founded, but it is perfectly manifest that lord Bolingbroke conducted himself towards the partisans and adherents of the pretender in general, with the highest rudeness and disdain, not even excepting the queen-mother, whom he regarded as counteracting by her influence, every project that could be framed for the restoration of her son, which bore the least indication of rationality.

On the return of the chevalier into France, he sent the duke of Ormond to demand the seals of office from lord Bolingbroke, in consequence of the complaints so loudly and universally preferred against him, and particularly for a series of accusations comprized in a formal denunciation or impeachment transmitted from London, March 1716, by the agents and friends of the pretender, in relation to the affairs of Scotland. To this charge lord Bolingbroke did not deign personally to reply; but his secretary, Mr. Brindsden, made a variety of observations upon the several articles in the accusation, in vindication of that nobleman's conduct, addressed in three successive letters to Mr. James Murray, afterwards created by the pretender earl of Dunbar, to which Mr. Murray published an acute and severe reply.

A few extracts from these different productions, will tend to throw some light on the general state of affairs at this period, and will prove that the petty courts of St. Germaine's and Commerci were as much distracted with intrigues and cabals, with jealousies, rivalships, and animosities, as those of St. James's or Versailles. In all the possible diversity of situations in which man can be placed, human nature remains invariably the same.



The articles against lord Bolingbroke are as follow :

I. Lord Bolingbroke was never to be found by those who came to him about business. If by chance or strata-gem they got hold of him, he affected being in a hurry, and by putting them off till another time, still avoided giving them any answer.

II. The earl of Mar, by six different messengers, at different times, acquainted lord Bolingbroke, before the king came from Dunkirk, of his being in distress for want of arms and ammunition, and prayed a speedy relief; and though the things demanded were in my lord's power, there was not so much as one pound of powder sent in any of the ships which by his lordship's direction parted from France.

III. The king himself, after his arrival, sent general Hamilton to inform him, that his want of arms and ammunition was such, that he should be obliged to leave Scotland unless he received a speedy supply. Lord Bolingbroke amused Mr. Hamilton twelve days together, and did not introduce him to any of the French ministers, though he was referred to them for a particular account of affairs, or in all that time so much as communicated his letter to the queen or any body else.

IV. The count de Castel Blanco had for several months at Havre a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition, and did daily ask his lordship's orders how to dispose of them, but could never get any, even to the hour the king landed in France.

V. The king's friends at the French court had for some time past no very good opinion of his lordship's integrity, and a very bad one of his discretion; for at a time when many merchants in France would have carried privately any quantity of arms and ammunition into Scotland, my lord desired a public order of the regent for the embarkation, which being a thing not to be granted, is said to have been done in order to beg a denial.



VI. The king wrote to his lordship by every occasion after his arrival in Scotland, and though there were many opportunities of writing in return, yet from the time he landed there to the day he left it, he never received one letter from his lordship.

*Answer to the above Charges, by Mr. Brinsden  
to Mr. Murray.*

EXTRACTS.

April 4, 1716.—I have communicated to his lordship what you wrote to me, and it is by his lordship's order that I give you the following answer.

The charge that you have sent over is so full of improbable lies, that his lordship can hardly imagine it can have any other effect than the shame and confusion of those that brought it.

When my lord returned last summer out of Dauphiné, and at the desire of his friends engaged in this business, he found himself immediately exposed to a daily struggle with difficulties of three sorts: the first, arising from the rivetted prejudices of one person; the second, from the impossibility of keeping the queen, and the whole rabble of the court of St. Germaine's, from meddling in business; and the third, from the cabals of French and English men, women, and children, people for the most part of no name in the world, or else of very bad characters, who had been let into the most secret parts of business, and expected to continue so.

To get over the first of these difficulties, my lord saw would be the work of time; but he saw likewise, the later it was begun the harder it would prove: and that any yielding to these prejudices increased and strengthened them. He therefore began upon the first, and continued upon every occasion to combat them with great decency, but with great firmness, contrary indeed to the opinion of



others, who imagine it will be time enough to talk of those things when his lordship thinks it will be too late.

As to the people of the court of St. Germaine's, my lord knew enough of England and France too, to know they would be a load upon business, but no help to it. With this set of people, and a whole tribe of jesuits, my lord, therefore, avoided all sorts of commerce before the duke of Ormond arrived. He would not so much as see any of them, before his grace came and thought fit to open his door to them. My lord could no longer avoid seeing them: but he never would enter into any familiarity with them. He chose three or four persons of sense and activity: some of them were protestants, and others were very indifferent roman catholics. Those he employed were as many as he wanted. During the time that my lord, much against his will, was obliged to reside at St. Germaine's, he observed the same conduct, and never associated with any one man there but the duke of Berwick, who is not to be reckoned of the court, though he has lodgings in the house, who has a hundred times more capacity and credit than all the rest put together, in concert with whom my lord all along acted, and by whose judgment he is willing to stand or fall.

With the other cabal of people that I mentioned in the third place, my lord had at first some little communication, for he was thrown into their hands; but as soon as he knew of their persons, and informed himself of their characters, he broke all measures with them.

April 8, (N. S.) 1716.—When the resolution was taken of leaving Scotland, and the principal persons returned hither, it was judged a proper time to make the utmost effort against my lord; and perhaps there were people who thought, that the loading of him would excuse the precipitation with which Scotland was abandoned.

That my lord was seldom to be found with any direct answer to their business is true, if by people is meant, any



such as in the former part of what I have writ are designed. If by people is meant any one man who could be of use, or was fit to be trusted, the accusation is false.

As to the second, it is true that the earl of Mar wrote for arms, for ammunition, for money, for officers, and, last, for a body of troops. My lord used his best endeavours to procure all that was desired. Arms and ammunition were to be got but two ways: they were either to be bought and sent into Scotland, or such quantities as had been before promised were to be made use of. That there was not one farthing to buy them with is true; my lord may appeal to those of St. Germaine's, who had the management of the money, upon this head. The little cash that was procured, was either sent in specie to Scotland, or employed in answering the bills that were constantly drawing from the coasts. And besides, if money had not been wanting, the necessary orders for buying, conveying to the coasts, and embarking, could not have been procured.

As for sending such arms and stores as were provided, my lord knew but of two parcels; one, and that a small one, might have been in Scotland in October or November, had the directions given by my lord been pursued: why they were not, he will not say. As to the other parcel of arms and stores, it is that which you call count Castel Blanco's, and contains a very large quantity of both. This Castel Blanco is a Spaniard, who, by the merit of marrying lord Melfort's daughter, sets up for a manager of English business. It is silly to say that orders from my lord were wanting to send them: these orders must be of another kind, and such orders could not be got sooner, or in any other manner, than they were got.

What is said under the second head may serve as an answer to the fourth. As to the third article, upon general Hamilton's arrival, my lord represented, where it was proper, all that he brought by letter and by word of



mouth the very next morning. It is therefore a simple lie, and worthy of those who scribble from this side of the water, to say that general Hamilton was amused for twelve days, as if during all that time the purport of his message had been kept a secret.

The sixth article contains the most impudent falsehood that ever was invented. Without money, and the orders above-said, no merchant could or would undertake to transport any quantity of arms or ammunition; and I am able to cite some very great bargains of this kind which my lord brought to bear, which failed at last for want of money and the necessary countenance.

As to the seventh article, nobody is better able to answer it than myself, since I entered all the letters which my lord writ; and there were no less than five dispatched before Mr. Hamilton came into France, by whom my lord received the first letter of business after the king's landing there. Some of those were lost at sea; and the three last packets were brought back to my lord, the gentlemen that carried them being arrived too late in Scotland.

April 14, 1716.—I hope you have received my last, of the 9th instant, which, with my former, will give you a light into affairs here. There are abundance of things more my lord could say to clear himself, but he rather chuses to be silent. Those on this side who first raised the storm, begin to be sensible of their folly. My lord has acted like a wise, prudent, and honest man; they quite the contrary. And would they have staid a very few days longer in Scotland, which every body now agrees they might have done, they would have had such assistances which, in all probability, must have restored them.



*Reply of Mr. James Murray.*

## EXTRACT.

His lordship's letters are not calculated so much to clear himself as to weaken the king's interest in England, and to discourage all correspondence with him. He has given general answers to particular charges.

The duke of Mar, by six several expresses, solicited lord Bolingbroke for an immediate supply. In all his letters he assures him that numbers of men would join him if he had arms for them, and that he wanted powder for the few arms that he had. The want of money to provide arms is as groundless as his other pretensions; for though the king did not abound in money, there was always a sufficient sum for that service.

His lordship declines answering the charge of his insisting upon a public order, and neglecting private methods of embarkation. He knew that a public order would not be granted, and he owns that a connivance from the officers might be depended on; and therefore it may be presumed, that his conduct in this case was to amuse the king's friends in Scotland, and cover his wilful neglect of them.

The 10,000 arms, and the 30,000 pounds weight of powder, which he says would have been sent to Scotland if they had staid a few days longer, were not procured by his lordship, but by a gentleman who was sent by the king from Scotland, and who, being convinced of his lordship's former neglects, applied for a supply of arms elsewhere, and upon his own credit obtained it. About the same time the duke of Ormond procured 15,000 arms, with a proportionable quantity of ammunition, without the privity or assistance of lord Bolingbroke.

Another remarkable circumstance of his lordship's conduct was, the variety of excuses he made to those gentle-



men who came from Scotland, for not sending arms and ammunition. In September and October, he said he was providing them; in November, that the sending them through the Channel would endanger the king's passage; in December and January, that the court of France would neither grant arms nor ammunition: and his lordship had probably pretences for every month of the year. What reason, then, had his majesty to expect a supply of arms after so many repeated delays? And with what injustice does his lordship charge the king and the duke of Mar with precipitation in leaving Scotland, when the necessity they were in of coming away was entirely occasioned by his neglect?

What lord Bolingbroke intended as a reflection on the duke of Ormond, will be acknowledged by every honest man here, that his grace observed at Paris a quite contrary conduct from his lordship. His grace, it is true, opened his doors to every gentleman who came to wait upon him. He thought it was for the king's service to receive those persons with civility who cheerfully offered to embark in it; that those gentlemen who were ready to hazard their lives in the same cause with his grace, ought not to be treated with contempt, and that his lordship's conduct was imprudent and unseemly. Upon his grace's first expedition into England, he endeavoured to persuade a gentleman who had promised to accompany him not to go: he told him that the duke of Ormond would certainly be never heard of more; and that it was a rash and foolish enterprize he was going upon: and by the discovery of his grace's designs at that time, and his lordship's conduct since, it may be presumed he had good reasons to be assured that the attempt would miscarry.

His lordship's insinuation of the rivetted prejudices of one person, has the same malicious view; and though his lordship affirms, that from the very first he began to combat them with great decency and firmness, it is certain he



never spoke of his having such a design till a few days before the king had fixed his departure for Britain. And it must be owned, that several worthy men, who were then at Paris, thought it an improper time to press his majesty on that head, when he had not leisure to inquire into it; and that his lordship was not the most proper person to talk of religion.

His lordship's behaviour to his equals and inferiors was not only contemptuous, but his treatment of the queen was insolent to the last degree. To insult majesty in distress aggravates the crime, and such a carriage to the king's mother is an evident proof of want of duty to his majesty.

What the principles were which his lordship says he brought out of England with him, I do not know, having never had reason to believe that he gave himself much trouble about any.

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### PEERAGE BILL.

LORD CHANCELLOR MIDDLETON TO LORD MONTJOY.

*A. D. 1719.*

*ENDORSED.*—This paper I sent sealed to lord Montjoy, to shew my resolution of voting against the peerage bill, though told by lord S. and the duke of B. what the consequences of my so doing would be, almost in express terms.

*March 10, 1718-19.*

I am not at all a stranger to the probable consequences of men's speaking and acting according to their own sentiments, in a certain affair. On the contrary, have had broad hints, nay, plain indications, what is deter-



mined to follow. I have put honour and integrity in one scale, and find it vastly to outweigh convenience; and am determined never to purchase the latter by parting with the former: this is a fixed resolution now, when it is in my power to do the convenient thing if I please.

MEMORANDUM ENDORSED IN LORD MIDDLETON'S  
HAND-WRITING.

*Conversation between Lord Sunderland and me, about  
the Peerage Bill.*

When the duke of Bolton first spoke to me about the matter then under the consideration of the house of lords, for restraining the number of peers, I did not relish the scheme; but refrained expressing myself more against it at that time, being told the king was acquainted with it, and that the ministry thought it very good for the kingdom. Besides, he either had not then, or did not shew me, the resolutions which were intended to be moved in the house of lords, so I was much in the dark. After the lords had passed their resolutions, I waited on him again, and continued of the same mind, but expressed myself determined not to debate or vote against a matter thought of such consequence; but could not be convinced of the reasonableness of the thing.

On the 6th of March, lord Sunderland, at Mr. Boscawen's, desired me to see him on the Sunday morning, that he might discourse with me on this subject. At St. James's he explained to me the motives and inducements the ministry had to push this matter, and I then shewed my not comprehending the reason or necessity for bringing in the intended bill; but expressed myself resolved, considering my being in the king's service, not to speak or vote against the bill. His lordship seemed to think more would be expected from me, and used words of the king's being obliged to change hands, &c.; but whether



he meant that he must be obliged to change the ministry if the bill miscarried, or to remove those of his servants who should not be for it, he did not expressly say, though from the nature of the discourse, and what I was told by the duke of Bolton the first day, I am well convinced which he meant.

On the 15th March, I discoursed this matter with my lord chancellor at St. James's, and expressed myself not convinced of the reasonableness of the intended bill. He was very warm for it, and seemed surprized at my being so uncomplying; but lord Coningsby coming in, broke off the conversation. The more I consider this matter, the more I am confirmed in my opinion, that the bill brought into the house of lords on the 14th March, commonly called the peerage bill, is of that nature, that the commons ought not to pass it: and after having heard the arguments offered by the duke of Bolton, lord Sunderland, lord chancellor, and all that was offered in the house of lords, to induce them to come to the resolutions on which the bill is founded, without being convinced, I think I am not like to alter.

26th March, lord Sunderland, at my lodging, pressed coming into the bill—the king's desire, not the act of his ministry—resents it in foreigners, and others, who represent it now a contest between the king and prince—The whig administration undone if disappointed—The whig majority preserved the constitution in queen Anne's time. This is a way to settle it!—ridiculous, not to say mad things, will be done hereafter, when a certain event happens. Must advise the king to change hands, though he will \* \* \* \* \*. Lords will consent to part with *scand. magnat.*—that commons may administer an oath on elections. The king will consent crown shall not pardon before or after judgment on impeachment. If other things can be thought of, thinks will be come into;—the bill will drop without prejudice. Professed regards



for me—would have me communicate it to my brother. I said I would to him and others. Desired leave to go for Ireland, and to be absent, else would be in the house and vote with my judgment. He told me the king would tell me his own thoughts—I offered to wait on the king, if he commanded it, after his lordship had told him what my thoughts were, and would repeat them to him. Said the prince had launched out 40,000*l*. A lord offered to be bribed—poor, ill used by his father.

28th March, lord Sunderland came to me, told me had spoke to the king, who was uneasy at my not, &c. but, being urged, consented to my going to Ireland—Urged it might be some time the coming week—that I should not say on what occasion, but on my own—that I was wanted, &c.—and desired my brother would not be warm. I said I would go out of town for a few days, then return, kiss the king's hand, and go away. He desired some time this week—I promised. Lord Coningsby, 29th March, meeting me at court, asked me when I went for Ireland—probably he knew it was concerted at St. James's to have leave.

*Lord Chancellor Middleton to Thomas Broderick.*

EXTRACT.

DEAR BROTHER,

*Dublin, Dec. 14, 1719.*

I am obliged to you for the account you give me of the peerage bill on Tuesday last. It was what I expected, as well as wished; though I confess I was, and am, a good deal confounded how to account for their prudence, who, after a former unsuccessful attempt, resolved on renewing it so very soon after, without having taken a more exact muster of the troops they should be able to bring into the field on the day of battle. You know last spring what my sentiments were on this subject, and I remember to have told you in what a manner my giving into the bill was pressed upon me, and by whom. For fear of mis-



takes, I wrote down my resolution, and read it to a certain great man, which was in the words following : “ I cannot, with honour or conscience, vote for the peerage bill, it being perfectly against my judgment. I desire I may, without displeasing his majesty, be absent from the house while that bill is under consideration, not thinking it becoming me to give opposition by voting or debating against a bill introduced and carried on as this has been. If this be too great a favour to be allowed me, I am ready, with the most dutiful submission, and without the least reluctance, to suffer any thing which I may be thought to deserve, for not being able to perceive the reasonableness or expediency of the bill.” This I read on the 17th March, 1718, and desired the person I read it to that he would acquaint the king with it. He seemed much out of humour ; said he was sorry, nay surprized, to find me to have taken this resolution, having formerly thought I had been for the bill ; but promised to acquaint Lord S. with it. On the 19th I went to his house, and asked him if he had seen his majesty ; he told me he had not, but should see him that day. About an hour after he called at my lodging, expressed great kindness for me, recommended the Old Whig\* to me, and hoped I would be convinced : I gave him no reason to expect it, and so we parted. Soon after I was told I might prepare for Ireland without loss of time.

\* Addison’s pamphlet. The “ great man” alluded to, was the duke of Bolton. After the perusal of these papers there is little occasion to pass any encomium upon the integrity of lord Middleton. This nobleman, descended from sir St. John Broderick, of Richmond, in Yorkshire, who, for his services at the Restoration, was rewarded by a grant of lands in the county of Monaghan, had in the late reign conspicuously distinguished himself by his attachment to the whig interest, and in the last parliament convened, 1713, under the duke of Shrewsbury, was chosen speaker of the house of commons, in opposition to the utmost efforts of the court. At the accession of George I. he was nominated chancellor of Ireland, and advanced to the dignity of the peerage. And it was not in those times thought derogatory to the



## COUNT BROGLIO TO THE KING OF FRANCE.

*A. D. 1724.*

July 6, 1724.—As the duchess of Kendal seemed to express a desire to see me often, I have been very attentive to her, being convinced that it is highly essential to the advancement of your majesty's service to be on good terms with her; for she is closely united to the three ministers who now govern, and these ministers are in strict union together, and are, as far as I can judge, well inclined. They visit me very frequently both together and singly, and I behave to them in the same manner. Chavigny strongly assured me that I might place an entire confidence in them. Their future conduct will enable me to judge better of their sentiments. The king of England has made Chavigny a present of 1000*l.* which is double to what is usually given to envoys. Both the king and the ministers appear to be very well satisfied with him.

Lord Townshend and Mr. Walpole have been lately indisposed, but they are now quite recovered. It is much to be wished that they should remain in power, for they

high office he held, to sit in the intervals of business as a member of the British house of commons, where his unblemished character, and superior talents, rendered him highly useful to the court. His son and brother, St. John and Thomas Broderick, were also members of the British parliament. The lord chancellor Middleton was not indeed dismissed from his office in consequence of his opposition to the peerage bill, but he no longer enjoyed the same degree of favour and influence: and his determined resistance to Wood's patent, a few years afterwards, exciting anew the resentment of the court, he was at his own request permitted to resign the great seal, May 1725. Writing to his brother, a few months previous to this event, he thus expresses himself: "I shall, I think, very soon retire into Surrey. My way of thinking is not such as is pleasing on your side, and of consequence my advice can have little weight. I have done all in my power to discover what is the right thing to be done, and have an inflexible purpose to follow what I think to be so."



appear anxious to maintain the good intelligence which subsists between the two crowns. They possess an unbounded influence over the king and the duchess of Kendal: they enjoy the whole power of government, and the entire confidence of the king.

The prince of Wales endeavours to obtain information of what passes from persons who are attached to him, but he learns nothing either from the king, the duchess, or the ministers. The king goes every afternoon at five o'clock to the duchess, the ministers occasionally attend, and it is there that affairs which require secrecy are treated. M. Dillon has introduced me to his relations and friends, who, as he informs me, can supply me with good intelligence.

July 10.—The more I consider state affairs, the more I am convinced that the government is entirely in the hands of Mr. Walpole, lord Townshend, and the duke of Newcastle, who are on the best terms with the duchess of Kendal. The king visits her every afternoon from five to eight; and it is there that she endeavours to penetrate the sentiments of his Britannic majesty, for the purpose of consulting the three ministers, and pursuing the measures which may be thought necessary for accomplishing their designs. She sent me word that she was desirous of my friendship, and that I would place confidence in her. I assured her that I would do every thing in my power to merit her esteem and friendship. I am convinced that she may be advantageously employed in promoting your majesty's service, and that it will be necessary to employ her: though I will not trust her farther than is absolutely necessary.

Staremborg hopes to go to France in a month, with the character of ambassador. He had written to the court of Vienna that he had discovered a close union between the ministers of France, Spain, and England. He received for answer, that the imperial court was persuaded of the



good-will of several persons who compose the cabinet of Spain, but that if they were not implicitly to be depended on, the government was so \* \* \* and their power so weak, that there was nothing to fear. It must be of advantage to your majesty's service that a quarrel has broke out between this ambassador and the king and ministry of Great Britain. I shall not exert myself to adjust the difference.

20th July.—Lord Townshend did not solicit the honour of a garter for himself; he had even requested it for another person; but the king spontaneously insisted on his accepting it, notwithstanding his remonstrating with great modesty that there were many persons more deserving of it than himself. It is however generally believed, that the duchess of Kendal, at the instigation of lord Townshend, suggested to the king that it would be proper to invest him with the garter; and there is a great appearance of probability in the conjecture. It is much to be wished, for the maintenance of the union between your majesty and the king of England, that no misfortune may happen to Mr. Walpole, he being absolutely the helm of government. The king cannot do without him, on account of his great influence in the house of commons, where he depends entirely upon him in every respect. He is a man of great abilities, and very enterprising. The house places a most unreserved confidence in him, and he has the address to persuade them that the national honour is dearer to him than all the wealth in the world. He is very ably seconded by Townshend, who is a man of great capacity, and with whom he is in perfect harmony. The duke of Newcastle, who is indebted to him for his situation, submits to his judgment in every thing; so that the king experiences no contradiction to his wishes, but leaving the internal government entirely to Walpole, is more engaged with the German ministers, in regulating the affairs of Hanover, than occupied with those of England. It is to be observed, that Mr. Walpole adjusted the quarrel be-



tween the king and prince of Wales. He entirely governed the prince at that period, but he has since left him, and attached himself to the king. For some years past the king has not spoke a word to the prince, nor the prince to him. The princess of Wales sometimes in public attacks the king in conversation; he answers her; but some who are well apprized that his majesty likes her no better than the prince, have assured me, that he only speaks to her on these occasions for the sake of decorum. The king regularly receives 1000*l.* every week, which he keeps himself; the remainder of the revenue of the civil list, amounting to 600,000*l.* sterling per annum, is remitted every month to his treasurer. It is said that the prince of Wales is a very good economist, not only of the 100,000*l.* a-year allowed him by parliament, but of the revenues of the principality of Wales, which may amount to 20,000*l.* more.

The king has no predilection for the English nation, and never receives in private any English of either sex. None even of his principal officers are admitted to his chamber in a morning to dress him, nor in the evening to undress him. These offices are performed by the Turks who are his valets-de-chambre, and who give him every thing he wants in private\*. He rather considers England

\* The Turks alluded to, and known by the names of Mustapha and Mahomet, had been many years before captured, during the wars of Hungary, in which the king, then electoral prince of Hanover, served under the imperial banners. As they discovered an extreme attachment to the prince, he took them into his service, and distinguished them by many marks of his favour. Their portraits are on the great stair-case in Kensington palace. Pope has mentioned one of these Turks in terms of approbation in his *Moral Essays*.

From peer or bishop 'tis no easy thing,  
To draw the man who loves his God or king.  
Alas! I copy, or my draught would fail,  
From honest Mah'met, or plain parson Hale.



as a temporary possession, to be made the most of while it lasts, than as a perpetual inheritance to himself and family. He will have no disputes with the parliament, but commits the entire transaction of that business to Walpole; chusing rather that the responsibility should fall on the minister's head than his own, and being well apprized that a king of Great Britain is obliged, when the parliament requires it, to give an account of his conduct, as well with respect to the liberty of the subject as to the execution and formation of laws. I have even been assured that the king has expressed himself to this effect.

I am persuaded, on the other hand, that Mr. Walpole, who is immensely rich, would wish to retire from business, and enjoy his wealth in quiet; but as he has excited a great share of enmity and envy, it would be dangerous for him to retire. He is under the necessity of retaining his situation, to preserve to himself and family the wealth and honours of which they are possessed. I am even inclined to think, that he entertains hopes of a particular protection from the king, if he should happen to fall into disgrace. I labour daily, with all the dexterity I possess, to induce him to think so, that I may keep him in all the favourable sentiments he now entertains towards your majesty. I am very much deceived if affairs are not exactly as I represent them; and I think I may go so far as to claim your entire confidence in the statements I have the honour to make.

Carteret no longer goes to court; the prevailing party has entirely destroyed his influence with the king. He is no longer engaged in business. He is a man of great vivacity and intelligence, and very ambitious. He has already changed his party several times, from interested motives; a circumstance which has brought him into disgrace with all parties. There is a strict friendship and union between him and my lord Cadogan; and I think it



very fortunate for your majesty's interest that Carteret is out of power ; having been assured by people who pretend to great information on the subject, that he was very much devoted to the interest of the emperor.

The ministry hold Cadogan very cheap, and as he receives 20,000*l.* sterling a-year from the treasury, he is Walpole's humble servant ; a circumstance not at all to his honour, as he is treated with much indignity, and there is no reason for him to expect a change of situation, or that he will obtain the patents of which he is so desirous. He has no influence at court or in parliament, nor is he beloved by the people at large. He keeps up his respectability only by the fortune he has amassed in the wars, and the revenues of his offices. He is a man of courage, and behaved well in his situation of quarter-master-general, and on other occasions. The immense wealth he has acquired, and his having, by means of the powerful interest of the duke of Marlborough, passed over the heads of many of his seniors in the army, have drawn on him a great many enemies. Every body speaks of him to me in those terms ; and I am inclined to think the ministry would dismiss him, and give his place to some one else, but the duke of Argyle is next in rotation to take the command of the troops, and as he is a man of exalted rank, who has seen a great deal of service, is well versed in intrigue, and would not submit to their authority as they would wish, they retain Cadogan, but humble him as much as possible on every occasion.



OBSERVATIONS RELATIVE TO THE TREATY OF  
VIENNA.*A. D. 1725.*

THE treaty concluded at Vienna, in the month of April 1725, between the emperor Charles VI. and Philip V. king of Spain, excited the astonishment of Europe, and occasioned great uneasiness and alarm to the courts of London and Versailles; who could not comprehend how an animosity so deeply rooted, and of such long duration, could be so suddenly converted into the most cordial friendship, and the most intimate alliance.

Nevertheless, on the first communication of the treaty to the king of England by the Imperial ambassador, count Staremberg, that minister declared it “to be in all respects conformable to the quadruple alliance, and that it merely regulated those points which remained to be adjusted: and that his Imperial majesty hoped that the kings of Great Britain and France would accede to the treaty, and join in the guarantee of the pragmatic sanction.” He added, “that the duke de Ripperda had informed the emperor, that some points still remained to be settled between Spain and England, and the king his master requested the emperor to employ his mediation to that effect. To this request the emperor had replied, that if those matters related to, and were the consequence of, the quadruple alliance, and if the king of England approved of it, he would willingly offer his interposition, but that otherwise he would not interfere.”

The king of England, in answer, took no notice of the overture for acceding to the treaty; and in regard to the interposition of the emperor, “he did not recollect that any difference subsisted between himself and the king of



Spain, except such as related to commerce, and in those there was no occasion for mediation\*.”

This was certainly an extraordinary declaration, when it was known to the whole world that the king of Spain claimed the restitution of Gibraltar, by virtue of a promise in writing transmitted to him in the king of England's own hand.

Great jealousies were immediately conceived by the court of London, that some fearful mystery lay concealed under the veil of the late treaty; and that the king of Spain would not have consented to guarantee the pragmatic sanction without some adequate compensation, which compensation was supposed to be the recovery of Gibraltar. And it soon began to be the subject, first of suspicion, then of rumour, then of assertion, and at length of serious belief, that deep designs were formed by the two allied sovereigns, for the restoration of the pretender to the throne of Great Britain.

In order to counteract the projects, real or imaginary, of the imperial and Spanish courts, a defensive alliance was framed and signed at Hanover, September 3, 1725, between England, France, and Prussia, to which Holland and other powers afterwards acceded. But the ideas of lord Townshend, the negotiator of this treaty, extended far beyond a mere system of self-defence. Even previous to the completion of it, he wrote a letter in confidence to Mr. Horace Walpole, disclosing the particulars of a rash and romantic project, formed by him for the conquest and partition of the Austrian Netherlands†. But this scheme he did not regard as unjust, being firmly convinced of the reality of the plot concerted in favour of the pretender. In lord Townshend's dispatch of October 4, from Hano-

\* Lord Townshend to St Saphorin, chargé d'affaires at Vienna, May 3, 14, 1725; Coxe's Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, vol. i. p. 243.

† Ibid. vol. i. p. 246.



ver, to the duke of Newcastle, secretary of state, to be communicated to sir Robert Walpole only, he says, “ I have been for some months thoroughly persuaded that Spain and the court of Vienna, when they concluded the late treaty, entered into a strong engagement in favour of the pretender by a secret article. I acquainted your grace some time ago with this intelligence, which I had from so good hands, that i no more doubt the truth of it, than if I had actually seen the article\*.

Sir Robert Walpole, however, was far from participating in the ardent credulity of lord Townshend ; for in his reply to this letter (October 13), he declares most strongly against the commission of any act of hostile aggression on the part of England. “ If we are to be engaged in a war,” says this cool and sagacious politician, “ *which I most heartily deprecate*, ’tis to be wished that this nation may think an invasion by a foreign power, or an *evident design* of such invasion, the support of the pretender, and the cause of the protestant succession, are the chief and principal motives that obliged us to part with that peace and tranquillity, and the happy consequences thereof, which we now enjoy †.”

In his next letter to lord Townshend, he says, in language that implies vigilance and caution indeed, but nothing allied to a blind and bigotted belief, “ I must confess, the apprehensions of some design next spring obtain so much with me, that I think it deserves the greatest attention, and we cannot be too watchful to trace and discover all that can possibly be known ‡.” And to a flaming war speech, intended for the opening of the session, of which lord Townshend had sent over a copy from Ha-

\* Coxe's Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, vol. ii. p. 480.

† Ibid. vol. ii. p. 486.

‡ Ibid. vol. ii. p. 488.



nover, his wiser colleague made such forcible objections, as produced an essential alteration in its whole tenor and purport\*.

“ Sir Robert Walpole thought that the king and Townshend were too much alarmed with the exaggerated rumours and apprehensions of distant evils. He thought Townshend too precipitate in concluding the treaty of Hanover, and was dissatisfied with that nobleman for having concealed the negotiation which terminated in that treaty until it was entirely concluded. He was averse to enter upon measures which might tend to diminish the force of the house of Austria, whom he considered as the natural ally of England, and the bulwark against any future ambitious designs of France. He invariably recommended caution and forbearance; and he availed himself of the pacific sentiments of the duchess of Kendal, to counteract, by her influence over the king, the more violent and hostile resolutions of Townshend†.”

In order to decide with impartiality on the conduct of ministers at this juncture, it is, however, undoubtedly requisite to take into our consideration that evidence, and that alone, on which they were compelled to act at the time. Lord Townshend asserts, in his letter of October 4th, to the duke of Newcastle, that Spain had remitted within a short time vast sums, amounting to four millions of crowns, to Vienna. The rage and resentment of the king and queen of Spain, against both England and France, were such as would probably incite them to acts of extravagance and desperation. The councils of that kingdom had long been characterized only by pride and passion, combined with folly and imbecility. At the

\* Coxe's Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, vol. i. p. 254, vol. ii. p. 492, and 494.

† Ibid. vol. i. p. 249, and 250.



court of Madrid the dukes of Ormond and Liria held frequent conferences with the Spanish, Russian, and Imperial ministers, and troops were openly assembled for the pretender's service. The duke of Wharton, who resorted thither with credentials from the pretender, was received with distinguished honours; and the British ambassador, to use his own words, "was avoided by the grandes like a pestilence." The duke de Ripperda, the Spanish minister at Vienna, said publicly, "that by this close union of Spain and Austria the two sovereigns would avenge the insults they had received."

The Austrian prime minister, count Zinzendorf, boasted "that the emperor would give laws to Europe." He also said to Petkum, "Let the king take care of himself, for we know that the people of England are beginning to be tired of him." The emperor, in allusion no doubt to the remonstrances respecting the new commercial establishment at Ostend, declared himself "desirous to favour the commerce and people of England, but that Gibraltar and Minorca must first be restored \*."

Notwithstanding the demonstrations of friendship and cordiality subsisting at this time between the courts of Madrid and Vienna, it was to the last degree improbable that the political views of the two monarchs respecting England should really coincide. The strong sagacity of Walpole could never be imposed upon by mere external appearances, and surely it was not difficult, under this veil, to perceive that Spain was the dupe of Austria, who succeeded in drawing from her vast sums of money, in detaching her entirely from the interests of France, and even in obtaining the unqualified guarantee of the pragmatic sanction. In return for which, Spain was to be amused with projects for the recovery of Gibraltar and Minorca, and eventually, perhaps, for the restoration of the pretender; and, above

\* Coxe's Memoirs of Walpole, vol. i. p. 251, 252.



all, with the hopes of a double marriage between the infants don Carlos and don Philip, and the two archduchesses, Maria Theresa and Marianne, daughters of the emperor: by which means the immense succession of Austria would devolve upon a younger son of the king of Spain, by his present queen, Elizabeth of Parma, a woman of restless and unbounded ambition. In respect to the first of these projects, the Imperial court appears to have been very little, and as to the others, not at all in earnest. The idea of transferring the Austrian empire to a cadet of the house of Bourbon, as a consequence of these marriages, was, on the contrary, entertained with impatience by the court of Vienna, and regarded with indignant detestation.

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COLONEL STANHOPE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

MY LORD,

*Madrid, Feb. 4, 1726. (N. S.)*

Two posts being yet wanting here from England, I am still without any commands from your grace and lord Townshend. The second, hitherto secret treaty, betwixt the emperor and the king of Spain, will, as the duke de Ripperda told me two days ago, soon be made public. It consists, according to his representation of it to me, of three particular articles, besides the general one of alliance offensive and defensive, *viz.* 1. An engagement on the part of Spain, to support and maintain the company of Ostend. 2. An engagement on the part of the emperor, as an equivalent for the former, to procure Gibraltar for the king of Spain, by good offices, if possible, but if they prove ineffectual, by open force. 3. The adjustment of the succours to be reciprocally furnished in case of a war, *viz.* on the part of the emperor, 30,000 men to be actually sent by him into Spain. On the



part of Spain, money to be sent for the payment of the like number of troops, wheresoever the emperor should think fit to employ them. This treaty was concluded soon after the first, but thought not proper to be divulged till it became necessary, in order to frighten the Dutch from acceding to the treaty of Hanover.

\* \* \* \* \*

The minister of Spain had long persisted in his denial of any secret treaty whatever between the king of Spain and the emperor ; but the political profligacy of the duke de Ripperda was such, as to divest his testimony of all pretension to credit, equally in what he denied and what he affirmed. It may however be remarked, that this minister was now in the zenith of his power, yet no public step was taken by the court of Madrid in advancement of that cause which this adventure was supposed so much to favour. Colonel Stanhope even assures the duke of Newcastle, in his next dispatch (February 11th), “ that the annual pension allowed to the pretender was, as Ripperda affirmed, at his persuasion actually taken off ; saying, that he would speedily do the same thing with the duke of Ormond and the rest of the jacobites in Spain ;” though at this very time the pretender professed to rely upon this political mountebank as his only support. The following letter discovers both his fears and his hopes.

#### THE PRETENDER TO THE DUKE OF RIPPERDA.

*De Rome, ce 4 Mars, 1726.*

Le duc de Wharton n'aura pas besoin de recommandations auprès de vous. Vous connoissés son mérite et son crédit en Angleterre, et son sincere attachement à moy ne vous le rendra pas, je suis sure, moins estimable. Je le'envoye en Espagne pour représenter à leurs majestés ca-



tholiques ce qui regarde mes interests dans une conjoncture aussi critique, et je vous prie de lui donner vos conseils, et de l'appuyer de tout vostre crédit auprès de vos maistres. Je suis plus sensible que je ne puis vous l'exprimer, à tout ce qu'il m'a dit de vostre zèle et amitié pour moy, et j'y place d'autant plus de confiance qu'il semble qu'il ne manque que mon ré-tablissement pour mettre le comble à vostre propre gloire, et pour rendre le roi catholique le plus grand prince de l'univers. Je n'entreray ici en aucun detail, me remettant au duc de Wharton à vous entretenir de toutes mes affaires politiques et domestiques. J'espère tout de vos bonnes offices, et je vous prie de conter sur la sincerité de ma gratitude et amitié.

JACQUES R.

\* \* \* \* \*

The duke de Ripperda was suddenly hurled from the pinnacle of power, in the month of May following, and immediately consequent to his disgrace, having taken refuge from the violence of his enemies at the hotel of colonel Stanhope, he was, as we are informed by the subsequent dispatch of June 15th, *pressed* by the ambassador, who would not lose so inviting an opportunity of multiplying discoveries, and at length *prevailed upon*, to make a full disclosure of the secret treaty of Vienna; which, conformably to this new and improved edition of it, consisted of no less than eight articles. By the first of these all preceding treaties are ratified. By the second and third, the two arch-duchesses are given to the infants don Carlos and don Philip. By the fourth, the emperor and the king of Spain engage to enter into a war with France, for re-conquering the duchy of Burgundy, Franche Comté, Alsace, the French conquests in Flanders, &c, also Navarre and Roussillon; the two latter to be annexed to Spain, and the former to be settled on don Carlos. By the fifth article, the emperor and king oblige themselves



never to give an arch-duchess or infanta in marriage to France. The three following are separate articles: "1. In case the king of France dies without issue, the infant don Philip is to succeed to the crown. 2. The emperor and king solemnly engage to assist the pretender with their forces, to regain possession of the crown of Great Britain. 3. Their Imperial and Catholic majesties reciprocally undertake, and pledge themselves, utterly to extirpate the protestant religion, and not to lay down their arms until this design be fully and effectually executed."

It is astonishing that so gross and impudent a forgery should be able to obtain the least credit. Colonel Stanhope declares, in his dispatch to the duke of Newcastle, July 30, 1726, "that Ripperda, while he was stating the terms of this treaty, appeared to be in the greatest agony, and at times cried like a child." Of the agitation of mind and distress of Ripperda, at this juncture, there can indeed exist no doubt; and that practised dissembler well knew how to convert these effusions of passion to his own purpose. To this *authentic account* of the secret treaty of Vienna, Ripperda added a variety of circumstances worthy of equal attention. He averred, "that the kings of England and Prussia were not only to be stripped of their dominions in Germany, but that the princes who were to succeed to them were actually pitched upon."—"I could never, however," says the ambassador, "induce him to name to me those princes. Upon which occasion I beg leave to observe to your grace, that although in the *discoveries* made to me by him, several particular circumstances, that were to have been wished to have been explained, are omitted, it is not so much to be wondered at, as that he had the *courage* to open himself so far as he did, considering the risque he run thereby while in the dominions of his Catholic majesty." But the risk this flagrant fabricator of falsehoods must neces-



sarily incur, of being detected by the imprudent mention of names, sufficiently accounts for his extreme caution and obstinate reserve on this head.

It is manifest that Ripperda had taken his resolution to throw himself upon England for protection; in order to merit which, it was deemed by him necessary to invent a tale as extravagant and as terrible as any to be found in the Arabian Nights Entertainment; and it is not the least marvellous circumstance of the story, that he had even for a moment the good fortune to be believed.

M. POZOBUENO, SPANISH AMBASSADOR AT LONDON,  
TO THE DUC DE RIPPERDA.

A. D. 1726.

*London, May 16, 1726.*

The king of Great Britain suspects more and more, that if the king of Prussia conceives that the treaty concluded at Vienna, between the emperor, Russia, and Sweden, will be prejudicial to his interests, he will recede from the treaty of Hanover; and on this event the king's German dominions will be exposed to invasion, should a war be occasioned by the treaty of Vienna. This reflection has considerably agitated the king's mind, for it is evident that his wishes tend to the preservation and augmentation of his electorate; and his inclination is so great, that he cannot dissemble it. To this inclination may be attributed the resolution which it is said he has taken, that at the least cause of suspicion from the king of Prussia, he will instantly repair to Hanover, to keep Frederic William to his promises, and to place himself at the head of his troops, should any invasion from the emperor or the czarina render it necessary. It is feared that the czarina will form an enterprize in favour of her son-in-law, the



duke of Holstein, and it is added that the duke of Mecklenburg will command the Russian troops at their debarkation.

Besides these subjects of disquiet, the king of England feels no less chagrin in having lost the confidence of the emperor, whom he so much loves and esteems; considers the treaty of Vienna as offensive and prejudicial both to the safety of his Hanoverian dominions and to the British commerce: and if his inclination first leads him to preserve his hereditary dominions, yet his interest obliges him to endeavour to maintain the commerce of England, which is his chief wish, the loss of which, he is convinced, would effectually prove the ruin of all.

The king is no less troubled with the suspicions which he entertains, that the emperor is resolving to annul the treaty of Hanover, as opposite to the constitution of the Germanic empire. The Hanoverian party here encourage these suspicions, and insinuate that an electoral assembly will be convened, for the purpose of declaring the treaty unconstitutional, and of exhorting the king and Frederic William, as electors of Hanover and Brandenburg, to retract it; and in case of refusal, to put them under the ban of the empire. The confidential friends of the king speak with regret of this convocation of the electoral assembly, which is threatened to be called in the month of July. And a hint thrown out by the empress, in a letter to the duchess of Kendal, that it appears from the treaty of Hanover, as if the king had no longer occasion for the emperor's friendship, has tended to confirm the king in his opinion that he has lost the emperor's confidence.



## M. POZOBUENO TO M. RIPPERDA.

## EXTRACTS.

London, May 23, 1726.—The account I transmitted to your excellency last week, of what passed between the king and the duchess of Kendal, lord Townshend and sir Robert Walpole, in regard to the letter from the empress of G. has been confirmed to me from another quarter. I also know, by the same channel, that Fabrice, chamberlain to the king as elector, his favourite, told the Imperial resident that the king was uneasy on account of the situation in which he stands with the emperor; and he added that Fabrice, after abusing lord Townshend as overbearing and violent in his resolutions, declared that he would never speak to him in future. The resident attempted to appease his anger, but in vain, for Fabrice protested that he feared no one, because in all he did and said he consulted only the interest of his master; and he requested the resident to furnish him, according to his promises, with those papers which prove the ill consequences of the treaty of Hanover, in regard to the emperor and the empire, and which give the reasons that induce the emperor to protect and support the Ostend company, and promised not to omit the first opportunity of laying them before the king. Fabrice concluded that the motive which induces the duchess of Kendal to lean to the opinion of Walpole to avoid a war, is not, *as she declares*, because it is the interest of England, but from self-interest. That the misunderstanding between Townshend and Walpole daily increases. Fabrice imagines that Walpole is so desirous of getting rid of Townshend, that he is capable of reconciling himself to Pulteney, and of placing him in Townshend's post.

London, May 30, 1726.—A few days after the departure of the last post, I happened to meet with the Imperial resi-



dent: he proceeded to communicate to me that he had learned from a safe and certain quarter, that the duchess of Kendal had copied afresh a letter to the empress, dictated by the Hanoverian minister. The resident also spoke to me of the division subsisting between lord Townshend and sir Robert Walpole, which he described as very great. Whatever care ministers may take to conceal every unpleasant fact, and to keep a guarded silence even with their great intimates, yet the nation is apprized, that whatever hostilities arise in the north, they will pay dearly for them. They observe, that most of the facts disclosed to them respecting our treaties with Vienna are not truly stated; and that even the treaty of Hanover has not produced the effects they were so liberally taught to expect. They even shew displeasure at the facility with which the parliament has permitted itself to be led by the influence of the minister. The resident also told me, that Mr. Pulteney, the oracle of opposition, who is very intimate with him and Staremborg, had given him this information\*.

\* From the above documents, corroborated by other testimonies to the same effect, published in Coxe's Collection, it is evident that the violent measures of lord Townshend, calculated to bring on an immediate and general war, were happily counteracted by a variety of causes. The court of Vienna itself, far from devising projects for the eventual restoration of the pretender, was manifestly reluctant in the highest degree to come to a rupture with the maritime powers. The empress herself condescended to carry on a private correspondence with the duchess of Kendal, with a view to prevent it. In case of a war, the defection of Prussia being scarcely a matter of doubt, Hanover would be completely at the mercy of the Imperial court. This made the Hanoverian ministers to tremble, and the king himself to ponder and to hesitate. The sagacity and moderation of Walpole led him at once to discern the absurdity, and to avoid the danger. Even the leading members of the opposition, whether acting from patriotic or factious motives, would be happy on this occasion to second the counsels of Bothmar and Fabrice, in order, by effecting a reconciliation with the emperor, to preserve their country from the calamity of war; and also to furnish themselves with so fair a handle for exposing in parliament the late rash and precipitate proceedings of their political antagonists.



## COUNT PALM TO THE EMPEROR.

*London, Dec. 13, 1726.*

In the present circumstances, when the violent proceedings of the English ministry against the Spanish court have the appearance of an almost inevitable breach of the peace with that court, and when it is to be feared that all Europe may be plunged in a destructive war, I, urged by my duty and zeal, have endeavoured to learn, 1st, how the nation is inclined on that head ; and, 2dly, who it is in reality that labours to blow these coals. As to the first, it is most certain that the greatest part of the nation, nay, as I have been told by people of good experience and knowledge, even two-thirds of it, are discontented at the present ministry, and not only abhor the war with your Imperial majesty and Spain, but also the strict alliance and union with France. As to the second, it is no less manifest that the cause of these measures, so precipitate, and tending to a dangerous rupture, can be imputed to none else but the *English ministry*, that is to say, to my lord Townshend. For the king, as to himself, is of a peaceable disposition, and not to be brought to proceedings of that nature, unless he has been induced to it by such misrepresentations and false suggestions, as have been able to create a suspicion and hearty fear in him.

I have just now said, that the nation is not inclined to a war, especially against your Imperial majesty ; and it is very well known to the public, that the Ostend commerce is a grievance industriously enhanced by the ministry, to animate the nation, and make them cry out against your Imperial majesty, fancying that you might thereby be induced to gratify them (the ministry), as well in this point directly, as indirectly in other affairs.

In some of my former, but especially in my reflections upon the answer given to the Spanish court, I men-



tioned how great a mistake the ministry were guilty of in that answer, and how they committed so false a step, that it is almost impossible for them to make it consistent with their honour and security not to make a war. But who is the *primum mobile* in the ministry? 'Tis very well known to the whole world that it can be but my lord Townshend. For his brother, Robert Walpole, though his power and credit be far greater, yet he properly does not meddle with foreign affairs, but receives accounts of them in general, leaving for the rest the direction of them entirely to lord Townshend. As for others, there are none that have any share in those affairs besides the duke of Newcastle only: but then it is also known to every body, that this latter is nothing but a figure of secretary of state, being obliged to conform himself in every thing to lord Townshend, who is *propriè autor et anima negotiorum*. Now, as long as his lordship continues in his post, it does not appear how one may expect from England a sincere good understanding and undisturbed alliance. For the known principles of this minister, as well as the present condition of affairs, hurried by him to the brink of a rupture, are an obstruction to such an amicable composition as might be relied upon. As for his principles, it is known that he has always been against the system of Europe as settled by the quadruple alliance, for he has told upon that head, "that had it depended upon him, he would have ordered it so, that the advantages your Imperial majesty got by it should have cost you dearer." Those were his very expressions. Since he came to the ministry, experience has convinced, that he has almost upon all occasions acted against your Imperial majesty's interests; of which the steps taken in the face of the whole world, both at Cambray and since, are evident proofs, and shew his real disaffection. Besides this, nobody is ignorant of what he said in parliament, for in his speeches he ran into such excesses, that all impartial people could not hear of



them without horror. In this situation it is probable that we can never promise to ourselves any good from him; for should we even resolve to forget his audaciousness and indiscretion, and should he disguise his natural opinion and inclination, yet all that could be negotiated with him could not be lasting, but we should ever run the risk, upon every proffered occasion, of his returning to the maxims formerly used by him, and entirely suitable to his genius.

As much as this man is an obstruction to a general quiet and reasonable agreement, as easy would it be to arrive at it, were he no longer in the way, and removed from the direction of affairs: for the nation in general hates him, and the king himself is not well inclined to him by his own choice; but he only keeps himself in power and credit, because he and his brother have in a despotic manner rendered themselves masters of all affairs. It is true, they have the parliament on their side; but that is not to be wondered at, for upon the foot that matters have been carried on within these few years, when the members, and consequently the majority, are bought with great pensions and employments, it is no great skill to have gained the parliament. But then I have been assured, from a very good hand, that if it should be once perceived that the ministry are not deep in the king's favour, and that his majesty should out of dislike to them make some shew of changing them, in that very moment there would be a turn, and most of them upon whom the ministry chiefly depend would pull off the mask, and declare against them. But as long as this does not happen, it is not so much as to be supposed that the parliament will oppose the government, unless the kingdom should come to be plunged into some visible ruin or danger: for though more than the third part have actually opposed, and will still oppose it, yet this can have no effect, because the ministers will always get the better by their purchased majority.



The nation itself is not satisfied with the parliament, because every body knows that there has not been one, time out of mind, in which the members have been so corrupted and devoted to the court.

For though the parliament has approved the measures and engagements taken with foreign powers, and particularly with France, yet the nation in general, high and low, are of a contrary opinion: the close understanding with France, and the hostile proceedings towards your Imperial majesty, being disapproved by them. Now, as long as the ministry can produce nothing to convince the nation that it has reason to fear any hostile act from your Imperial majesty or your allies, that opinion will not be altered, and all the blame returns upon the ministry. From which one may conclude, that as long as your Imperial majesty and your allies design nothing in favour of the pretender, and will make it known so to the world, the imputations invented on that head by the ministry will do hurt to none but themselves. For the nation must clearly see how ill they are led on by the ministry. Some eminent subjects, who are well inclined to your Imperial majesty's service, and extremely opposed to the present maxims of the ministry, have assured me, not only that the said ministry are extremely put to it, but also, that if your Imperial majesty and the king of Spain should continue with the same steadiness as hitherto, and the nation be convinced, besides, that all is false and groundless which they are told in order to prejudice them against the treaty of Vienna, and to render it odious, then the ministry would not long be able to blind the people, and play their cheating tricks; and a declaration of this, made to please the nation, and the most sensible part of the people, would in due time produce a good effect. Now, therefore, to promote this point, and your Imperial majesty's service, and deprive the ministry of all strength and credit, which they so mightily endeavour



vour to preserve, both at home and abroad, the opinion of the well-intentioned is, that besides the aforementioned steadiness of your Imperial majesty and Spain, a true state of the present matters should be fairly, and with convincing proofs, laid before the king. As to the nation, it may be done by publishing in print, and by word of mouth, information to such as have most credit and influence among them. And to the king it should be done by a confidential channel: then if his majesty were thus retrieved, by better informations and assurances, from his false impressions, and convinced that his English ministers intended to lead him on in so dangerous a way, there is no doubt but he would apply to better counsels, and then there would be found some people who would enforce such good dispositions, and break the neck of the present ministry. I know most certainly, that the king loves to learn some things *in materia negotiorum publicorum*, by other hands than by his ministers; which, it may very well be supposed, proceeds from a suspicion he has, that his ministers do not acquaint him with the true circumstances of matters. The king has many times had such informations conveyed to him, which he has taken as kindly as one could expect from a mind so prepossessed as his is; and this gives reason to believe, that what one would desire to convey to him in that manner would have a good effect.

COUNT ZINZENDORF TO COUNT PALM.

Vienna, Dec. 21, 1726.

We see plainly by the proceedings against Spain, that England seeks by all means to compel Spain by force, in order to break with us, as St. Saphorin gives out, in pursuance of their alliance. This arises chiefly from hence, because the ministry cannot support themselves otherwise than by troubling and confounding matters.



We must wait to see whether the nation will suffer themselves to be led away blindly any longer. Do they say that there is a secret engagement entered into, in the offensive alliance, concerning Gibraltar? that is the greatest untruth, as the treaty itself shews. Do they say that an agreement is made concerning the pretender? that is likewise the greatest untruth that can be imagined. Let them ask all the jacobites whether they have heard one word from us, or from Spain, that could be construed to mean such an enterprise, so long as we don't enter into a war: but then we shall help ourselves as well as we can. In short, the mad English ministry shall never bring us to any thing through fear; our measures are so taken, that certainly we shall be able to oppose the aggressor.

As to the commerce of Ostend, we have already made such steps as shew the peaceable desires of his Imperial majesty, and we are ready every moment to go farther. Do they talk of a marriage between an arch-duchess and don Carlos? 'tis very wonderful that they would prevent by a war *now*, a case that is so far from happening; which would not be avoided by a war, were it intended, which is a case put, but not granted. What danger can Europe undergo by that? *This* only, that this being a prince of the house of Bourbon, the strict union between France and Spain and this house will be promoted. But if France herself, as it seems, opposes this, and don't care that a cadet of that family should rise so high, then this fixes a disunion between France and Spain, which was attempted to be fixed by so long and bloody a war. What then is the cause and reason for making war? The augmentation of 30,000 men goes on, and we have many friends.



MEMORIAL OF COUNT PALM TO THE KING OF GREAT  
BRITAIN, PRESENTED FEBRUARY 1727.

MOST SERENE AND POTENT KING,

As soon as the speech made by your majesty to the parliament of Great Britain, now assembled, came to the knowledge of his Imperial and Catholic majesty, my most gracious master, he was struck with the utmost astonishment, that your majesty could suffer yourself to be prevailed upon to declare, from the royal throne, to that most renowned nation, in a manner hitherto unheard of, as undoubted facts, several things, some of which are strained in that speech to a wrong sense, some are entirely distant from the intentions of his Imperial and Catholic majesty; and, LASTLY, which affect much more sensibly than all the rest, some absolutely void of all foundation.

For as to what regards the peace concluded at Vienna with the most serene king of Spain, who can forbear being astonished that this very peace, which is built on the quadruple alliance signed at London, and other treaties contracted with your majesty, as its solid and sole foundation. And for the obtaining of which peace your majesty, together with your allies, waged so bloody, so long, and so glorious a war, and took yourself so much pains to procure, should now be alleged by your majesty as a just ground of complaint, and should be made use of as a pretence for these things which hitherto your ministers have been doing in all parts, to the great detriment of the emperor and the empire and the public tranquillity, and should be represented by your majesty to the British nation, with so much animosity against the emperor and the king of Spain, as a violation of treaties.

After complaining of the peace made at Vienna, complaint is likewise made of the treaty of commerce entered into with Spain, which is calculated to promote the mu-



tual and lawful advantages of the subjects of both parties, which is agreeable to the law of nations, and to the customs of all people in amity with each other : which can in no respect be of any prejudice to the British nation, whether we regard the situation of the countries, or the particular nature of the trade, and which is not in the least repugnant to the treaties made with Great Britain. So that if this treaty be considered with a mind free from prejudice, and from all design of inflaming the nation, there will remain no pretence to say that this treaty can be grievous or hurtful to a nation for which his Imperial majesty has the greatest affection and esteem, and whose glorious exploits, and important succours, no time will efface out of his memory.

The other head of complaint, which contains such things as are void of all foundation, relates principally to that imaginary alliance, which in the speech is called offensive, and is there supposed to have been made against your majesty between the emperor and king of Spain. But it will not only appear how groundless and frivolous this supposition is, from the offer lately made by his Imperial and Catholic majesty, of entering into a convention *de se mutuo non offendendo*, but will be entirely refuted by the consideration of the tenor of the treaty of alliance and friendship itself, made with the crown of Spain, and communicated in its whole extent to your majesty when it is proper : from the words of which, whether the least shadow or appearance of an offensive alliance can be drawn, is submitted to the judgment of the whole world.

Another part of the complaint relates to the secret articles made in favour of the pretender, whereof your majesty asserts that you have certain and undoubted informations, by which articles it should have been agreed to set the pretender on the throne of Great Britain. With what view, on what motive, and to what purpose, these informations, founded on the falsest reports, were repre-



sented to the people of Great Britain, is only not easy to be understood by his Imperial and Catholic majesty, but is obvious to the meanest capacity. But since the inviolable dignity and honour of such great princes cannot suffer that assertions of this nature, entirely unsupported by truth, should be advanced from the royal throne to the whole nation, and to all mankind, his sacred Imperial and Catholic majesty has expressly commanded me, that I should declare to your majesty, and to the whole kingdom of Great Britain, how highly he thinks himself affronted thereby, solemnly affirming upon his Imperial word, that there exists no secret article, nor convention whatsoever, which contains, or can tend to prove, the least tittle of what has been alleged. But that the secret designs, which lie concealed under a conduct till this time unheard of, may more manifestly appear, it must be observed, that the time is purposely taken for doing this, when a negotiation is on foot at Paris for composing the differences which have arisen, without any fault of his Imperial and Catholic majesty; which negotiation sufficiently shews how much his Imperial and Catholic majesty is at all times inclined to peace, and to the religious observation of his treaties.

As to what is said of Gibraltar, and concerning the siege thereof, under which, in the speech, it is insinuated as if some other design was concealed, the hostilities notoriously committed in the Indies and elsewhere against the king of Spain, in violation of treaties, seem to have given a very just occasion to the king of Spain for attempting that siege. But as to the intentions and engagements of the emperor upon that article, it is easy to see what they are by the treaty above-mentioned, which has been communicated.

As to what is said in the last place, concerning the Ostend trade, which the goodness of the Catholic king induced him to favour, being bound by no treaty, after he



had been apprized of the just reasons for the establishment of it, various expedients for a composition have been proposed, not only at the Hague, but even lately at Paris, lest this harmless method of providing for the security of the barrier, should prove an obstacle to the common friendship of the neighbouring powers.

Which things being thus the injury offered to truth, the honour and dignity of his sacred Imperial and Catholic majesty require that they should be exposed to your majesty, to the kingdom of Great Britain, and to the whole world. And his sacred Imperial majesty demands that reparation which is due to him by all manner of right, for the great injuries which have been done him by these many imputations.

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The preceding documents appear in the most decisive manner to demonstrate the non-existence of any such design on the part of the court of Vienna, in favour of the pretender, as the king of England had announced in his speech to both houses of parliament, January 1727. And upon what plausible grounds of evidence the pertinacious belief of that monarch and his ministers, in the reality of this design, was founded, yet remains amongst the arcana of history. Nevertheless, as the original editor of these papers has not merely declared his firm conviction of its truth, in common with the first assertors of it, but has assigned specific reasons for that conviction, it will not in this place be deemed improper, though at present chiefly a question of historic curiosity, concisely to state the argument on both sides, and leave the reader to draw his own conclusions,

I. In vindication of the hypothesis contended for by Mr. Coxe, has been urged the solemn assertion of the king of Great Britain in his famous speech of January



17th, 1727, in which that monarch pledged his faith and honour in support of the veracity of the charge brought by him against the emperor.

II. There is also alleged, the steady and continued belief of the confidential ministers of the crown, Townshend and the Walpoles, in the reality of the design, long after the period of apprehension was past; a belief which we are led to infer remained unaltered to the last moment of their lives.

III. The evidence of the duke de Ripperda is positive respecting the existence of a plan, or plot, concerted between the two courts of Vienna and Madrid, to restore the pretender, however he may have varied as to the particulars.

IV. The testimony of the two Sicilian abbots, Platania and Carraccioli, to the same purpose, is no less express, and not subject to the same imputation of inconsistency.

V. The implied avowal of count Zinzendorf himself, contained in his declaration to count Palm, "that in case of a war the emperor will help himself as well as he can," &c. is strongly insisted on, for no one ever imagined that the pretender could be restored otherwise than by a war\*.

Now, in the first place, and as a preliminary remark, it must be observed, there existed the strongest *previous* improbability that the emperor, a man not destitute of knowledge or understanding, and at this time greatly influenced by the counsels of prince Eugene, scarcely less eminent as a statesman than a warrior, could harbour a design so totally devoid of common sense as that imputed to him. An invasion of Great Britain was a project for the accomplishment of which the Austrian power was altogether unfit and incompetent. The misunderstandings

\* Vide Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, and Appendix. Also, Memoirs of Lord Walpole, p. 189.—Both by the Rev. William Coxe.



between the courts of London and Vienna related almost wholly to the affairs of Germany, and were by no means of such magnitude as were likely to excite the emperor to so vast and desperate an enterprise. Even admitting the attempt to be feasible, what political purpose could be answered by its success? The house of Stuart, odious to the bulk of the nation, if restored, could maintain permanent possession of the throne only by the aid and assistance of France, with which power it must sooner or later be expected to form connexions fatal to the interests of the house of Austria; whose political views had been in the main, and particularly by the late treaty of the quadruple alliance, zealously promoted by the king of England.

At this crisis, it must indeed be acknowledged, that the court of Vienna, perceiving an unexpected opportunity offer itself of detaching Spain for ever from France, was eager to meet the advances of the court of Madrid, which was governed by counsels to the last degree weak, proud, and passionate. The restitution of Gibraltar being one of the most favourite objects of this haughty court, the duke de Ripperda, its minister at Vienna, would naturally urge the emperor to concur in the rash and violent measures in contemplation, to extort that restitution from England. There exists no proof, however, that the court of Vienna carried her complaisance even so far as this. On the contrary, both count Palm in his public memorial, and count Zinzendorf in his private dispatches, absolutely deny that the emperor has entered into any offensive engagement with Spain respecting this fortress. That the court of Madrid was amused by that of Vienna with delusive hopes on this and other points, is indeed sufficiently manifest, and vast sums of money were from time to time remitted to the emperor by the Catholic king, in order to enable his Imperial majesty to act with vigour in support of the wild projects of Spain;



but the real policy of the court of Vienna was widely and totally different from that of her new and restless ally.

After these preliminary remarks, we may with advantage descend to particulars—And,

I. As to the solemn declaration of the king of England from the throne, nothing more can be inferred from it, than the entire conviction of that monarch respecting the truth of the charge thus publicly brought against the emperor. To this may with far greater force be opposed, the equally solemn and positive denial of the emperor. For the king of England *might be*, and very many of his best friends even then believed him *to be mistaken*: but the emperor could not possibly be liable in this case to be deceived; and there is no pretence, from the general character of this prince, to accuse, or even suspect him of hazarding a flagrant falsehood, respecting a matter of the highest importance, in the face of the whole world. Besides, nearly two years had elapsed since the conclusion of the treaty between the emperor and Spain, in which interval no one step had been taken by the court of Vienna towards carrying this pretended project into execution: although, in consequence of the quarrel of England with Russia, circumstances were unusually favourable to its accomplishment, if indeed it could for a moment be supposed possible or feasible, in *any circumstances* of which the most sanguine adversary of Great Britain could indulge the expectation.

II. The unvaried belief of the confidential ministers of the crown, Townshend and the Walpoles, in the truth of this design, if admitted (though the concurrence of sir Robert Walpole in this opinion seems very problematical), proves only the reluctance of human nature to relinquish the prejudices it has once imbibed. Moreover, as we have no specific declarations to judge from on their part,



and must rely on a general and vague assurance of this obstinate adherence to their original opinion, it is impossible to say with what abatements and modifications it might in the lapse of years be qualified.

III. The evidence of the duke de Ripperda is reduced by his innumerable contradictions and extravagancies to a mere nullity. In Mr. Stanhope's dispatch to lord Townshend, December 27, 1725, the ambassador declares, "that he had received the most positive assurances from the duc de Ripperda, that nothing had been concerted, or even treated upon between the courts of Madrid and Vienna in favour of the pretender; and that whatever designs on that head should come to his knowledge, he would oppose to the utmost of his power; and he positively affirmed, that there was no secret treaty or articles whatsoever entered into between the two courts." Early in the following February the duke de Ripperda informed Mr. Stanhope, "that the second or secret treaty would soon be made public; that it included an engagement, on the part of the emperor, to procure Gibraltar for the king of Spain, by good offices if possible, but if they prove ineffectual, by open force." In a few weeks after this (April 11th), the duke declared to Mr. Stanhope, "that the real intention of the secret treaty was defensive; for that although the emperor engaged to join with the king of Spain for procuring him Gibraltar from his majesty, 'tis expressed in the treaty *amicabiliter si fieri potest*." And it was not till after his disgrace, when he resolved to throw himself upon the protection of England, that he fabricated that extravagant tale which seems to have been swallowed by the ambassador, Stanhope, with implicit credulity.

IV. With regard to the testimony of the Sicilian abbots, Platania and Carraccioli, it bears upon the very face of it the character of a mere Sicilian romance. The secret treaty of Vienna is pretended to have been commu-



nicated to these abbots by the king of Spain on the 15th November, 1725. By the fifth article of this suppositious treaty, “the emperor and king obliged themselves to seek all methods to restore the pretender to the throne of Great Britain.” This disclosure was made in confidence by the king, as we are told, for the express purpose of obtaining the observations of these abbots upon it. But, as the romance proceeds to state, “the remarks made by them were so free as to inflame the resentment of the king, and he thereupon banished them from Spain.” The king was therefore no doubt willing, if not desirous, that this profound secret should be at length made public; otherwise he would have adopted a different mode of punishment—“not sent them wandering, but confined them at home.” They were, however, it seems, allowed to retire to France, where, as the king of Spain unquestionably foresaw and intended, “they imparted much useful intelligence to Mr. Walpole,” then resident at Paris. Amongst other extraordinary intelligence, these Sicilian adventurers, to the great terror of the English court, communicated their edition of the secret articles of the treaty of Vienna. Were this marvellous tale uncontradicted by any external evidence, it is from its own incongruity and extravagance wholly undeserving of serious belief; and it may without hesitation be placed on the same shelf with the Exploits of Don Bellianis, or the History of the Seven Champions of Christendom.

V. The declaration made by count Zinzendorf to count Palm, which is supposed to imply the reality of this design, remains to be considered. But in order to decide upon a question of this kind, no particular sentence or expression of the Austrian ministers can with propriety be taken or judged of separately. The whole scope and tenor of the correspondence is to be considered together; and whatever may appear in any degree ambiguous, must be explained agreeably to the plain intention and design of the whole.



Judging in conformity to this rule of common sense, not even the shadow of difficulty can remain.

Far from indicating any wish, and far less any intention, of involving herself in a war with England, the court of Vienna discovers an extreme solicitude for the re-establishment of that harmony and friendship which formerly subsisted between the two countries. Both ministers express a great degree of surprise at the extreme animosity displayed by the English court, which they endeavour to account for in various ways, though unable fully to develop the causes of it to their own satisfaction : and they concert schemes for the purpose of infusing a spirit of equity and moderation into the English counsels. Is this consistent with the existence of any secret and pre-determined design of invading Great Britain for the purpose of restoring the pretender ? Is it imaginable that such a design should exist in that court, the confidential ministers of which hold this sort of language in their private intercourse with each other, and even with the emperor himself ? The supposition involves in it an absolute moral impossibility.

Count Palm tells the emperor, “ that two-thirds of the English nation abhor the war with Austria ; that lord Townshend is the cause of these precipitate measures which tend to so dangerous a rupture ; that the king, peaceably disposed himself, has been induced to concur in them, by such misrepresentations and false suggestions as have been able to excite not merely suspicion, but a hearty fear in him ; that so long as his Imperial majesty and his allies design nothing in favour of the pretender, and will make it known so to the world, the imputations INVENTED on that head by the ministers, will do hurt to none but themselves ; that should the nation be convinced that all is false and groundless which they are told in order to prejudice them against the treaty of Vienna, and to



render it odious, then the ministry would not long be able to blind the people, and play their CHEATING TRICKS; that if the king were retrieved from his false impressions, there is no doubt but he would apply to better counsels," &c. &c.

The empress herself had, as it appears, even condescended to enter into a private correspondence with the duchess of Kendal, in order to secure her influence with the king in favour of the moderate and pacific system.

In fine, the prime minister of the Imperial court, count Zinzendorf, declares positively to the Imperial ambassador in London, count Palm, that "the notion of an agreement entered into in favour of the pretender, is the greatest untruth possible." He even denies that any offensive engagement exists concerning Gibraltar. And as to the commerce of Ostend, and the company established there, he affirms that "the court of Vienna have already made concessions, and are ready every moment to go farther."

His general conclusion is, "that the MAD English ministry cannot support themselves otherwise than by troubling and confounding matters. And though the Imperial court means no such enterprise as is charged against them *in case of a war*:" *i. e.* not surely the war which they themselves have determined secretly and desperately upon, with the view of dethroning the family actually reigning in Great Britain, but the war which they are anxiously apprehensive they may be eventually forced into, by the violence and "madness" of the English ministry, and more particularly of the secretary for foreign affairs, lord Townshend—"they shall help themselves as well as they can." And who would not in the same circumstances say the same thing?

This nevertheless is the irrefragable proof which we are told "confirms beyond a doubt the secret resolutions of the emperor!" And we are gravely reminded of "the



futility of opposing weak conjectures and perverted reasonings against positive facts\*.”

A moral and philosophical conclusion somewhat more pertinent to the occasion may be deduced from this recital, in the words of a discerning and experienced statesman, who tells us, that “there exists in politics a great truth, which is, that as all independent powers are with respect to each other in a state of nature, and consequently ever in a state of distrust, each party continually exaggerates the injuries and views of the adverse party; and that fear always bewildering the judgment, each combats chimeras of its own creation, and finishes by realizing dangers which at the beginning existed only in imagination†.

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#### LORD TOWNSHEND TO KING GEORGE II.

*A. D. 1728.*

IN the collection of state papers published by Mr. Coxe, are to be found a series of notes from lord Townshend to the king, principally serving to demonstrate the eager and unbounded complaisance of that minister in relation to the Hanover system of politics.—A few specimens may suffice.

September 20, 1728.—I have drawn a declaration, in concert with M. Hattorff. If your majesty approves of it, I humbly propose that it should be sent to Mr. Walpole, with orders to communicate to the cardinal the conversation he had with count Bassewitz, and the terms that were offered by him; and that as your majesty would do

\* Vide Coxe's Memoirs of Lord Walpole.

† Count de Segur's Memoirs of Frederic William II. vol. i. p. 49.



nothing without the cardinal's advice, your majesty had thought fit to desire it particularly in this case. By this step I conceive your majesty will have advantages: that if the cardinal advises your majesty to go this length, and desire this declaration, your majesty will be sure that the cardinal is determined to do something in favour of the duke of Holstein, and that it is in such case for your majesty's interest not to be left single; and if the cardinal is of opinion that your majesty should not hearken to these propositions of count Bassewitz, your majesty will find plainly that France has no intention to recede in the least from their guaranty, or give offence to Denmark. In the first case, Mr. Walpole may have orders, with the cardinal's approbation, to talk to count Bassewitz as from himself, and to propose his giving a declaration of the nature of the inclosed, in order to procure your majesty's friendship and good offices. And, in the second case, that the cardinal appears indifferent as to the duke of Holstein's satisfaction, Mr. Walpole may drop the whole, and take no farther notice of count Bassewitz's proposals.

September 24, 1728.—I send your majesty the inclosed draft of a declaration to be made by count Bassewitz, to which I have added the clause marked with dots underneath. By the former paper the duke of Holstein would not have been obliged to renounce his pretensions upon your majesty, unless the whole satisfaction were obtained. But as it is now turned, the renunciation will be immediate, upon your majesty's engaging to act in concert with the Most Christian king to those purposes therein mentioned. And as it is proper the duke should renounce those pretensions which really can never avail him any thing, upon your majesty's promising your good offices in his favour, so your majesty is engaged to nothing but in concert with France. And if that crown joins in obtaining a competent satisfaction for the duke, your majesty



will be undoubtedly quit of all shadow of pretension on the part of that prince. And if France should not be active and hearty in that matter, your majesty, by your readiness to join, will have deserved this declaration from the duke, which will always stand as a proof of your majesty's goodness towards him, and of the little ground he has for any pretensions upon your majesty ; so that in all events, whatever the success of your majesty's endeavours may be, if the duke makes this declaration, he will have quitted all claim upon your majesty for any part of the equivalent for Sleswig, and all pretensions to Bremen and Verden.

THE KING IN REPLY.

I like this form of a declaration much better than the first ; and if it is to be obtained, it will entirely secure the possession of Bremen, and free me from any obligation of an equivalent.

LORD TOWNSHEND TO THE KING.

EXTRACT.

November 1728.—I cannot but apprehend that Chauvelin is preparing materials in relation to Sleswig, that may in the end prove prejudicial to your majesty's interests. Mr. Walpole, therefore, should have orders to talk with the cardinal, in a calm but serious manner, upon this point, and to shew him how dangerous a step it would be for the two crowns to enter into this discussion at present : that France having given her guaranty to the king of Denmark for Sleswig, can no more insist upon her giving the duke any equivalent for it, than upon his restoring the duchy itself. And Mr. Walpole should do his utmost to induce the cardinal to declare that your ma-



jesty shall not be in any manner affected by any thing that may be done in favour of the duke of Holstein, or given him as an equivalent for Sleswig.

## EXTRACT.

October 5, 1729.—I flatter myself that the use I have made of M. Knyphausen's notion concerning the guarantee of Sweden and Denmark, and what I have grafted upon that proposal, may, if it be accepted by the court of Prussia (considering the great inclination of the Swedes to see themselves again masters of Stettin and what they have lost in Pomerania, and considering the *hank* your majesty has upon Denmark with regard to the affair of Sleswig), facilitate any views your majesty may have upon any part of the country of Mecklenburg.

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NEGOTIATIONS RELATIVE TO THE TREATY OF  
VIENNA.

THE EARL OF CHESTERFIELD TO LORD HARRINGTON.

APART.

(1.)

MY LORD,

*Hague, Sept. 19, (N. S.) 1730.*

I WAS honoured by the last post with your lordship's private letter of the 1st (N. S.), by which I am sorry to find the resolution that seems to be taken about Mecklenburg. It appears to be no less than perpetuating the commission, at least for this duke's life; for if he is too wild and extravagant at his age to be treated with at all, I presume he will hardly ever become more *traitable*. As to



the dissatisfaction his majesty expressed with relation to the pensionary's ideas, I have justified him, and very truly, in my other letter to your lordship by this post; for I really had not informed him of all his majesty's demands, thinking it improper, in the infancy of this affair, to frighten him with a catalogue of pretensions, that might make him consider the very thing I was employing him to transact, as impracticable. However, I look upon our negotiation with the emperor as begun; but I look upon it too as very far from being ended, and I foresee the many difficulties that will arise in the course of it. The king thinks the guarantee so great a concession, that it entitles him to ask any thing or every thing. The emperor considers it in a different light, and though desirous to obtain it, will not purchase it too dear. He knows it is almost as much our interest as his; he sees our situation with France, and he apprehends little from the concurrence of such jarring particles as our present alliance is formed of. These difficulties, which to me are obvious ones, will certainly spin out the negotiation to a considerable length, though not break it off; for the good of it is, that when once begun, and the demands of England and the Republic meeting with little difficulty, as I am persuaded they will, it will be impossible to break it off, for the sake of some certain conditions that your lordship and I know of. But as these difficulties will take up a good deal of time, and probably not be discussed here; or if they were, as I am both unfit and unwilling to be concerned in them, I submit it to your lordship, whether it is not time to think of a successor for me here, who will require some time to get ready, and who it may be proper should be here before I go. There is now a little more than three months to the sitting of the parliament, and since I am to be back by that time, I confess I should be glad it were as soon as possible. I therefore beg your lordship will mention this affair to the king, in what way you think properest, whether as from



yourself or me. It is with the utmost pleasure I reflect, that I can address myself in this manner at the same time to a friend and a minister, and subscribe myself with as much sincerity to the one as respect to the other, &c.

CHESTERFIELD.

LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

EXTRACT.

(2.)

SIR,

*Windsor Castle, 14-25th Sept. 1730.*

Nobody is better apprized than yourself, of the sincere desire and readiness which his majesty has constantly shewn upon all occasions, ever since the conclusion of the treaty of Seville, to have all the engagements entered into by it in favour of Spain, executed with the greatest faith and punctuality; and that the king for the same purpose has not only incessantly pressed his allies, particularly France, to enter into such measures as would most effectually conduce to that end, but also has always readily consented to every proposal that has been made to him of that nature, by offering generously to furnish all such succours as were demanded of him, though far exceeding his proportion as stipulated by the said treaty. You have also been a witness to the several chicanes and unreasonable objections started by France, against the execution of every proposal, though made by themselves, as soon as ever they found it agreed to by his majesty. And you must have observed by what invidious insinuations, and false assertions, they have endeavoured to persuade the the court of Spain, that the inaction of this year, though evidently and solely occasioned by themselves, and consequently the non-execution of the treaty of Seville, ought



to be imputed to his majesty. Affairs being at present in this disagreeable situation, and there being too just grounds to apprehend, from what has passed, that France will either undertake nothing, even next year, and by that means keep matters in the same intolerable state of uncertainty and expense which they are now in, or else, not content with the bare execution of the said treaty, will engage the allies in such a general war as must inevitably overturn the balance of Europe; for these reasons his majesty, who is always desirous and determined to execute with the greatest faithfulness all his engagements, has been induced to hearken to and encourage any proposal conducive to that end, to the preserving at the same time the public tranquillity and equilibrio of Europe, even at the price of entering into such a new engagement as, though not contrary to his treaties with any of his allies, may yet be of that nature, as, in a less violent situation of affairs, he might not have taken upon himself for the present. I mean the GUARANTEE of the PRAGMATIC SANCTION, which the emperor has so much at heart, and which, considering the plan of operations, and the scheme of partitions, which are now concerting at Paris and elsewhere, is so essential to him, as well for the security of his possessions for the present, as for preserving them united and entire to his successor.

But as the taking such a step in favour of the emperor, though strictly justifiable in itself, would inevitably not only be highly disagreeable to France and Spain, but even lose his majesty the confidence and friendship of most of the powerful princes in Germany, and particularly of the electors of Bavaria and Saxony, the court of Vienna cannot but be convinced of the justice, and even the necessity there is, not only that the strictest friendship and union should be at the same time established between the two courts, by finally and effectually adjusting ALL matters at present in dispute between them; but also, that



the emperor in return should heartily concur in all such reasonable measures and proposals as shall be made to him on the part of his majesty, *as well for the present quiet enjoyment of his possessions in Germany, as to secure them against any future attempts that may be made by any of the neighbouring powers*, disobliged by the king's thus voluntarily and generously entering into an engagement of such vast importance and service to the emperor.

Wherefore the king has commanded me to acquaint you, that he expects that the emperor should consent to the introduction of the Spanish garrisons, according to the treaty of Seville; and that the points of the Ostend trade, Ostfrise and Mecklenburg, with all other matters now in dispute that regard the king and his allies, should be adjusted to his satisfaction; *and likewise that such farther particulars as may be necessary to his majesty's security in Germany*, should be settled. And in case you find the Imperial ministers *ready to agree to these proposals*, you may give them to understand that his majesty will also be willing, on his part, to give his guarantee to the pragmatic sanction for maintaining the succession to the dominions of the house of Austria, according to what has been established by his Imperial majesty therein; provided that the emperor will at the same time give such security to the allies of Seville, and to Europe in general, concerning the marriage of the arch-duchesses, his daughters, as may quiet the apprehensions that have arisen on that account, as to the breaking of the balance of power in Christendom.

And as the emperor seems to expect that the king, in order to make known his desire to settle a thorough reconciliation with him, should shew a disposition to give this guarantee, which his Imperial majesty appears to have most at heart; although his majesty is in no wise obliged to take upon himself an engagement of that nature, so his majesty persuades himself that the emperor, on his part,



will not be backward to do every thing that shall tend to re-establish the most perfect friendship between the two courts. And as the king, as elector, has several matters which ought to be adjusted, in order to remove all kinds of seeds of misunderstandings, his majesty, who makes no question but that the emperor is in the same good disposition, has ordered his minister at Ratisbon, M. de Dieden, immediately to repair to Vienna, and to lay before the Imperial ministers his particular demand as elector. The emperor cannot but be sensible, that when a friendship is to be renewed, all occasions of dissatisfaction and diffidence should in prudence and true policy be taken away; and therefore the king does not doubt but that the Imperial court will at once enter into his majesty's thoughts on that head, and not leave any point between the two courts unadjusted. Wherefore, when M. Dieden shall arrive at Vienna, you shall receive him with the utmost confidence, and take your information from him as to what he has to propose in the king's name as elector; and you will support his arguments and reasonings with the Imperial ministers, and endeavour to get his majesty all just satisfaction on the demands which M. Dieden is instructed to make.

These then are the king's sentiments upon the present negotiation with the court of Vienna. His majesty is sincerely inclined to re-establish a perfect friendship with the emperor, and even to enter into the guarantee so earnestly sought for by the Imperial court, *provided* his majesty's demands as to the introduction of Spanish garrisons be agreed to; that the other points relating to him and his allies be settled; *that his ELECTORAL AFFAIRS be adjusted to his satisfaction*, and that the article concerning the guarantee be made wholly a secret for the present.



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## LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

## EXTRACT.

(3.)

London, December 3-14th, 1730.—M. Dieden will acquaint you with his instructions, by which you will find him directed to obtain a declaration from the emperor, setting forth the particular satisfaction to be given to the king upon all his electoral points, *which you will procure to be signed at the same time that you execute the treaty.* But if the court of Vienna should obstinately refuse to give such a declaration, *you will not absolutely break off the treaty upon that head, but send an account of every thing withal to England.* And if you find you are not likely to agree upon those points, I believe you would not do amiss to dispose that court to send at the same time full powers and instructions to their minister here to conclude them, if possible without any loss of time.

## EARL OF CHESTERFIELD TO LORD HARRINGTON.

## APART.

(4.)

MY LORD,

*Hague, Dec. 19th (N.S.) 1730.*

I am in such a hurry to dispatch the courier to Vienna as soon as possible, that had it not been for your lordship's commands in your letter of the 4th, *apart*, I should have deferred giving you this trouble till next post. I confess I have my doubts about the success of our Vienna treaty, at least about the dispatch it will meet with there, and I am



persuaded it will employ couriers some time longer. When I saw the plan transmitted to your lordship by Mr. Robinson, I was concerned to find it clogged with conditions which they could never imagine would be agreed to; such as the guarantee of Brunswick, the duke of Holstein's affair, &c. and consequently seemed to be intended delays\*.

Prince Eugene's behaviour to Mr. Robinson would naturally give one hopes of success; but when I consider how much that gentleness is out of character, I own I refine enough to suspect it. The treaty sent to Vienna, as far as it relates to England and the Republic, is such as the emperor, I think, in prudence ought to agree to; but considering his haughtiness and obstinacy, and the knowledge he certainly has of the distrusts and jealousies among the allies, I fear it is uncertain whether he will or no. I hope M. Dieden's demands will not prove an obstruction to this affair; but I cannot comprehend what can be meant by an additional security to the king's electoral dominions, which are already guaranteed over and over by all the powers upon earth, and by the whole empire, as being a part of it; so that I suspect additional security to mean additional dominions, which can only be dismembering Mecklenburg upon a pretence of paying in that manner the expenses of the commission. And this I think the emperor never can, and the empire never will consent to, it being a total subversion of all the fundamental laws of the empire.

I am very willing to stay here till this affair be determined one way or other, and the more so, because, should the emperor agree, I foresee there will be some difficulties

\* The court of London had transmitted to Mr. Robinson the plan, or *precis*, of a treaty, ready drawn, for the acceptance of the court of Vienna. The plan to which lord Chesterfield refers, was a *contre-projet*, framed by count Zinzendorf, and transmitted by Mr. Robinson to lord Harrington.



in finishing here, where, from the nature of the government, every wrong head or heart has a right of opposition, and can do hurt, though not good.

CHESTERFIELD.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO LORD HARRINGTON.

EXTRACT.

(5.)

Vienna, December 23, 1730.—M. Dieden found by a conversation which he had yesterday with the bishop of Bamberg, that the emperor would make no difficulty to put his majesty immediately into possession of the county of Hadeln, nor even to extend the investiture of Bremen and Verden to the female line.

January 3, 1731.—I expect to be called this day or tomorrow to a conference, wherein the objections of this court will be proposed to me; for objections there are, which turn principally upon the declaration to be given to his majesty's demands as ELECTOR.

EARL OF CHESTERFIELD TO LORD HARRINGTON.

APART.—EXTRACT.

(6.)

December 26, 1730.—I heartily wish this affair may succeed, for if it does not, I think we shall be in a very bad condition. The design of France, to do either nothing or too much, is now too plain to be doubted of; and the jealousies and distrusts among the allies have taken too deep a root to be removed with any prospect of future concert. And if the emperor is obstinate enough



to reduce us to return to France after this jealousy, we shall be obliged to give them fatal pledges of our future fidelity.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO LORD HARRINGTON.

EXTRACT—PRIVATE.

(7.)

Vienna, January 16th, (N. S.) 1731.

When I wrote on the 18th November, I did not know what were his majesty's demands as elector, and much less apprehend that they would have been forced verbally upon the emperor without remission. Prince Eugene has said more than once, that he believed every minister at Hanover had thrown in his mite to make his court to the king: When I first saw them, I was indeed so much frightened as to write my letter of the 22d by the post. God be praised, I have not been long enough here to be so much habituated to this court, and am not so little a devoted servant to the king, as to think that they have had *the least shadow of reason* in their manner of acting. But I believe there is one consideration which must be made, and without it his majesty's German affairs will always be far from being remedied: that is, as long as this court will regard the king only as elector, with respect to his electoral affairs, and as long as the elector will push them as king of England, and independent of the empire, those two contradictions will thwart the best intentions imaginable. It is a truth which I would mention to nobody but your lordship; and I believe M. Dieden has mentioned it to nobody but me, that the pride of this court has not been so sensibly touched since the time of Gustavus Adolphus, and the next ensuing years. The blood that started in the bishop of Bamberg's face at receiving M. Dieden's paper;



the reproaches that have fallen from every minister in particular of what they think, and have even called an unprecedented manner of negotiation in an elector; their unanimous crying out to M. Dieden at the conference, that it was no less than imposing the law upon the emperor; their retorting upon his demand of the emperor's declaring to administer justice to the states of the empire, that the emperor had never acted otherwise, and only prayed to God to give him less disobedient princes; joined to the confidence which has been made me by a fifth person\*, of the emperor's having been piqued to the quick, as what he would not have dissembled on another occasion; are so many proofs of what they call the offence which has been taken here, that considering the different principles at Vienna and at Hanover, it is almost as much a wonder that we have obtained this declaration, such as it is, in so short a time, as it will be unexpected if his majesty can content himself with it.

THE EARL OF CHESTERFIELD TO LORD HARRINGTON.

APART.

(8.)

MY LORD, *Hague, Jan. 16 (N. S.) 1731.*

I was extremely glad to find, by your lordship's letter *apart*, that the trouble I had given both you and myself about M. Hop's intercepted letter, was unnecessary; and indeed I should never have thought it necessary to take the least notice of any of that gentleman's surmises,

\* The cabinet council at Vienna consisted of four persons, who were styled ministers of the conference. These were count Zinzendorf, grand chancellor; the bishop of Bamberg, vice-chancellor; prince Eugene, and count Staremberg. The *fifth* person referred to was probably count Windisgratz, from whom, it appears by Mr. Robinson's official letter of the same date with the above, he had received other confidential information.



had I not found by Mr. Walpole's letter, that at least they had made some impression upon him.

Your lordship will have seen by this time, from Mr. Robinson's letters, that I guessed pretty right as to our negotiation at Vienna, that it would still require couriers, and that M. Dieden's demands would create the great difficulty; and that this I find has exactly happened, though I am very sure the court of Vienna was resolved to bring all possible facilities to M. Dieden's demands. I should be wanting to the regard and friendship I profess for your lordship, if I did not lay before you the fatal, but natural, and even necessary consequences, that will attend the breaking off this negotiation upon electoral points, in which you are more particularly concerned as being in your department.

This negotiation is already known by many, and suspected by all. Should it break off, we must be more in the power of France than ever, who then knowing that we have no resource left, will use us as they think fit, and insist upon dangerous pledges of our future fidelity. We must either enter into all their destructive schemes, or at best continue a good while longer in the disagreeable and unpopular situation we are at present in. But this is not the worst neither; for it is impossible that this negotiation, so far advanced, can now break off without additional acrimony on both sides. And in that case, it cannot be expected but that the emperor will take the natural advantage of declaring to the nation, and to this Republic, that the public tranquillity might have been restored, that he had agreed to all the points that related to England and this country, but that electoral considerations only prevented the conclusion of so desirable a work, and plunged us into so dangerous a war. What effect this will have I need not say: our enemies will tell us with pleasure. Nor can I answer, that when the Republic shall once know it, as they certainly will know it, they will not



conclude a separate peace, or a neutrality upon any terms,—such are their apprehensions of a war, and especially of this war. The pensionary at first apprehended difficulties from these electoral points, even without knowing them, and only from the outward aspect of affairs in that part of the world, and he thought it would be impossible to adjust them by treaty. But he hoped they would be referred to future negotiations, after the harmony between the two courts should be restored; and that then the emperor might connive at what he could not publicly authorize. But if the whole negotiation should break off, upon any or all of these electoral points, I think it is impossible to describe the fatal consequences that must result from it, both to the king, the ministry, and the nation.

I find by the accounts from Berlin, that the king of Prussia is frightened out of his wits, if ever he had any, and wants to be friends with the king, and for that reason desires a minister may be sent there, which in my opinion should not be done; for he takes every instance of complaisance to be an indication of fear, and grows insolent upon it: whereas, if he is really frightened, as I believe he is, there is no imaginable meanness to which he will not stoop for his security. And I should think it would be better to make him take some of those steps first, before he meets with the least return from his majesty. Grumkow's conversion, I hope, will be cultivated in a proper manner. A sum of money will be well employed there, and put him too much in our power for him to go back.



## THOMAS ROBINSON TO LORD HARRINGTON.

## EXTRACT.

(9.)

Vienna, January 16, 1731.—When I returned in the evening to the chancellor, he continued to shew his concern at M. Dieden's obstinacy. He said the affair must still be finished one way or other; that it was the most glorious opportunity that ever offered, for an Englishman to do his nation and all Europe the greatest service imaginable.

At the conference next day, the prince asked me abruptly if I would treat independently of his majesty's electoral affairs? I told him I had so little to do with them, that my only business was to treat of matters of quite another nature; and that I had not so much as been yet invited to treat directly, after so many days that I had demanded it. The prince justified that delay, by so much time being taken up in endeavouring to adjust his majesty's electoral demands, and summoned me to declare if, in that interval, I had not asserted that I could not treat or sign till that was done to his majesty's satisfaction?

I told them, that though I saw their referendary ready to take down every word that fell from me, yet I would declare to them boldly, that nothing could be so injurious as to tax me, in the quality of an English minister, with so much as interrupting the affairs of Europe for the private concerns of the elector of Hanover. That I might at different times have *insinuated* to them (for what I said or did, nothing on earth would make me deny)—I might have *insinuated*, that if his majesty's affairs as elector, were not



immediately finished, I could not sign till his minister had new orders\*.

During this discourse count Zinzendorf returned, and after having spoken to his brethren in the German tongue, prince Eugene told me that the chancellor had been to receive the emperor's last orders, which he bid the referendary, Bartenstein, read. It was a kind of manifesto, to shew no less wonder than surprise, that after all the mutual professions of friendship between the emperor and the king of Great Britain, the minister of the latter should, for the sake of very unreasonable demands made by his master, as elector of Hanover, refuse to put the last hand to a treaty which was so far advanced for the public good and tranquillity of Europe. Those demands were represented as injurious to the dignity of the chief of the empire, as contrary to its constitution, and as infringing the rights of others. This I took to be the purport of the paper, as well as I could judge, by hearing it once read, and as far as my indignation would permit me to give attention to it; so far I was from taking it into my hands, or giving it a reading myself, and much less, as they would have persuaded me, to transmit it to his majesty.

LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

EXTRACT.

(10.)

*Whitehall, Jan. 28, Feb. 8, 1731.*

I must not conceal from you, that the king apprehends he has the most just grounds to be highly dissatisfied with the behaviour of the court of Vienna. Although what the mes-

\* Count Zinzendorf affirmed, that the express words of Robinson's declaration were, "that unless all the German points were settled to his majesty's entire satisfaction, every thing else is to be deemed null."



senger brought fell very short of what your former letters gave us ground to expect, the king does not think you went the least too far in giving the credit you did to the strong and repeated declarations and assurances of the Imperial ministers, and particularly of prince Eugene, whose character and reputation are in too high a light in the world, to have his honour or veracity suspected. 'Tis chiefly from the credit given to those professions and promises, that his majesty is induced to make this farther and last tentative of the sincerity of the court of Vienna, which, if rejected, or even trifled with, must inevitably cut up by the roots any possibility of this negotiation being ever brought to perfection; for as the king offers every thing that the emperor can really want, and all that the court of Vienna itself must know his majesty has in his power to grant, any refusal or hesitation to comply with the little, that not only the strongest reasons, but necessity itself, obliges the king to insist upon in return, must demonstrate to all the world how vain it would be to think of treating any longer.

LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

PRIVATE.

(11.)

DEAR SIR,

*London, Jan. 28, Feb. 8, 1731.*

Notwithstanding my being at present more tired than ever I was in my life, I cannot however let this messenger return to you, without carrying something to you from me as a private friend; and as I hope you will be pleased with what I send you as a minister, I am sure you would not be less so with these good wishes of the friend, if you knew the cordiality and sincere affection with which they are accompanied. I flatter myself with hoping, that the



instructions and powers now sent you, will enable you to bring this great work to perfection, and that without loss of time, for in the present situation of affairs, delay is death to us.

You must be sensible of the necessity there is not to let this treaty miscarry, if it is possible to be avoided. It is heartily to be wished that the emperor would be induced to give entire satisfaction upon all the points which M. Dieden is charged to negotiate; but when every thing is obtained that is possible to be got, you will, I am persuaded, *ACCORDING to your INSTRUCTIONS*, sign the treaty; insisting, at the same time, that all that cannot be adjusted be finally settled afterward, by an amicable negotiation. I heartily wish you all imaginable success, and beg you will be assured of the most warm affection and esteem with which I am ever, &c.

*P. S. G. TILSON*, Under Secretary of State, to *THOMAS ROBINSON*.—Jan. 28, Feb. 8, 1731.—I *hope* you will sign, *as I take it you are AUTHORIZED to do*; and if our plan is agreed to in the main, I do not see how you can decline putting the last hand to it on your part, for all or any *collateral difficulties*, if there are no essential ones.

\* \* \* \* \*

Lord Chesterfield's alarming dispatch of the 16th January, to lord Harrington, evidently gave birth to the above private letter; but notwithstanding the courtly professions and artful insinuations contained in it, the plain homespun sense of Robinson enabled him to discern, that between the public and private instructions of the secretary, he was placed by his *dear friend* in a most perplexing and perilous dilemma. Lord Harrington's original public letter, of the 14-25th September, only empowered him to sign when the points respecting "Ostfrize and



Mecklenburg, with such other particulars as may be necessary to his majesty's security in Germany, should be settled." And he is ordered "to receive M. Dieden with the utmost confidence, and to take his information from him, as to what he has to propose in the king's name as elector." But his lordship's private dispatch of January 28, clearly signifies that he is *authorized* to sign, although the Hanover demands were not acceded to by the emperor. Lord Harrington had never indeed ventured to send a precise and positive order to the ambassador not to sign the English treaty, unless the Hanover treaty were signed at the same time. By the dispatch of December 3-14th, he is directed not absolutely to break off the treaty on this head, but send an account of every thing to England;" which amounted to an indefinite delay, and was virtually equivalent to an order of not signing till he received farther instructions. It was therefore in the highest degree insidious, to authorize merely, without at the same time directing Mr. Robinson to sign *separately*, for this was a construction and distinction that threw the whole responsibility upon the ambassador. If he signed in these circumstances, he incurred the risk of forfeiting for ever the favour of his sovereign; if he refused to sign, he run the still more serious hazard of national censure and parliamentary vengeance.

The characteristic artfulness of lord Harrington is severely animadverted upon by Mr. Horace Walpole, at a subsequent period, in a letter to sir Robert Walpole, alluding to some unexplained transaction. "I won't quarrel with my lord Harrington, but I won't have, undeservedly, raps on the fingers, without shewing that I feel them; nor a train laid for making me a dupe, without letting him see that *I know what is meant*. There are some expressions, and some turns in his letters, more cold



and ungracious than I ever had in seven years during my embassy in France\*.”

There are evident proofs also in Robinson's correspondence, that he was not so dull as to be at any loss to know what was meant by this nobleman's high-flown professions of affection and friendship.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO LORD HARRINGTON.

EXTRACT.

(12.)

*Vienna, March 18, (N. S.) 1731.*

Though the treaty which I have the honour to send your lordship should be approved, yet I can hardly hope even that success itself can excuse the many liberties I have taken to obtain it. Your lordship will have seen by my other letter what passed in the first conference, upon the paragraphs in the paper E, with regard to his majesty as elector.

It seemed there remained difficulties, which I began terribly to apprehend would not be removed time enough for me to sign with great tranquillity of mind, and therefore the next evening, after I had settled the Latin project with count Zinzendorf, I represented to him, in the most lively manner imaginable, the ill appearance and effect of such a proceeding. I saw prince Eugene the next day, to thank him for the expedition with which the affairs committed to him had been done. He proposed Friday the 16th for the day of signing: at which time, I only added, I hoped his highness would likewise put me into a condition of making his majesty's satisfaction complete in every respect. To have said more, my lord, would, if I can be allowed to have attained some knowledge of that minister, have been ill placed. But I will

\* Coxe, vol. iii. p. 184.



leave your lordship to judge how M. Dieden's and my uneasiness arose, proportionably as the hour of signing, which ought otherwise to have given me so much pleasure, advanced without M. Dieden's receiving any satisfactory answer ; but rather, as it almost appeared to us, that I was destined to be drawn on in uncertainty, till I should be shut up with the ministers to sign, while probably M. Dieden should be at the vice-chancellor's, to comply or not, good or bad, with what the emperor would consent to upon the electoral affairs.

I went, however, the evening before to count Zinzendorf, and in three words told him to take care what was to be done. The king's affairs had indeed been separated with great condescendence, purely to facilitate matters, from those of the elector ; but nothing could separate the honour of the elector from that of the king. The next morning M. Dieden, about half an hour after ten, went to the vice-chancellor : when talking with great earnestness upon the subject, and demanding a final answer, that the same courier might carry his majesty a double satisfaction, the clock struck eleven ; upon which the bishop of Bamberg said maliciously, " Now Mr. Robinson is with my brethren ;" but he was mistaken. I had agreed with M. Dieden to delay my going as long as I could, that if possible he might give me advice of what should have passed with the vice-chancellor, in order for me to take my party, according as despair or cooler judgment, if I had time for the latter, should in that moment dispose of the fate of Europe. I had even agreed with M. Dieden, that if his conference with the vice-chancellor should last longer than I could, with common decency, make prince Eugene, count Zinzendorf, and count Staremburg wait for me, who would certainly be assembled at eleven, I would endeavour to amuse them by objections and cavils, and waste the time before the sign-



ing, till he should send me a billet, to be delivered to me at the conference table, with regard to his transaction.

With these precautions, instead of going to prince Eugene's house at eleven, I went round to M. Dieden's lodgings, to inquire first if he was come back. He was just returned from the vice-chancellor, and I found him writing the note we had agreed upon. It was to tell me, that all the vice-chancellor had had to say was, that he had spoken the day before with the emperor, who had still doubts upon the article of Bremen; and particularly with what was demanded now, contrary to what was supposed to have been granted by the late king to the branches of Wolfenbuttle, Blankenburg, and Bevern; that his Imperial majesty was not resolved to accept the condition under which the king, as elector, offered his guarantee and good offices in the empire; that he, the bishop, had advised the emperor to content the king upon the first article, and to rely upon his majesty's generosity with regard to the second; that he expected the emperor's resolution every moment, but if it did not come, he could not see his Imperial majesty till the evening.

I humbly desire your lordship to judge of my situation at eleven o'clock and a quarter. What could be done? I rather suffered any resolution that should come itself into my mind to take me, than well thought how to take one myself. When I arrived at the prince's, they had waited for me an half hour. I made an excuse like a person embarrassed, and was willing enough they should judge of the pain in my heart by the concern on my face. We proceeded, however, to compare the draughts, and when all was collated, a pause succeeded for bringing in the taper and wax, and ranging other matters for signing. I rose up with some solemnity, and drawing my seal out of my pocket, placed it upon the draughts designed for England, and said, "There, gentlemen, is my seal and my honour; look upon the



treaty as signed ; but I will take this opportunity, while it offers, to disburden my mind. I already speak, and act now as the minister of a great king, who this moment gives a most distinguishing mark of his friendship for the emperor, your master. I demand the same friendship, and the same marks of it from his Imperial majesty, in behalf of the elector of Hanover : however separated their affairs may have been in one light, their honour is inseparable." I added, my lord, such things as the emotion in which they saw me could not but excuse. However, plainly I told them that this new-born friendship, without the satisfaction demanded, would not outlive the six weeks fixed for the ratifications. That for my part, I had taken two resolutions, the one to sign, the other not to dispatch the courier, though all Europe depended upon it, till the elector of Hanover could be the first to reap the fruits of the peace, which, as king of England, he had given to the world.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO LORD HARRINGTON.

PRIVATE—EXTRACT.

(13.)

Vienna, March 20 (N. S.) 1731.—I will not pretend to excuse the manner in which things have been done, but one thing I am sure of, that right or not, nothing could have been done in any other manner whatever. I signed boldly, before I was sure what the king would obtain as elector, without which there would have been no treaty. I have as boldly detained the courier for four days since, without which the papers now sent to his majesty would not have been obtained. M. Dieden has got, by my obstinacy in detaining the courier, more than he expected from the beginning.



Till I have the honour to know your lordship's most sincere sentiments upon my conduct, I will wrap myself up in hopes, that though I may have done ill, yet it will be thought I could not have done better. My lord, I would not pass another month as I have done this last for a kingdom, nor all the kingdoms guaranteed to the emperor ; and yet, God knows, till I have the honour to hear from your lordship, I have at least as bitter a month to come.

LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

EXTRACT—PRIVATE.

(14.)

London, March 30, April 10, 1731.—Your conduct has met with the universal applause here, which it so justly deserved. Both the king and all his servants think, it would have been impossible for an angel from heaven to have acted better than you have done throughout this whole affair.

LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

EXTRACT—MOST SECRET.

(15.)

Whitehall, March 30, 1731.—I now come to answer your most secret letter of the 18th inst. by Gould, which I shall begin to do by telling you, that although his majesty is extremely pleased with the manner in which the treaty has been finally adjusted and signed, and as the greater proof of his being so, sends back his ratifications of every part of it, which you are ordered to exchange against those of the emperor within the term pre-



scribed by the said treaty ;—the king thinks, however, and with the greatest reason, that the conduct and proceedings of the Imperial court, with respect to his majesty's electoral affairs, are by no means such as, in the strictest justice and reason, he might have expected from them ; and has therefore ordered M. Dieden to employ all the time from the arrival of this messenger to that limited for the exchange of the ratifications, in making the strongest instances to the court of Vienna, for settling to his majesty's satisfaction the points upon which he is instructed to insist. And as he will inform you particularly what those points are, you will employ all the authority and influence of the crown of England, and your own particular credit and friendship with the ministers, in the most efficacious manner, for obtaining, before the term for the exchange of the ratifications is elapsed, all such satisfaction and security for his msjesty's electoral affairs, as M. Dieden shall inform you he is commanded to insist upon.

I need not, I am sure, suggest any arguments to you in support of M. Dieden's demands : the justice and reasonableness of them, especially as they are now reduced, will abundantly furnish you wherewithal to enforce them. But I cannot help expressing my great surprise, that the court of Vienna should not be convinced, that the surest and most effectual way to gain and secure to them the affections and support of the ENGLISH NATION, must be the making his majesty easy as to his electoral affairs. The king, out of his paternal affection and goodness to his British subjects, would not suffer the signing a treaty so necessary and advantageous to them, to be deferred for the settling his electoral demands, though never so justly founded. What less return, then, can the nation make for such an unexampled generosity and goodness, than to look upon all his interests as their own, and be equally solicitous about them.



## THOMAS ROBINSON TO THE EARL OF CHESTERFIELD.

(16.)

MY LORD,

*Vienna, April 7, (N. S.) 1731.*

I dare not wish your excellency joy in your negotiation till I know whether what I have sent be a proper foundation for it. No moments of impatience which your lordship may have passed lately to hear from me, can equal those of uneasiness and anxiety with which I wait for your answer. I need not say they are principally founded upon what has passed with regard to the electoral affairs. When I had my first instructions, not to give the king's guarantee without procuring satisfaction for the elector, I boldly, out of *honour and duty*, suspended the affairs of all Europe. When afterwards I found myself more at large under my instructions, I as boldly suspended his majesty's electoral affairs for the sake of Europe. The elector's hands are still free, if he does not like the emperor's last offers; and if his majesty does like them, the emperor will execute them notwithstanding the events at Wolfenbuttle. M. Dieden says, the king has obtained more than ever he expected to procure for his majesty; and he owns, that without my behaviour before the signing, and without my obstinacy in detaining the courier after the signing, his majesty would either have less, or nothing at all. But how, my lord, to inculcate all this rightly in England? *The honour of this employment was FORCED upon me*; and even if I have met with any success, I may say with Pyrrhus, "Such another victory would ruin me."

\* \* \* \* \*



It is manifest, on an impartial review of this important and successful negotiation, which originated in the wise counsels of sir Robert Walpole, that the real merit of the execution belongs solely to the Earl of Chesterfield, who, with true political discernment, saw the whole transaction from the beginning to the end in a perfectly just point of view, and painted in colours so forcible to lord Harrington the fatal consequences of the policy he was acting upon, as to incite, or rather impel, that nobleman to the adoption of decisive measures. The insidious art with which the secretary endeavours to throw the whole responsibility upon the resident Robinson, and the servile and selfish terrors of the latter, are well depicted in their respective dispatches.



POLITICAL REMARKS BY SIR ROBERT WALPOLE,  
ON THE PART WHICH GREAT BRITAIN OUGHT TO TAKE  
IN THE PRESENT SITUATION OF AFFAIRS.

A. D. 1733.

DECEMBER 24, 1733.—In considering what part it is most advisable to Great Britain to take in the present situation of affairs in Europe, it will be necessary, in order to avoid prolixity and confusion, to reduce the whole consideration to as few points as possible; which I think may very properly be done under the following heads.

I. Whether we ought to comply with the demands of the emperor, and admit the present war carried on against the emperor to be a *casus fœderis* upon our defensive alliances, and upon that foot enter into the war.

II. How far the dangers that may threaten the liberties



of Europe, and in consequence our own interest and security, call upon us to put a stop to, and oppose the progress of the arms of the three crowns.

III. Whether the mediation of the maritime powers will prove effectual in putting an end to the present war; or if that does not succeed, which of the two measures that seem now to offer is the most eligible to be pursued; viz. whether we should endeavour to detach the king of Sardinia from France and Spain, by securing to him the Milanese; and then, in conjunction with the Imperial troops and the troops of Sardinia, endeavour to drive both branches of the house of Bourbon entirely out of Italy. Or whether, if necessity, and the circumstances of the emperor, should compel him to think of complying with what has seemed all along to be the view of the queen of Spain, of dividing Spain from France by a marriage with don Carlos and one of the arch-duchesses, we should not rather chuse to acquiesce in such an accommodation, than enter into an open war against France and Spain for the recovery of Italy, and for preventing the dangerous and ambitious views of the house of Bourbon.

As to the first article, it seems already to be determined for the present, by the measures we have entered into with the States-General; and it is sufficient for my present purpose to say, that the resolutions taken jointly by the maritime powers may be very well justified when that is the question.

As to the second head, what part it may be incumbent upon us to take, exclusive of our engagements with the emperor in defence of the common cause, and our own interest and security, it must be considered at what time and in what manner we shall enter into a war, if it becomes unavoidable. And here it must be allowed, that Great Britain can neither with safety nor prudence enter into



this war but in conjunction with the States. Let us admit that it is a common cause betwixt us ; as they are more nearly and more immediately concerned, it will be expected that they should go hand in hand with us, and unite in our common defence. I will not enter into the consideration of the advantages and prejudices that must attend our being engaged in a war against France and Spain, and the Dutch continuing in a state of neutrality. They are too evident, and we must conclude it is what this nation cannot, will not bear.

What then must be done in this case ? The Dutch still decline taking any part. It is to be hoped, that although they would not suffer themselves to be forced into a war with the emperor, nor to be drawn into it insensibly by us, of which they conceived very great, though groundless jealousies ; if the common danger becomes very evident, and it shall appear that the views of the house of Bourbon are truly formidable, that the Dutch will be convinced by the common enemy to do what they could not hitherto be prevailed upon to think of. In the meantime it must be confessed, that the maritime powers have acted very prudently and justifiably in the part they have hitherto taken.

But if the Dutch, from an incapacity of bearing the burden of another war, *of which, when once begun, no man can foresee or determine the conclusion*, or not enough alarmed with the views and engagements of the confederated powers, and less apprehensive of the common danger than it may reasonably be thought they ought to be, should persist in a resolution to try all means rather than engage in a war, what part will it be advisable for Great Britain to take separately or jointly with the Dutch to put an end to the present war, and at least to make the dangerous consequences as little fatal to the liberties of Europe as possible ? And I cannot but take it



for granted, that in whatever measures are to be pursued, the maritime powers should endeavour to act in concert, that they may have greater weight in any accommodation, and be better able to support themselves in case of extremity.

Thirdly, It must be admitted that the Imperial court has been all along divided upon the question of the marriages. And it may be supposed that a deference for the opinion of Great Britain has had great weight in postponing that affair : and from the beginning of this year to this present time, the menaces of the Imperial court have plainly tended to this single point. There seems likewise at present to be no doubt, but that the court of Spain is now disposed to make some overtures to us upon this head, if we shewed the least inclination to hearken to them. This will make us in some measure answerable for all the consequences, if by dissuading, or at least diverting the emperor on one hand from the only expedient that he seems to have at present of extricating himself; and, on the other hand, by slighting the offers of the court of Spain, we should be the principal authors of bringing things to an extremity, and of continuing the war.

To the emperor we shall be inexcusable, if we obstruct this only measure of saving himself from destruction, and do not at the same time assist him in what he calls his just demands. To Spain our conduct will be thought most provoking, if we defeat their most favourite scheme, and rather chuse to enter into a war against them, than submit to their terms of reconciliation with the emperor. And as to the court of France, I cannot see the least reason to conclude that they are at all inclined to this marriage, and therefore it ought not to be looked upon as a scheme concerted for aggrandizing the house of Bourbon. As little it is to be apprehended, that if Spain was thus



detached from France, that France would look upon it as a sufficient cause to carry on the war against the powers that would be united to support this scheme.

If the chief apprehension is, that such a marriage would tend to aggrandize the house of Bourbon, and make them hereafter upon future events formidable to all Europe, let it be considered how great and imminent is the present danger, if the success of the arms of France and Spain should be carried much farther, by continuing the war: and whether, unless it can be shewn that there will be a sufficient power to resist them united and allied, the course of another year's successful campaign may not make the house of Bourbon immediately masters of all Europe; in which case we should bring immediately upon ourselves the mischiefs which we only apprehend may happen in future times. If the danger to Europe arises from the union in the house of Bourbon, the separating them answers that apprehension. If the emperor and Spain had been reconciled before the war was declared, the war had possibly been prevented, at least had been less formidable.

All that we have lately seen, is very express upon the concern France was under, least Spain should have made up with the emperor. This marriage is mentioned in a most emphatical manner, as an argument to induce the king of Sardinia to submit to the hardships he so loudly complained of. It is said the marriage is carrying on "*par l'entremise de l'Angleterre.*"

\* \* \* \* \*

Don Carlos and the pragmatic sanction have been the cause of all the troubles in Europe for near twenty years last past — Can they be reconciled, and how? Has consanguinity, or relation by marriages, ever among princes outweighed the present interest of the princes concerned? What has been hitherto the case between France and Spain? What regard has France shewn to the court



of Turin but for interest? What effect has the alliance between the houses of Hanover and Berlin? Would another marriage in those families make the friendship more certain, and of longer duration than the ties of interest kept them together? If Spain and don Carlos are brought to guarantee the pragmatic sanction, may not that prevent the troubles that are threatened by France upon that event? If this marriage is to be looked upon as the cause of the house of Bourbon, what gave the alarm to France upon the first treaty of Vienna, which occasioned the treaty of Hanover? The *first* point, to strengthen and secure ourselves at home—The emperor distressed but by his own neglect—The allies exhausted at a great expense of men and money—We continue in a state of mediation.

The excellent and admirable sagacity which dictated the above remarks, is too apparent to need any comment or illustration. Political merit so great and obvious, disdains the frivolous tribute of literary panegyric.



#### THE EMPEROR TO COUNT KINSKY.

*Vienna, July 31, 1734.*

I HAVE been confirmed by yours of the 13th, in the opinion which I before entertained of the sentiments of the English court. You are better acquainted than any other person, with how much sincerity I have desired to renew the ancient and natural system with the two maritime powers. I had good reasons to mistrust the conduct of the Walpoles, after the conclusion of the treaty with England on the 16th March, 1731; but the strong and repeated assurances which I received, that it was intended to fulfil the guarantees, took away my doubts, and fully



satisfied me. From that time I have never failed in paying a due attention to the king and the royal family, and doing every thing which could be agreeable to the present administration.

As soon as the king of Poland was dead, my first care was to communicate to the king of England the principles on which I acted. I took no step without making a previous and confidential overture to him, and I followed in every instance his advice. In conformity to his representations, I entered into an accommodation with the present king of Poland. In deference to his counsels, I sent no troops into Poland ; and I consented to every measure which the king of England recommended in regard to don Carlos : and while my conduct has excited jealousies in others, I have no reason to be satisfied with the manner in which I am treated. When the discontents against the Walpoles were carried to so great a height, and when Chavigni and Montijo endeavoured to increase them, you, on the contrary, exerted all your efforts in favour of the court, although even at that period I was apprized that the Walpoles would return my services with ingratitude.

England has never failed to give me promises, both before and since the commencement of the war ; but instead of fulfilling them, she has even favoured my enemies. This behaviour, however, has not induced me to address myself to the king of England otherwise than in the most amicable terms, and to represent to him, in the most affecting manner, the imminent danger which threatens to overwhelm not only the house of Austria, but all Europe, and more particularly his royal family, as well as the honour and prosperity of the English nation. But these representations have not hitherto had any effect.

This fatal inactivity has now continued for eleven months ; and although the evil might have been easily



prevented, yet the whole is left exposed to the most dangerous extremities. These very extremities, of which England is the occasion, are made a pretext to palliate and excuse the want of assistance; and this want of assistance is urged as an inducement to compel me to accept an unjust and dishonourable peace.

It is not easy to conceive any measure less equitable, and more pernicious; and it must appear evident to every impartial observer, that the English ministry, in direct contradiction to the good intentions of the king, has made overtures to me, with no other intention than to suffer my hereditary estates in Italy to fall under the dominion of Spain; and I am fully convinced that those who persuade the king to act in this manner, are not better inclined to the king and to the nation than to me.

What affects me most sensibly is, that (as I see by your secret relation), with a view to conceal these sinister intentions, many falsities are circulated against me. However averse I may be to adopt measures which, although derived from good motives, may be misrepresented to the king, I may still find myself compelled to act in that manner; for it can never be expected, that, in addition to the losses which I suffer, I ought also to bear the blame of being the cause of them; and that I am indifferent to the attempts made to prejudice against me the English nation, for which I entertain so high an esteem.

Having therefore many reasons to believe that the Walpoles have, for some time past, prevented the good intentions of the king in my favour, my views have been always directed, on one side, not to do any thing of which the king could complain, as if I were endeavouring to excite the nation against him, until I was sufficiently acquainted with the situation of affairs; and, on the other side, if the private interests and intrigues of the



Walpoles should prevail over the obligations of the English nation, and the security and glory of the public good, to be prepared with sound and vigorous answers to all the arguments advanced in justification of such an infamous proceeding. With this view I have been ever ready to refute the objections, drawn partly from the bad situation of affairs in the Low Countries, and partly from the private and unjustifiable negotiations of Boltza. I have considered it also as no less expedient, not only to employ every effort in my power, for the purpose of shewing that the maritime powers do not lie under the necessity of employing as many forces as they maintained during the last war ; and I have collected all the representations made to Robinson before and since the rupture ; that if it should be thought proper to lay before the public the whole series of affairs, the ill conduct of the Walpoles may be made manifest. For the same reason I unwillingly consented not to publish all the pieces which relate to the answer of the Spanish manifesto, and I now evidently perceive the hidden and perfidious views of the English ministry in opposing the publication.

I have therefore strictly ordered all my ministers to be extremely reserved towards Robinson, Hamel, and Bruyninx ; to insist upon the execution of the treaties ; not to make any verbal explanation, but, on the contrary, to declare positively, that no business will be transacted with them except in writing.

You have therefore acted right, in having counteracted *there, where it was necessary*, the insinuations of the Walpoles against me, and in developing to all, the real state of the question, and by whose means affairs have been brought into their present dangerous situation. I also entirely approve your resolution to address yourself to the king himself, and to convince him of the extraordinary attention you have always shewn not to do any thing



which might be disagreeable to him ; and at the same time to represent to him the necessity which you are under, of no longer permitting the circulation of those ill-founded reports, which are not only contrary to my interests, but also to my honour, and at the same time no less destructive to the true prosperity of his royal family.

The king himself will have no difficulty in judging whether I or the house of Bourbon are most inclined to court his friendship. Let him know that I never will consent to the plan of pacification now in agitation ; that I had rather suffer the worst extremities than accede to such disadvantageous proposals : and that even if I should not be able to prevent them, I will justify my honour and my dignity, by publishing a circumstantial account of all the transactions, together with all the documents which I have now in possession.

If all these representations produce no effect, and if the Walpoles continue their unjustifiable conduct, means must be taken to publish and circulate throughout England, our answer to the offer of good offices, which was not made till after the expiration of nine months. You will concert with count Uhlfield the best method to effect that purpose, and contrive that the answer shall appear to have been first published in Holland without our concurrence. But should the court of London proceed so far as to make such propositions of peace as are supposed to be in agitation, you will not delay a moment to publish and circulate throughout England a *pro memoria*, containing a recapitulation of all negotiations which have taken place since 1718, together with the authentic documents, detailing my just complaints, and again reclaiming, in the most solemn manner, the execution of the guarantees,



## HORACE WALPOLE TO QUEEN CAROLINE.

MADAM,

*Hague, Oct. 11-22, 1734.*

MY duty to my king and country, my concern for maintaining the balance and liberties of Europe, and that by preserving the house of Austria, as well as the security of his majesty's crown to himself and his family, are all motives that oblige me to take the liberty earnestly to recommend to your majesty, the imagining and pursuing some early measure for disposing the emperor to let his best friends use the best means they can to bring him out of his present great and daily increasing misfortunes, by a pacification, to be compassed by their treating with such of the allies as may appear to them best disposed to make the peace most advantageous to his Imperial majesty. It is demonstration to me, that if the emperor had accepted of our good offices when they were first offered, he might immediately have been brought out of the war, and been upon as good a foot, even in Italy, for convenience and power, though not exactly with the very same dominions, as he was before the rupture.

It is demonstration to me, that if he would now let his majesty and the States negotiate for him, that he might still have a solid peace, and an honourable one, if compared with what he must unavoidably suffer if he persists in going on with the war; for I cannot foresee any possible event in his favour. His expectations, that the further progress of the French arms, next year, on this side, will oblige the States to take a part in the war, are vain, and ill grounded. The worse things shall grow, the more will this government be afraid to stir: and sooner than be forced into a war in their present condition, and against their will, they will take for their only security and protection the word of a cardinal, who is eighty-four years



old, and who, when he finds he can run no risk, can dissemble too.

Supposing the present king of Prussia to be dead, and his brave and active son should be never so well disposed for the liberties of Europe ; supposing the princes of the North be inclined to put a stop to the progress of the French arms, yet as they will furnish no troops without money, this state can never second those good inclinations. They have it not in their power, and consequently not in their will to do it : and it will be impossible for Great Britain to pay those necessary subsidies without the States taking their share in it. I can therefore see no event that can happen, to save Europe and the house of Austria, but the emperor's immediate condescension to a peace, to be negotiated for his best advantage by the maritime powers ;—otherwise he will be driven next spring out of Italy. The Turks will invade him at the same time in other parts, and although it may seem chimerical, what shall hinder France from carrying the elector of Bavaria, if they and he please, directly to Vienna ?

To reason about what the maritime powers may do, from what they have done, is, if I may so say, very absurd. Some miracles, in a manner, happened in their favour after the last war was begun, but there is no room for those miracles now. The best and greatest of those miracles was the vast subsidies paid, and numbers of troops maintained, by the maritime powers. But have they now the power of that miracle in their hands ? The Dutch owed in the beginning of that war about five millions sterling. They now owe, would your majesty believe it, fifty millions sterling ! and they do not know which way to turn themselves, to lay a new tax upon their people, already so grievously loaded, without a convulsion in the state.

Great Britain certainly, comparatively speaking, is in a much better condition than the States are, and has some



resources still. But if Great Britain should venture to go into this extensive, expensive, and ruinous war, without the Dutch, I say in that sense we are in a worse condition than they are; that is, they are better able to go into a Gallic war jointly with us, than we are without them. The consequences of which would be, if we engaged in it without them, an immediate ruin and stagnation of our trade, to their great advantage; the loss, perhaps, of our best colonies, the great sources of our riches; destitute of all friends and allies, but those that can neither help themselves nor us,—a condition which our envious enemies heartily wish us in, as what must ruin the nation, and, in consequence, the present happy establishment.

For these reasons, and innumerable others that may occur, as the emperor must be convinced of his majesty's real affection for him, even in his own—were it in the king's power, the king and your majesty, if I may be so bold as to say it, should take the liberty to let his Imperial majesty see, by some private and confidential way, the state of things in the true light, and not let him vainly flatter himself that it is possible to help him by any other way but by that of good offices, or at least till that is tried where it is most likely to bring about the soonest the most honourable peace for him. And his Imperial majesty should be undeceived in those idle notions, by which he is encouraged by count Zinzendorf and others to believe that little prating emissaries, and manifestoes printed and dispersed, will have an effect upon the English nation to engage them in a war for him. He should be undeceived in thinking, as I am told he thinks, that their majesties of Great Britain are for him, but that the British ministry is against him: and therefore he will attack them. A noble scheme indeed to beat the French with, and to recover Italy, supposing he succeeds in it! He should be told, that if the maritime powers were to embark in the war, there is



not the least prospect of their recovering for him so much in Italy, as he may in all likelihood still preserve and recover by an immediate peace.

As good a countenance as is possible must be held by the maritime powers, to make the cardinal apprehend a war, that he may be brought to be more reasonable in his terms for peace; but the Imperial court should be made sensible, by some private means, that there are hopes of a general war in their favour. What shall be the conditions of peace, I cannot pretend to determine. When we are once permitted to negotiate, that will soon appear. That there is a door open for peace all the world sees, and France apprehends; and yet the emperor will not let us lead him that way.

I shall only make one observation, which I believe, though coming from me, is a true and a prudent one; that circumstances must determine the reasonableness of things; and that which, in a calm, might be unnecessary and unreasonable, for fear of future contingencies, may become even reasonable and necessary in a storm, because the immediate danger of the ship and crew is first to be considered, and they are to be saved by means that may occasion some future inconvenience. But as that inconvenience is only eventual and contingent, it may be prevented by measures after the great danger shall be over. But I am afraid I have taken too much liberty, and troubled your majesty too much, which I hope you will pardon, as coming from the sincerity of my heart, and from my zeal for his majesty's service.

I am, with the most profound veneration and respect,

MADAM,

Your majesty's most dutiful, most faithful,

And most obedient humble servant,

HOR. WALPOLE.



## LORD HARRINGTON TO HORACE WALPOLE.

## EXTRACT.

*N. B.* The letter from which the following paragraphs are taken, was never sent, the sentiments contained in it not being approved by sir Robert Walpole, to whose judgment it was previously submitted.

SIR,

*Whitehall, Nov. 5-16, 1734.*

THE king, having reflected with the greatest attention upon the present critical situation of the affairs of Europe, and having maturely weighed the vast difficulties which are so justly to be apprehended in our scheme of putting an end to the war, by means of a secret negotiation, either with France or Spain, together with the danger of a private concert between those two crowns, for amusing the maritime powers by overtures of peace, in order to prevent their taking the necessary precautions against such ambitious and fatal designs as they may be preparing to put in execution,—is every day more and more convinced of the necessity there is for his majesty and the States to be prepared against all events, by not neglecting to put themselves betimes into a proper posture of defence and safety, and by providing, in the first place, for the security of the Austrian Netherlands, that important barrier, upon which their own preservation, and that of the balance of Europe, so greatly depends.

His majesty has himself a very considerable fleet ready for service in his ports; he is raising near 10,000 additional landmen; has already contracted for 6000 Danes, and is negotiating the same number, not without hopes of success, in Sweden.



In the same views of safety and self-defence, the king has constantly recommended to the States-General to resolve upon a speedy augmentation of their forces, and would have you continue to press the said augmentation with the greatest warmth; and his majesty hopes that an expedient which he has thought of, for taking off what seems to be one of the principal objections, may produce the desired effect.

To explain this to your excellency, I am to acquaint you, that M. Ho having frequently intimated in his conversations with the king's servants, that one of the chief difficulties which has hitherto prevented the States from coming to a resolution of augmenting their forces, was an apprehension lest, upon the first preparation they should make for that purpose, the French ministers might conceive a jealousy of that step's being taken with a view of employing their forces in Flanders, and might immediately endeavour to prevent them, by taking possession of those countries;—it has therefore occurred to his majesty, that in case he could be enabled in private to give proper assurances to the emperor, that the States-General, upon seeing the Austrian Netherlands put in the meanwhile into a sufficient posture of defence, to prevent any sudden surprise, would join with his majesty, as soon as their troops could be ready for that purpose, in providing for the future security of the said countries, in conjunction with such forces as should be left there by the emperor; the king would not find it difficult to prevail upon his Imperial majesty to march a body of his troops immediately into the Netherlands, under pretence of changing their winter quarters, to remain there till such time as they should be joined by those whom his majesty and the States-General should determine to send thither. And this method of proceeding, the king thinks, might serve to quiet the apprehensions of the States with regard to the umbrage that might be conceived by France at



their augmenting their forces, and the steps that might be taken by that crown thereupon.

And that they may know in what the said provisional security for those parts is intended to consist, your excellency will then inform them, that his majesty will be ready, on his part, to furnish 10,000 men to be thrown into the Netherlands, in conjunction with an equal number of Dutch troops, whenever their High Mightinesses shall make the necessary requisitions for that purpose, according to the tenor of the treaties in that behalf.

I cannot avoid just taking notice to your excellency, as an addition to what I mentioned to you upon the same head in the beginning of this dispatch, that the paragraph in the cardinal's letter of the 20th inst. (N. S.), wherein he tells you, "that it could not be hoped, that in case our present negotiation proves ineffectual, our great armaments would be employed against the emperor, and that all Europe would certainly look upon them as designed to force France into a peace which idea would be no less injurious to their nation than to the French king:"—this paragraph, I say, seems to imply an indirect menace, as if they would be obliged, in case of the failure of this negotiation, and the continuance of our armaments, which are so much magnified, to do something for the vindication of their honour; and nothing appears more obvious to be apprehended in such a case, than their preventing us in the design of taking possession of the Netherlands.



## LORD HARRINGTON TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

SIR,

*London, Nov. 8-19, 1734.*

BY the return of a messenger from Houghton, with the two packets of Mr. Walpole's letters, I was honoured this evening with one from you, dated yesterday, and was sorry to find by it, that the draft which I had sent you of what I proposed to write to Mr. Walpole concerning the Netherlands, had been so much disapproved by you. The letter itself never went; nor shall I now stir that matter any more: what I therein suggested, was what I apprehended to be right, and agreeable to what you told me were the king's sentiments.

The letters that were due yesterday from Holland are not yet arrived. However, I send you copies of what I write this night to Mr. Walpole, by which you will see that I suspend sending him any orders from the king, upon the subject of his late important dispatches, till we shall have learnt your sentiments upon them, of which I hope to be fully informed by the return of the duke of Newcastle, since you were not pleased to send them to me yourself, which I was in hopes you would have done, and which I should have most earnestly desired of you by letter, had not the duke of Newcastle told me I need not do it, he having the king's commands to desire it of you. I wrote this to you to-night, being to set out early to-morrow morning to hunt in the New Park.

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The extreme chagrin of lord Harrington, at the rejection of his scheme, is very apparent in the above letter. Indeed, had it been sent as intended, the clear and strong sense of the pensionary Van Slingelandt could never have been so far imposed upon by the cunning of lord Harrington, a statesman far inferior in talents to the Dutch



minister, as to induce him to give his assent to a plan which must inevitably have been regarded by France as equivalent to a declaration of war, and which would have given a decided ascendancy, in the cabinet of Versailles, to the party which, in opposition to the pacific views of the cardinal, were eager to push to the utmost the successes of the allied arms. Fortunately sir Robert Walpole and M. Slingelandt, by their superior discernment and wisdom on this occasion, saved the two nations whose counsels they presided over, from the mischiefs and horrors of the impending calamity: they were convinced, first, that the crisis was not so urgent as to demand the interposition of the maritime powers; and, secondly, from the nature of the case, they saw that such interposition would probably prove wholly unavailing.

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LORD HARRINGTON TO HORACE WALPOLE.

EXTRACT.

*N. B.* The letter from which the following extracts are taken, was transmitted by lord Harrington to sir Robert Walpole, then at Houghton, for his approbation, and, like the former, was strongly objected to by that minister, and consequently never sent.

NOVEMBER, 13, 1734.—His majesty being desirous of going as far as possible in his concessions towards the re-establishment of the public peace, has ordered me to authorize you, if the pensionary is willing, and empowered to concur with you in it, to offer the following preliminaries, which are, however, only proposed upon the supposition of the cardinal's concurrence in the reciprocal en-



gagement with respect to the allies of France, mentioned in mine of the 8th inst. and of our agreeing together upon a certain plan of pacification, of which it is necessary that I should acquaint your excellency, that the guarantee of the pragmatic sanction by that crown, is understood by his majesty to be one unchangeable condition. The said preliminaries are as follow.

I. That in case of the emperor's refusal to accept the plan so settled between the maritime powers and France, his majesty and the States will not give him any assistance against that crown and her allies, provided France engages that the war shall be solely confined to the limits hereafter mentioned; that the king, in particular, will recall the troops he has sent over, and above his contingent as elector, to that prince's assistance, and will be so far from opposing the negotiations of France, for detaching other princes of the empire, as proposed in your excellency's letter of the 16th, by treaties of neutrality, that his majesty will even concur therein by his own example and influence.

II. As Italy is the part in which the balance of Europe seems least concerned, and as, by the plan supposed to be settled with France, the maritime powers would, in case of the emperor's acquiescence therein, have obtained very considerable possessions there for his Imperial majesty in lieu of Naples and Sicily, the king will therefore concur with the States-General in giving proper assurances, that in case of the war's continuing upon account of that prince's refusal, and provided France engages to confine it wholly to Italy, they will not oppose his being deprived of some of the advantages in those parts, which would have been secured to him by his joining at first in the plan. But, even in this case, his majesty thinks we should labour to fix the forfeitures upon his refusal at as low a rate as possible, and with an abso-



late exclusion of any acquisitions to the crown of France ; his Most Christian majesty engaging, at the same time, not only to forbear all hostilities in any other part of Germany and Flanders, against the emperor, and not to encourage or excite any other power to attack him in other parts, or to assist them directly or indirectly in so doing, but likewise to restore Fort Kehl and Philipsburg, and whatever else may have been taken on that side during the war.

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO LORD HARRINGTON.

EXTRACT.

HOUGHTON, November 15-26, 1734.—As to the affair of Italy, I should be sorry that positive instructions should be sent to my brother to insist upon any one part as a condition *sine quâ non*, which it may be neither in the power nor inclination of France to procure ; for example, Tuscany. There is no doubt but that would be a great and very valuable addition to the emperor. But if he can recover the Milanese, preserve the Mantuan, and obtain Parma and Placentia, I should be unwilling to advise the breaking this negotiation for the want of Tuscany.

I am sensible that our friends in Holland are of opinion, that the French will insist that the plan of execution shall at least accompany the plan of pacification, if not precede it ; but I cannot be so clearly of that opinion. The French must expect, that whatever engagements they exact of us, with regard to the emperor, in case he shall refuse, upon the acceptance of France and her allies, will be made mutual in common justice. Will France think it a desirable thing, previously to engage not only to dispose of the dominions of don Carlos, very probably without the con-



sent of Spain, but to compel by force the compliance of the court of Spain?

Suppose the emperor to accept the terms of pacification, and Spain to refuse them, will France make peace with the emperor, become neutrals jointly with the maritime powers, and leave Spain to make good their ground in Italy against the emperor? This consideration may be shewn in various views; but, not to enlarge upon this topic, to me it seems apparent, that neither party will chuse previously to engage to compel their allies to accept of terms not even settled and agreed to by themselves. For if this negotiation finally fails, we shall be liable to the reproach of having engaged to impose terms upon our allies without their consent, where they have valuable interests concerned, and such terms as will be found impracticable, and become abortive.

And moreover, I think it is not eligible for us to make engagements so offensive as what is under consideration may be thought to be by Spain, till we see a probability of success. To dispose of Parma, Placentia, and Tuscany from don Carlos, and to engage to compel the execution of it, will not sound well in the ears of the queen of Spain, if that part of our secret negotiation should be the first that reaches the court of Madrid; and perhaps I am singular, but I think there is more reason to apprehend the refusal of the allies of France upon the first opening of this affair than of the emperor.

I should with great pleasure see a plan of pacification settled between France and the maritime powers, and the execution, or other good consequences, will certainly follow from it. But I fear the plan of execution will very much encumber the pacification; and the pacification well settled, will facilitate, I had almost said effectuate, the execution.

If my reasonings deserve any regard, it makes it almost unnecessary to trouble your lordship very particularly



about the preliminaries, which, you will perceive, *I wish may be postponed for the present.*

By what I have said before, your lordship will see I think the cession of Tuscany should not be made an absolute condition. I am likewise afraid, if we agree on all other points, it cannot be expected that the French will give a positive guaranty of the pragmatic sanction, if the emperor shall at that time be in actual war with France. If France will agree in no manner, directly or indirectly, to oppose the pragmatic sanction, considering the powers that are already engaged in that case, will the difference between France's engaging to guarantee, or not to oppose, when there are no other considerable opponents left, be considerable enough to defeat this negotiation?

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DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

EXTRACT.

NEWCASTLE-HOUSE, November 19-30, 1734.—I received on Sunday morning the copy of your letter to lord Harrington, and sent it immediately to the queen, as lord Harrington did the original to the king. I must own I thought it was clear and strong, and not liable to the objection that was afterwards made to it. The queen told me she could by no means agree with her friend about Tuscany; that she thought we went too fast with France. Upon which I told her, that you was against *any* previous preliminary; that as the negotiation was of the greatest consequence, and the success of it so desirable, we ought to forward it as much as we could. Her majesty told me I should speak to the king, which I had an opportunity of doing soon after alone.



The king was at first much out of humour, not pleased with your letter, and understood it as if you proposed that Horace should have a latitude, or discretionary power, as to the terms and conditions to be agreed on. He seemed at first disposed to send lord Harrington's letter which you saw, and said orders must be sent to Horace, that he must not be at liberty, &c.

His lordship is much mortified at his letter not being approved; thinks your letter cool and formal, and asked me if you was angry with him. I told him not, that I knew; but he knew very well you was strong in opinion against the project of our sending troops to garrison Flanders. Lord Harrington told me that the king was embarrassed at the difference of opinion amongst us; that he told him he had at first approved his letter, but that your letter, and some things that I think I happened to suggest, had made him doubt about it, or inclined him to alter his opinion. Harrington, as usual, retains his own, but professes we all mean the same thing, and that it is right for us to tell our opinions. He has desired me to write to Horace, to explain the order he is obliged to send him of restriction. Hitherto, I think, if I understand you right, you have no notion of Horace's having a latitude to agree to terms and conditions without previous order and approbation; but if, in the course of the negotiation, any such power should be necessary, you, and you only, can get it. I can do no more than I have done.

I do not like things. The more the cardinal seems reasonable and sincere, the backwarder we go; and I doubt, in the progress of the negotiation, we shall never think of what we can do, but of what we wish to do. We go too fast they say. Has there been any precipitate measure proposed, but that of the preliminary, which the king certainly gave into? The queen is against giving up Tuscany. Does she know whether she shall be obliged to give it up or not? She has more than once mentioned to



me, that our application to the emperor must be made alone, to give it the greater weight. But notwithstanding what passed at Houghton, I always have told the queen that nothing of that kind could be done till we had agreed with France. Can one be sure Kinsky will know nothing of this? Hitherto, I dare say, he does not. The king is now renewing his old pretensions of arrears due from Spain to the elector of Hanover. I think I have touched it in a manner to Waldegrave to do no hurt.

In short, upon the whole, so many new incidents arise every day, from king, and queen, and brother secretary, that I can't pretend to do any thing without you. I have done for the best, without passion or prejudice of any kind. I have endeavoured, through the whole, to follow your scheme; and if I have erred, I have done it ignorantly. The only way to prevent it for the future, is for you to come back, which I once more beg most earnestly. My friend has not laid aside his favourite project of a preliminary with France, which he thinks desirable for us, though France should not insist on it; and in that I widely differ with him.

The queen continues to mend, but slowly: her cough still hangs upon her. She is not quite right, and nothing but your presence can make her so in *rebus publicis*,



## LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

SIR,

*Whitehall, Jan. 15, 1734-5.*

YOU have been acquainted, from the beginning, with the several steps taken by the king and the States-General, in relation to the offer of their good offices to the respective powers, to the time of the acceptation thereof by all the parties concerned; and the joint declaration of the maritime powers, made the 17th past (N. S.), that they would then immediately proceed in their endeavours towards an accommodation of the present differences in Europe, which last piece I find, by yours of the first instant, that you had received, and that your court were in earnest expectation of seeing what would be done in consequence of it. I am now, therefore, to acquaint you, that, since the said acceptation of the several parties, the king has been endeavouring to fix and settle, in concert with the States, some such plan of accommodation as might be proposed by them jointly, in pursuance of the admission of their good offices by the respective courts: which way of proceeding appeared to his majesty to be more suitable, as well to the urgency of the occasion, as to the nature of the present disputes, wherein so many various and jarring interests are concerned, than that of demanding of the several powers at war, a declaration in form, of their respective terms of reconciliation, in order to convey it to the opposite parties. And as the king, for these reasons, preferred the former of these methods, his majesty had, at the same time, the satisfaction of seeing, by some of your letters, that it was the way in which the court of Vienna seemed to wish and expect that we should proceed.

You will easily imagine that a considerable time must have been necessarily spent in examining and preparing



the several articles of the plan which has been, as I before told you, under deliberation, as the affairs to which it relates are of so complicated, extensive, and difficult a nature. And I cannot indeed now inform you that it is entirely fixed and adjusted. But as the resolution of proceeding in this method has been taken, and the most essential points of which the said plan is to consist are now in a manner settled, his majesty's perfect friendship and affection to the emperor would not suffer him to lose a moment's time in communicating to that prince an affair of so much importance; and I am therefore commanded to acquaint you, by this messenger, with the principal heads of what is intended to be afterwards proposed to the several courts in form, that you may previously sound such of the Imperial ministers as you may judge proper upon them, in order to give his majesty the most early intimation of the emperor's sentiments, and that you may be at the same time furnished with such arguments as may perhaps be necessary to be alleged, both for the support and recommendation of the plan itself, and for justifying our conduct in proposing such terms to the emperor.

The principal and essential parts of the said plan are these that follow: king Stanislaus to renounce the crown of Poland, and the elector of Saxony to remain in possession of it; and neither of those princes to be obliged either to declare, or in any manner to acknowledge, his own election to have been invalid: Stanislaus to reserve to himself for his life, the title and honours of king of Poland, as was practised in the case of the present elector's father upon his abdication: his estates in Poland to be restored to him; a general indemnification for both parties; and the liberties and constitutions of that kingdom to be guaranteed by all the powers: all that has been taken from the emperor and the empire out of Italy, to be restored: Naples and Sicily to remain with don Carlos,



in exchange for the immediate cession to the emperor of the duchies of Parma and Placentia, and the reversion of that of Tuscany, excepting only the town of Leghorn, which is to be for the future a free port, and independent. Every thing else that has or shall have been taken from the emperor in Italy to be restored, particularly the Milanese, excepting Navarra and the Navarrese, with Tortona and the Tortonese, which are to remain to the king of Sardinia. The emperor's pragmatic sanction, excepting the alterations above-mentioned, to be guaranteed by all the powers now at war with his Imperial majesty, in the same manner as it is already guaranteed by the king and the States, viz. exclusive of future acquisitions.

You will immediately, upon the arrival of this messenger, communicate in the utmost confidence, and under the strictest ties of secrecy, the several propositions above contained, to your court, as the chief points of the plan to be proposed to them afterwards in form. And as it may be apprehended, that upon the first communication you will meet with objections on the part of the Imperial ministry, together with the topics of reproach upon his majesty's not assisting the emperor in pursuance of the supposed obligations of his treaties, but, on the contrary, proposing new sacrifices to him for the sake of peace, the observations that I am now ordered to make to you upon those subjects, may, as the king hopes, be sufficient to answer all that may be said to you of that kind.

I shall be so much the shorter in stating these observations to you, as your own sagacity and experience in affairs, will abundantly furnish you with materials for reasoning with the Imperial ministers upon the points above-mentioned.

Upon recollecting the contents of some of my former dispatches, you will find the reasons for our having deferred entering into the present war so fully set forth, that



the repetition of them here is unnecessary. However, without entering at all at present into the question of the *casus fœderis*, it may not be improper to take a short view of what has passed, and to shew you, in a few words, by what steps, and how unavoidably, his majesty has been led into his present method of proceeding.

As the war was, as you know, from the beginning, declared in all parts to have been occasioned purely by the conduct of the emperor with regard to king Stanislaus, it was generally treated both here and in Holland as a Polish quarrel only, and it was not possible for his majesty to have removed that first impression, to the disadvantage of your court, or to have brought this nation, without the concurrence of the States, to enter cheerfully into a war, the foundation of which was supposed to be owing to interests so remote from those of the maritime powers. The defenceless state in which the emperor's possessions in Italy were found, and to which the rapid progress of the allies in that country were imputed, had likewise very much alienated the minds of people who did not otherwise accustom themselves to look upon those dominions as extremely concerned in the balance of Europe. And the repeated declarations of France, that she would make no conquests for herself, had taken off great part of the apprehensions that were inculcated by your court from the proceedings of that crown against the house of Austria. In this situation the States-General, who had openly and often declared, that they would take no part in the consequences of the Polish affairs, and had engaged themselves likewise thereto by their convention of neutrality with France, proposed to the king their offering their joint good offices to the several parties, in order to try if possible to set on foot a treaty of accommodation, before they should be obliged to explain themselves as to the *casus fœderis*. This was an offer which, in the circumstances



affairs were then in, had such a plausible appearance, and the future harmony between his majesty and that republic depended so evidently upon his consenting to it, that there cannot want much reasoning to convince all impartial persons of the absolute necessity of its being complied with. The result of this was, that the allies accepted, and the emperor declined, the good offices, which occasioned a great loss of time, and prevented his majesty and the States from obtaining, so soon as might have been wished, even for the emperor's service, such an insight into the views and intentions of France and Spain, with respect to an accommodation, as might have determined their future conduct.

That difficulty being at last got over, the maritime powers are now using their utmost endeavours to bring affairs to a precision. They are forming a plan which, they flatter themselves, may be acquiesced in by the several parties, and think they have projected it in as favourable a manner for the emperor, as could possibly be done, consistently with the present posture of affairs in Europe.

To begin with the part of Poland : the king is persuaded your court must readily acknowledge, that he undertakes a great deal in proposing to France to give up, in a manner, the cause of his Most Christian majesty's father-in-law, and by so doing to disavow, in great measure, the principles upon which she has hitherto proceeded ; the consequence of which, if this article be accepted, must certainly be, that the honour of having carried this point must remain, in the eyes of the world, to the emperor, as well as all the advantages which he proposed to himself by placing the elector of Saxony upon the throne, and fixing him in the quiet possession of that kingdom.

As to the cessions proposed to be made by the emperor in Italy : and, first, that of Naples and Sicily to don Carlos, in exchange for Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia,



his Imperial majesty will indeed suffer a diminution thereby in his revenues, but it appears that that loss will be in some degree compensated to him by the accession of real power that must accrue from the situation of the countries to be yielded, and their contiguity with the rest of his hereditary dominions : in which respect they seem far preferable to those distant kingdoms which could not but at all times be liable to sudden invasions, and required a maritime force, which is not the emperor's natural strength, for their defence. Besides which, it ought to be reflected on by your court, that, considering the present circumstances of Naples and Sicily, already in the possession of Spain, the re-conquering of them, even with the assistance of the maritime powers, must, if at all possible, which may be fairly disputed, take up a very considerable space of time, and leave the emperor in the mean while exposed to vast expenses, by the continuance of the war, and to the most imminent dangers in other parts, and perhaps to the loss of new dominions.

The portion of the Milanese proposed for the king of Sardinia, will, I suppose, be much exclaimed against by the Imperial court ; but they will consider, that his Sardinian majesty is already in possession of the whole, and supported therein by the powerful assistance of France and Spain ; which is a reflection that seems to make the sacrificing some part, for the immediate restitution of the remainder, advisable at least, if not absolutely necessary, in the emperor's present circumstances. But the chief and most weighty argument, both for justifying the maritime powers in making this proposition, and for inducing your court to accept it, is the consideration, that without proposing something that might save the honour of France, and have the appearance of being given as an equivalent to that crown for the compliance which is expected of the French king in the affair of Poland, and for the guarantee which is demanded of him, as well as of Spain,



and Sardinia, for the indivisibility of the emperor's succession, the king could entertain no hopes of his Most Christian majesty's concurrence in those important articles. The great power of that crown is known by repeated experience, and as the king of Sardinia cannot be supposed to have been drawn into the French quarrel, without assurances even of much greater advantages than what are proposed by this plan to be yielded to him, you will exhort the Imperial ministers to consider very maturely whether, if France, in the midst of her present superiority, will content herself with obtaining such terms as those for his Sardinian majesty, it will be for their master's interest to refuse absolutely to enable her to gratify him with them.

As to any accession of power to the king of Sardinia, which may be apprehended by the Imperial ministers, in consequence of this disposition of the Italian dominions, the king cannot but be of opinion, that any such accession will be entirely overbalanced by the much greater proportion of additional strength which is supposed to accrue to the emperor by the new acquisition to be allotted to him in the neighbourhood of his Sardinian majesty. For it is evident that the emperor, when put in possession of Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia, together with so much of the Milanese as is by the plan reserved to him, will be in a far better condition to prevent or repel any invasion which the court of Turin, after they shall have become masters of the Navarrese and Tortonese, may be induced, contrary to the guarantee to be exacted of them, to make upon his dominions, than he was before, whilst the king of Sardinia's possessions were confined to their former bounds, and the emperor had no other footing in those parts besides the duchies of Mantua and Milan, and whilst those of Tuscany and Parma, being in a manner at the disposition of Spain, might encourage and facilitate any such attack upon his Imperial majesty.



The last and greatest point is, that of the guarantee of France to the pragmatic sanction, the vast benefit and importance of which to the emperor and his family, are so obvious, that it is hardly necessary for me to enter in the least upon that subject. The king is persuaded that his Imperial majesty will give the greatest attention to this part of the plan to be proposed to him; and will acknowledge that nothing can be a greater proof of the zeal of the maritime powers for his interest, than their determining to make that guarantee one of the conditions to be demanded of France, who has hitherto shewn so great an aversion to it. The emperor's favourite view has constantly been, to fix the indivisibility of his succession, and to leave the quiet enjoyment of it to his posterity. The pretensions of the two houses of Saxony and Bavaria, who have been always supposed to be encouraged therein by France, have been hitherto the chief obstacles to this design; but if the present plan comes to take place, all apprehensions from thence are as much as possible removed, the elector of Saxony will have the obligation for his crown to the court of Vienna, and remain in the peaceable possession of that equivalent, in return for which he was induced not only to renew his renunciations to the Imperial succession, but even to guarantee it himself to the emperor's decendants; and as to the elector of Bavaria, it is evident that, without the assistance of France, the house of Austria will have very little to apprehend from that quarter.

Having thus gone through the several principal points of the plan of accommodation, I shall finish my remarks upon it, by observing to you, in general, that when the loss and advantage to the emperor is thus fairly stated and compared, throwing into one scale the cession of Naples and Sicily, and of Navarre and Tortona with their districts, and into the other the immediate peaceable possession of Parma and Placentia, with the right of succeeding



after the death of the present duke, to the duchy of Tuscany, to be secured to the emperor and his descendants, the renunciation of Stanislaus to the crown of Poland, and the establishment of the elector of Saxony in that kingdom, together with the guaranties of Spain and Sardinia, but, above all, that of France to the pragmatic sanction; the whole account being, I say, in this manner balanced, the king cannot but think that the Imperial court will have a very good equivalent for their compliance; and especially when it is taken, as it must be, into consideration, how extremely different the emperor's present situation is from that of the powers with whom he has to treat, both what is to be yielded to him, and what he is to yield, being already in their possession, and the means in their hands, according to all human probability, of extending their conquests a great deal farther, so that it might not, after a few months, be possible, if it is so at present, to obtain such conditions of his enemies. But the king cannot allow himself to suppose, that, after a due examination of all that is proper to be represented upon this subject, his Imperial majesty will be prevailed on, by an imaginary point of honour, or for the sake of gratifying any ill-timed resentment, to abandon and reject such solid and permanent advantages to himself and his posterity, as are hereby proposed to his acceptance; or that he will look upon the conduct of the maritime powers, in endeavouring to procure them in his favour, in any other light than as one of the strongest proofs of their sincere attachment to his family, and zeal for his real interests.

It is therefore the king's pleasure, that you should exert your utmost credit, and endeavour, by the most earnest and serious exhortations, to prevail on the Imperial ministers to obtain their master's acquiescence in the above-mentioned propositions.



I am to acquaint you, before I conclude this letter, that his majesty having thought fit that count Kinsky should be informed in general of the heads of the plan, that he might be induced, by that complaisance, to write favourably of it to his court, that communication was accordingly made to him, verbally, a few days since; and I am since acquainted, that he dispatched a courier upon that subject on Friday last to Vienna; so that you will find the Imperial ministers already prepared upon it.

These orders are sent you by his majesty, in the utmost confidence and secrecy: and you will understand, that they are for yourself alone, and not to be executed in concert with M. Bruyninx, or communicated to him, there not having been time to concert this previous step with the States-General.

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This masterly dispatch is written in a style so manifestly superior to the general tenor of lord Harrington's letters, and is so perfectly conformable to the ideas suggested by sir Robert Walpole in the course of the previous discussions in the British cabinet, that it may well be suspected to owe very different, and much higher obligation to that discerning and sagacious minister, than for the mere sanction of his approbation.



THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF  
NEWCASTLE.

## EXTRACT.

PARIS, June 1 (N. S.), 1735.—It is chiefly to inform your grace, of the impressions I think his majesty's having ordered a strong squadron to the coast of Portugal has made upon the French ministers, that I trouble you with this dispatch.

Lord Dursley, who has been here some days, having desired me to present him to the French king, I carried him with me to court. It is the custom here to acquaint the secretary of state for foreign affairs when any foreigner is to be presented: for that reason I alighted at Mons. Chanvelin's.

When I presented lord Dursley to him, he scarcely took the least notice of him; and without inviting us to dinner, which is usual on such occasions, he told me, that if I intended to see the French king we had no time to lose, for the levee was begun. I went from thence to the cardinal, whom I found in appearance less angry than his colleague, but equally vexed. He told me, in a most pathetic manner, that he could not but be excessively alarmed at the consequences of our sending so strong a squadron to the coast of Portugal; that he was acquainted with the reasons that had induced his majesty to take this resolution; and though M. Chavigny had wrote word that the king's ministers had assured him nothing would be undertaken by our fleet, but in defence of his majesty's subjects, and to protect their commerce, yet when the king of Portugal should see such a terrible fleet as twenty-five large English men of war come to assist him, it would raise his courage to such a degree, that there would be



no dealing with him. That undoubtedly the emperor's friends at Lisbon would encourage him to attack Spain, and he would probably do it. In fine, this step of ours would bring on a war in those parts, in which we should be parties, and consequently the war would be soon general.

Amongst the several reasons he gave for being alarmed at the sailing of our fleet, he said it would infallibly disappoint his project for an armistice; that, according to his former promise, he had been at work, and had even sent his plan for a suspension into Spain, where he had made no doubt but it would have been approved of. But now the queen of Spain would listen to no reason, and all his hopes of seeing peace restored were vanished. I told him I did not see any thing we had done in the Portuguese affair could make much difference as to other matters now depending in Europe: that if the king of Spain does not attack Portugal, we shall be quiet; that if he should *now*, it would be a demonstration that he was resolved upon it before, and every unprejudiced person would own his majesty did wisely to put himself in a state to protect the trade of his subjects, and defend his ally; that, considering the king's present measures in another light, there is more reason to expect they will take a good than a bad turn, from the practices of the court of Spain. For though they have hitherto talked angrily, and threatened Portugal, yet before they entered upon action they may think more calmly of it; and may weigh the inconveniences of attacking a prince who may be supported by England, and from this consideration they may be more tractable than they would be were not our fleet on the Portuguese coast; and should this be the case, our fleet's going out would rather promote than obstruct the pacification. But the cardinal is so piqued at this step of ours, that he will allow nothing to be a good reason for our taking it.

His eminency talked yesterday to Gedda on this sub-



ject with great concern, and full of fears and apprehensions of its being a forerunner of our declaring for the emperor.

I have endeavoured to lay all I learnt yesterday from the French ministers, in as clear a light before your grace as I could, from the conversations I have had with them. It is evident they are heartily frightened at our preparations, and what adds to their fears is, lest now one step is taken in favour of a prince more inclined to the emperor than to the allies, his majesty may hereafter take some others more disagreeable to them.

I hear they have had a council, to which M. de Maurepas was called, to know what ships they can fit out with speed ; but I am assured that at Brest and Rochefort they cannot get fifteen men of war in readiness these six weeks, and to do that, they must work night and day. At Toulon they have not above eight fit for service.



#### THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

##### EXTRACT.

PARIS, August 2 (N. S.), 1735.—I am to give your grace an account of a very long and confidential conversation I had this morning with the cardinal at Issy.

I represented to him, in the most friendly and confidential manner, that for my own part I would, as long as it was possible for me, give the best construction to any thing I thought he had a hand in ; that I did not doubt of his own disposition for restoring peace to Europe, but hitherto I could see nothing but ruin and destruction from the fluctuating measures of this court—beginning negotiations, and dropping them as soon as there



is the least appearance of their coming to perfection, and substituting new projects in their place, which any one might be sure would come to nothing. He defended himself but slightly, and owned at length, that he did not expect much good from the congress, or the suspension of arms he had proposed. I then pressed him home to say how peace could be restored : and finding him pretty willing to hear any thing I had to say to him, I asked him some plain questions. *First*, whether he would let the emperor have a footing in Italy or not? At this he paused, and, looking earnestly at me, he said, "*Ne me trahissés vous point ?*" I assured him it was not my intention. "Well, then," says he, "I will unbosom myself to you. The emperor shall have a footing in Italy. I think it right he should : for, to keep a balance there, it is necessary that somebody of weight should be between the king of Sardinia and don Carlos." In fine, he allotted Mantua, a great share of the Milanese, and some other parts which he was not determined upon, to the emperor, and, by his manner of talking, Parma and Placentia. But he apprehended he should have a good deal of difficulty to make the queen of Spain yield up her native country to the emperor. As for Tuscany, he said the emperor could not have it. This brought on, as I expected, the exchange of it against Lorraine, on which subject I gave him some encouragement. He immediately cleared up his countenance, and owned it was the only thing could satisfy the French nation ; that for Poland he cared but little, it was only the point of honour made him insist upon it ; but that if a real advantage was offered to France, in his situation he could not refuse it. He said he could not propose the exchange, after the declarations that had been made on his part : but Lorraine was what he wished for, and to have the exchange proposed to him. As to the king of Sardinia, he was of opinion he deserved something more than was



allotted to him by our plan, and he thought the places on the coast of Tuscany, lately taken by the Spaniards, ought to be given to don Carlos with Naples and Sicily.

I then asked him who was to propose this plan? He gave me to understand that nobody but his majesty could do it, and that if ever it was to be executed, it must be in consequence of a private agreement between England and France for that purpose. I asked him, next, whether, if that was to be the case, he would leave his allies if they did not approve of it? After a fresh pause, and repeating twice, *Ne me trahissés vous pas?* he said that such a peace, being established on a foundation of justice and reason, since due care was taken of them, he would abandon them if they did not comply.

Your grace sees by this, the cardinal's present project: France to have Lorraine; the house of Lorraine to have Tuscany; the emperor, Mantua, Milan, and a great part of the Milanese; France disposed to give his Imperial majesty Parma and Placentia, but apprehensive of the queen of Spain's not consenting to it: France to guarantee the pragmatic sanction; don Carlos to have Naples and Sicily, and the towns heretofore possessed by the emperor on the coast of Tuscany; the king of Sardinia, besides the Tortonese, Navarrese, and Vigevanasco, to have some farther share in the Milanese; but what, the cardinal could not directly say: the execution of this plan to be privately concerted between his majesty and the French king.



THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF  
NEWCASTLE.

EXTRACT.

PARIS, September 28 (N. S.), 1735.—As a proof of the obstructions he (*i. e.* the cardinal) put to the siege of Mantua, he told me in confidence that he had written a letter, in his own hand, to the duc de Noailles yesterday se'nnight, to avoid coming near Mantua as long as he could, and to seek as many pretences as could possibly be alleged, to count Montemar, for not undertaking the siege. At last, if he was drove to a *nonplus*, he was to tell the Spanish general that he must write to court for orders, without which he was not to stir. This, he said, would occasion a delay of near three weeks, by which time the season of the year, and other unforeseen accidents, might make the undertaking unadvisable.

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THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF  
NEWCASTLE.

EXTRACT.

FONTAINEBLEAU, October 26, 1735 (N. S.)—All the day yesterday the cardinal was so taken up, on account of the expresses that they received in the night from the army, that none of the foreign ministers could see him, and this morning I saw him but an instant. The sum of what he said to me was, owning a private transaction between this court and the emperor, though he would not say how or by whom it was carried on, upon which he made the following declaration: that it had never been



his intention in this affair to do any thing but what would be agreeable to his majesty ; that he had declared at Vienna, that his majesty must be a party to whatever should be agreed on ; and he added, that nothing should be agreed upon without his majesty's knowledge ; and that if the negotiations at Vienna went on, all relating thereto should be communicated to us. The *Garde des Sceaux* came in as he was finishing this declaration, and his eminency repeated the same in M. Chauvelin's presence : adding, that for this twelvemonth past he had constantly told me that he desired nothing more than to act in concert with his majesty, by which means we could both be sure of maintaining a just equilibrium in Europe.



#### HORACE WALPOLE TO LORD HARRINGTON.

PRIVATE.

MY DEAR LORD,

*Hague, Oct. 19, 1735.*

I WAS honoured last night with your public dispatches of the 10th, and as I was extremely busy in writing to England, I had hardly time to peruse them ; referring myself to the copies I had ordered to be made of your last letters to the duke of Newcastle and Mr. Robinson, for my breakfast this morning, for I live upon paper ; but I am now called up by Over the messenger, and as I do not think fit to detain him any longer than while he is getting his horses ready, knowing the king's impatience, I shall only beg leave to observe, that I do not agree with your lordship, in shewing so much dissatisfaction at the imperfect communication made to Mr. Robinson. Although I would not appear pleased with it, I should, in my humble opinion, instead of soliciting with resentment



a farther explanation, have waited and seen what they had farther to say to us.

The emperor has plunged himself into a negotiation with France without us : he must get through it as well as he can, and he must have our assistance for it, and I think he plainly tells us so. The paper delivered to Mr. R. is rather in the nature of a request than of a reproach, and the court of Vienna must become petitioners to us for accomplishing their own work, instead of our having been hitherto petitioners to her. With respect to France, supposing that court disposed to be sincere, as by keeping up the cardinal's apprehensions I think he will become sincere, I think pretty much the same conduct should have been observed. The cardinal should be made sensible that we know, and have constantly known, without the help of the Imperial court, the secret negotiation. He should have been let to see that we were not at all surprised at his denying it, because he must have been under the strongest previous obligations imaginable not to own it, and perhaps to deny it, and was prepared to do so,—and indeed I am not at all surprised at that denial,—and after proper intimations to him of our not being at all in the dark, I would, without solicitation, or appearance of uneasiness to get to the bottom of the negotiation, have left it to the French ministers to explain themselves. If they are desirous, as well as the emperor, to make a peace, they will, as things have fortunately turned out, want our concurrence and assistance as well as him. The Imperial court will want money, and the cardinal some countenance from us, in opposition to Spain ; and it seems our business to wait and hear them explain themselves, and make a merit of what we are to do : but your lordship will pardon these hasty, and, I believe, injudicious reflections.



## HORACE WALPOLE TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

## EXTRACT.

HAGUE, October 25, 1735.—You will have seen by my last, that I am extremely well satisfied with what has been done at Vienna, and with the communication, though imperfect, that has been made to you ; and, between you and me, I could have wished that my lord H. had forborne to express so much resentment and dissatisfaction as I find he has done, against the behaviour of the court of Vienna, in his letter to you on that occasion. I must own, that for several reasons you give, and for others that occur to me, I think ourselves in a more advantageous situation than if we had been originally concerned, and had had the confidence of every step ; since, without our appearing either satisfied or dissatisfied, they must come to us. For I cannot, and indeed I never could see, how the emperor and France could make an absolute pacification without our assistance.

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## SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

DEAR BROTHER,

*London, June 18-29, 1736,*

I FIND there may be some difficulty in carrying on this summary correspondence between you and me ; for I do apprehend you will be constantly asked what letters you have, and as constantly desired to shew them, which will be unavoidable, unless upon particular occasions I give you the trouble of a separate paper, with an ostensible letter to be produced. Such a companion this shall



have. Look upon this as my private thoughts, suggested to you alone.

There seems to me to be three points now upon the *tapis*, that may deserve consideration ; the affairs of Berg and Juliers, the mediation between the czarina and the Porte, and a northern league said to be in view, to be formed between Denmark, Sweden, and the maritime powers, to observe the growing power of Muscovy. Of this last I shall make no mention in my other letter to you, though I cannot suppose but it must have been mentioned to you by the king and Mr. Finch, who I understand has mentioned it to the king, as suggested by M. Rosencrantz ; but you are to know nothing of this from me, till you hear farther of it. Upon this point I must begin with observing, that count Kinsky, in his parting conference with me, mentioned such a design as a cause of jealousy and complaint in the court of Vienna, which, as I had not heard one word of, I very roundly denied the least notion of it ; and for my part, I cannot conceive what inducements should lead us into such a negotiation, the surmise of which must give offence to the czarina, in consequence to the emperor, and may tend to make the courts of France and Vienna more entirely one, and, in the conclusion, at the expense of the maritime powers. And I cannot think the state of affairs in any part of Europe settled enough to make us desire to be engaged sooner, or more than we shall necessarily be called upon to be so. Let us wait and see how things will turn out, and then determine what part to take. The late treaties with Denmark and Sweden have been burthensome and expensive, and our subsidies will never be unwelcome to them.

The next article that naturally occurs is, the mediation between Muscovy and the Porte ; and here too I think we should defer concerning ourselves until it is demanded of us by both parties. I observe, by Mr. Robinson's letters, that it is expected at Vienna that the Porte should make a



formal demand, and in that expectation full powers are ordered for Mr. Tatman *pro ista vice*. But it seems to me that this will be conditional; and although no mention is made of such an expectation from the Russians, the strict alliance that subsists between the emperor and the czarina, persuade me that no step would be taken upon this subject at Vienna but in concert with the czarina. That should likewise be equally expected by us, and if the demand of both is made, we should then do nothing but in concert with the Imperial court and the States-General.

I have read the long letter from count Osterman to the grand vizier, which seems to me to be as strong a remonstrance of a long-continued series of violences and oppressions as it is possible for one power to lay to the charge of another; and although it concludes with professions of a sincere desire for peace, that is no more than is usual in all declarations of war. And when sir E. Faulkener is desired to deliver the letter, nothing is said to him, that implies at all any desire of our mediation, but proposes the sending ministers reciprocally to the respective borders, to treat and adjust, without any mention of the intervention of other powers. These reasons induce me to think, that we are in this case, too, to wait for events and proper applications, and to be well assured of the real sentiments of both the Imperial and Russian courts before we offer our good offices, and take any step which may possibly disoblige, without a probability of doing any good.

The same spirit of not being too forward, induces me to think our taking any part as yet in the affairs of Juliers and Berg is not advisable. In that case we must wait for the sentiments of the emperor and France, and what part they will probably take, before, in compliance with the Dutch, we make any declaration which may be thoroughly disobliging to the king of Prussia, and in which we may be left singly with the Dutch. It is most cer-



tainly a very desirable thing to me, if it were possible that all future occasions of a rupture in Europe should be remedied and prevented. But as no court of Europe, except the Dutch, have an inclination to make the settlement of that affair a part of the present pacification, but both the emperor and France are expressly of opinion to postpone that affair till the chief business of the negotiation shall be over, and as there is in the preliminaries a positive exclusion of all matters foreign from the late war; I see great inconveniences that may arise from our pressing that affair to be carried on at the same time, although in a separate negotiation with the general transactions now upon the *tapis*.

Upon further consideration, I see no occasion of your communicating my thoughts upon any of the heads at present to the king, but leave them for your own information and amusement only; and shall write you only a short letter upon the army matters, transmitted now by sir William Yonge, as far as I had troubled the king about them before he went from home,

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

DEAR BROTHER,

London, Aug. 6-17, 1736.

UPON the receipt of the project of a treaty between the king and the crowns of Sweden and Denmark, and discoursing with some few of his majesty's servants upon it, I was inclined to think that, for the present, it was not absolutely necessary to lay it before the cabinet council, where I apprehend there would have been great difficulties, not only from the thing itself, but from the surprize of producing so suddenly, and all at once, an



affair of that consequence. It was therefore thought more advisable to postpone the formal consideration of this affair till matters could be better prepared, and it might be seen what probability there was of succeeding in the respective courts where this negotiation was to be transacted. In order to which, it is with great submission presumed, that it may be very advisable to send back Mr. Finch and Mr. Titley to their respective courts, with proper instructions and intimations of his majesty's sentiments, that they may discover and learn how far such treaties will be agreeable to either or both of these crowns, and upon what terms they will be willing to renew their former, or enter into new engagements with his majesty ; and as their cause and interest is more nearly and immediately concerned, it will be an advantage to his majesty rather to hear and receive, than to make proposals.

If any prejudice could arise from the danger of losing the present opportunity, which there might be hazard in retrieving, if now neglected, these cautions might be avoided ; but as the jealousies that will arise in other courts, and the umbrage and offence that will be taken, be immediate, it is worth while to consider, whether his majesty will subject himself to all the inconveniences that may immediately follow from setting such a treaty on foot, which, as the courts of Denmark and Sweden are constituted, will not be a secret, before he sees into the probability of concluding such a treaty as may answer his majesty's reasonable hopes and expectations. As we have above a year good before the expiration of the treaty with Sweden, there is time sufficient too, upon the foot that our present alliances stand with Denmark, which it will certainly be proper to think of renewing, either jointly or separately, as circumstances and opportunity shall offer ; but I hope there will be no prejudice in taking a little time to look about us. The scene of affairs in Europe should, in my poor opinion, be a little more settled,



that we may see who and who is together, before we form new schemes that may clash with we know not whom nor how.

The mobs and tumults in Spital-fields are now quite over; and it appears, every day, that the dispute with your Irish labourers was the true source of the whole; with this favourable circumstance, that the attempts of the jacobites to carry it farther did not succeed.

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

EXTRACT.

LONDON, August 6-17, 1736.—When I came to consider the project of the treaty which you sent over, and had perused your paper upon that subject, I was so fully confirmed in my own opinion, that it was not proper to be too hasty in proceeding at present upon that affair, that I found it necessary to convince the queen likewise, which I had no ways of doing so effectually as reading your paper to her, which, as it was impossible it should not, had the desired effect, and she will write to the king by this messenger, in the same manner as I now write to you.

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THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

EXTRACT.

PARIS, October 23, 1736.—I had this morning a very extraordinary conversation with the cardinal, which he allowed me to impart to you alone. It was upon the subject of the late riot at Edinburgh, in which captain



Porteus was murdered. I find the jacobites and their abettors here have made a great stir about it, and look upon this horrid act as a signal of a rebellion. In this sense the cardinal mentioned it, not from his seeing it in that light, but as deserving, nevertheless, the utmost attention of the government. I acquainted his eminency with the facts as they were related to me in a letter from the duke of Newcastle, which agreed exactly with the account given in our news-letters on all sides. I satisfied him that in the tumult nothing had appeared like disaffection towards his majesty ; that as soon as the mob had perpetrated their inhuman revenge they retired quietly, and had not given the least provocation since.

The cardinal said he knew all this ; but that he saw in our Gazettes promises of rewards for apprehending the actors in this wicked scene. That he was sensible they deserved the utmost punishments, but he was not for severity ;—that the proclamation might be very proper *in terrorem*, whatever step was intended in consequence of it, after the discovery, though, for his part, was he at the head of affairs in England, he would rather let the matter drop, than be too inquisitive ;—that it would be well to know the persons concerned in the scheme, which could hardly have been executed with so much address, had there not been better hands than the mob to conduct it ;—that in speaking to me thus, he meddled with other people's business, but that his respect and goodwill towards their majesties, made him wish that rigour might not be used in this case. The cardinal agreed to my mentioning it (*i. e.* his opinion), provided it was to you alone ; and he expressed on this occasion, as he has on many others, the greatest value and respect imaginable, and a sincere desire to live in strict friendship with you.

This conversation was followed by another still more extraordinary, considering the man it came from. We were discoursing upon proper alliances to maintain peace,



and a right balance of power in Europe. The cardinal began with making a short apology for himself, telling me that I perhaps would be surprised at his frankness ; but as he knew me, and was sure I would not make an ill use of any confidence he made me, he would open his mind. The cardinal then laid down as a rule, that nothing but a firm union between the protestant powers in Germany could prevent the emperor's growing too powerful ; that it behoved the king, not only as elector, but as king of England, and as such the first protestant prince in Europe, to bring about an union between the protestant powers to support themselves against the emperor, or any one else ;—that it were to be wished a hearty reconciliation could be effected between his majesty and the king of Prussia ;—that the king of Prussia alone, considering his temper, was not of much consequence, yet in a body with others he would make a great figure ;—that it would ever be the interest of France to join a protestant league in Germany ;—that it was no new thing there, France having been constantly engaged in their support. He ran on a good deal in this project, saying he did not speak on this subject as commonly people of his cloth used to do, but that, as minister of France, he was to prefer his master's interest to all other considerations ; therefore he was for keeping well with protestant powers, and glad to see them a respectable body.

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The advice given by cardinal Fleury, relative to the affair of Porteus, is a strong characteristic trait of the candour and good sense which marked that mild and beneficent statesman, when not warped by particular prejudices. The conversation respecting the emperor, however remote from realities, is at least a proof of sincerity ;



for the cardinal must have been deeply impressed with the visionary notion of the danger resulting from the aspiring views of the emperor, if he suffered himself to entertain the most distant hope that England would be induced, by any arguments he could use, to join in such a project as he proposed, for the reduction of the Imperial power. He had recently and repeatedly urged the propriety and necessity of a close and intimate union between the crowns of England and France for that purpose, declaring to lord Waldegrave, "that the ambition of the house of Austria had never been more unbounded than at this time, but that he never would be accessory to the emperor's views for enslaving Germany." But ambition, unsupported by ability, is an object not of dread but of ridicule and contempt.

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THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF  
NEWCASTLE.

EXTRACT.

*Paris, Nov. 3, 1736.*

I WENT this morning to Issy about ten, according to the cardinal's appointment. He had great reason to hope every thing that had retarded the conclusion of the peace would be soon got over. As to the definitive treaty, he was for it, and his majesty, was master, to have what share he pleased in it: that I might depend upon it he would not recede a tittle from any thing he had said to me on that point;—that he continued in the same mind, that a strict union between England and France was the only security for the liberties of Europe;—that it is what he wants; and, in saying this, he seemed to throw out a hint, as if we were not so ready to engage with him as he was to engage with us.



I laid hold of a pretence, that fell naturally in my way, to renew the discourse about the pretender. He said he had told me the other day: that I need not *question* him further about it—that he knew the situation of the pretender's affairs, and, were they much more prosperous than it is morally possible for them ever to be, he certainly would not engage in his cause\*.

Paris, November 17, 1736.—I am very sorry that the last accounts I sent of my transactions with the French ministers have not altogether answered your expectations; but I must beg leave to tell your grace, that I have done all I possibly could towards getting out of them what I wanted to know.—I must remark to your grace, that one gets little by asking questions, and that all that is to be had, must be by putting the cardinal to talk upon matters you want to be informed of, and if you light upon a lucky moment, he will then say more in a quarter of an hour, of his own accord, than can be got out of him in two hours by asking him questions; besides, he does not love it. He himself has told me many times, that he cannot bear *des questions*. He says they either put him upon equivocating, or make him break off the conversation.

\* This alludes to a singular incident, by which a letter of the pretender to his agent at Vienna, was, through a strange inadvertence, put by M. Chauvelin into the hands of lord Waldegrave, and by that nobleman transmitted to the English government. The letter was expressive of the foolish and sanguine hopes entertained by the pretender, of obtaining aid and assistance of the courts of Vienna and Versailles, in order to effect his restoration, and it excited almost as much alarm at St. James's, as if a treaty had been actually concluded for that purpose.



HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

EXTRACT—PRIVATE.

*Hanover, Nov. 11, 1736.*

PENDING these difficulties about the execution of the preliminaries, M. Chauvelin has persuaded the cardinal to be for making a definitive treaty between the emperor and France. And if the cardinal, by holding the same language, has almost persuaded the Imperial court to follow that method, I cannot think it proceeds from any ill will even of his eminence towards us, much less of the emperor, but from the necessity of his Imperial majesty's affairs. And, therefore, if a definitive treaty should be concluded at Vienna, between the emperor and France, and even Spain, without desiring the maritime powers to be parties to it—and it is an usual and natural thing for a treaty between the parties concerned in the war to be absolutely made before the guarantee and accession of other powers is asked—I cannot imagine that such a measure proceeds from a concert between the emperor and those powers, in order to favour the pretender, or to be at liberty to do us some mischief. The emperor's interest, his own safety, the preservation of the peace, and the support of the pragmatic sanction, will not suffer him to enter into such a concert with France at any time, I think, but to be sure not at this juncture.



## HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

## EXTRACT.

HANOVER, November 11, 1736.—His majesty having been graciously pleased to communicate to me, the account lord Waldegrave has given to you alone, of an extraordinary discourse which the cardinal had held to him in confidence, I beg leave to trouble you with a few words upon it.

As to the first part, relating to the outrage committed by the populace at Edinburgh—his eminence, according to his calm and pacific disposition, seems of opinion that a strict inquisition and severe punishment of those concerned in this wicked act should rather be dropt than pursued. This way of reasoning, looking upon the cardinal to be an old bigotted popish priest, and a declared enemy, not only to our religion, but to our government and present happy establishment, and that he delights in confusion, would make one naturally suspect his having some knowledge of the horrid crime that was committed, of the authors of it, and of their being persons of consideration, and consequently that his design was, under this colour of friendship for his majesty and his government, to divert us from discovering and punishing the heads of it, and to keep us in ignorance and indolence in regard to the true view of this horrid crime, and the consequences of it.

But without considering whether this advice of his eminence should or should not be followed, in any degree, I really believe, from the long and intimate acquaintance I had for several years with the cardinal, that his confidential frankness towards lord Waldegrave on this head, proceeded from the natural disposition of his mind, as a lover of peace and quiet\*. For he has often told me, at

\* There can be no doubt that the advice of the cardinal, to drop all proceedings of an extraordinary nature, and unusual rigour, in this case, was



times when I could have no reason to suspect his having any particular view, that, notwithstanding his being a cardinal, he was too good a Christian, too much a lover of mankind, to encourage any attempt in favour of the pretender against his majesty's government, which must create a scene of blood and confusion in England, and, in consequence of it, in all Europe. And although he may possibly have from time to time returned civil answers to the pretender's agent, agreeable to his mild temper, yet I never had cause to think his eminence gave him the least hopes or encouragement. Nay, on the contrary, the Jacobites, that had been very numerous and active at Paris, upon the cardinal's first coming to the administration, after some experience of his words and actions, soon vanished and retired in despair; saying, *there was nothing to be had during that old fool's life, who is governed entirely by the Walpoles*. And during several years of my embassy, and his eminence having the chief credit in France, I did not perceive any thing that tended in the least towards favouring the pretender: and notwithstanding the great industry and address of the late bishop of Rochester, to gain, by the means of the Jesuits, whom the cardinal then favoured in opposition to the Jansenists, some interest with his eminence, it had no manner of effect. He was used to tell the Jesuits they had nothing to do with politics.

He has often told me, that as he laid the foundation of his merit in endeavouring to preserve the tranquillity of Europe, and should value himself more upon being called *the pacific cardinal*, than his predecessors could do upon their great and extensive conquests, he was persuaded

founded both in sincerity and good sense. The parliamentary inquisition and punishment resorted to on this occasion, and which gave to an incidental riot almost the aspect of a rebellion, constituted one of the very few instances of indiscretion with which sir Robert Walpole's administration is chargeable.



that the public peace, in a great measure, depended upon preserving the present establishment in England, which makes me believe that the cardinal's discourse was cordial and sincere.

As to what the cardinal added, relating to his majesty's endeavouring, as the first protestant prince in Europe, to bring about a firm union among the protestant princes in Germany, although it seemed very extraordinary to lord Waldegrave, as indeed it would to any body who knows nothing more of him than being a priest and a cardinal, I can assure you he has held that language, during our great intimacy, often to me, founded upon a principle which I thought the late war had cured him of, viz. that the emperor is a most formidable power, and that in consequence of it, he is a most ambitious prince, and desirous to make himself absolute in Germany, which nothing can prevent but an union between the protestant princes in Germany, and France joining, in case of necessity, with those princes, to check the designs of the house of Austria. I have often endeavoured to shew him the weakness of that family without the assistance of the maritime powers. He always persevered in insisting there could be no sufficient restraint to the emperor's power and views, but a perfect harmony among the protestant powers in the empire; and no sure way of preserving the tranquillity of Europe, but a good understanding between France and the maritime powers. However weak the first part of this reasoning, as is found by experience, may be, and however contrary the last maxim may be to the old ambitious views of France, yet I must do the cardinal the justice to own, that he never departed from talking and acting agreeably to these principles for several years. But after Mons. Chauvelin came into the administration, he found means, by his tricks and impositions, to make his eminence deviate from them, particularly in the execution of the treaty of Seville.



THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT  
WALPOLE.

EXTRACT.—VIDE COXE'S PAPERS.

PARIS, November 21 (N. S.), 1736.—I was with the cardinal the day before yesterday at Issy. I began the conference with reminding his eminence of the discourse we had had some time before, which he had allowed me to communicate to you in the utmost confidence. I then told him that I was authorized by you, and ready to acquaint him with your sentiments upon his friendly overtures. The cardinal seemed earnest to hear.

As the first paragraph of your letter consisted most of compliments, and shewed your desire to cultivate a friendship with his eminency, for the mutual honour and interest of our respective masters, he made the like professions on his part, adding, that he did not question but this correspondence would answer the ends proposed by it, since, besides your known and distinguished abilities, he knew you to be *un tres honnête homme, et de grand courage*—characters he looked upon as highly necessary to carry on good business *bonne besogne*.

The cardinal approved extremely your manner of reasoning upon the late outrageous tumult at Edinburgh; and, from what you were pleased to say on the subject, he was satisfied you would follow the properest step in such a case. He allowed, that what I had advanced about the variations in his negotiations at Vienna, to be true, relatively to the form; but as to the substance, he denied positively there being the least; insisting, that when we saw the whole, we would believe him. He insinuated pretty strongly, that applications were made to him from many parts, *l'on nous recherche de beaucoup d'endroits*; but he should ever prefer a strict union with England.



In reading the next paragraph to him, I laid my stress upon the advices you had from Vienna, that France had proposed to finish alone with the emperor, exclusive of the maritime powers: that this scheme had lain dormant for some time, but began now to revive, and with the addition of Spain to the emperor, and France, for the conclusion of a definitive treaty. I added, carelessly, that I could not give credit to your intelligence, for the same reason you mentioned, since it was contradictory to all his eminence had said to me of his intention.

Here the cardinal bid me take a pen and a sheet of paper, and began to dictate as follows: *Il est faux que l'on ait proposé un traité défensif entre l'Espagne, la France, et l'empereur. Il est vrai que l'on a proposé un traité définitif entre l'empereur et la France comme le moyen le plus court pour parvenir à l'exécution des préliminaires, que le traité proposé n'est que général d'amitié et d'union sans aucune stipulation contre aucune puissance, ni même aucune stipulation particulière à leur sujet que ce traité n'est pas conclu. A l'égard de l'Angleterre—Dès le commencement de la négociation avec la cour de Vienne, la France a proposé que l'Angleterre, et la Hollande eussent part à la pacification, que bien loin à présent de chercher à les en exclure, elle continue dans ses premiers sentimens pour les admettre.*

As the cardinal made a sort of pause, I asked in what manner, how, and by what means, this admission was to be brought about? But the answers to these queries were put off to farther consideration, and the cardinal dictated on: *Que l'objet present de la négociation à Vienne, c'est l'exécution des préliminaires tels qu'ils ont été communiqués à l'Angleterre, qu'ils n'y à absolument pas d'article secret, que le but en est de garantir réciproquement les arrangements qui y sont contenus.* By way of explication to the foregoing paragraph, he said there might be a small variation as to the letter of the



preliminaries, in case Spain evacuated Tuscany, for then France was to have the actual possession of Lorraine; but this would make no alteration as to the general system with respect to France, since having that duchy in present, or upon the grand duke's demise, considering its situation, seemed indifferent to the rest of Europe. The cardinal then thus pursued to dictate: *Sa majesté tres Chrétienne n'a presentement d'autre vue, que d'empêcher autant que faire se pourra par des alliances défensives, qu'aucune puissance n'envahisse les états ou les droits des autres. Par ce qui est déjà dit, Mons. le chevalier Walpole peut voir la part qu'il contiendra à l'Angleterre de prendre pour ces fins, il pourroit même, s'il le juge convenable, trouver des moyens de faire goûter à la cour de Vienne l'admission de l'Angleterre au present traité; que la France concurreroit volontiers, et cela ne paroitroit pas étrange à Vienne, puisque Mons. le cardinal y a toujours parlé dans ce sens.*

These are the very words, as they were dictated to me by the cardinal the day before yesterday at Issy. I read them over to him yesterday at Versailles, to avoid mistakes, and he acknowledged them as his own. He put me there again in mind, that it was not in his ministerial capacity he took this step, but merely to shew his confidence in you; that he thought it the best way of treating, since, by exposing the state he was in, you might judge what might be proper for England to do, to act in concert with France. To keep up the discourse, I asked the cardinal if he thought of a congress for the general definitive treaty? He said he would avoid one if he could: that we saw how much time a private transaction with the emperor, for matters quite settled by the preliminaries, had taken up: that if a congress was appointed for the discussion of such other as would unavoidably be brought there, God alone knew who would live to see an end of it; therefore, if he was not forced to have a congress, he would have none:—



that the pacification had taken up a long space; that he was tired, and would finish at any rate; and that if the emperor's councils judged right, or he was in the emperor's case, he would agree to the last project of Spain, which seemed to be equitable.

This last passage gave the cardinal an opportunity to assure me, in the strongest terms, that he had no engagement whatsoever with Spain; that his engagements with that court had finished with the war; that the queen of Spain hated him as much as ever, and was as jealous of France as if he was at the eve of declaring war to her; that she pretends to know for certain that France will join its forces with the emperor, to drive her out of Italy, if she does not quit Tuscany. The cardinal observed here, that he has no such intention: he is not sorry the queen of Spain should think it, hoping it will make her more tractable. When he had concluded his story, I put him again upon the subject of his former notions of treating privately with us, when his treaty with the emperor should be continued in the same mind as before; that he would *bona fide* acquaint us with all his treaties; that we ought to do the like by him, and we might then see to form alliances agreeable to both our engagements; that with respect to him, we should have few difficulties, for he had no treaties but what we knew of; that it was a common notion, we had lately concluded one with king Augustus, and that we were now upon concluding one with Sweden. But he was not in pain about them, being sure that you would not take engagements without France, inconsistent with those you might have with other powers; that his object, in treating with us, was to maintain a just balance in Europe, and to obviate what might occasion fresh disturbances; that this object ought to be equally desirable by his majesty as by France; and, for that purpose, he (the cardinal) was as ready to treat, though with this express condition, that in any future



convention or agreement between England and France, we must not look upon ourselves to be engaged only by the terms of art, but be likewise engaged upon our honours, not to enter into any engagements with other powers, without previously acquainting each other with what we proposed to do. In this method, and no other, we could make a lasting work.

In the course of the conversation, the cardinal himself renewed his former professions of having nothing to do with the pretender. He told me frankly, that he fancied we had had some suspicions of his or his master's being disposed to favour him. He said as much as it was possible to say, to clear himself and the French king of such an imputation.

I must not omit acquainting you, that the last thing the cardinal said was, that Chauvelin must not know a word of any thing that passed between us; and this he repeated in a mysterious manner, putting his finger to his mouth—*pas un mot de ceci au garde des sceaux*.

I have endeavoured to relate facts as near as I could, as they were told me by the cardinal. My letter is already too long for increasing it by observations of my own, and you are much more capable of making just ones than any body I know. All I can venture to say on the foregoing subjects is, that though it is to me a great question whether much will be concluded in consequence of these private transactions with the cardinal, yet from what he said, one may judge that he has not taken any engagement, nor is like to take any, to our prejudice.



THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF  
NEWCASTLE.

## EXTRACTS.

PARIS, Feb. 22, 1737.—M. de Maurepas went on Wednesday morning, between six and seven, to M. Chauvelin's, and by the king's command demanded the great seal, and an act of dismissal, in form, for his place of secretary of state for foreign affairs; both which being complied with, M. de Maurepas added, that it was the king's pleasure he should go immediately to Gros Bois, there to remain till further orders; and that there was an officer of the grey Mousquetaires, M. de Jurnillac, to see him thither. Though M. Chauvelin and his friends had reason enough to fear that it was not the cardinal's intention he should hold his post long, yet none of them thought his fall would have been so sudden. I went thither, *i. e.* to Issy, yesterday. The cardinal desired me to acquaint my court, that his most Christian majesty had thought fit to dismiss M. Chauvelin from all his places, and that M. Amelot de Chaillon, one of the intendants of finances, was to be secretary of state for foreign affairs; that he was persuaded, from this gentleman's good character in the world, that he would discharge the duties of his new employment with honour and probity. M. D'Aguesseau, the chancellor, has the seals restored to him.

Paris, February 22, 1737.—At last the most violent enemy we had is fallen. There are few but rejoice at it; and those that do not, are afraid to shew their concern. I complimented the cardinal yesterday from myself upon it. His eminence took it very well, and was obliging enough to tell me, that I had a greater share in the change, than, considering circumstances, it was proper for the world to know; that as he looked upon me as *un*



*honnête homme et son ami*, the account I gave him some time ago of M. Chauvelin's behaviour to me, had struck him; that he had at the time opened his heart to me as far as he could; that I must have seen plainly it was not then a time of day to make any *eclat*; but what I then said to him had put him upon inquiring more narrowly into the man's dealings than ever he had done before, and by that means had made such discoveries as not only confirmed all I had said, but brought to light many other matters of the most perfidious nature. This he bid me keep to myself.

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EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALFOLE.

EXTRACT.

PARIS, April 13, 1737.—I am now to give you an account of the conversation I had with the cardinal upon the secret transaction between you and him. I thought, as you did, that we might keep silent till he should explain himself further than he had yet done, and till I had your answer concerning M. Amelot's admittance to that confidence; and for that reason I did not propose to myself to say any thing more on the subject till I had heard from you. But he began himself, and of himself, for I had not lain any thing in his way to engage the discourse. He began with a repetition of his desire of settling a good and perfect union and understanding between our masters; that neither of them wanted to enlarge their possessions, but it behoved both to enjoy in peace and tranquillity what they had, and to secure the same as far as they could to the rest of Europe; that, in consequence of the discourses we had had on the subject, he thought nothing would better answer that purpose than a private treaty between England and France, under the strictest and



most inviolable secrecy, for a reciprocal guarantee of the rights and possessions of both crowns, and for a mutual defence, to which general articles might be added, if thought necessary, for confirming all former treaties; as likewise, engagements might be taken not to make any new alliances contrary to the present treaty, or without the mutual consent of both parties. The principal object of this treaty, according to the cardinal, was to prevent the ever growing power of the house of Austria, or its representatives in Germany, and to hinder their encroaching upon the rights of the princes there; in fine, to keep them down to the constitution of the empire; but he did not explain himself as to the means.

It may not be improper to make use of this conjuncture, to give you some account of my notions of the cardinal's present situation. I must own, I apprehend he has something that hangs heavy on his spirits. Last Tuesday, in talking to me, as he often does in the utmost confidence, and without restraint, tears came in his eyes, and he remained thoughtful and dejected for about a minute; but, upon recollecting himself, he resumed his natural good-humoured look. Perhaps the experience the cardinal has of the insufficiency of his master's present grand council, may make him thoughtful, which, together with the weight of business he has been forced to bear since Chauvelin's dismissal, should have sunk his spirits, and made him sensible of the difficulty of carrying matters in the way we have at this time.

You know the present council of state is composed of the duke of Orleans, the cardinal, Mar. d'Estrees, M. d'Aguesseau, secretary at war, M. Orry, the controleur-general, and M. Amelot, the new secretary for foreign affairs. The duke of Orleans is deeper in his devotion than ever. Mar. d'Estrees has been a good seaman, now much decayed with gout and age; he is never consulted but in the marine affairs. D'Aguesseau is reckoned to



know less of the affairs of his own office than any that preceded him in it, and nothing at all of any other business. Orry and Amelot are the only two he seems at present to confide in, and the only ones of the board he can do any business with. My opinion of both is, that, by the help of their commissaries, they may be able to reduce into form any plan the cardinal may propose to them, but that neither of them have knowledge or experience enough of foreign affairs, to offer any thing of their own towards settling a good understanding with their neighbours, or in order to molest them. The town talks of several who push at getting into the administration. M. de Noailles is the man that pushes most: he makes his court with the utmost assiduity, both to the king and cardinal; but I believe both know his intriguing temper and turbulent spirit too well, to admit him. Torcy, the cardinal tells me, does not think of getting into business any more. The bishop of Ambrun shews too much eagerness to be admitted, and yet I protest I do not see how business can go on here in the hands it is.

END OF VOL. III.



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## VOLUME THE THIRD.

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VOLUME THE THIRD




















Belsham, William,

History of Great Britain from the Revolution, 1688, to the conclusion of  
the treaty of Amiens, 1802 ; in twelve volumes

Bd.: 3

London (1805)

Brit. 53 d-3

urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10278593-8